Zero Hour (2004–…): Season 3, Episode 5 - Falling Star: Columbia - full transcript

(CLOCK TICKING)

(RADIO CHATTER)

NARRATOR: In the unspeakable
cold of space, a fireball erupts.

The Space Shuttle Columbia was
the most advanced vehicle ever built.

ANNOUNCER: We have booster ignition
and liftoff on Space Shuttle Columbia

with a multitude of
national and international...

NARRATOR: First of a fleet
designed to take men and women

into orbit around the
Earth, and home again.

CHRIS: Look at the chunks coming off of it!

CHRIS: What the heck
is that? TOM: I don't know.

MISSION CONTROL:
Columbia, Houston, com check.



NARRATOR: This program counts down the
final 60 minutes of this catastrophic event.

It is a story about the loss of seven lives

on a mission that was
doomed from the start.

And about scars that time will never heal.

NARRATOR: February the 2nd, 2003.

280 kilometers above the Earth,

a team of NASA's top astronauts
aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia

prepare to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere.

(RADIO CHATTER)

Okay, Houston, go for the burn.

NARRATOR: Paris. Tel Aviv.
Moscow. Beijing. Vancouver.

New York. London, then Paris again.

Around the world in ninety minutes.

Blazing in its orbit at
28,000 kilometers per hour,



the astronauts on the
shuttle experience 16 sunrises

and 16 sunsets every day.

The hour leading up to Columbia's re-entry

is a flurry of activity at the John F. Kennedy
Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida.

Let's get to work, shall we?

NARRATOR: The man who
must bring the Columbia to Earth

is LeRoy Cain, Flight Director.

Just 39, he has risen
through the ranks of NASA

thanks to his iron nerve.

Okay, getting ready for
the de-orbit burn here...

It's not a job clearly
for everyone or anyone

that's not inclined to
do that kind of work.

I'm a person who sort
of thrives on pressure.

NARRATOR: Cain leads a team of technicians

who must decide if conditions are right

to bring the most complex
flying vessel ever built

safely to the ground.

This is a rare interview with the one man

who knows most about
what happened that day.

Fundamentally, a flight
director is responsible

for the safety and the success

of the mission, the space
craft and the flight crew.

Okay, getting ready
for the de-orbit burn here

in a few minutes.

- How do those targets look to you, guidance?
- They look good.

NARRATOR: At 8:03 a.m.,
Cain continues his checklist.

Okay, flight controllers.

We are through step three point nine.

-Go, no-go for the burn. Fido? -Go for it.

NARRATOR: The shuttle is computer
operated from Mission Control.

It's up to Cain to check every system

to make sure he can get
the astronauts home alive.

-EPS? -We are go, fight.

Flight surgeon?

CAIN: The program essentially entrusts

the mission operations team

to execute the mission.

And they, combined with the flight crew

as the ops agent, if you will,

for the space shuttle program,

they are entrusted with this crown jewel

of manned space flight
to go execute the mission

and do it safely and do it
successfully and do everything

within your ability to get
the vehicle and the crew back

at the end of the mission.

So, trust is huge.

NARRATOR: It's all systems go.

When Cain gives the order,

Columbia's rockets will fire,

slow the vessel down, and leave orbit.

Columbia Mission Commander, Rick Husband,

has dedicated his life
to being an astronaut

and earned his place as
one of NASA's brightest stars.

NARRATOR: Canadian
astronaut, Julie Payette,

flew with Rick Husband on
a previous shuttle mission.

We were both rookies,
new guys on the block.

Um...

Which is, you know, a particular bond,

because you experience this
new thing, space flight, together.

Rick is the Texan from Amarillo

and spoke with a very
distinctive Texan accent.

And here I was, the
little girl from Montreal.

It was a joy to fly and have
this experience with him.

RICK HUSBAND: When I was four-years-old
and the Mercury Project first got started,

I was in front of the TV for
every one of the launches.

And the whole time I was growing up,

as long as I can remember,

anytime anyone asked
me what I wanted to be,

it was, "I want to be an astronaut."

Capcom, flight, we're go for the burn.

They can perform the maneuver on time.

Columbia, Houston. You're a go for the burn

and you can make the maneuver on time.

Okay, Houston, go for the burn.

NARRATOR: Bringing Columbia
back into the atmosphere is a critical job.

It takes the shuttle from the cold of space
into the raging inferno of the atmosphere.

G. Scott Hubbard was
a top scientist at NASA,

one of the shuttle's main designers.

The shuttle is a very, very complex system,

probably the most complex flying machine

humanity has ever built.

HUBBARD: It takes off like a
rocket. It orbits like a spacecraft.

It lands like an airplane.

(RADIO CHATTER)

NARRATOR: LeRoy Cain is the one who guides
Columbia back through the atmosphere.

He was born for the job.

CAIN: I perform well under pressure.

It's just a gift.

It's not anything that
I can take credit for.

It's a gift and some people
have it, some people don't.

And it becomes pretty clear pretty quick,

for folks that are gonna be

effective in those environments

versus those who are not.

It is a high stress environment

and if you don't thrive and perform well

in that kind of environment, it's
really not a good job for you to be in.

NARRATOR: Cain's team
have never seen him flinch.

Today, that will change forever.

A thousand miles north,
not far from Washington D.C.,

a man who had spent his career at sea

had no idea the Space Shuttle Columbia

was about to consume a year of his life.

I'm not an aviator and I've
never flown in the shuttle

and have no relationship to NASA.

I don't follow these
things particularly closely,

and I must admit that
probably a lot of people

in the United States don't either.

By the... You know, after 100 missions,

these things are not followed very closely

and I did not know that

it was scheduled to return
to Earth that morning.

NARRATOR: Admiral
Gehman will soon be tasked

to find out whether LeRoy
Cain and his control team

made mistakes that cost lives.

NARRATOR: The crew of
the Space Shuttle Columbia

prepare to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere

and begin descent into Cape Canaveral.

They are scheduled to touch down
in exactly one hour, four minutes.

So what's the weather
looking like in Florida?

Weather conditions are sunny
and clear, perfect for landing.

NARRATOR: They were
NASA's best and brightest.

Willie McCool, Pilot.

Kalpana Chawla, Engineer.

Michael Anderson, Payload Commander.

Laurel Clark, Zoologist.

David Brown, Flight Surgeon.

Ilan Ramon, Electronics Expert.

We have such a new and young
crew, and we worked together for so long

that the relationship is something
you don't quite understand.

There's always the potential
for something going wrong.

You know, we try not to
think about those things.

I remember Gemini and
Apollo quite late into the '60s,

and then Skylab and the early shuttle.

It may be something
which only a handful can do,

but if you really like what you do,
then you've never really lost anything.

As an Israeli astronaut,
they look at you as a dream

that they could never have dreamed of.

But the first free moment I have I'm excited
about just looking down at our planet.

NARRATOR: This was a unique mission.

There were no space-walks, no
work done to the space station.

The shuttle bay was filled with a
science lab to conduct experiments

strictly designed to help humankind
learn about long term space survival.

The experiments ranged
from tests on animals,

fish and ants, to the study of cancer.

All designed to help human
beings escape from Earth.

Where did we come from? Are
we alone? Where are we going?

What happens when a living system

leaves the planet of
origin, leaves this Earth?

I think it is critical for
understanding how life works

to understand the role of gravity
and if we're ever gonna take

the, probably, three year
trip to Mars with people,

we have to learn a lot more
about how you fix the problems

that weightlessness creates.

Weightlessness for human
beings is a lot like aging.

So, what the Columbia
was doing, scientifically,

was a little baby step along that way.

PAYETTE: It's unbelievable
that the human body

who has evolved for millions of years

and for most of us has
spent several decades

under gravity before we go to space

and then we go there
and a couple of days later

it's just like you've always
been in weightlessness

and we have to readapt to
gravity ten or twelve days later.

NARRATOR: Despite all the training,

nothing can prepare astronauts
for the experience of zero gravity.

In a quarter of a second,

we just go from three
times heavier to (SIGHS)...

You're still strapped into your seat,

but you can tell you already floating in it

and then stuff starts
floating in the cabin.

And then your brain says, "Whoa!

"Nobody told me about
this. What's this about?"

(BEEPING)

NARRATOR: Space shuttle missions
are bracketed in dangerous bookends,

launch and re-entry.

Launch was 16 days earlier.

CAIN: Commander Rick Husband
as he is currently in the white room.

Our pilot, Willie McCool,
this is his first flight.

NARRATOR: At launch, the Columbia
weighs four and a half million pounds.

Much of that weight is fuel,

housed in an orange, foam covered tank

directly under the shuttle.

Basically, the Columbia is
hard-wired to a big bomb.

ANNOUNCER: Go for main engine start.

HUBBARD: Space
exploration is a risky business.

It is foolish for anyone
who's in that arena

to pretend to the public

that there aren't significant challenges

and that there aren't risks, including

the risk of death and tragedy.

The shuttle is a risky vehicle.

It needs to be replaced.

NARRATOR: The world
watched stupefied in 1986,

when the Space Shuttle
Challenger turned into a fireball.

NARRATOR: This terrible image
scarred NASA's safety record.

Almost two decades later,
NASA still feared another disaster.

Columbia's mission had
been delayed 13 times

over two years because of technical snags.

The time had finally come.

ANNOUNCER: Two, one. We
have booster ignition and liftoff

of Space Shuttle Columbia with a
multitude of national and international

space research experiments.

NARRATOR: NASA had been under a
lot of pressure to get Columbia into space

after so many setbacks.

When you're in a program

that's got a lot of schedule
pressure, a lot of budget pressure,

a lot of performance requirements,

the tendency that grew up over time

was for you to get launch fever.

Let's just go ahead and
get this thing done, okay?

We got the right stuff.

NARRATOR: Once Columbia
had left the launch pad,

it fought to escape the Earth's gravity.

That's when the ride is very rough.

It's shaking inside.
There's a lot of movement.

It's actually hard to
interact with our systems.

About midway it starts
turning and then does a 180

to face back up with respect to space.

Before that, the space
shuttle was facing toward Earth.

And inside, that's when

we start feeling the pressures
of acceleration, the G's.

As we go into thinner
and thinner atmosphere,

faster and faster, higher and higher,

and that's when you feel that
you're pressed into your seat.

ANNOUNCER: Solid rocket
booster separation confirmed.

Guidance now converging.
Columbia's on-board computers...

NARRATOR: The Columbia launch
appeared to be a textbook success.

HUSBAND: And we're getting ready
to take a look outside the window.

And then after we pitched up and we're
looking at it through the overhead windows.

NARRATOR: Eight minutes later, the shuttle
was in orbit 300 kilometers above the Earth

racing at 28,000 kilometers per hour.

Yeah, they're saying they're
going to give it back to you, right?

- No, you're not. You're gonna plug in that one...
- Oh, oh, I'm sorry.

-We talked about. -Yeah. Okay.

Two minutes to enter Earth...

NARRATOR: Now 45 minutes from
their scheduled return to the Earth,

Columbia's astronauts
face a lethal problem.

Take a look at this.

NARRATOR: One day after launch,

a team inspecting video
discovered that a piece of foam

from the main fuel tank

had come loose and hit the
shuttle's left wing during liftoff.

MAN 1: Whoa. Can you highlight
it? MAN 2: Yeah, no problem.

NARRATOR: This was nothing new.

But usually the pieces were popcorn-sized.

This chunk of foam was big.

- What do you think?
- We have to get this upstairs now.

NARRATOR: The piece was about
the size of a 50 cm television screen,

but weighed nearly a kilo.

The foam has to cover

irregular areas on the
surface of this external tank.

It's a huge amount of
acreage. I mean, you're covering

hundreds and hundreds of
square feet or square meters.

The foam doesn't stick perfectly

and so every flight, literally
every flight of the shuttle,

some of it comes off.

-Here we go. -Yeah.

NARRATOR: It was, in NASA
speak, an "in-family problem."

The question now was, was
the damage to the shuttle deadly?

MAN: We're checking it. We've
got the flight controller powered on.

We're working through
the rest of it as well, thanks.

CAIN: Sounds good.

NARRATOR: After sixteen days in orbit,

the Space Shuttle Columbia prepares
to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere.

MISSION CONTROL: Team C,
are you ready? MAN: We're ready.

Team C is go.

NARRATOR: Back on Earth,

a team of experts have found evidence
of a freak accident during the launch

which could endanger the mission.

It was probably a day

or not more than two
days after we launched.

And I had seen some video.

At the time I didn't know what it was.

I didn't know if it was foam.

I didn't know if it had impacted the wing.

I knew that the engineering
teams were off looking at it

to determine whether it was something that

we needed to be or
should be concerned about.

NARRATOR: On January the
17th, after two days in space,

an object fell off the shuttle.

It was almost certainly a piece of
wing damaged by the foam impact.

It would take nearly two months

for the investigators to discover
this from Air Force tracking.

The reason no one knew lay at
the heart of the shuttle program,

one that doomed Columbia.

As a flying machine, the
shuttle was a dumb bird.

Unlike Star Trek or unlike
a science fiction series,

there is not aboard the shuttle

some all-powerful computer

that's analyzing thousands of inputs

and telling the crew there's a problem.

The shuttle is based in the technology

of the late '60s and early '70s.

The primitive computers that are on board

compared to your laptop
aren't hooked up to sensors

and even if they were,
they're not capable of doing

a lot of real time analysis.

NARRATOR: It went unnoticed at the time

because from the command
capsule on the Columbia,

the crew could not see the wings.

What would have been required
to actually see a hole in the wing?

A former astronaut came in and demonstrated

that it would have taken a space-walk.

It wouldn't have been impossible,
but it would have been very difficult.

NARRATOR: Unaware, the astronauts
held their first press conference

with Earth the next day.

Hey, Alpha. This is Columbia.
How are you doing over there?

MAN: We're doing great. We're so
glad to see you guys made it into orbit.

Yeah, we're glad to be here, too,

and everybody's doing a great job
and I'm really excited to be able to talk

to you guys one space lab
to another big old space lab.

We need to make sure
we have all the facts...

NARRATOR: Linda Ham was
Columbia's Mission Manager.

It was her responsibility to determine
what damage the foam might have done

to the shuttle's wing.

Before we go in there I need to have
the exact numbers. Do you understand?

Okay. I'll get on them and
I'll get it to you this afternoon.

NARRATOR: She chaired a series of
conference calls about the potential danger.

Okay, we received the data
from the systems integration guys

of the potential ranges of sizes and
impact angles and where it might have hit,

but the thermal analysis does not indicate

that there is a potential
for a burn through.

No burn through means
no catastrophic damage,

and localized heating damage
would mean a tile replacement?

Well, it would mean possible
impact to turnaround repairs

and that sort of thing but

we don't see any kind of
safety of flight issue here.

In other words, it's
just damage to the tiles

and they keep insisting

that there's no threat to life
and no threat to the mission.

No safety of flight and
no issue for this mission,

nothing we're gonna have to do different.

There might be a turnaround?

Right.

NARRATOR: At NASA,
turnaround means delay, not danger.

All shuttles come home battered,

and have to be serviced
before returning to space.

Although we could have some
significant tile damage here,

we don't see a safety of flight issue.

HAM: It would be a turnaround issue only?

Right.

Linda, we can't hear the speaker. Linda.

He was just reiterating
that he does not believe

that there is any kind of burn throughs.

It's more of a turnaround issue

similar to what we've had on other flights.

There are many other
examples like this where these

mission management
team and other teams too,

because of their lack of curiosity
and the way their cards were stacked

against anybody who was worried,

they just could not get
the system to recognize that

there was a danger.

All right, thanks for your
support. Keep up the good work.

And we'll meet again Monday at 8:00.

Have a good weekend.

Thanks.

NARRATOR: Some NASA
engineers were still worried.

They requested that the US Air Force

and other intelligence agencies

try to get satellite images
of the shuttle in space

to see if the wing was smashed up.

No, I don't believe that's
the case because we were...

NARRATOR: NASA didn't ask the Department
of Defense to photograph the shuttle.

The mission management
felt it was not necessary.

Either formally or informally.
You know, that is why I do go...

NARRATOR: Linda Ham chaired another conference
call with the mission management team.

Again, the foam impact was on the agenda.

There's not much we can do about it.

Yeah, as everybody knows,
we took a hit on the left...

Somewhere on the left wing leading edge and

we are also talking about what you can do

in the event that we do
have some damage there.

Right. Okay. So we
ought to pull that along...

NARRATOR: With years of
experience in foam collision,

the team agreed the
damage was not critical.

HAM: One-twelve or whatever
the flight was just to make sure.

Yeah, and we'll do that.

NARRATOR: Then Ham
delivered an explicit admission,

NASA was helpless.

You know, I'm really...

I really don't think
there is much we can do.

So it's not really a factor with this flight
because there is nothing we can do about it.

Okay.

NARRATOR: Engineer Scott Hubbard thinks his
colleagues at NASA made a fatal mistake.

At 82 seconds after launch,

the shuttle was moving very fast,

more than two and a half
times the speed of sound.

When the foam fell off,

it began to slow down
because it is very light.

The difference in the speed of the foam
and the speed of the shuttle at that point

was about 500 miles an hour.

So, in a sense,

the shuttle ran into the foam.

NARRATOR: NASA management had five
separate meetings about the foam strike.

Flight Director LeRoy
Cain was in those meetings.

All ended with no action being taken.

CAIN: "Subject. Help with debris hit.

"The Space Shuttle Program was asked
directly if they had any interest/desire

"in requesting resources outside
of NASA to view the orbiter.

"They said no. After talking to
Phil, I consider it to be a dead issue."

NARRATOR: Linda Ham authorized
one of her mission team to inform

Shuttle Commander Rick
Husband of the problem.

-Hey, Rick. -Yeah, Steve.

There is one item I'd like
to bring to your attention.

The item is not even worth mentioning
other than wanting to make sure

you're not surprised by it in
a question from a reporter.

During ascent, at approximately 80 seconds,

photo analysis shows some debris

impacted the orbiter left wing.

Experts have reviewed the high speed
photography and there's no concern.

We have seen this same
phenomenon on several other

flights and there's absolutely
no concern for entry.

Thanks for letting me
know. I've seen this happen.

Look, can you get the video up to me so I
can have a look and I'll show it to my crew?

- Sure thing. Safe ride home.
- Thanks, Steve. Keep up the good work.

Columbia out.

NARRATOR: NASA
uplinked the tape to the shuttle.

Rick Husband showed it to the crew.

No one was alarmed.

They all knew it had happened before.

And raising a fuss would put the
entire shuttle program in jeopardy.

As the Columbia management

was working on the assessment

of this strike which appears
to have hit the orbiter,

not the solid rocket boosters.

It appears to have hit the shuttle itself.

They were very sensitive about what label

they would put on this thing.

Because they knew that
if they put what I consider

to be the appropriate label on this thing,

which is a serious flight hazard label,

it would automatically
cancel the next flight.

And schedule pressures were so intense

that they were reluctant to do that.

(RADIO CHATTER)

NARRATOR: Two days before
their scheduled return to Earth,

Husband, McCool, and Chawla

ran a complete simulation of re-entry.

NARRATOR: Husband and his team were certain

the Columbia was
technically ready for touchdown

at Cape Canaveral at
9:16 the following morning.

NARRATOR: They didn't know that
their spacecraft was lethally damaged.

Just over half an hour from
their scheduled touchdown,

all systems seem perfectly normal
on the Space Shuttle Columbia.

We've got the flight controller powered on.

We're working through
the rest of it as well, thanks.

NARRATOR: In Mission
Control, Flight Director LeRoy Cain

recalls a feeling of total calm.

CAIN: It was right by
the numbers, as I recall,

and then we worked with the
crew through the post burn checklist.

There was nothing out of the norm.

Everything was going really well.

The systems were all performing very well.

The team was really on
top of its game that day.

- How do we look for landing?
- We are go, Flight.

NARRATOR: Two minutes later, the
Columbia enters the discernible atmosphere,

200,000 feet above the Earth's surface.

The utter cold of space transforms
into violent heat on Columbia's hull.

The temperature on the shuttle's
wings soars to 1,400 degrees Celsius.

This is normal but the superheated
air is entering through the unseen hole

caused by the foam hit.

The internal structure was never designed

to withstand such heat
churning inside the left wing.

Rick Husband and Willie McCool
start the re-entry procedure.

It's completely computer controlled.

Only in the case of an emergency
would they be forced to override

the shuttle's electronic brain.

Once re-entry begins,
there's no turning back.

Columbia slows by 800 kilometers per hour,

still traveling faster than any
object ever created by humankind.

This is the danger zone,
losing speed and catching air.

But this is normal.

It happens on every shuttle re-entry.

You have to go from
17,000 miles an hour to zero

sitting on a runway somewhere

in the span of just a few minutes.

That means that you have to give up

a huge amount of energy
in a short period of time.

That translates into a lot of heat.

NARRATOR: Inside the command capsule,

the astronauts stare in awe at the
raging heat outside the glowing windows.

Again, normal.

WILLIE MCCOOL: It's really
getting fairly bright out there.

HUSBAND: Yeah, you definitely
don't want to be outside now.

-Yeah, like we did before? -(ALL LAUGH)

NARRATOR: In Mission Control,

the weather, not the wing, is on
Flight Director LeRoy Cain's mind.

The winds are high at
Cape Canaveral this morning.

Cain's thinking about sending
Columbia around for another orbit.

At the last minute, he decides
conditions are within the margin of safety.

He gives approval for the
planned touchdown in Florida.

Just then, the first sign of trouble,

a sensor on the left wing

shows that the leading
edge is 1,650 degrees,

hotter than ever recorded
on a shuttle re-entry.

Flight, Max.

Go ahead, Max.

FYI, I've just lost four separate
temperature transducers

on the left hand side of the vehicle.

Hydraulic return temperatures.
Two of them in system one,

and one each in systems two and three.

Four hyd return temps?

To the left outboard and inboard elevons.

NARRATOR: The hydraulic
systems in the wheel are failing.

The shuttle can't extend its landing gear.

Flight Director Cain
knows the shuttle can't land.

Where is that instrumentation located?

They're located on the aft part of the...

NARRATOR: In Mission Control, LeRoy
Cain does a quick mental calculation.

Tires, hydraulics and elevons are
three completely different systems.

Cain thinks it can only mean one thing.

No commonality.

NARRATOR: Computer error.

We began to look around the room

and ask the other team
members, "Hey, how's it look?"

"Everything's going fine?"

And the reason everything
else was working fine is because

the orbiter was continuing to fly fine.

All of the rest of the systems

were continuing to function normally.

NARRATOR: Right on schedule,

the shuttle executes a
computer-controlled roll to the right.

The maneuver is designed to find some lift

to slow the shuttle even more,

and cool down her superheated outer skin.

Columbia seems to perform perfectly.

But it's in trouble.

What the astronauts do not know

is that the thrusters
are working in overdrive

trying to compensate for
the hole in the left wing.

We know now it was firing continuously

in order to correct for
the wing with the hole in it

that was starting to disintegrate.

TOM: Look right at it. Look at the trail.

NARRATOR: In the skies over Arizona,

a group of shuttle-watchers get up early
to take home videos of the famed Columbia.

TOM: Oh, that's beauty.

CHRIS: There's seven
people in that thing. TOM: Wow.

- CHRIS: Look at the chunks coming off of it!
- Yeah.

CHRIS: What the heck is that? TOM: I
don't know, but I see what you're saying.

TOM: Ice maybe?

NARRATOR: A few stargazers know more
than the astronauts, and Mission Control

about Columbia falling apart.

This is real footage from
Columbia's final minutes,

which miraculously survived the crash.

Everything look good to you? Control
and rates and everything is nominal, right?

Control's been stable through the
rolls we've gone through so far, Flight.

We have good trims. I don't
see anything out of the ordinary.

All other indications for your
hydraulic systems indications are good?

They're all good. We've had
good quantities all the way across.

And the other temps are normal?

NARRATOR: This is Cain's worst nightmare.

He receives word that the shuttle's
flight surfaces are not responding.

Without control, Cain has no way to
guide Columbia down to Cape Canaveral.

Still, he has trouble
believing the sensors are right.

Max, tell me again
which systems they're for.

That's all three hydraulic systems. It's...

NARRATOR: Training and experience
have not prepared Cain for this moment.

MAX: ...two on the left elevon
and two on the left inboard.

Okay, I got you.

NARRATOR: Right on schedule,
the computer kicks in once more,

and Columbia executes a roll reversal,

another maneuver to slow
the vessel's re-entry speed.

And once again, the
shuttle performs perfectly.

Wing temperatures even begin
to drop, exactly as planned.

But readings on the Columbia's hydraulic systems
on the left wing are still going haywire.

We've seen on the front also.

When you say you lost those, are you saying

they went to zero or off scale low?

All four of them are off-scale low.

And they were staggered. They were,
like I said, within seconds of each other.

NARRATOR: A huge piece of
thermal tile flies off the shuttle.

The astronauts have no idea
that the shuttle is irreversibly,

and rapidly, disintegrating.

This will be the first piece of Columbia
found on the ground by investigators.

Columbia, this is Houston. Please respond.

Then, a new problem from the
systems tech in Mission Control.

TECH: We just lost tire pressure on the
left outboard and left inboard, both tires.

Copy.

NARRATOR: Cain's calm
answer masks his confusion.

Losing tire pressure means the
Columbia would crash on touchdown.

These are the final words
between Mission Control

and Columbia Commander, Rick Husband.

HUSBAND: On left outboard
and left inboard, both tires.

MISSION CONTROL: And Columbia,
Houston, we see your tire pressure messages

and we did not copy your last one...

Is it instrumentation, Max?

HUSBAND: Yeah. Roger...

(STATIC)

Columbia, this is Houston. Please respond.

NARRATOR: For two
minutes, nothing but silence.

MISSION CONTROL: Columbia,
this is Houston. Please respond.

Flight, there is still no
response from Columbia.

Copy.

NARRATOR: LeRoy Cain's mind
flashes back to the foam impact.

In that moment, he knows
the unthinkable has happened

and that NASA has made a grave mistake.

I can probably even show you,

if you have the Mission Control video,

where that thought was
going through my mind.

MAN: (ON RADIO) Fido, when
are you expecting tracking?

One minute ago, Flight.

Columbia Houston, UHF com check.

Columbia Houston, UHF com check.

(BEEPING)

NARRATOR: Dallas TV news
showed home video of the disaster

before NASA's computers positively
confirmed what Cain had feared.

-TC, Flight. -MAN: Flight, TC.

-Lock the doors. -Copy.

NARRATOR: Mission Control is now like a
crime scene that must not be contaminated.

CAIN: I just wanted to make sure that
number one, folks understood that again...

Stay focused on the task here.

Let's stay within ourselves

and stay within the system
and keep doing what we know

and understand how to
do until we know more.

And that's when I asked
him to lock the doors.

HUBBARD: Between the time the
ground lost communication with the crew

and the time that the
orbiter broke up entirely

was a span of perhaps a minute or less

and during that period of time

is when the wing disintegrated,

the orbiter may have
started flipping around.

It may have started
tumbling, we're not really sure.

But it was not instantaneous.

There was a period of time in there

when the crew probably knew

that the end was near.

NARRATOR: At 9:18, the Space
Shuttle Columbia disintegrates.

The flagship of the fleet,

a screaming fireball over the desert.

Seven men and women have
died on LeRoy Cain's watch.

Marty, can you confirm
that the DDS, DDMS folks

in the Dallas area have been
mobilized to the extent we're able to?

MARTY: Yeah, rescue coordination
center is mobilizing to that area.

These were people that I
knew, that I cared about.

They were part of my...

Certainly part of my work family and, uh,

these are people that
my kids and my wife knew

and had relationships with.

Um, it was part of our family.

And it was difficult to think about the
fact that we may have just lost them.

NARRATOR: Now, it's up to
investigators to determine what went wrong.

(CROWD APPLAUDING)

Their mission was almost complete
and we lost them so close to home.

The men and women of the Columbia
had journeyed more than six million miles

and were minutes away from arriving.

NARRATOR: Seven people are
dead after the Space Shuttle Columbia

disintegrates over Texas.

It's one of NASA's worst failures.

The rule of thumb in the space business,

and the space business

is a one-strike-and-you're-out business.

It's not a type of business

where you get another shot at bat.

You can have one problem
and it creates a tragedy.

So you need constant vigilance

and this is the part of the foam shedding

that was so unfortunate,

that the impact of it was
never evaluated thoroughly.

The rule of thumb is "Fly
as you test, test as you fly."

And that meant that

people should have, as changes were made,

as this problem kept appearing,

they should have gone

and understood it much more deeply.

NARRATOR: Hours after the disaster,

NASA called upon a retired Navy admiral

with no space experience
and no ax to grind,

to conduct an inquiry.

We are going to work
with the NASA officials.

NARRATOR: Harold Gehman's
findings were detailed, and damning.

I mean the shuttle program
management was unsafe.

They couldn't manage anything safely.

I mean they couldn't
manage a bus line safely

much less a shuttle

because of the way they were organized.

Good morning. We will follow
the same process that we follow

at all of our press
conferences. I have a...

We made a template of how
people who do risky things

manage and assess the risk

and we applied that template
to the space shuttle program

and they failed miserably.

NARRATOR: Five months after the accident,

scientist G. Scott
Hubbard conducted a test.

ANNOUNCER: Three, two, one.

(EXPLOSION)

We fired a 1.7 pound piece of foam

at about 500 miles an hour

at the lower part of panel number eight

that had been taken off
one of the other orbiters,

so it had a flight history

just exactly or as close as we could

to that of Columbia.

HUBBARD: We fired that piece of foam

and it blew a hole 16 inches in diameter.

There was an audible gasp from the crowd.

The astronauts who were with me,

one of them said, "So this
is what really happened."

It was clear then that we achieved not only

a technical goal,

we'd achieved a psychological goal as well.

NARRATOR: The shuttle was mortally
wounded with a large hole in the wing.

During re-entry, super-hot
air penetrated the wing,

burned through insulation, and melted
the aluminum structure like candle wax.

Instead of a period behind our
findings we had an exclamation mark.

NARRATOR: Some managers
retired and others were reassigned.

There are some people
who did the wrong things.

They conducted serious
discussions in the hallway.

They didn't request detailed information.

They made decisions
based on flawed thinking.

"It didn't hurt me yesterday,
it won't hurt me today."

And those individuals now are
no longer part of the program.

GEHMAN: The shuttle
program was an unsafe program.

The ground team broke its
covenant with the astronauts.

That covenant is that

when we put you up in space,
and while you're up in space,

we will do everything we possibly
can to ensure your safe return.

And they did not do
everything that they could

to ensure the safe return of the Columbia.

NARRATOR: Could anything
have been done to save the lives

of the seven astronauts aboard Columbia?

There is nothing on board, no repair kit,

no collection of materials

that would not have burned up upon reentry

at that 3,000 degree temperature.

The other option was a rescue mission.

Now this country has done incredible things

to rescue people over the years.

It would undoubtedly have been

a decision at the highest
levels to pursue this because

what if the next orbiter
had the same foam problem

and on launch another hole was created?

You would have to weigh

a huge set of contingencies

and problems and issues against each other.

But the answer we came up with was

it is in principle possible
for a rescue mission.

NARRATOR: Since the Columbia disaster,

astronauts do space-walks to
inspect the shuttle's hull for damage

as well as a video inspection.

If they find damage, there's now a
toolbox aboard to fix basic problems.

Simple solutions to a
catastrophe that cost lives.

LeRoy Cain remains a top NASA
flight operative since Columbia.

To this day, he thinks not
knowing was a blessing in disguise.

CAIN: The difference would have been
that we on the ground and the crew onboard

would have known.

And that of course would have been

maybe even unbearable for some of us.

There is no short answer
to what caused this disaster.

There was both a mechanical cause

and an organizational cause.

The mechanical cause

was a piece of foam
fell off of the external tank

and hit the leading edge of the wing,

poked a hole in the wing and
tried to enter the Earth's atmosphere

with a hole in its wing.

But the organization of the shuttle program

is equally a cause.

And it is our judgment

that if this piece of
foam had not fallen off

and caused the loss of Columbia,

something else would have
caused the loss of another shuttle

sometime in the near future
due to the management scheme

and the organizational
scheme that they were using.

The shuttle program was an unsafe program.

NARRATOR: Astronaut Julie
Payette says the seven crew members

knew the risk they were taking.

They loved what they did.

They had a great mission in space.

It was extremely successful, STS 107,

for its scientific content.

And I know that every
single one of them would have

boarded the shuttle the next morning

if they could have.

And that was our duty,

to continue explore because
that's what they believed in.

NARRATOR: Payette's
dreaming of going back to space.

She says her friend, Rick Husband,
would have wanted it that way.

That's interesting. I never
thought it could have been me.

It never crossed my mind.

I just wish it wasn't them.