Vietnam: A Television History (1983–…): Season 1, Episode 7 - Vietnam: A Television History - full transcript

A NEW PHASE IS NOW STARTING.

WE HAVE REACHED

AN IMPORTANT POINT

WHEN THE END BEGINS
TO COME INTO VIEW.

NARRATOR:
TET: THE VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR.

A MASSIVE VIET CONG
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE

STRUCK THE CITIES
OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE ATTACKS SPILLED INTO
THE LIVING ROOMS OF AMERICA.

AND SPLIT THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF.

I WAS OPTIMISTIC

AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE--



EVEN MORE OPTIMISTIC, IN A SENSE

THAN BEFORE

BECAUSE IT'S ONE THING
TO HAVE CONFIDENCE.

IT'S ANOTHER THING
TO SEE

THAT EVERYONE WAS COPING.

YOU'LL SEE THAT THE CABLES
FROM SAIGON--

FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER--

TOLD US THAT THE ENEMY
WAS DEFEATED ON THE GROUND

VERY EARLY.

IT WOULD TAKE TIME
TO MOP UP.

FOR THE REST OF US

WHO WERE NOT IN THE NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

EVEN THOUGH WE WERE READING



MANY OF THOSE CABLES

WE WERE ALSO WATCHING
THE AMERICAN TELEVISION.

AND AMERICAN TELEVISION
WAS SHOWING A DIFFERENT SIGHT.

THAT SENSE OF THE AWFULNESS--
THE ENDLESSNESS OF THE WAR--

THE UNETHICAL QUALITY
THAT DID NOT RECOGNIZE

THAT WHEN A MAN
WAS TAKEN PRISONER

HE WAS NOT TO BE SHOT
AT POINT-BLANK RANGE.

THE TERRIBLE SIGHT
OF GENERAL LUAN

RAISING HIS REVOLVER

TO THE HEAD
OF A CAPTURED VIET CONG

AND KILLING HIM.

THEY WERE AWFUL CONTRADICTIONS--

THE CABLES ON THE ONE SIDE,
THE TELEVISION ON THE OTHER.

CAPTIONING OF THIS PROGRAM
WAS MADE POSSIBLE IN PART

BY THE CORPORATION
FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING

AND PUBLIC TELEVISION STATIONS.

FOR A LATE FILM REPORT
ON VIETNAM COUNTRYWIDE

HERE IS NBC NEWS CORRESPONDENT
JACK PERKINS.

232 GIs KILLED
AND 900 WOUNDED

MAKES ONE OF THE HEAVIEST WEEKS
OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

AND IT IS NOT A WEEK--
IT IS JUST OVER TWO DAYS.

SNIPER FIRE IS STILL COMING
FROM SOME BUILDINGS

AROUND THE AMERICAN
OFFICERS QUARTERS

JUST ACROSS THE STREET

FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF COMMAND.

NARRATOR:
VIETNAM WAS HISTORY'S FIRST
TELEVISION WAR.

NOW, AS THE FIGHTING
RIPPED INTO SAIGON

MILLIONS OF AMERICANS
WATCHED THE BATTLE

ON THE EVENING NEWS.

WE'VE GOT ANOTHER
TWO MORE ALERT FORCES

THAT ARE TRYING

TO PUSH HIM
OUT THIS WAY

BUT HE'S HEAVILY
FORTIFIED.

WHAT'S
HE GOT?

SMALL ARMS,
AUTOMATIC FIRE.

YOU LOST
ANY MEN HERE?

I'VE GOT SIX
PEOPLE

I'VE HAD
WOUNDED.

NOW C.I.A. MEN AND M.P.s
HAVE GONE INTO THE EMBASSY

AND ARE TRYING TO GET
THE SNIPERS OUT...

BY THEMSELVES.

NARRATOR: NOTHING DRAMATIZED
THE VIET CONG'S DRIVE

MORE VIVIDLY TO AMERICANS

THAN THE SCENE
INSIDE THE U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND

IN SAIGON--
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAPITAL.

THE CENTER OF AMERICAN POWER
IN VIETNAM

HAD COME UNDER FIRE.

GENERAL, HOW
WOULD YOU ASSESS

YESTERDAY'S
ACTIVITIES
AND TODAY'S?

(EXPLOSION)

THAT'S E.O.D. SETTING OFF
A COUPLE OF M-79 DUDS

I BELIEVE.

HOW WOULD
YOU ASSESS

THE ENEMY'S PURPOSES
YESTERDAY AND TODAY?

THE ENEMY, VERY DECEITFULLY

HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE
OF THE TET TRUCE

IN ORDER TO CREATE
MAXIMUM CONSTERNATION

WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

PARTICULARLY
IN THE POPULATED AREAS.

NARRATOR: THE "CONSTERNATION"
WAS INDEED "MAXIMUM."

FOR YEARS

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
AND VIET CONG HAD FOUGHT

MAINLY IN THE RICE FIELDS
AND JUNGLES.

NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME,
THEY WERE FIGHTING IN THE CITIES

IN THEIR BIGGEST OFFENSIVE
OF THE WAR.

THEY HIT NEARLY EVERY PROVINCE
AND DISTRICT CAPITAL

ACROSS SOUTH VIETNAM.

THEY HIT WESTMORELAND'S
OWN HEADQUARTERS.

AND THE GOVERNMENT
RADIO STATION.

I WAS THE HEAD OF A SQUAD

ASSIGNED TO ATTACK

THE SAIGON RADIO STATION

AND ON JANUARY 27

OUR REGIONAL COMMAND
GAVE ME THE FINAL ORDERS.

THIS WAS, I WAS TOLD,
A ONCE-IN-A-LIFETIME ASSIGNMENT.

WE WERE INSTRUCTED
TO OCCUPY THE RADIO STATION

IN LESS THAN TWO HOURS

THEN TURN IT OVER
TO THE REGULAR FORCES.

THIS IS THE MAIN VIETNAMESE-
LANGUAGE RADIO STATION IN SAIGON

AND RIGHT NOW

THERE ARE AN UNDISCLOSED NUMBER
OF V.C. INSIDE

OCCUPYING THE STATION.

THEY'RE SURROUNDED
BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

WE THINK

THEY'RE GOING TO BE THROWING
TEAR GAS

TO TRY TO GET THEM OUT
THAT WAY.

THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF SHOOTING
UP ON THE SECOND FLOOR.

A COMRADE INSIDE
THE RADIO STATION

HAD CAPTURED
AN ENEMY MACHINE GUN

AND HAD FOUGHT WITH IT
THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

BY 9:00 IN THE MORNING
HE HAD ONLY 20 ROUNDS LEFT.

HE WAS WOUNDED,
HIS LEG SHATTERED.

HE ASKED ME TO GO
AND FIND OUT

WHETHER HE SHOULD TRY TO HOLD
THE PLACE OR BLOW IT UP.

AT ABOUT 10:00 IN THE MORNING
WE HAD ONLY EIGHT MEN INSIDE

WITH A VERY LARGE EXPLOSIVE.

THEY DETONATED THE EXPLOSIVE

DESTROYING
THE ENTIRE RADIO STATION

AND SACRIFICING THEMSELVES
IN THE BLAST.

NARRATOR:
U.S. COMBAT TROOPS

HAD BEEN IN VIETNAM
FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS

BEFORE TET, 1968.

YET ALL THEIR SUPERIOR POWER
HAD FAILED

TO GRIND DOWN THE ENEMY.

THE WAR WAS DEADLOCKED.

IN JULY, 1967

COMMUNIST PLANNERS IN HANOI
DEBATED THEIR NEXT MOVE.

SOME WANTED TO CONTINUE
THEIR WAR OF ATTRITION.

BUT HO CHI MINH APPROVED
A BOLD OFFENSIVE

DESIGNED TO BREAK
THE DEADLOCK

AND OPEN THE WAY TO POWER.

THE WAR IN 1967
POSED A DIFFERENT PROBLEM

FOR LYNDON JOHNSON.

HE HAD TO RAISE TAXES

TO CONTINUE BOTH THE WAR
AND HIS SOCIAL PROGRAMS.

TO RALLY DOMESTIC SUPPORT

HE HAD TO PROMISE
LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL.

HOW DO YOU SEE
IT, GENERAL?

VERY, VERY ENCOURAGED.

I'VE NEVER BEEN MORE ENCOURAGED

DURING MY ENTIRE
ALMOST FOUR YEARS IN COUNTRY.

I THINK WE'RE MAKING
REAL PROGRESS.

WE FEEL

THAT ON THE MILITARY SIDE

THERE HAS BEEN

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS

IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS

THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN
EVEN MORE RAPID.

ALL THE CHALLENGES
HAVE BEEN MET.

THEY ENEMY IS NOT BEATEN

BUT HE KNOWS THAT HE HAS MET

HIS MASTER IN THE FIELD.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON HAD ORCHESTRATED

THIS CAMPAIGN OF OPTIMISM

ONLY WEEKS BEFORE TET.

BUT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE

AN ENEMY ATTACK OF SOME KIND
WAS COMING.

DURING THE TWO PREVIOUS YEARS

THE COMMUNISTS HAD STAGED
WINTER OFFENSIVES

ALONG SOUTH VIETNAM'S BORDERS.

NOW, AS U.S. INTELLIGENCE
DETECTED LARGE DEPLOYMENTS

MOVING SOUTH

WESTMORELAND EXPECTED
SIMILAR ASSAULTS.

HE RUSHED 6,000 AMERICAN MARINES
AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS

TO KHE SANH--

A REMOTE FRONTIER OUTPOST
NEAR THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL.

FROM HERE, HE HAD HOPED
TO CONTROL

NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION

INTO SOUTH VIETNAM'S
NORTHERN PROVINCES.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKED
KHE SANH IN JANUARY

SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE TET.

WESTMORELAND THOUGHT THIS WOULD
BE A DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT.

I THINK HIS PLANS CONCERN

A MAJOR EFFORT

TO WIN A SPECTACULAR

BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS

ON THE EVE OF TET,
WHICH IS THE CHINESE NEW YEAR

WHICH TAKES PLACE
AT THE END OF THIS MONTH.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON KEPT A MODEL
OF KHE SANH

IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

BUT NEITHER HE NOR HIS GENERALS
THEN FULLY KNEW

THE COMMUNISTS' REAL PURPOSE
IN FIGHTING THERE.

I DID FEEL
IT WAS A TARGET

THAT THE ENEMY WAS VERY MUCH
INTERESTED IN--

THAT HE WOULD WANT TO SEIZE IT.

AND I WANTED TO FIGHT HIM
IN THE HINTERLAND

RATHER THAN ALLOW HIM
TO GET DOWN AMONG THE PEOPLE.

OUR OBJECTIVE WAS

TO INFLICT CASUALTIES

ON THE ENEMY

AT KHE SANH

THUS COMPELLING HIM

TO SHIFT
MORE OF HIS FORCES THERE

FROM THE SOUTHERN PART
OF THE COUNTRY.

BUT BECAUSE WE DREW LARGER
ENEMY FORCES INTO KHE SANH

AND ALLOWED THEM TO SUPPLY
AND REINFORCE THEMSELVES

WE COULD NOT TURN THE ENCOUNTER
INTO A FINAL BIG BATTLE.

NARRATOR: DAYS AFTER THEY BEGAN
TO SHELL KHE SANH

THE COMMUNIST COMMANDERS
ISSUED FINAL ORDERS

FOR THEIR NATIONWIDE OFFENSIVE
AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM'S CITIES.

THE LONGEST BATTLE
WAS WAGED FOR HUE--

THE OLD IMPERIAL CAPITAL.

SURVIVORS OF THE BATTLE
TELL DIFFERENT STORIES:

THE NIGHT OF TET--
THE LUNAR NEW YEAR--

WAS DIFFERENT
FROM OTHER NEW YEAR'S EVES.

FIRECRACKERS WENT ON LONGER.

THEY CAME FASTER AND FASTER.

THERE WERE MORE, MANY MORE
THAN ON OTHER NEW YEAR'S.

THE SOUNDS OF FIRECRACKERS
AND GUNFIRE INTERSPERSED.

NOBODY REALIZED THAT IT WAS
THE GUNFIRE OF COMMUNISTS

WHO WERE OVERRUNNING
THE CITY OF HUE.

AT THAT TIME

I WAS AT THE NURSING SCHOOL--

NOW THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

FOR NURSES.

I WAS AMONG
THE STUDENTS THERE

AND WEAPONS
WERE SMUGGLED IN TO US.

AT THE NURSING SCHOOL,
WE ALSO MANAGED

TO PRINT
A NUMBER OF LEAFLETS AND TRACTS

FOR
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

CALLING ON THE POPULATION
TO REMAIN CALM

AND NOT CARRY OUT REPRISALS

WHEN ITS FORCES ENTERED
THE CITY.

FOR EXAMPLE

WHEN PEOPLE ARRESTED
AN ENEMY AGENT

THEY WERE TO TURN THEM OVER
TO THE CADRES.

COMMUNIST SOLDIERS CAME IN

AND ASKED MY FATHER

HIS OCCUPATION
AND HIS RESIDENCE.

THEY TOLD MY FATHER
TO DESCRIBE HIS BACKGROUND.

MY FATHER REPLIED

THAT HE WAS
DEPUTY DISTRICT CHIEF

OF TRIEU-PHONG

AND THAT HE WAS ALREADY OLD
AND WOULD RETIRE IN ONE YEAR.

THEY WROTE DOWN EVERYTHING,
THEN WENT ON TO OTHER HOUSES.

NARRATOR:
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
AND VIET CONG

DOMINATED HUE
FOR THREE DAYS.

THEY ROUNDED UP
SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS

AND GOVERNMENT SYMPATHIZERS.

SOME ELUDED ARREST
AND FLED WITH OTHER CIVILIANS.

MANY DID NOT.

MY FATHER WAS ORDERED

TO ATTEND A STUDY SESSION
FOR 10 DAYS

AND HE WAS TOLD

THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED
AFTERWARD.

MY MOTHER AND I ACCOMPANIED HIM
TO THE SCHOOL.

WE STAYED THERE
UNTIL WE SAW MY FATHER LEAVE.

MY MOTHER AND I
WERE VERY WORRIED

BECAUSE IN 1946

MY FATHER'S FATHER HAD BEEN
ARRESTED IN THE SAME WAY

BY THE COMMUNISTS.

HE NEVER RETURNED.

THE PEOPLE SO HATED THOSE

WHO HAD TORTURED THEM

IN THE PAST

THAT, WHEN THE REVOLUTION CAME
TO HUE

THEY ROOTED OUT THOSE DESPOTS
TO GET RID OF THEM

JUST AS THEY WOULD
POISONOUS SNAKES

WHO, IF ALLOWED TO LIVE,
WOULD COMMIT FURTHER CRIMES.

AND SO, EVEN THOUGH
OUR POLICY WAS

TO RE-EDUCATE

AND NEVER KILL ANYONE
WHO SURRENDERED TO US

THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY
TOOK JUSTICE

INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.

AND THERE WAS LITTLE

OUR REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDERS
COULD DO

TO CONTROL THEM
WHILE THE FIGHTING RAGED.

NARRATOR:
TROOPS OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S
FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION

JOINED U.S. MARINES

IN THE COUNTERATTACK
AGAINST HUE.

MANY WERE FIGHTING
FOR THEIR HOMES

AND FOR AN HISTORIC CITY.

THE NGUYEN EMPERORS
HAD BUILT THE CITADEL--

HUE'S WALLED FORTRESS--

EARLY IN THE 19th CENTURY.

THEY MODELED IT

ON THE IMPREGNABLE
FORBIDDEN CITY IN PEKING--

THE CHINESE CAPITAL.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
SET UP A COMMAND POST

NEXT TO THE THRONE
IN THE PALACE OF PERFECT PEACE.

DELTA COMPANY, 1st BATTALION,
5th REGIMENT, U.S. MARINES

HEADED FOR THE CITADEL.

I THINK

MY MOST VIVID MEMORY

AS I WENT IN

WAS IN TALKING

WITH ONE OF THE OTHER

COMPANY COMMANDERS

WHO HAD ALREADY
BEEN PARTICIPATING THERE

IN THE ACTION
FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS.

AND IN A VERY MATTER-OF-FACT WAY

WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL
OF EMBELLISHMENT

HE JUST FRIGHTENED
THE HELL OUT OF ME

IN TELLING ME
HOW BAD IT WAS.

AND I THOUGHT IN MY MIND,
RIGHT THEN AND THERE

HEY, HERE I AM
WITH A FRESH COMPANY

AND I KNEW,
WITHOUT HAVING TO BE TOLD

THAT MY MISSION
THE NEXT DAY

WAS TO TRY TO TAKE
THIS FORTIFIED TOWER POSITION

ALONG THE EAST WALL.

AND SURE ENOUGH, THAT EVENING,
WHEN I WENT IN TO BE BRIEFED

MAJOR THOMPSON--
HE JUST SAID:

"DELTA COMPANY

TOMORROW YOU'RE GOING
TO TAKE THAT EAST WALL."

AND I SAID,
"AYE, AYE, SIR"

AND WENT AT IT.

WHAT'S THE
HARDEST PART
OF IT?

NOT KNOWING WHERE THEY ARE--
THAT'S THE WORST.

THEY RUN IN THE SEWERS,
THE GUTTERS--ANYWHERE.

JUST HOPE YOU CAN STAY ALIVE
FROM DAY TO DAY.

YOU LOST
ANY FRIENDS?

QUITE A FEW--
WE LOST ONE THE OTHER DAY.

THE WHOLE THING STINKS, REALLY.

NARRATOR:
TWO DAYS LATER

ON FEBRUARY 14

DELTA COMPANY TOOK
THE FORTIFIED TOWER--

THEN MOVED ON.

WE TRIED OUR BEST TO AVOID
MALICIOUS DAMAGE, IF YOU WOULD.

WE JUST DIDN'T SHOOT AT WALLS
JUST TO BLOW 'EM DOWN.

BUT WHEN WE HAD
TO SHOOT AT A HOUSE

WE SHOT AT A HOUSE.

WHEN WE HAD
TO DESTROY A HOUSE

WE DESTROYED IT.

BUT WE DIDN'T GO IN THERE
WITH THE EXPRESS PURPOSE

THAT THIS IS
A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY

TO SHOW HOW GREAT
OUR WEAPONS ARE

AND HOW MUCH DESTRUCTIVE POWER
THEY POSSESS.

AS A RESULT
OF THEIR BEING SO ENTRENCHED

IT REQUIRED FOR US

TO BRING MAXIMUM FIREPOWER
AT OUR DISPOSAL

TO ELIMINATE THEM.

BUT WE HAD THE WEAPONS

TO ROOT THE N.V.A.
AND THE VIET CONG

OUT OF THEIR POSITIONS.

THEY DIRECTED ARTILLERY FIRE

INTO THE AREA WHERE I LIVED.

ALL THE HOUSES AND TREES
WERE DESTROYED.

THEY ALSO DIRECTED ROCKET FIRE
AGAINST THE HOMES

OF THE PEOPLE
IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD.

THE PEOPLE HERE
USE KEROSENE AND GASOLINE

AND SO THEIR HOMES
BURST INTO FLAMES

WHEN THEY WERE HIT
BY THE ROCKETS.

OLD FOLKS, CHILDREN
AND PREGNANT WOMEN

WHO COULD NOT FLEE

WERE BURNED ALIVE
IN THEIR HOMES.

HARRINGTON:
AND THROUGHOUT ALL OF THIS,
YOU CONSTANTLY HAD THIS FEAR--

NOT SO MUCH
THAT YOU WERE GOING TO DIE

BECAUSE I THINK,
TO A CERTAIN DEGREE

THAT WAS A GIVEN.

THIS WAS COMBINED

WITH THE SEMI-DARKNESS
TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT

THAT WE WERE FIGHTING IN

BECAUSE OF THE LOW OVERCAST

THE FACT
THAT WE DIDN'T SEE THE SUN--

GAVE IT
A VERY EERIE, SPOOKY LOOK.

YOU HAD THIS UTTER DEVASTATION
ALL AROUND YOU.

YOU HAD THIS HORRIBLE SMELL.

I MEAN, YOU JUST CANNOT DESCRIBE
THE SMELL OF DEATH--

ESPECIALLY WHEN
YOU'RE LOOKING AT IT

A COUPLE OF WEEKS ALONG.

IT'S HORRIBLE.

AND IT WAS THERE
WHEN YOU ATE YOUR RATIONS.

IT WAS ALMOST LIKE
YOU WERE EATING DEATH.

YOU COULDN'T ESCAPE IT.

NARRATOR:
AFTER 24 DAYS OF FIERCE FIGHTING

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS
ENTERED THE CITADEL

AND RAISED THE FLAG
OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

HUE HAD BEEN SAVED--
BUT DESTROYED.

75% OF ITS PEOPLE
WERE HOMELESS.

8,000 SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS
ON BOTH SIDES

HAD BEEN KILLED
IN THE FIGHTING.

BUT THE FINAL TOLL
WAS HIGHER.

IN 1969

A COMMUNIST DEFECTED

AND TOLD THE CHIEF

OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE

THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD BURIED

A NUMBER OF PEOPLE

IN THE XUAN O AND XUAN DOI
AREAS.

THE PROVINCE CHIEF ORDERED
THE BODIES DUG UP--

TO EXHUME THE REMAINS
OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED

DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE.

I, ALONG WITH OTHERS
WHOSE RELATIVES HAD BEEN KILLED

INSPECTED THE REMAINS.

THE SMELL WAS TERRIBLE.

BUT WE HAD LOVED AND MISSED
OUR RELATIVES

AND I WAS OUR DUTY
TO SEARCH FOR THEM.

THOSE WHO FOUND
THE REMAINS OF THEIR RELATIVES

WERE GRATIFIED.

AND THOSE WHO COULD NOT,
WERE SAD.

I CONTINUED LOOKING,
ALONG WITH OTHERS.

AT PHU TU

EIGHT MORE TUNNELS
WERE DUG UP.

STRANGELY,
ALL THE SKULLS OF THE SKELETONS
WERE SMASHED.

THEIR ARMS WERE TIED

AND THEIR POSITIONS INDICATED
THAT THEY DIED KNEELING.

THE SKELETONS
WERE NOT STRETCHED OUT.

THEY WERE BUNDLED UP,
OR HUDDLED.

I WENT ON
FOLLOWING THE SEARCH PARTY

UP UNTIL SEPTEMBER, 1969

BUT I NEVER FOUND
MY FATHER'S REMAINS.

NARRATOR:
THE BODIES FOUND
IN THE MASS GRAVES

WERE SOLEMNLY REBURIED

BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT--

BODIES OF OFFICIALS,
ARMY OFFICERS, PRIESTS,
STUDENTS.

SOME, WHO BORE
NO VISIBLE MARKS OF VIOLENCE

HAD PRESUMABLY BEEN
BURIED ALIVE.

2,800 BODIES
WERE EVENTUALLY FOUND.

ANDD

U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
OFFICIALS

TO PREDICT A BLOODBATH
IF THE COMMUNISTS WON THE WAR.

FOR THE COMMUNISTS,
HOWEVER

THE TET OFFENSIVE FELL SHORT
OF THEIR EXPECTATIONS.

AT THAT TIME,
IN THE NORTH

WE HAD DEVOTED
OUR RESOURCES AND OUR ENERGY

TO THE LIBERATION OF THE SOUTH

IN 1968.

AND WHEN

THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED

WE CERTAINLY FELT
A LITTLE LET DOWN.

LOOKING BACK AT IT NOW

IT IS CLEAR

THAT THE FIRST OBJECTIVE--

THE LIBERATION

OF THE SOUTH--

WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED.

BUT AT THAT TIME

WE DID ATTACK
THE COMMAND CENTERS

OF THE AMERICAN FORCES
AND THE PUPPET REGIME

IN THE URBAN AREAS
AS WELL AS IN THE PROVINCES.

WE ATTACKED
THE PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS

THE SAIGON
PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

THE VARIOUS
SECRET POLICE HEADQUARTERS

AND THE RADIO STATIONS.

AND IN SAIGON

WE FOUGHOUR WAY
INTO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

WE WERE ABLE
TO OCCUPY ALL THESE PLACES

BUT WE COULD NOT HOLD THEM.

THEREFORE, WE DID NOT GAIN
ENOUGH TIME FOR THE PEOPLE

TO STAGE
THEIR GENERAL UPRISING.

FOR US, YOU KNOW

STRATEGY IS NEVER

PURELY MILITARY.

OUR STRATEGY IS ALWAYS

A GENERAL
AND INTEGRATED STRATEGY--

SIMULTANEOUSLY MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC.

THUS, THE TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968
OBVIOUSLY HAD AN OBJECTIVE

THAT WAS BOTH
MILITARY AND POLITICAL.

NARRATOR:
AS A MILITARY OPERATION

THE OFFENSIVE HAD FAILED.

THE SOUTHERN VIET CONG
GUERRILLA FORCES HAD SURFACED

TO BE KILLED OR CAPTURED
IN LARGE NUMBERS.

AFTER 1968

THE WAR WAS INCREASINGLY FOUGHT
BY NORTH VIETNAMESE

AS A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT.

THE POLITICAL GOAL

OF FORCING PRESIDENT THIEU
TO ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT

ALSO FAILED.

WHAT THEY HAVE REALIZED

IN THE CITY

THAT THE PEOPLE

WAS AGAINST THEM.

SO I BELIEVE

THAT THE GENERAL UPRISING

THAT THEY HAD HOPED

HAVE NOT HAPPENED.

THEY HAVE MET
WITH THE ANTICOMMUNIST SENTIMENT

SO THEY FAILED
IN BOTH COUNTRYSIDE AND CITY.

I THINK WE'RE STRONGER

ON A NUMBER OF COUNTS HERE.

THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

HAVE DEMONSTRATED

THEIR CAPABILITY.

I THINK THEY HAVE TURNED IN
AN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE.

BUT EVEN THOUGH IT WAS

A CONSIDERABLE MILITARY SETBACK

FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

AND VIET CONG

OUT THERE ON THE GROUND

IT WAS, IN EFFECT,
A BRILLIANT POLITICAL VICTORY

FOR THEM
HERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

I'M NOT SURE
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE REASONS

BUT IT BECAME VERY CLEAR
AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE

THAT MANY PEOPLE
AT THE GRASS ROOTS--

SUCH AS MY COUSINS
IN CHEROKEE COUNTY--

FINALLY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION

THAT IF WE COULD NOT TELL THEM
WHEN THIS WAR WAS GOING TO END--

AND WE COULDN'T,
IN ANY GOOD FAITH--

THAT WE MIGHT AS WELL CHUCK IT.

THE TET OFFENSIVE CAME

AS A BRUTAL SURPRISE

TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

AND ALL OF HIS ADVISORS.

WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE

THAT THE VIET CONG
WERE PRETTY WELL DE-FANGED

BY THAT PERIOD--

THAT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM
HAD WORKED VERY WELL;

THAT MOST OF THE VILLAGES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

WERE SECURE

AND THAT
IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE

FOR THE VIET CONG

TO RISE TO THE HEIGHTS
THAT THEY DID IN 1968.

NARRATOR:
THE SHOCK OF THE TET ATTACKS

FORCED JOHNSON
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

TO SEEK REFUGE
IN THE MILITARY.

JOHNSON THE PRESIDENT
SAID NOTHING TO THE NATION.

TET HAD CRYSTALLIZED
THE DILEMMA OF THE WAR.

JOHNSON WANTED VICTORY.

BUT HIS ENEMY, THOUGH REBUFFED,
WAS STILL NOT DEFEATED.

COULD HE WIN NOW
WITHOUT EXPANDING THE WAR

AND COMMITTING MORE TROOPS?

AT THE TIME

OF THE TET OFFENSIVE

I ASKED

FOR ONLY THOSE TROOPS

THAT WERE ON THE WAY TO ME

ANYWAY--

THAT HAD BEEN PROMISED

AND I ASKED
THAT THEY BE ACCELERATED.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON APPROVED THIS REQUEST

AND SENT OFF
AN AIRBORNE UNIT.

BUT BY NOW,
VIETNAM WAS DRAINING

AMERICA'S OVERALL
MILITARY FORCE.

JOHNSON'S GENERALS PRESSED HIM

TO TAKE A STEP
HE HAD ALWAYS RESISTED--

TO CALL UP THE RESERVES--

TO GIRD THE NATION
FOR A BIGGER WAR.

MR. JOHNSON
THEN SENT A MESSAGE:

"IF YOU NEED
FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS

PLEASE CALL FOR THEM."

I TOOK NO STEPS IN THAT REGARD
TILL GENERAL WHEELER CAME OVER.

HE WAS THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

AND WHEELER TOLD ME

THAT THERE WAS
A GOOD PROSPECT

THAT THE RESERVES
WOULD BE MOBILIZED--

THAT THE STRATEGY
WOULD BE CHANGED.

AND IF
RESERVES ARE MOBILIZED--

THAT WOULD BREAK DOWN

SOME OF
THE GEOGRAPHICAL BARRIERS

OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA--

WHAT WOULD I WANT
TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END?

IT WAS
A CONTINGENCY PLAN

BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION
OF A DECISION.

AND IT WAS NOT A REQUEST
PER SE.

NARRATOR:
BUT IT WAS PRESENTED

AS WESTMORELAND'S REQUEST
FOR 206,000 TROOPS.

GENERAL EARL WHEELER SAID

THEY WERE NEEDED
TO STOP ANOTHER ATTACK.

IN FACT,
WHEELER PLANNED

TO KEEP HALF THE TROOPS AT HOME.

ANOTHER ADVISOR WANTED
TO USE THE TROOPS

TO INVADE NORTH VIETNAM.

I THOUGHT

THAT THE EXTRA TROOPS

WOULD BE JUSTIFIED

ONLY IF WE USED THEM

IN A VERY ACTIVE POLICY

THROUGH PUTTING FORCES
INTO NORTH VIETNAM

AND BLOCKING OFF ON THE GROUND
THE MULTIPLE TRAILS IN LAOS.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON TURNED THE TROOP REQUEST

OVER TO CLARK CLIFFORD--

HIS NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
A TRUSTED ADVISOR

AND SUPPORTER OF THE WAR
FROM THE BEGINNING.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON APPOINTED
A TASK FORCE

AS SOON
AS I WENT INTO THE PENTAGON

AND NAMED ME CHAIRMAN.

THE REASON WAS

THAT THE MILITARY
HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED

206,000 MORE TROOPS
BE SENT TO VIETNAM.

HE WANTED US TO DETERMINE

HOW THE TROOPS COULD BE GATHERED
AND SENT;

WHAT THE IMPACT MIGHT BE
ON THE UNITED STATES.

NARRATOR:
THE TROOPS REQUEST CAME
AT A TIME

WHEN JOHNSON WAS CONCERNED
ABOUT KHE SANH

WHERE THE MARINE GARRISON
WAS STILL BESEIGED.

JOHNSON BELIEVED

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
STILL PLANNED

A MAJOR ASSAULT
AGAINST KHE SANH.

THE MARINES,
SURROUNDED AND OUTNUMBERED

WERE ENDURING
DEADLY ARTILLERY BARRAGES

AS THEY WAITED

FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
TO STORM THE BASE.

JOHNSON: TO MEET THE NEEDS
OF THESE FIGHTING MEN

WE SHALL DO
WHATEVER IS REQUIRED.

MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT:

I DON'T WANT A MAN IN HERE
TO GO BACK HOME

THINKING OTHERWISE.

WE ARE GOING TO WIN!

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON DID MEET

THE NEEDS OF HIS MEN
AT KHE SANH.

HE UNLEASHED THE AIR FORCE

AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
ENCIRCLING THE BASE

IN ONE OF THE MOST INTENSIVE
BOMBING CAMPAIGNS IN HISTORY.

BY EARLY MARCH

ASSURED THAT KHE SANH WAS SAFE
AND THE TET OFFENSIVE REPELLED

JOHNSON QUIETLY SHELVED
THE REQUEST

FOR 206,000 TROOPS.

BUT THE TROOP REQUEST
HAD DEEPLY INFLUENCED

HIS NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

I KNOW
FOR THREE FULL DAYS

I SPENT DOWN IN THE TANK

WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WHERE YOU SIT

WITH ALL

OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES

WE HAD LONG TALKS--

"HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE?"

THEY DIDN'T KNOW.

"HOW MANY MORE TROOPS
WOULD IT TAKE?"

THEY DIDN'T KNOW.

"WOULD 206,000
ANSWER THE DEMAND?"

THEY DIDN'T KNOW.

"MIGHT THERE BE MORE?"

YES, THERE MIGHT BE MORE.

SO WHEN IT WAS ALL OVER,
I SAID:

"WHAT IS THE PLAN
TO WIN THE WAR IN VIETNAM?"

"WELL, THE ONLY PLAN IS

"THAT ULTIMATELY,
THE ATTRITION WILL WEAR DOWN

"THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

AND THEY WILL HAVE HAD ENOUGH."

"IS THERE ANY INDICATION
THAT WE'VE REACHED THAT POINT?"

"NO, THERE ISN'T."

AS A RESULT
OF THAT KIND OF INTERVIEW

I HAD TURNED AGAINST THE WAR.

BUT WE DON'T PLAN TO SURRENDER,
EITHER.

AND WE DON'T PLAN
TO PULL OUT, EITHER.

AND WE DON'T PLAN
TO LET PEOPLE INFLUENCE US

AND FORCE US
TO DIVIDE OUR NATION

IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL PERIL!

I THEN DECIDED
THAT WHAT I MUST DO

WOULD BE TO GET
ALL OF THE STRENGTH THAT I COULD

BECAUSE THE MERE FACT

THAT I HAD REACHED
THE CONCLUSION

WAS NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT.

CLIFFORD SAID:

"I NOTICED YOU THIS AFTERNOON

"AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

"AND IT SEEMS TO ME

"YOU AND I

ARE ON THE SAME SIDE.

"AND I THINK
WE SHOULD FORM A PARTNERSHIP.

"YOU SHOULD BE
THE PARTNER IN THE WHITE HOUSE

"AND I'LL BE
THE PARTNER IN THE PENTAGON.

"AND TOGETHER

"WE'LL GET THIS COUNTRY
AND OUR PRESIDENT

OUT OF THIS MESS."

HARRY WAS OUR SECRET DOVE.

HARRY WAS

VERY CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT.

HARRY AND I WERE CLOSE.

WE BEGAN TO DEVELOP A GROUP.

AND I KNOW
THAT AFTER A WHILE

THE QUESTION WOULD BE,
VERY SECRETLY:

"IS HE WITH US?"

THAT MEANS:

"IS HE PART OF THIS GROUP

"THAT IS ORGANIZED
AND DEDICATED

TO CHANGING
LYNDON JOHNSON'S MIND?"

IT WAS ALMOST LIKE
SOME VERY SIMILAR EXPRESSION

USED IN
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

WITHOUT HIS HAVING TO SAY SO

"GETTING US
OUT OF THIS MESS"

DID NOT MEAN

PUTTING IN
ANOTHER 200,000 OR 300,000 MEN

IN ORDER
TO BEAT NORTH VIETNAM--

THE VIET CONG--

IT MEANT TO BEGIN
THE PROCESS OF "DE-ESCALATION"--

AS IT WAS CALLED--

OF DISENGAGEMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES.

I WAS EXHILARATED.

NARRATOR:
ON MARCH 10th

THE NEW YORK TIMES
REVEALED

THE PENTAGON'S REQUEST
FOR ADDITIONAL TROOPS.

THE REQUEST HAD BEEN
A CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET.

THE DISCLOSURE
STUNNED MEMBERS

OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE--

THEN HOLDING HEARINGS
ON VIETNAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK
WAS GRILLED ON LIVE TELEVISION

FOR TWO DAYS.

THERE IS INCIPIENT UPRISING

IN THIS COUNTRY

IN OPPOSITION TO THIS WAR

AND IT'S GOING
TO GET WORSE.

THIS TALK ABOUT SENDING OVER
200,000 MORE TROOPS--

YOU'RE GOING TO CREATE

A VERY SERIOUS DIFFICULTY
IN THIS COUNTRY.

FOR SOME YEARS

WE HAVE BEEN
BOMBING THE NORTH.

AS I
UNDERSTAND IT

THIS BOMBING OF THE NORTH

HAD THREE PURPOSES:

ONE, TO HURT NORTH VIETNAM.

THAT'S BEEN DONE.

SECONDLY,
TO STOP THE INFILTRATION OF MEN

DOWN ACROSS THE PARALLEL

HAS THAT BEEN DONE?

IT HAS NOT
BEEN STOPPED COMPLETELY, SENATOR

AND WE NEVER SUPPOSED

THAT IT COULD STOP IT
COMPLETELY.

IT HAS HAD
SOME MAJOR IMPACT

UPON THE CAPACITY
OF THE OTHER SIDE

TO CARRY OUT
THIS INFILTRATION.

THE RATE OF INFILTRATION IN 1965
WAS ABOUT 1,500 A MONTH;

IN 1966,
ABOUT 4,500 A MONTH;

IN 1967,
BETWEEN 5,500 AND 6,000 A MONTH

AND IN 1968,
IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING

THAT IN JANUARY

20,000 MEN CAME DOWN
FROM NORTH VIETNAM

INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

IS THAT CORRECT?

I WOULD ACCEPT THOSE

AS APPROXIMATELY CORRECT.

THTHTHTHIRD FACTOR WAS

TO BRING HANOI
TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

ARE THEY ANY CLOSER
TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE NOW

THAN THEY WERE
WHEN THE BOMBING BEGAN?

WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE

THAT THEY'RE PREPARED
TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS

TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

NARRATOR:
SENATORS MORSE AND MANSFIELD

HAD LONG OPPOSED THE WAR.

BUT AFTER TET,
SUPPORTERS--

LIKE SENATOR CARL MUNDT
OF SOUTH DAKOTA--

BEGAN TO ABANDON JOHNSON.

MUNDT: AS ONE
WHO HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED

THE DECISION
OF THE ADMINISTRATION

TO PRESS ON WITH THIS WAR

I AM TOTALLY
AND SORROWFULLY DISAPPOINTED

BY YOUR ANSWER.

THE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS
WOULD LIKE TO SEE

A PRIORITY

AND UNLESS IT IS ESTABLISHED
BY THIS ADMINISTRATION

I THINK WE'RE GOING
TO INCREASE THE DIVISIVENESS.

NARRATOR:
NOW CONGRESS WANTED A CHANGE:

EITHER VICTORY OR WITHDRAWAL.

CONGRESS, ALSO CONCERNED
ABOUT THE COST OF THE WAR

FORCED JOHNSON
TO TRIM HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAMS.

HE COULD NOT SPEND MORE
ON A LIMITED WAR

AND HE FEARED
AN EXPANDED WAR.

JOHNSON'S GREATEST FEAR,
AS HE ONCE PUT IT

WAS THAT AN AMERICAN PILOT
WAS GOING

TO MISS HIS TARGET
IN HAIPHONG HARBOR

AND PUT A BOMB
DOWN THE SMOKESTACK

OF A RUSSIAN FREIGHTER

WITH THE RUSSIAN MINISTER
ON BOARD

AND THAT THE PILOT WOULD BE
FROM JOHNSON CITY, TEXAS.

HE WAS EXTREMELY DISTURBED

THAT WE MIGHT
PROVOKE THE RUSSIANS

INTO COMING TO THE AID
OF VIETNAM.

AND THAT WAS ONE
OF THE TREMENDOUS DILEMMAS

HE HAD
THROUGHOUT THE WAR

WHEN A GREAT MANY AMERICANS
WANTED THE UNITED STATES

TO FINISH IT OFF.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON ALSO HAD TO CONSIDER

THE WAR AT HOME.

UNTIL THEN

HE HAD DISMISSED
STREET DEMONSTRATIONS.

BUT 1968 WAS
A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR

AND THERE EMERGED
A PEACE CANDIDATE

THRUST INTO PROMINENCE

BY THE SHOCK
OF THE TET OFFENSIVE.

I AM A CANDIDATE

FOR THE NOMINATION

TO THE PRESIDENCY

ON THE DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

AND I RUN FOR THAT OFFICE

AGAINST AN INCUMBENT LEADER
OF OUR PARTY

BECAUSE I BELIEVE
THAT WE ARE INVOLVED

IN A VERY DEEP CRISIS
OF LEADERSHIP;

A CRISIS

AND A CRISIS
OF NATIONAL PURPOSE.

AND THE ENTIRE HISTORY
OF THIS WAR IN VIETNAM--

NO MATTER WHAT WE CALL IT--

HAS BEEN ONE OF CONTINUED ERROR
AND OF MISJUDGEMENT.

NARRATOR:
SENATOR EUGENE McCARTHY

NEARLY BEAT JOHNSON
IN THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY.

AND THE CLOSE VOTE
JOLTED JOHNSON.

AT THE TIME, IT LOOKED LIKE
A VOTE FOR PEACE.

IN FACT,
IT WAS A VOTE

AGAINST JOHNSON'S
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

MANY NEW HAMPSHIRE VOTERS
FELT

THAT HE WASN'T BEING
TOUGH ENOUGH.

A PLURALITY OF THOSE
WHO VOTED FOR McCARTHY

LATER SAID
THEY PREFERRED GEORGE WALLACE--

A STRIDENT ANTI-COMMUNIST.

WALLACE: ANYBODY WHO WANTS
THE VIET CONG TO WIN

WHEN I BECOME
THE PRESIDENT

I'LL GIVE YOU
A PASSPORT TO HANOI

AND YOU GO ON TO HANOI
OR YOU GO TO MOSCOW.

NARRATOR:
JOHNSON WAS FURTHER RATTLED

WHEN ROBERT KENNEDY JOINED
THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE.

THE GLAMOROUS KENNEDYS
HAD ALWAYS WORRIED HIM.

ROBERT HAD SWITCHED
TO A PEACE PLATFORM

AND JOHNSON SMELLED
DEFEAT IN WISCONSIN--

THE NEXT PRIMARY.

THE FARAWAY WAR
WAS TAKING ITS TOLL AT HOME.

JOHNSON TURNED
TO A GROUP OF ELDER STATESMEN

CALLED "THE WISE MEN."

THEY HAD CONSISTENTLY BACKED
HIS WAR POLICIES.

HE CONVENED THEM
ON MARCH 25.

THEY INCLUDED
ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES

LIKE FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
DEAN ACHESON

FORMER AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM
MAXWELL TAYLOR

AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR McGEORGE BUNDY.

I REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENED

BECAUSE AS IT HAPPENED

THE REST OF THE BRETHREN
ASKED ME

TO BE A KIND OF A RAPPORTEUR.

I'D BEEN THAT KIND OF PERSON
IN N.S.C. MEETINGS EARLIER.

I WAS MORE OR LESS
AT THE CENTER OF GRAVITY
OF THE GROUP.

AND OUR RECOMMENDATION,
ON THE WHOLE--

NOT WITHOUT DISSENT,
DISAGREEMENT--

WAS THAT
THERE SHOULD NOT BE

AN INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE
A MODIFICATION

OF THE POLICY
OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM.

NOW, HERE WAS A GROUP
SAYING:

"MR. PRESIDENT,
STOP TRYING TO WIN THE WAR.

"START CUTTING BACK.

"DON'T SEND
ANY MORE MEN.

WE THINK
YOU OUGHT TO GET OUT."

IT WAS
A VERY BITTER PILL FOR HIM.

I THINK
HE HAD DECIDED

THAT HE WOULD NOT DO
THE GROUND-FORCE REINFORCEMENT.

SO IT WAS MORE
OUR GLOOMINESS

THAN
OUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT HE MAY HAVE FOUND
TROUBLING.

NARRATOR:
ON THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 31

AFTER TWO MONTHS
OF INDECISION

JOHNSON REHEARSED
AN ADDRESS TO THE NATION

SCHEDULED FOR THAT EVENING.

JOHNSON: ...THE ESTIMATE
OF THOSE ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES
IS...

SO GET CLIFFORD IN
TO SEE WHAT FIGURES...

WELL, YOU'RE GOING
TO HAVE TO GET HIM

IN THE NEXT HOUR

SO YOU CAN MIMEOGRAPH IT.

NARRAT:
AS LATE AS MARCH 28

HIS AIDES WERE STILL DIVIDED
ON VIETNAM POLICY.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT SPEECH

BECAME PARAMOUNT.

SUB-MEETINGS WERE HELD

EFFORTS WERE MADE

TO PERSUADE THIS PERSON

AND THAT PERSON:

"STAND UP UNDER PRESSURE,"
AND SO FORTH.

"LET'S PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT
TO MAKE THE DECISION

TO BEGIN
TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM."

FINALLY,
THE MORNING OF THE 28 CAME

AND WE MET IN THE OFFICE
OF DEAN RUSK.

THERE WERE
FIVE OR SIX PERSONS THERE.

WE WENT THROUGH
A DRAFT OF THE SPEECH.

IT WAS A STRONG

"WE WILL BE IN THERE,
WE WILL BE FIGHTING

THEY WILL NOT DRIVE US OUT,

WE WILL SAVE VIETNAM" SPEECH.

THERE WAS A MEETING

IN SECRETARY RUSK'S OFFICE--

RUSK, CLIFFORD,

BILL BUNDY, ROSTOW AND ME.

CLIFFORD SAID,
"THE SPEECH IS A DISASTER."

I THOUGHT
THE DRAFT WAS DREADFUL.

I THOUGHT
THAT IT WAS HARSH.

I THOUGHT

THAT IT TALKED ABOUT
THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.

IT TALKED ABOUT TET--
HOW TET COULD BE RESOLVED.

THERE WAS SOME SUGGESTION
ABOUT SENDING SOME OF THE MEN--

NOT THE WHOLE 206,000.

TO ME,
IT NEEDED MUCH CHANGING

AND MUCH AMENDMENT.

THE REALLY SURPRISING THING
WAS

THAT RUSK AND ROSTOW
DID NOT FIGHT CLIFFORD ON THAT

BUT BEGAN TO SPEAK
AS IF:

"WHAT DO WE HAVE TO PUT IN LINE

TO WRITE
A DIFFERENT KIND OF SPEECH?"

I WENT BACK
AND WROTE A DIFFERENT SPEECH.

AS A QUICK ILLUSTRATION

THE FIRST FEW SENTENCES

OF THAT SPEECH
IN THE ORIGINAL DRAFT

SAID, "I WISH TO TALK
ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM."

BY THE TIME
THE SPEECH WAS REWRITTEN--

WE WORKED DAYS ON IT--

THAT FIRST SENTENCE READ:

GOOD EVENING,
MY FELLOW AMERICANS.

TONIGHT
I WANT TO SPEAK TO YOU

OF PEACE IN VIETNAM
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THAT SPEECH WAS ALMOST
A COMPLETE REVERSAL

OF WHAT
THE SPEECH STARTED OUT TO BE.

TONIGHT I HAVE ORDERED

OUR AIRCRAFT
AND OUR NAVAL VESSELS

TO MAKE NO ATTACKS
ON NORTH VIETNAM

EXCEPT IN THE AREA
NORTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

WHERE THE CONTINUING
ENEMY BUILDUP

DIRECTLY THREATENS
ALLIED FORWARD POSITIONS

AND WHERE THE MOVEMENT
OF THEIR TROOPS AND SUPPLIES

ARE CLEARLY RELATED
TO THAT THREAT.

I HAD CUT OFF THE PERORATION--
THE ENDING OF THE SPEECH--

WHICH WAS
A KIND OF McPHERSON EFFORT

TO WRITE CHURCHILLIAN.

IT HAD BEEN
ON EVERY DRAFT OF EVERY SPEECH

FROM THE BEGINNING.

CLIFFORD CALLED ME
AND SAID:

"THAT PERORATION
DOESN'T BELONG THERE ANYMORE.

"THE SPEECH HAS CHANGED.

"YOU CAN'T MAKE

"THE KIND OF SPEECH
WE'VE NOW GOT

"AND THEN END IT
WITH A SORT OF:

'WE WILL FIGHT 'EM
IN THE LANES AND THE VILLAGES
AND THE BEACHES' LANGUAGE

THAT IS IN THAT PERORATION.

SO I JUST CUT IT OFF.

I DIDN'T HAVE TIME
TO WRITE A NEW ONE.

JOHNSON ASKED ME,
"WHERE WAS IT?

I LIKED THAT."

AND I SAID:

"WELL, I DIDN'T LIKE IT--

"I'LL GO UPSTAIRS
AND WRITE A NEW ONE.

"AND I'LL MAKE IT SHORT

BECAUSE THE SPEECH IS
ALREADY VERY LONG."

HE SAID:

"YOU DON'T NEED
TO WORRY ABOUT TIME.

I MAY HAVE
A LITTLE ENDING OF MY OWN."

AND HE WALKED OUT OF THE ROOM,
LEAVING ME AND CLIFFORD.

I SAID TO CLIFFORD:

"GOOD LORD!
IS HE GOING TO QUIT?"

AND CLIFFORD LOOKED AT ME
AS IF I WERE OUT OF MY MIND!

WE'D ALL ASSUMED, OF COURSE,
THAT HE WOULD RUN.

HE LOVED THE JOB.

ABOUT 5:00 IN THE AFTERNOON,
I GOT BACK TO MY OFFICE

AND JOHNSON CALLED ME

AND ASKED ME
WHAT I THOUGHT

ABOUT THE SPEECH.

AND I SAID
I THOUGHT IT WAS PRETTY GOOD--

I WAS REALLY PROUD AND GLAD
THAT WE HAD CHANGED THE SPEECH.

HE SAID,
"I'VE GOT AN ENDING."

I SAID,
"I'VE HEARD THAT."

HE SAID,
"DO YOU KNOW WHAT'S IN IT?"

I SAID,
"I THINK SO."

AND HE SAID,
"WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT IT?"

I SAID:

"I'M VERY SORRY,
MR. PRESIDENT."

AND HE SAID,
"OKAY--SO LONG, PARDNER."

WITH AMERICA'S SONS
IN THE FIELDS FAR AWAY

WITH AMERICA'S FUTURE
UNDER CHALLENGE

RIGHT HERE AT HOME

WITH OUR HOPES
AND THE WORLD'S HOPES FOR PEACE

IN THE BALANCE EVERY DAY

I DO NOT BELIEVE
THAT I SHOULD DEVOTE

AN HOUR
OR A DAY OF MY TIME

TO ANY PERSONAL,
PARTISAN CAUSES

OR TO ANY DUTIES OTHER THAN
THE AWESOME DUTIES
OF THIS OFFICE--

THE PRESIDENCY OF YOUR COUNTRY.

ACCORDINGLY, I SHALL NOT SEEK,
AND I WILL NOT ACCEPT

THE NOMINATION OF MY PARTY

FOR ANOTHER TERM
AS YOUR PRESIDENT.

AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE,
AFTER HE SPOKE

I HAD A PRESS CONFERENCE

AND ANNOUNCED FORMALLY

THAT THE 206,000 TROOPS
WERE NOT TO BE SENT.

THIS IS PART AND PARCEL

OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

TO PLACE A LIMITATION

UPON OUR TROOP LEVEL

AT A POINT
NOT EXCEEDING 550,000.

IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE
THAT IT SHOULD BE SAID--

IF THAT'S WHAT HE MEANT--

AND I ASSUMED
THAT THAT WAS WHAT HE MEANT

FROM THE TONE OF HIS SPEECH
ON MARCH 31.

THERE WERE STILL THOSE
WHO VERY MUCH WANTED TO--

THE MILITARY STILL THOUGHT
THE MATTER WAS HANGING FIRE.

THAT ENDED IT.

AFTER THAT STATEMENT
WAS MADE PUBLICLY

THERE WAS NO FURTHER COMMENT
ABOUT THE 206,000 TROOPS.

NARRATOR:
THE TET OFFENSIVE

HAD A FURTHER IMPACT:

IN MID-MAY

NORTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS
ARRIVED IN PARIS

TO NEGOTIATE,
FOR THE FIRST TIME.

THAT WEEK

THE VIET CONG LAUNCHED
A NEW OFFENSIVE.

AMERICANS FOUGHT ON
FOR THE SAME OBJECTIVE--

AN INDEPENDENT
SOUTH VIETNAM.

BUT AFTER TET,
THE STRATEGY CHANGED.

THERE WERE PEACE TALKS

AND THE SLOW WITHDRAWAL
OF AMERICAN TROOPS.

THE TALKING AND FIGHTING WENT ON
FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

CAPTIONED BY
THE CAPTION CENTER
WGBH BOSTON