Vietnam: A Television History (1983–…): Season 1, Episode 12 - Vietnam: A Television History - full transcript

TWO YEARS AFTER
A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

PROMISED PEACE IN VIETNAM;

10 YEARS AFTER AMERICA SENT
COMBAT TROOPS

INTO ITS LONGEST WAR;

20 YEARS AFTER

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
DIVIDED VIETNAM;

30 YEARS AFTER THE COMMUNISTS
LAUNCHED THEIR STRUGGLE

FOR VIETNAM'S INDEPENDENCE.

AFTER A GENERATION OF BATTLE

HANOI'S COMMANDING GENERAL
PROCLAIMED

THEIR GREAT SPRING VICTORY.



FINALLY, FOR AMERICA, IT WAS
THE END OF THE TUNNEL.

CAPTIONING OF THIS PROGRAM
IS MADE POSSIBLE, IN PART

BY THE CORPORATION
FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING

AND PUBLIC TELEVISION STATIONS.

A CEASE-FIRE--

INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED--

WILL BEGIN AT 7:00 P.M.

THIS SATURDAY, JANUARY 27.

WITHIN 60 DAYS

ALL AMERICANS HELD PRISONERS
OF WAR THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA

WILL BE RELEASED.

THERE WILL BE THE FULLEST
POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING

FOR ALL OF THOSE
MISSING IN ACTION.

ALL AMERICAN FORCES WILL BE
WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.



THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM
WILL DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

WE WERE ABSOLUTELY FURIOUS
ABOUT THE AGREEMENT.

IT WAS AN INJUSTICE--

MORE A DEATH SENTENCE

THAN A PEACE AGREEMENT.

WE HAD NEVER SEEN ANYTHING
MORE ILLOGICAL.

IT CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ONLY THE AMERICAN FORCES

AND NOT THE WITHDRAWAL
OF OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS

SUCH AS THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS.

NARRATOR:
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
GREETED THE PARIS ACCORDS

WITH A DEFIANT DISPLAY OF FLAGS.

THE RED-AND-YELLOW BANNERS
WERE PUT OUT

AS SYMBOLS OF LOYALTY

ON ORDERS OF THE SAIGON REGIME

WHICH HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT

UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE
FROM PRESIDENT NIXON.

IN THE COUNTRYSIDE,
A CHECKERBOARD OF FLAGS--

OFTEN WITHIN SIGHT
OF ONE ANOTHER--

MARKED THE TERRITORY
OF THE OPPOSING SIDES.

THE AGREEMENT LEFT VIET CONG
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

AWAITING A POLITICAL COMPROMISE.

THE COMMUNISTS WELCOMED
THE AGREEMENT

AS RECOGNITION
OF THEIR LEGITIMACY.

THEY DID NOT SEE THEMSELVES,
BUT THE AMERICANS,
AS AGGRESSORS.

WE ALWAYS TRAINED OUR SOLDIERS

TO LOVE THEIR COUNTRY

AND TO HATE AGGRESSORS.

WE WERE NOT INVADERS.

WE WERE DETERMINED
TO PREVENT INVASION.

NARRATOR: BOTH SIDES KNEW
THE STRUGGLE WAS NOT OVER.

THE COMMUNISTS WERE ARMED
WITH NEW SOVIET WEAPONS

BUT FOCUSED, AT FIRST,
ON POLITICS.

THEY REINFORCED THEIR
ORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTH--

NOW LEGALLY RECOGNIZED

AS THE PROVISIONAL
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

THE SAIGON REGIME,
EQUIPPED WITH NEW AMERICAN ARMS

ORDERED ITS TROOPS
TO SEIZE MORE TERRITORY.

IN 1954, AN AGREEMENT SIGNED
IN GENEVA HAD DIVIDED VIETNAM

LEAVING THE FUTURE OF THE
SOUTH UNDECIDED.

NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS WERE
SCHEDULED, BUT NEVER HELD.

NOW--19 YEARS LATER--

A NEW AGREEMENT AGAIN LEFT SOUTH
VIETNAM'S FUTURE UNDECIDED.

BUT THIS TIME,
TWO HUGE ARMIES--

ONE EQUIPPED BY AMERICA,
THE OTHER BY THE SOVIET UNION--

STOOD POISED HEAD-TO-HEAD OVER
A BATTERED AND EXHAUSTED LAND.

ASK MR. DO VAN SU
HOW HE WOULD FEEL

IF HIS ONLY
REMAINING SON

HAD TO JOIN
THE ARMY.

I ALWAYS BELIEVED IN MY COUNTRY

AND ALWAYS WANTED MY CHILDREN
TO DEFEND IT

SO THAT WHEN PEACE COMES
AND THE COUNTRY IS REUNIFIED

WE COULD FEEL PROUD ABOUT IT.

BUT INSTEAD OF SENDING MY SONS
OUT TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY

I SENT THEM TO THEIR DOOM.

MY SONS HAD TO DIE
BECAUSE OF THEIR COUNTRY

AND I AM PAINED AND SAD.

BUT I STILL HAVE
A YOUNG SON LEFT.

I BEGGED THE AUTHORITIES
TO SPARE HIM

SO THAT HE CAN
STAY HOME WITH ME.

THAT'S ALL.

HE SHOULD NOT BE DRAGGED
INTO THE WAR.

BECAUSE OF THIS CONFLICT,
MY OTHER TWO SONS ARE NO MORE.

NARRATOR: AT ARLINGTON NATIONAL
CEMETERY ON FEBRUARY 5

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM NOLDE
WAS BURIED.

ON THE LIST OF AMERICANS
KILLED IN VIETNAM

HE WAS NUMBER 57,597.

MAY THEY RECEIVE STRENGTH
IN YOUR PROMISES OF ETERNAL LIFE

AND FINALLY, MAY WE CONTINUE
TO SERVE UNSELFISHLY

FOR THE IDEALS OF FREEDOM
AND PEACE...

NARRATOR:
WHATEVER THEIR VIEWS OF THE WAR

MOST AMERICANS NOW BELIEVED
THAT THE COST HAD BEEN TOO GREAT

AND THE GREATEST COST
HAD BEEN AMERICAN LIVES.

THEY BELIEVED

THAT NO MORE AMERICANS
SHOULD DIE FOR VIETNAM.

(CHEERING CROWD)

A FEW DAYS LATER

THE AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR
BEGAN TO COME HOME FROM HANOI.

THEY WERE THE CENTER
OF A MONTH-LONG CELEBRATION

THEIR HOMECOMING PLAYED AND
REPLAYED ON NATIONAL TELEVISION.

THE LAST AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN
WERE OUT OF VIETNAM.

BUT AMERICA WAS STILL COMMITTED
TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

AT SAN CLEMENTE IN APRIL

PRESIDENT NIXON PUBLICLY
RESTATED HIS SUPPORT

FOR SOUTH VIETNAM'S
PRESIDENT THIEU.

PRESIDENT THIEU AND I HAVE
HAD VERY CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS

WITH REGARD
TO HOW WE SHALL WORK TOGETHER

IN THE YEARS AHEAD

WORKING FOR
THE PROGRAM OF PEACE

WHICH WE NOW HOPE WILL ALL BE
THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE

NOT ONLY
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

BUT FOR ALL OF THE COUNTRIES
IN INDOCHINA.

MR. PRESIDENT

WE HAVE BEEN ALLIES
IN A LONG AND DIFFICULT WAR.

AND NOW YOU CAN BE SURE
THAT WE STAND WITH YOU

AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER
TO BUILD A LASTING PEACE.

NARRATOR:
NIXON PLEDGED

HE WOULD
"RESPOND WITH FULL FORCE"

IF THE COMMUNISTS BROKE
THE CEASEFIRE.

BUT NIXON'S OWN POWER
WAS UNDER ATTACK IN WASHINGTON.

WE ARE BEGINNING THESE HEARINGS
TODAY

IN AN ATMOSPHERE
OF UTMOST GRAVITY.

NARRATOR: WATERGATE WAS
UNDERMINING

THE NIXON PRESIDENCY.

TELEVISED HEARINGS REVEALED
THE DEPTH OF THE SCANDAL

LINKING IT TO VIETNAM

AND TO NIXON'S COVERT ACTIONS
AGAINST THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE SOUGHT
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

ABOUT DEMONSTRATION LEADERS

THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT
THE DEMONSTRATION

WAS SPONSORED
BY SOME FOREIGN ENEMY.

WE NEVER FOUND EVIDENCE

THAT THESE DEMONSTRATORS
WERE PART OF A MASTER PLAN.

SOME OF THESE EVENTS
IN 1969 AND 1970

INCLUDED HARASSMENT
OF POLITICAL CANDIDATES

AND VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS.

TAKEN AS PART

OF AN APPARENT CAMPAIGN

TO FORCE UPON THE PRESIDENT
A FOREIGN POLICY

FAVORABLE TO THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE

THESE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE MORE

THAN JUST 1st AMENDMENT
EXERCISES.

I BELIEVE THAT MOST ANYONE
WHO WORKED AT THE WHITE HOUSE

DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS

CAN ATTEST TO THE CONCERN
REGARDING LEAKS.

THAT CONCERN TOOK A QUANTUM JUMP

WHEN THE NEW YORK TIMES

BEGAN PUBLISHING
"THE PENTAGON PAPERS."

HAD WE NOT HAD
SECRET NEGOTIATIONS

WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

HAD WE NOT HAD SECRECY

PRIOR TO THE SOVIET SUMMIT

HAD WE NOT HAD

SECRET NEGOTIATIONS

OVER A PERIOD OF TIME
WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS

LET ME SAY QUITE BLUNTLY

THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
NO CHINESE INITIATIVE

THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN

NO LIMITATIONS OF ARMS
FOR THE SOVIET UNION

AND NO SUMMIT.

AND HAD WE NOT HAD

THAT KIND OF SECURITY
AND THAT KIND OF SECRECY

THAT ALLOWED FOR THE KIND
OF EXCHANGE THAT IS ESSENTIAL

YOU MEN WOULD STILL BE
IN HANOI

RATHER THAN WASHINGTON TODAY.

IT IS TIME IN THIS COUNTRY

TO QUIT MAKING HEROES

OUT OF THOSE WHO STEAL
NATIONAL SECRETS

AND PUBLISH THEM
IN THE NEWSPAPERS.

KISSINGER: AFTER JUNE 1973

I DID NOT BELIEVE
THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD HOLD.

WATERGATE WAS IN FULL SWING.

WE HAD ALREADY ACQUIRED
INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS

IN WHICH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

HAD MADE
THE VERY CORRECT ANALYSIS

THAT NIXON WOULD NOT BE
IN A POSITION

TO REPEAT WHAT HE HAD DONE
IN 1972

BECAUSE OF HIS DOMESTIC
DIFFICULTIES.

THE CONGRESSIONAL AGITATION

TO END ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WAS ALREADY IN FULL FORCE

AND EVERY DAY, A NEW AMENDMENT
WAS BEING PROPOSED.

SO IT WAS JUST A QUESTION
OF TIME

UNTIL ONE OF THEM WOULD PASS

AND LE DUC THO
WOULD READ THEM TO ME.

NARRATOR: NIXON AND KISSINGER
WERE CONVINCED

THAT ONLY THE THREAT
OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

WOULD DETER THE COMMUNISTS

FROM RAPIDLY TAKING OVER
THE SOUTH.

IN JUNE, 1973

AS THE WATERGATE SCANDAL
CONTINUED TO WEAKEN NIXON

KISSINGER INITIATED A NEW
ROUND OF TALKS WITH LE DUC THO

THE CHIEF COMMUNIST NEGOTIATOR.

THE TWO PUT THEIR SIGNATURE

ON A RENEWED
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

HIS PRESIDENCY WANING

NIXON LACKED THE POWER
TO STAND FIRM IN VIETNAM

EVEN THOUGH
THE ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATORS

HAD DWINDLED TO A DEDICATED FEW.

HE HAD ENDED THE DRAFT
AND BROUGHT TROOPS HOME.

DESPITE THE CONTINUED BOMBING
OF CAMBODIA

TO MOST AMERICANS,
THE WAR WAS FINISHED.

NIXON'S OPPOSITION NOW CENTERED
IN CONGRESS

WHICH MOVED TO LIMIT HIS ACTIONS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THE CAMBODIA BOMBING IS ILLEGAL.

I THINK IT VIOLATES

THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

IT IS INEFFECTIVE AND IMMORAL.

YET THE PRESIDENT STUBBORNLY
IGNORES THE WILL OF THE CONGRESS

AND IGNORES THE WILL
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

NARRATOR:
ON AUGUST 15, 1973

AMERICAN BOMBERS COMPLETED

THEIR FINAL WARTIME MISSION
OVER INDOCHINA--

CONGRESS' FIRST STEP
TOWARD ENDING THE WAR.

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY,
RESUPPLIED WITH AMERICAN WEAPONS

HELD ITS OWN
THROUGH THE REST OF 1973.

BUT SOME OF THIEU'S OFFICERS
WERE WORRIED

THAT THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR
MOMENTUM WITHOUT THE AMERICANS.

WHEN WE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS

TO PRESIDENT THIEU

HE REPLIED

THAT HE AGREED WITH US.

BUT HE EXPLAINED

THAT THE AMERICANS
HAD NO CHOICE--

THEY HAD TO KEEP
THEIR ARMED FORCES

OUT OF THE VIETNAM QUAGMIRE.

BUT HE PROMISED

THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD PUNISH
ANY COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS--

AND WE BELIEVED HIM.

NARRATOR: LATE IN 1973,
PRESIDENT THIEU ANNOUNCED

THE START OF THE
"THIRD INDOCHINA WAR"

LAUNCHING AN AIR AND GROUND
OFFENSIVE

AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS.

THIEU SAW NO ALTERNATIVE
TO WAR.

HE WAS CONVINCED

THAT THE POLITICAL COMPROMISE
CALLED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT

WOULD LEAD
TO A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER.

HE WAS DETERMINED
TO FIGHT ON

BELIEVING THAT AMERICA
STILL STOOD BEHIND HIM.

THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR,
GRAHAM MARTIN

ENCOURAGED THIEU'S CONFIDENCE
IN AMERICA.

SOME MEMBERS OF MARTIN'S STAFF
DISAGREED.

THERE WAS MARTIN

ENCOURAGING THIEU TO BELIEVE

THAT THERE WOULD BE

CONTINUING AID

FROM THE UNITED STATES

EVEN, AGAIN, B-52s.

AND HE ENCOURAGED THIEU
TO ACCEPT THIS

AND AS I'VE SAID BEFORE

THIEU BELIEVED IT
WITH SUCH CONVICTION

THAT HE DECIDED NOT TO PULL BACK
UNTIL IT WAS MUCH TOO LATE.

NARRATOR: CONGRESS
WAS ON THE OFFENSIVE.

WE HAVE REACHED A MOMENT

WHEN WE ARE READY TO DEBATE

RESOLUTIONS WHETHER OR NOT

THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SHOULD RECOMMEND THAT
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ADOPT ARTICLES CALLING
FOR THE IMPEACHMENT

OF RICHARD M. NIXON...

MR. DANIELSON?
AYE.

MR. DRINAN?
AYE.

MR. RANGLE?
AYE.

MISS JORDAN?
AYE.

MR. SMITH?
NO.

MR. SANDMAN?
NO.

MR. RAILSBACK?
AYE.

MR. RODINO?
AYE.

NIXON: TO FIGHT
THROUGH THE MONTHS AHEAD

FOR MY PERSONAL VINDICATION

WOULD ALMOST TOTALLY ABSORB
THE TIME AND ATTENTION

OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS.

THEREFORE, I SHALL RESIGN
THE PRESIDENCY

EFFECTIVE AT NOON TOMORROW.

VICE PRESIDENT FORD WILL BE
SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT

AT THAT HOUR IN THIS OFFICE.

FORD:
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY
AFTER BECOMING PRESIDENT

IN AUGUST OF 1974

I WROTE THE HEADS OF STATE
OF ALL OF OUR ALLIES

INCLUDING PRESIDENT THIEU
OF VIETNAM.

I WOULD CARRY OUT THE POLICY
OF MY PREDECESSORS

INVOLVING SOUTH VIETNAM.

MR. THIEU BROUGHT THE LETTER

WRITTEN BY PRESIDENT FORD

TO THE WHOLE CABINET MEETING

IN SAIGON

AND IT WAS QUITE A STRONG EFFECT
ON ALL THOSE PEOPLE OVER THERE

AND THEY THOUGHT THAT
EVEN IF MR. NIXON RESIGNED

THEY CAN STILL BELIEVE
IN A COMMITMENT FROM THE U.S.

TO HELP SOUTH VIETNAM.

NARRATOR: BY AUGUST OF 1974

THE MILITARY BALANCE
HAD BEGUN TO SHIFT

AGAINST PRESIDENT THIEU.

HIS TROOPS WERE THINLY SPREAD.

THEY NO LONGER HAD
AMERICAN AIR SUPPORT.

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORS
WERE GONE.

CONGRESS HAD REDUCED AID

AND SOUTH VIETNAM ALSO SUFFERED
FROM SOARING OIL PRICES

AFTER THE 1973
MIDDLE EAST WAR.

GASOLINE WAS TIGHTLY RATIONED.

AMMUNITION WAS SCARCE.

HELICOPTERS LACKED SPARE PARTS
AND MAINTENANCE

AND TROOP DEPLOYMENT BY TRUCK
WAS SLOW AND CUMBERSOME.

SNEPP:
IN ADDITION, THERE WAS
THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION

THE SIPHONING OFF OF MATERIEL
DESTINED TO TROOPS.

THE U.S. ESTABLISHMENT

IN SAIGON

NEVER HAD A VERY GOOD GRASP

ON CORRUPTION

BECAUSE IT WAS,
FROM AN INTELLIGENCE STANDPOINT

STRICTLY OFF-LIMITS.

WE OF COURSE REALIZED
THAT IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

LOOKED ANYTHING BUT
PRISTINE PURE

THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD NOT
VOTE ANY ADDITIONAL AID

TO SAIGON.

NARRATOR:
SOME SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS
AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

SOLD STOLLEN GASOLINE
AND OTHER SUPPLIES.

SOME PILOTS DEMANDED BRIBES
TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED.

WHEN THE MILITARY BUDGET

WAS SO DRASTICALLY REDUCED

THE SO-CALLED ONE-TIME
USE" BANDAGES AND SYRINGES

FOR THE USE OF MEDICAL DRUGS
AND BLOOD BAGS

THAT SORT OF THING
FOR TRANSFUSIONS

THOSE WERE GONE.

THEY HAD TO WASH THE BANDAGES.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY DID
FOR BLOOD BAGS.

THEIR MEDICAL SUPPORT,
WHICH HAD BEEN PRETTY GOOD

WAS GETTING VERY GRIM.

NARRATOR: MORE THAN 31,000
SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS

DIED IN 1974--

THEIR HIGHEST NUMBER
FOR ANY YEAR EXCEPT 1972.

GEN. TRAN VAN NHUT:
THE AMERICANS INSTILLED

IN THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS
AND OFFICERS

THE AMERICAN WAY TO FIGHT A WAR.

WHEN THE AMERICANS WITHDREW

AND THE SUPPLIES REDUCED

IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THAT MORALE
AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

CHANGED FOR THE WORSE.

NARRATOR: THE AMERICANS
HAD SPENT LAVISHLY IN VIETNAM.

AT CAM RANH BAY THEY BUILT A
$2 BILLION DEEPWATER PORT.

NOW, HOMELESS VIETNAMESE
IMPROVISED SHELTERS

OUT OF ITS DESERTED
BARRACKS AND CLUBS.

AID HAD BEEN CUT,
AND THE BOMBING STOPPED.

BUT THIEU STILL COUNTED
ON PLEDGES

FROM TWO U.S. PRESIDENTS
AND FROM AMBASSADOR MARTIN.

HE COULD NOT BELIEVE

THE U.S. WOULD ABANDON ITS
INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM.

IN HANOI IN OCTOBER 1974

NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS
REACHED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

GENERAL VAN TIEN DUNG,
A SENIOR STRATEGIST

WAS PRESENT.

DURING THIS MEETING, WE
REACHED AN IMPORTANT CONCLUSION.

THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAD
ALREADY WITHDRAWN THEIR TROOPS

FROM THE SOUTHERN PART
OF VIETNAM

AND IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT
FOR THEM TO RETURN.

THEREFORE, NO MATTER
HOW MUCH AID

THEY GAVE THE SAIGON REGIME

THEY COULD NOT PREVENT
THE COLLAPSE OF THAT REGIME.

IF THE AMERICANS

HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DEFEAT US

WHAT HOPE WAS THERE

FOR THEIR PUPPET TROOPS?

WE COULD FIGHT
THE PUPPET TROOPS EASILY.

THEY HAD FEWER WEAPONS
THAN THE AMERICANS USED TO HAVE.

THEIR MORALE WAS HURT
BY THE BEATINGS

OUR FORCES HAD INFLICTED
ON THEM.

AND THEY FACED
A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

WHICH HAD BECOME MUCH STRONGER

WITH THE INCREASED SUPPLIES
IT RECEIVED FROM THE NORTH.

NARRATOR: AFTER 30 YEARS
OF ALMOST CONTINUOUS WAR

THE COMMUNISTS' DREAM
OF A REUNIFIED VIETNAM

SEEMED WITHIN REACH.

THIS NORTH VIETNAMESE FILM

DEPICTS THE BEGINNING
OF THE 1975 CAMPAIGN

COMMANDED BY GENERAL DUNG.

MORE THAN 100,000 FRESH TROOPS
MOVED DOWN THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL

NOW A MODERN TRUCK ROUTE.

THEY MASSED IN COMMUNIST-HELD
AREAS IN THE SOUTH.

CRACK UNITS ATTACKED
THE PROVINCE OF PHUOC LONG

AND EASILY TOOK
ITS CAPITAL CITY.

THEY WERE PROBING--
TESTING AMERICA'S REACTION.

THIEU RENEWED HIS APPEAL
FOR U.S. AID.

WHAT WE NEED IS
TO HAVE ENOUGH MEANS

NOT ONLY TO SUSTAIN
THE CURRENT SITUATION

BUT AS LONG AS THE COMMUNISTS

SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM
OF THEIR OFFENSIVE

I THINK WE STILL NEED
THE MEANS TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

NARRATOR:
PRESIDENT FORD

AFFIRMED THAT AMERICA
HAD A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

WAS THEN TRYING TO GET CONGRESS

TO VOTE MORE MONEY

FOR VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

AND A NUMBER OF US WENT

TO VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

TO TEST AGAINST WHAT MARTIN
HAD BEEN SAYING.

GRAHAM MARTIN
AND HIS STATION CHIEF

WERE INCAPABLE
OF GIVING A FAIR APPRAISAL.

THEY WERE SO EMOTIONALLY
WRAPPED UP

IN SAVING SOUTH VIETNAM.

MARTIN SAID:

"THE VIETNAMESE CAN STAND.

"ALL YOU GOT TO DO IS GIVE 'EM
MORE AMMUNITION

AND MORE EQUIPMENT."

NARRATOR: THE DELEGATION
CONCLUDED

THAT SOUTH VIETNAM HAD RECEIVED
ENOUGH AMERICAN AID.

IT WOULD NOW
HAVE TO FIGHT ALONE.

AT THE SAME TIME GENERAL DUNG
DEPLOYED THREE DIVISIONS

ENCIRCLING THE CITY
OF BAN ME THUOT

IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S
CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE
AMERICANS WOULD NOT INTERVENE

BUT HE STILL EXPECTED THAT IT
WOULD TAKE TWO YEARS

TO DEFEAT THIEU'S FORCES.

HE MOVED CAREFULLY.

IN ORDER TO ALLOW
THE TANKS TO GO IN

THE ARTILLERY UNITS

SHELLED STEADILY
FOR ABOUT TWO DAYS

SO THAT THE ENEMY
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HEAR

THE RUMBLING NOISE
OF THE TANKS.

NARRATOR:
DUNG ALSO STAGED
SEVERAL DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS

AROUND PLEIKU--
ANOTHER HIGHLAND CITY.

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE LURED
INTO DEFENDING PLEIKU

WEAKENING BAN ME THUOT'S
DEFENSES.

AS THEY LEFT,
DUNG'S TROOPS MOVED.

OUR UNIT

REACHED THE OUTSKIRTS

OF BAN ME THUOT

ON THE AFTERNOON

OF MARCH 9, 1975.

WE MADE CAMP

AND PREPARED
FOR THE NEXT DAY'S ATTACK

AGAINST THE CITY.

WE WERE ORDERED TO FIGHT
THE ENEMY AT CLOSE RANGE--

TO "CLING TO THEIR BELTS,"
AS WE PUT IT.

NARRATOR: WITHIN TWO DAYS,
DUNG'S SUPERIOR FORCES

HAD OVERWHELMED BAN ME THUOT.

MY OWN AIR FORCE UNIT

TRANSPORTED TWO REGIMENTS
OF SPECIAL FORCES

TO PLEIKU

IN ORDER TO RETAKE BAN ME THUOT.

BUT TO OUR COMPLETE SURPRISE

ON THE 14TH THERE WAS AN ORDER
TO WITHDRAW FROM PLEIKU.

NOBODY COULD BELIEVE IT.

NARRATOR: PRESIDENT THIEU
MADE A CRUCIAL DECISION.

HE ORDERED HIS FORCES
TO ABANDON THE NORTHERN

AND CENTRAL PROVINCES

AND FORM A NEW LINE
OF DEFENSE, FURTHER SOUTH.

HOPING TO AVOID PANIC

HE DID NOT ANNOUNCE
THE WITHDRAWAL

OR REVEAL HIS PLANS.

AS THE RUMORS FLEW,
FEAR SPREAD.

THE PUPPET TROOPS
REALLY PANICKED.

IT WAS TOTAL CONFUSION

WHEN THEY TRIED TO RETREAT
AND SURRENDER.

THEIR UNITS HAD DISINTEGRATED

AND THEY SIMPLY FLED
FOR THEIR LIVES.

KENNETH MOOREFIELD:
DURING THE WITHDRAWAL

THE AIR FORCE
WAS USING THEIR AIRPLANES

TO GET OUT ANY WAY THEY COULD.

MIXED IN WITH ALL OF THIS

WAS THE PANIC-STRICKEN FLIGHT

OF TENS OF THOUSANDS
OF CIVILIANS.

IN MANY INSTANCES
THE MILITARY FORCES

HAD THEIR FAMILIES
LIVING WITH THEM

IN THE KONTUM-PLEIKU AREA

AND THAT MEANT THEY HAD
TO BE CONCERNED

ABOUT THE SURVIVAL
OF THEIR OWN FAMILIES

AT A TIME WHEN THEY WERE
ATTEMPTING TO RETREAT

BACK TO THE COAST.

BAN ME THUOT FELL--

BUT THE GOVERNMENT SAID NOTHING.

WE ONLY LEARNED

ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL FROM PLEIKU

FROM RUMORS.

THE ADMINISTRATION ISSUED

NO OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS
AT ALL.

SO PEOPLE STOPPED BELIEVING
IN THE GOVERNMENT.

NARRATOR: THE OFFICIAL SILENCE
PANICKED THE POPULATION.

WITHIN DAYS, THOUSANDS
OF CIVILIANS WERE STREAMING

TOWARD THE COASTAL CITY
OF DANANG

DESPERATELY SEEKING SAFETY.

THE COMMUNIST LEADERS--

SURPRISED BY THE SAIGON ARMY'S
DISINTEGRATION--

NOW MOVED SWIFTLY.

THEY SET A DEADLINE:

VICTORY
BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON.

DUNG'S FORCES CLOSED IN
ON DANANG.

THE BBC AND VOA BROADCASTS SAID

THAT DANANG WAS ABOUT TO FALL.

AND THAT NEWS FURTHER SPREAD
PANIC AMONG US SOLDIERS.

OUR OFFICERS HAD FLED.

WE TALKED THINGS OVER AMONG
OURSELVES AND THEN DECIDED:

LET'S GO HOME.

NARRATOR:
BY MARCH 21

100,000 REFUGEES--MANY OF THEM
TROOPS AND THEIR FAMILIES--

HAD CROWDED INTO DANANG.

SOME SOLDIERS PUT THEIR WIVES
AND CHILDREN

ABOARD SHIPS HEADED
FOR SAFER AREAS IN THE SOUTH.

MANY FAILED TO GET OUT.

THE SOLDIERS HERE ARE CONFUSED.

AS YOU WALK DOWN THE STREET

YOU SEE SOLDIERS WITH NO SHOES--
THEY'RE JUST STARING INTO SPACE.

I THINK PANIC IS A WORD

THAT DESCRIBES VERY WELL
WHAT'S HAPPENING IN DANANG.

WE'VE HEARD THAT A PLANE TICKET,
NOW, TO SAIGON

IS OVER 100,000 PIASTRES,
IF YOU CAN AFFORD IT.

SO THE RICH LEAVE AND THEY TAKE
ALL THEIR BELONGINGS.

NONE OF THE CIVILIAN

AND MILITARY PLANES

COULD LAND AT THE DANANG AIRPORT

BECAUSE EVERY TIME
THEY APPROACHED

CROWDS CHASED AFTER THEM
IN JEEPS AND MOTORSCOOTERS

TRYING TO GET ON THE PLANES
AND GO TO SAIGON.

NARRATOR:
A WORLD AIRWAYS JET

WITH COMPANY PRESIDENT ED DALEY
ABOARD

MADE A PERILOUS LANDING
AT DANANG.

DALEY WAS FLYING
ONE LAST RESCUE MISSION

AGAINST
OFFICIAL AMERICAN ADVICE.

HE WANTED TO SAVE
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST

BUT DESPERATE SOLDIERS
JAMMED INTO THE AIRPLANE.

THEY SCRAMBLED
INTO THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT

AND CLUNG TO THE STAIRWAY
AS THE PLANE TOOK OFF.

IT WAS THE LAST AMERICAN
FLIGHT OUT OF DANANG.

ON THE 30th OF MARCH

GENERAL DUNG'S FORCES
CAPTURED DANANG--

SWEEPING ACROSS THE VAST AIRBASE

WHERE THE FIRST U.S. GROUND
FORCES HAD LANDED IN 1965.

FOR ONE OF HIS MILITARY
CAMERA TEAM, DANANG WAS HOME.

I ARRIVED THERE ON THE 31st--

THE DAY AFTER LIBERATION.

ALONG THE ROAD I SAW
MANY CORPSES OF SAIGON TROOPS.

THEIR WEAPONS AND UNIFORMS,
WHICH THEY HAD STRIPPED OFF

WERE STREWN ALL OVER THE PLACE.

AS WE ENTERED THE CITY OF DANANG

WE ENCOUNTERED A GROUP
OF DISBANDED SAIGON SOLDIERS.

THEY HAD BEEN HIDING
IN A GRAVEYARD

AND THEY STOOD UP
TO SURRENDER TO US.

WHEN I FOUND MY FAMILY

I SAW MY MOTHER
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS.

BEFORE WE COULD SAY
A SINGLE WORD

WE EMBRACED EACH OTHER
AND WEPT.

DURING THE CONVERSATIONS
WITH MY FAMILY

I LEARNED THAT ALL MY NEPHEWS
HAD BECOME SAIGON SOLDIERS.

NARRATOR:
MANY VIETNAMESE FAMILIES

HAD MEMBERS
FIGHTING ON BOTH SIDES.

NOW, SOME WERE REUNITED
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES.

OFFSHORE, REFUGEES FROM DANANG
WERE PACKED ABOARD RESCUE SHIPS.

THOUSANDS DROWNED,
TRYING TO FLEE

OR WERE SUFFOCATED IN THE CRUSH.

AS THIEU'S ARMY CRUMBLED,
THE HYSTERIA SPREAD SOUTH.

GENERAL TRAN VAN NHUT:
CONFUSION SPREAD EVEN FURTHER
IN THE ARMY

WHEN RUMORS MULTIPLIED

THAT VIETNAM WOULD
BE AGAIN PARTITIONED.

SOLDIERS COULDN'T UNDERSTAND

WHY SHIPS WERE BEING SENT

TO CENTRAL VIETNAM

TO EVACUATE THEIR FAMILIES.

IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE
ANOTHER PARTITION

WHY SHOULD THEY CONTINUE
TO FIGHT?

AND WHY SHOULD THEY LEAVE THEIR
FAMILIES STRANDED OUT THERE?

NARRATOR:
PRESIDENT THIEU--

STILL BELIEVING THAT AMERICA
WOULD NOT ABANDON HIM--

AGAIN PLEADED FOR HELP.

ON APRIL 2,
HE MET WITH AMBASSADOR MARTIN

AND PRESIDENT FORD'S
SPECIAL ENVOY

GENERAL FREDERICK WEYAND.

WEYAND PROMISED
TO RECOMMEND MORE AID.

BUT BY NOW, THE AMERICANS
WERE LOSING FAITH IN THIEU.

WEYAND REPORTED TO KISSINGER
AND FORD AT PALM SPRINGS.

THEY CONCLUDED

THAT A MILITARY DEADLOCK
WAS THEIR BEST HOPE.

EVEN IF ONLY PART OF SOUTH
VIETNAM COULD BE DEFENDED

THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT AGREE
TO A POLITICAL DEAL--

WITH OR WITHOUT THIEU.

PRESIDENT FORD:
GENERAL WEYAND CAME BACK
AND RECOMMENDED

$722 MILLION
IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID

TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE WOULD HAVE

ADEQUATE MILITARY HARDWARE
TO CREATE THE STALEMATE.

I WAS ALWAYS HOPEFUL

THAT THERE COULD BE
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

NARRATOR: FORD AGAIN ASKED
CONGRESS FOR AID.

BUT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
REJECTED HIS REQUEST.

WE'VE SENT, SO TO SPEAK

BATTLESHIP AFTER BATTLESHIP

AND BOMBER AFTER BOMBER

AND 500,000 MORE MEN

AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS.

IF BILLIONS DIDN'T DO

AT A TIME WHEN WE HAD
ALL OUR MEN THERE

HOW CAN $722 MILLION
SAVE THE DAY?

CAN THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT--

UNDER PRESIDENT
THIEU

OR ANY OTHER
LEADER--

HANDLE THIS
SITUATION?

WELL, I THINK THE TEST IS

THAT THEY HAVE HANDLED IT.

AND I THINK

THE GOVERNMENT CAN HANDLE IT

IN THE FUTURE

AND ALLOW US, WHEN WE END
OUR INVOLVEMENT HERE

TO WITHDRAW,
AS I THINK WE SHOULD

LEAVING SOUTH VIETNAM
ECONOMICALLY VIABLE

MILITARILY CAPABLE
OF DEFENDING ITSELF

AND FREE TO CHOOSE
ITS OWN GOVERNMENT.

THIS IS A GOAL WHICH IS
EASILY WITHIN OUR REACH.

IT SEEMED TO ME

THE WAS NO QUESTION

THAT THE SOUTH WAS

IN IMMINENT JEOPARDY.

MARTIN WOULDN'T BELIEVE IT

AND MARTIN HELD
TO THIS OPTIMISTIC VIEW

ALMOST TO THE END.

AND THIS WAS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS

IN HIS APPROACH
TO THE EVACUATION QUESTION.

NARRATOR: THIEU IMPOSED
A CURFEW IN SAIGON.

AMERICAN CIVILIANS
BEGAN TO PACK UP.

OUTGOING COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS
WERE JAMMED

BUT THE U.S. MISSION REFUSED
TO DISCLOSE

ITS EVACUATION PLANS--

EITHER FOR AMERICANS
OR FOR VIETNAMESE.

WE HAD THE FEAR THAT
IF WE EVACUATED TOO RAPIDLY

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

MIGHT TURN ON US

AND THERE MIGHT BE

A MASSACRE OF AMERICANS.

WE WANTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
TO BE CONCERNED

THAT IF THEY MOVED TOO FAST,
WE MIGHT INTERVENE.

NARRATOR:
ON APRIL 11

U.S. CARRIERS DISPATCHED MARINES
ON ANOTHER EVACUATION MISSION--

TO GET THE LAST AMERICANS
OUT OF NEIGHBORING CAMBODIA.

COMMUNIST INSURGENTS WERE POISED
TO TAKE PHNOM PENH--ITS CAPITAL.

DESPITE THE DEFEAT IN CAMBODIA

THE UNITED STATES STILL HOPED
TO HANG ON IN SAIGON.

WE ASSEMBLED A LARGE FLEET
OFF SOUTH VIETNAM

FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES.

AND I ATTEMPTED
TO EASE THE TRANSITION

BY CREATING
A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON

AND IMPLYING THAT THAT FLEET
MIGHT BE THERE

FOR PURPOSES
OTHER THAN SIMPLY EVACUATION

AND PROPOSED SOME SORT
OF COALITION EFFORT

WHICH WAS NOT REFUSED
INITIALLY.

NARRATOR:
LE DUC THO--

KISSINGER'S
FORMER NEGOTIATING PARTNER--

JOINED GENERAL DUNG
IN THE FIELD.

THEY WEIGHTED THEIR OPTIONS
AS THEY BRACED FOR BATTLE.

IF THEY COULD CRUSH
THE SAIGON REGIME

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS
WOULD BE UNNECESSARY.

THIEU'S FORCES PREPARED
TO CONFRONT THEM

IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE
AT XUAN LOC

ON THE MAIN ROAD TO SAIGON.

THEY MOVED INTO POSITION
ON APRIL 12.

GENERAL LE MINH DAO
DEFIED THE COMMUNISTS.

I WILL HOLD LONG KHANH!

I WILL KNOCK THEM DOWN HERE

EVEN IF THEY USE
THREE DIVISIONS!

NARRATOR:
AT SAIGON'S AIRPORT

THE EMBASSY BEGAN
TO EVACUATE VIETNAMESE.

I ARRIVED OUT AT THE AIRBASE

WALKED INTO THE THEATER.

THERE WERE HUNDREDS--

MAYBE SEVERAL THOUSANDS
OF VIETNAMESE THERE.

WE'D BEEN CHARGED
WITH THE EVACUATION

OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS.

AND THERE WAS A PALPABLE SENSE
OF HYSTERIA IN THE AIR.

NARRATOR:
AT XUAN LOC

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
HELD THEIR GROUND

UNDER RELENTLESS SHELLFIRE

FINALLY YIELDING

AS GENERAL DUNG THREW
THREE DIVISIONS AGAINST THEM.

ON APRIL 21, THE REMNANTS
OF THIEU'S TROOPS WERE RESCUED

AS WOMEN AND CHILDREN
AND THE WOUNDED

STRUGGLED FOR SPACE
ON THE FLIGHTS OUT.

THAT SAME DAY--

PRESSED TO MAKE WAY
FOR A LEADER

WHO MIGHT REACH A DEAL
WITH THE COMMUNISTS--

PRESIDENT THIEU RSIGNED.

HIS SUCCESSOR WAS THE AGED,
HALF-BLIND VICE PRESIDENT--

TRAN VAN HUONG.

THE COMMUNISTS
PROMPTLY REJECTED HUONG.

AT DAYBREAK ON APRIL 28

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS FACED
NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS

AT THE NEWPORT BRIDGE.

THEY WERE AT THE GATES
OF SAIGON.

IN SAIGON
AND WASHINGTON

FAINT HOPES FOR A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT PERSISTED.

HUONG WAS REPLACED
BY DUONG VAN MINH--

REGARDED AS A FIGURE
THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT ACCEPT.

AS MINH SPOKE,
A THUNDERSTORM ERUPTED.

THE COMMUNISTS HAD BEAT
THE RAINY SEASON TO THECAPITAL.

GENERAL DUNG HAD MET
HIS DEADLINE.

THE MORNING
OF APRIL 29, 1975:

TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT
WAS UNDER FIRE

PREVENTING PASSENGER PLANES
FROM TAKING OFF.

BUT AMBASSADOR MARTIN
WAS STILL RELUCTANT

TO BEGIN A FULL-SCALE
HELICOPTER EVACUATION.

COLONEL WILLIAM LeGRO:
NORTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY

WAS FALLING INTERMITTENTLY
ON THE AIRFIELD.

WE NO LONGER HAD ANY CAPABILITY
TO USE FIXED-WING AIRPLANES

FOR THE EVACUATION.

I TOLD THE AMBASSADOR

THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE

A GREAT DEAL OF TIME LEFT--

THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE

TO LEAVE THAT NIGHT.

HE GOT AUTHORITY TO BEGIN
THE EVACUATION FROM THE EMBASSY.

NARRATOR:
THE WORD WENT OUT:

ALL AMERICANS
AND VIETNAMESE AT RISK

WOULD BE TAKEN OUT BY HELICOPTER
TO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

OFFICIALS QUICKLY DESIGNATED
DEPARTURE POINTS

AT THE AIRPORT,
THE U.S. EMBASSY

AND ELSEWHERE IN THE CAPITAL.

I GOT TOGETHER
WITH THE MARINE CAPTAIN

THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ORGANIZING

THE CONVOYS OF BUSES WHO WERE
TO GO INTO THE CITY.

HOW ARE WE GETTING
TO THE HELICOPTERS?

THEY'RE GOING TO PICK US UP
AROUND TAN SON NHUT.

KEN MOOREFIELD:
I DISCOVERED

THAT HE DID NOT HAVE
A VERY GOOD KNOWLEDGE

OF WHERE
SOME OF THE PICKUP POINTS WERE

IN THE CITY.

SO I ASSISTED HIM

IN GETTING SOME OF THE BUSES
TOGETHER.

LET THIS
WOMAN THROUGH!

COME ON,
LET'S MOVE IT!

COME ON!

(VIETNAMESE)

STOP
PUSHING!

ONE AT
A TIME!

MOOREFIELD:
WE SPENT THE BETTER PART
OF THE MORNING

AND THE EARLY AFTERNOON

RUNNING CONVOYS BACK AND FORTH

FROM SAIGON
TO TAN SON NHUT AIR FORCE BASE.

THE PEOPLE THAT I DESCRIBED
AS HIGH-RISK VIETNAMESE

WERE NOT HIGH RISK
MERELY BECAUSE

THEY'D HAD
A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH US

BUT BECAUSE
WE BELIEVED

THAT IF THEY STAYED BEHIND

THEIR LIVES WOULD BE
IN JEOPARDY.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THESE PEOPLE
WERE MORTALLY SCARED.

I MET
MY FRIEND'S WIDOW

WHO I'VE KNOWN ABOUT

FOR SOME 10 YEARS.

VIETNAMESE
FRIEND?

YES.

WE WENT TO SCHOOL TOGETHER
AT WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY.

I WAS VERY CONCERNED

ABOUT REPRISALS
TO THE FAMILY

AND SO I RETURNED
TO HELP THEM IF I COULD

BUT I COULDN'T GET
ANYONE OUT.

THE WIDOW WAS
GOTTEN OUT EARLIER

THROUGH EMBASSY HELP

BUT NOT THE OTHERS.

MOOREFIELD: THE EMBASSY WAS
COMPLETELY SURROUNDED

BY HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS
OF VIETNAMESE

AT THE THREE ENTRANCES.

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE,
IF YOU WERE ORIENTAL

VIRTUALLY TO GET INTO
THE GROUNDS OF THE EMBASSY

AT THAT POINT IN TIME.

GET DOWN!

NARRATOR:
BY LATE AFTERNOON

MOST AMERICANS,
AND THOUSANDS OF VIETNAMESE

HAD REACHED
THE U.S. CARRIERS OFFSHORE.

THOUSANDS MORE VIETNAMESE
WERE WAITING IN SAIGON.

SOME SOUTH VIETNAMESE PILOTS
DITCHED THEIR AIRCRAFT

IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

HE'S LUCKY!

HE'S LUCKY

IT DIDN'T
FALL OVER

ON TOP
OF HIM

AND CHOP HIM
TO PIECES!

MOOREFIELD:
THE FEELING IN THE CITY

WAS ALMOST ONE OF TOTAL CHAOS
AT THIS POINT.

VIRTUAL ANARCHY
WAS BEGINNING TO BREAK OUT.

THERE WERE ARMED SOLDIERS
IN HALF UNIFORMS--

COMBINED
AIR FORCE/MARINE/ARMY TYPES

THAT HAD OBVIOUSLY BEGUN
THE TASK OF LOOTING

AND TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF THE DISORDER AND CONFUSION.

GENERAL PHAN PHUNG TIEN:
AFTER LANDING

ON THE AMERICAN CARRIERS

I MUST ADMIT THAT THOSE OF US

WHO HAD BEEN
IN RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS

FELT KIND OF ASHAMED
AND DISHONORED.

TO ME IT SEEMED
THAT EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED

DURING THE LAST DAYS
OF SOUTH VIETNAM

HAD BEEN ARRANGED IN ADVANCE--

AND THERE WAS NOTHING

THAT THE VIETNAMESE OFFICERS
AT THE LOWER ECHELONS COULD DO

TO PREVENT THE SITUATION
FROM COMING APART.

I FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES--

PARTICULARLY THE CONGRESS

BECAUSE THEY WERE MAKING
THE POLICY--

HAD BETRAYED A TRUST

THAT THE UNITED STATES
HAD GIVEN SOUTH VIETNAM.

AND SINCE I REPRESENTED
THE UNITED STATES

I ALSO FELT THAT I WAS
PERSONALLY BETRAYED:

I HAD ALSO MADE
IMPLIED PROMISES

THAT THE UNITED STATES
WOULD HONOR THE AGREEMENTS

WE HAD MADE AT THE TIME
OF THE CEASE-FIRE

AND THEN,
WHEN THINGS GOT REALLY TOUGH

WE REALLY JUST CUT AND RUN.

AFTER REACHING

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BRIDGE

WE WENT STRAIGHT

TO THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE.

NARRATOR: COMMUNIST FORCES
ENTERED THE CITY.

THEY HAD PLANNED
A TWO-YEAR CAMPAIGN

TO CAPTURE THE CAPITAL.

IT TOOK 55 DAYS.

NONE OF US KNEW HOW TO GET
TO THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE.

SO MANY STREETS LED

TO DOWNTOWN SAIGON

AND I MYSELF HAD NO IDEA

WHERE IT WAS.

SO I TURNED TO AN D WOMAN
AND ASKED:

"MOTHER, WHERE IS SAIGON?"

AND SHE REPLIED:

"YOU'RE IN SAIGON."

NARRATOR:
INSIDE THE PALACE

DUONG VAN MINH, PRESIDENT
FOR 44 HOURS, WAS WAITING.

COLONEL BUI TIN
TOOK THE SURRENDER.

WHEN I SAW FEAR

ON THE FACES
OF MINH AND THE OTHERS PRESENT

I SAID:

"THE WAR HAS ENDED TODAY,
AND ALL VIETNAMESE ARE VICTORS.

"ONLY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS
ARE THE VANQUISHED.

"IF YOU STILL HAVE ANY FEELINGS
FOR THE NATION AND THE PEOPLE

CONSIDER TODAY A HAPPY DAY."

THAT NIGHT

WHEN I SPRAWLED ON THE LAWN
OF THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE

WITH MEMBERS
OF A COMMUNICATION UNIT

WE ALL AGREED IT WAS
THE HAPPIEST DAY OF OUR LIVES

BECAUSE THE WAR ENDED.

NARRATOR:
THE COMMUNISTS HAD ATTAINED
THEIR GOAL:

THEY HAD TOPPLED
THE SAIGON REGIME.

BUT THE COST OF VICTORY
WAS HIGH--

IN THE PAST DECADE ALONE

ONE VIETNAMESE IN EVERY 10
HAD BEEN A CASUALTY OF WAR:

NEARLY A MILLION AND A HALF
KILLED, THREE MILLION WOUNDED.

VIETNAM HAD BEEN
A TORMENTED LAND

AND ITS ORDEAL WAS NOT OVER.

THOUGH AMERICAN EQUIPMENT
STILL STOCKED SAIGON'S MARKETS

THE AMERICANS WERE GONE.

THEY COUNTED NEARLY 60,OOO DEAD
AND MORE THAN 300,000 WOUNDED.

IT WAS THEIR FIRST DEFEAT.

THE PROMISED END OF THE TUNNEL
HAD BROUGHT, NOT LIGHT

BUT A NEW UNCERTAINTY,
NEW QUESTIONS:

WHAT WAS AMERICA'S ROLE
IN THE WORLD?

WHAT WERE THE LESSONS
OF VIETNAM?

CAPTIONED BY
THE CAPTION CENTER
WGBH BOSTON