Inside Europe: 10 Years of Turmoil (2019): Season 1, Episode 2 - Going for Broke - full transcript

It was the middle of the night at
a deadlocked summit in Brussels.

With Europe's single currency on
the brink of collapse,

its leaders decided to force
the banks to pay their share.

The bankers refused.

He began to threaten and basically
say that,

unless we agreed to a deal,

he would unleash a vicious media
attack on the bankers

and that we would be totally
destroyed.

It was very brutal.
It was very brutal.

The French president was not only
clear,

it was much more than being clear,
strongly supported



by the German Chancellor.

Europe has been
racked by a decade of turmoil.

# Rule Britannia... #

Here, for the first time, presidents
and prime ministers take

us behind closed doors to reveal how
they battled, night after night,

to save the European Union.

I said, you know, you will find
yourself

with your referenda when...

..in deep shit.

The problem is that you have
political leaders who want to talk

together, alone. You never know what
comes out.

And what comes out of it this time
was absolutely terrible.

All they wanted to do was to
bamboozle me.

In this episode, one of Europe's
smallest economies brings the EU's



most ambitious project to the brink
of collapse.

Europe almost brought down
the entire world economy.

The crisis started in Greece.

For years, its governments had been
spending more than
they could afford.

And hiding it.

Prime Minister George Papandreou
tried to confront the problem

but, despite his efforts,
in the spring of 2010,

the markets stopped lending money
to Greece.

I called for a Cabinet meeting, told
them that we could go bankrupt

and going bankrupt would mean we
couldn't pay salaries,

our schools would close,
our hospitals would close,

our military would close.

Everyone in the Cabinet said,
"We can't go bankrupt."

It's a very difficult moment.

He knows the weight of that decision
that he has to take.

I had a trip the next day to a
small, beautiful island called

Kastellorizo.

I decided I would make the
announcement there.

And, in this perfect setting,
Papandreou is basically announcing

the end of the world.

One leader was key to the support
that Papandreou needed

to keep his country afloat.

I made the statement and then
I called Angela Merkel.

Obviously, she would have liked to
have heard

it before but I had to think about,
what if she said no?

He was right to be nervous.

Papandreou had been asking his EU
partners for help ever since

he discovered the scale of
the economic catastrophe

his country was facing.

But Merkel had turned him down at
a recent EU summit.

The Chancellor had the full backing
of her new finance minister.

I said to Angela Merkel,
"Angela, the more you delay,

"the more you pay."

And she said to me that she knew
about that but that she could not

take decisions at that moment,

precisely because that was not
a sufficient argument in Germany

to support Greece, but the argument
should be to support Europe.

When the Greek Prime Minister told
the world his country

was on the verge of bankruptcy,
the euro itself was put in danger.

Merkel was forced to
change her mind.

To show the markets the EU was
backing Greece,

Germany finally signed up to
a bailout.

The European Union, helped by the
International Monetary Fund,

put up 110 billion euros.

In exchange for the bailout,
the EU imposed tough austerity

measures on the Greek people,
including tax hikes

and widespread salary cuts.

Once the agreement on Greece was

signed on the 2nd of May,

then there was calm in the markets.

For one day.

On the 4th, a rumour came out
saying that Spain

had asked for a package

of assistance of 280 billion.

This was totally false.

But, you know, the markets were
so nervous that the pressure

continued on the 5th
and on the 6th of May.

We were, in fact, witnessing
a financial meltdown of Europe

in front of our eyes.

The next day was a Friday.

The leaders of the Eurozone
countries gathered in Brussels

for a crisis summit.

They had until the markets opened on
Monday morning

to find a solution.

Very difficult meeting.
Everybody knew

the financial markets were listening
to us, even in the room.

The French President arrived,

determined that the European Central
Bank should now throw

its vast resources at the problem.

I felt that for Sarkozy, Jean-Claude
Trichet was a French citizen,

a "citoyen" who had to be obedient

to the French President,
the head of state.

Rebuffed by the bank's governor,
the leaders had to find

another option.

They are passing the buck to the
finance ministers

who are supposed to meet on Sunday

before the markets open on Monday

and get an agreement that basically
allows the euro to not collapse

Monday morning under the pressure
of speculators in the markets.

All the EU finance ministers
were summoned,

even those not in the euro.

It was the worst weekend to call on
the government of the UK.

With the outcome of the general
election,

we find ourselves in a position
unknown to this generation

of political leaders,

with no single party able to have
a Commons majority

and therefore have a majority
government.

I was sitting in my garden where,
unseasonably,

the weather was really nice

at the beginning of May.

I was sipping my well-earned

glass of wine when I got

this very unwelcome call from my
private officer saying,

"Look, you'll need to go to Brussels
on Sunday.

"Obviously, you are the Chancellor
of the Exchequer until such time

"that a new one is appointed,
so you've got to go."

The EU Commissioner was next on
the phone to Alistair Darling

to tell him that Britain must
contribute

its taxpayers' pounds to save
the euro.

I said this is really about
the whole European Union,

the whole European economy and,
as the UK had been calling us

to take active and forceful action,
now we are doing that,

so let's practise what we preach.

I said, "Look, this is about
stabilising the euro,

"we're not in the euro."

There is no way I could agree to
that, even if we were still

definitely going to be
the Government.

And I said, "But even if we did
agree to it,

"there is no way I can bind a new
incoming Government,

"so I can't agree to it."

And he was very taken aback by that.

I asked to speak to George Osborne
because I thought there was every

chance he would be the Chancellor.

I was the Shadow Chancellor, still
in opposition, trying to

negotiate with Liberal Democrats to
form a new administration.

I was absolutely shattered and then
I get a call from Alistair Darling.

I explain to him the gravity of
the situation that, if things

weren't sorted out by
Monday morning, we could have
a real crisis on our hands.

And I said to him, "You're the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, you've
got to make your own decision,

"although, frankly, I don't think
you should commit

"a British government because
there's about to be a new one."

The meeting in Brussels came at
an awkward time for the German

Finance Minister too.

We gather around three o'clock
and then news comes

in that the German Finance Minister,
Wolfgang Schauble,

will not come to the meeting.

The question is, without Germany
around the table

in an authoritative way,
how can we take decisions?

German approval is very well
received by the markets.

So I ask Chancellor Merkel to send
us to the meeting another minister.

Sunday afternoon was fast
disappearing.

With the most powerful Eurozone
minister absent,

the others ramped up the pressure
on Britain's Chancellor.

He had agreed that they could use
some British money already committed

to the EU budget, but the UK would
contribute no more.

The final attempt to get us in
was amazing.

What happened was they simply
reordered the paragraphs on a piece

of paper and it was still there that
we were liable to contribute.

And I really was getting very angry
at this stage.

We had been sitting around
all afternoon,

I just didn't understand which bit
of "no" didn't they appreciate?

And, you know, I...

I'm very slow to get angry with
people, but I was just so frustrated

when all the time the clock was
ticking away and they just

would not accept this.

Darling stood firm.

Options were running out.

The rest of the world
was getting worried.

Europe was just so enormously
important to the global economy

as a whole, not just the US economy,
and our fear was that Europe

was just dramatically behind
the curve.

The US Treasury Secretary arranged
a conference call to tell

the Europeans they needed a massive
fund, a financial firewall.

And, on that call, I asked,
"How large would that firewall be?"

And they said, "Something in
the range of 60 billion euros."

I think I laughed at that point
and said,

"If you do that, you've got to be
kidding, if you do that,

"it'll just accelerate the run.

"People will view it as
so inadequate to
the scale of the problem

"that it will not be reassuring,
it'll magnify the fear.

"You need to do ten times that."

Building a protective firewall on
that scale was a huge challenge

to the European leaders,

especially the German Chancellor,
whose voters knew their country

would have to pay the most.

That Sunday, Merkel was in Moscow
for the anniversary of the defeat

of the Nazis.

LOUD FANFARE OF MILITARY BAND

As German Chancellor,
she felt she had to attend.

Even on the steps of the Kremlin,
anxiety about the crisis

was mounting.

Back in Berlin that evening,
Merkel revealed to her closest

European partner just how big a
bazooka she was prepared to load.

With barely six hours until
the markets opened in Tokyo,

Merkel's envoy finally arrived
in Brussels.

The stumbling block that remained
was how to guarantee the fund.

The Germans worried that the plan on
the table would require them

to underwrite the lot.

Merkel refused.

The discussion goes in fits
and starts.

Around midnight, we thought we had
the solution and the person

around the table representing
Germany

has to clear it with Berlin.

We were conscious to the fact
the clock was ticking away

and if you have not got an agreement
by the time the markets opened,

you could well have been back to
the problems we had in 2008

with Lehman's, RBS and so on,
and everything we'd done

in the previous 18 months would have
been completely undermined.

Just 15 minutes before
the markets opened,

they finally found the solution.

Each country would guarantee

only its own contribution.

Mr Olli Rehn came and he said,
"Chancellor Merkel has said yes

"and you should reconvene
the meeting as soon as possible

"and before anything changes,"
he said.

At 2:08am on Monday morning,

eight minutes after Asia had opened,

we had an agreement.

Good evening, or goodnight,
I guess I should say.

The European Union always takes
the best decisions at night.

We shall defend the euro,
whatever it takes.

Topped up by the International
Monetary Fund, the firewall

they created to protect
the single currency was enormous.

750 billion euros.

750 billion euros, at the level

of the Eurodollar,

was almost 1 trillion,

so, at this level, we had something

which looked credible in terms of
systemic defence of Europe.

Less than six months later,
Merkel met Sarkozy

in the French resort of Deauville.

Confidence was returning.

The two leaders set out for a stroll
along the promenade.

Merkel had come to Deauville
with a bold proposal.

To reassure her voters, she was
determined that the cost

of any future bailout would be more
widely shared.

Everyone knew that the banks had
been profiting from the crisis.

Merkel persuaded Sarkozy that
the bankers must be forced

to pay their share.

Sarkozy agreed.

In return, he got some leeway with
France's deficit,

which was well above the EU limit.

Not everyone agreed it was for the
best.

Particularly the IMF chief who had
backed the EU's bailout

decision so far.

When I heard about it the first
time, I was really surprised,

you know? It's a crazy idea.

It is a crazy idea,
I have to say that.

The problem is that you have
political leaders who may have a lot

of qualities, but they're not
all economists.

When they talk together alone,
you never know what comes out

and what comes out this time
was absolutely terrible.

And my view was that was destroying
part of the rebuilding

of the confidence for the future
and we need confidence.

All this is only about confidence.

Merkel's decision made bankers
panic.

Risking massive losses,
they stopped lending money

to weak economies.

By the spring of 2011,
Ireland and Portugal

had also needed bailouts.

The head of the IMF decided to go to
Germany to tell Merkel her policy

was making the crisis worse.

I was planning to say to Merkel that
it was the right time to move,

because there were risks
for other economies.

The risk of having the same problem
reappearing in another part

of the European Union
was an important one.

But Strauss-Kahn never made it.

The head of the International
Monetary Fund is charged

with attempted rape in New York.

The police arrested the head
of the IMF,

Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a pivotal
player in the global

economic system, who was about to
leave New York

for key meetings on Europe's
debt crisis.

The charge was later dropped
but the opportunity was lost.

The banks were still reluctant to
lend and a third of Eurozone

countries were now in trouble.

Britain also had reason to worry.

More than half of its trade was with
the European Union.

The euro's collapse would threaten
its fragile recovery.

The British Treasury had to do
something.

What we did was set up a secret
committee,

across the Government, which I
chaired, it met in my office,

in the Treasury, which had
the Foreign Secretary

on it, the Governor of the Bank of
England on it and other members

of the Government.

We talked through,
"Well, what on Earth happens

"if the euro collapses?"

I remember participating in one of
these meetings and there was real

concern. What would we do about
British tourists

who were stranded? And George
Osborne and his team at the Treasury

were arranging for money to be made
available,

literally, ready, physical money.

So, we had plans in place to fly
money out to those islands

on pallets, big lumps of cash, in
notes, so that they could get

off those islands and get back home.

The so-called secret preparations of
the British Government

for the collapse of the euro
were not so secret.

I was aware, of course,
because we were doing the same.

Mr Barroso, can you point it out a
bit clearer? What is the Plan B?

We never comment on Plan Bs,
we are working on Plan A.

I did not want to say the Plan B,
because it would be,

of course, creating more panic.

I said, "No, we don't
have a Plan B."

It's true, we did not have a
Plan B, but we had a Plan Z.

Merkel and Sarkozy pressed on
with their own Plan Z,

despite the backlash
from the markets.

By the autumn, Greece desperately
needed another bailout.

This time, the banks would have to
share the pain.

They would have to write off
50% of their loans.

Mr Papandreou.

In exchange, the Greeks would have
to suffer even more

drastic austerity.

Violent protests erupted against
the EU's deal.

Since the crisis began, unemployment
had more than doubled

and more than a third of Greeks
were now facing poverty.

Shaken by his people's anger,
Papandreou announced a referendum

on the terms of the bailout.

The news interrupted
the French President,

who was preparing to host
a glittering G20 summit

in Cannes, a meeting of the leaders
of the world's biggest economies.

Sarkozy called me.

He invited me to Cannes.

He was not happy about
the referendum,

but I was happy to go to Cannes,
because I was hoping...

My hope was that, since the G20 was
there, I would get

not only European support
but I would get the support

of a global body, the G20,
which would come and say,

"Yes, we are supporting Greece
and we do hope

"that the referendum will go well."

On the eve of the summit, Sarkozy
called in the eurozone heavyweights

to confront Papandreou.

We were all upset about all of this,
because we saw,

falling into pieces, all what we
tried to achieve.

I said, "No, no, that's not
the question.

"The question is not in or out
of the euro,

"we cannot have a referendum on
in or out of the euro.

"We are not out of the euro,
we are in the euro.

"I have a question on the programme,
whether the Greek people

"want the programme."

Of course, it was a humiliating
session.

Because he was...

Rightly so, but he couldn't have
expected it,

coming to Cannes,
that it would be a nice

meeting among friends.

The Greek Prime Minister flew home
to Athens,

a defeated man.

The dressing down in Cannes had lost
him the backing

of his cabinet.

He cancelled the referendum
and resigned.

Sarkozy's G20 officially opened
the next morning.

The euro crisis was top of
the agenda and not only

for the Europeans.

President Obama came to Cannes
determined to take the lead.

He was intent on getting the
Europeans to rebuild

their firewall.

Portugal and Ireland had already
badly depleted the fund.

Now, Spain and Italy were heading
the same way.

That probably was the most dangerous
moment so far in the crisis.

Our concern was that it would
unravel the monetary union

and, if that happened, you would
have a collapse

in the European economy, which would
risk great depression-like

economic outcome.

On the margins of the formal
session, Sarkozy called

the Eurozone leaders together.

The meeting was actually chaired
by Obama.

It was not the first time that
I noticed that he has a natural

tendency of chairing meetings,

even if he is not
the official chair.

President Obama told us,
"Look, you guys, you have to put

"more money in.

"Probably at least 1.3 trillion."

And he mentioned what he has done
in the United States.

What President Obama tried to do
was he tried to explain

that you needed more from Germany.

You needed more creativity from
Germany and from the central

banks of Europe if you're going
to find a credible solution.

Obama told his European partners
they had to use the reserves

of their central banks.

For Chancellor Merkel, this was not
an option.

The powerful Bundesbank had already
turned her down flat.

Merkel, she was visibly upset.

She was very upset to be put in
that position.

What she said was, "Our Central Bank
is independent and it is your fault,

"you wrote the Constitution.

"How could you put me in a position
of asking me to violate a set

"of constraints on independence that
you were part of shaping?"

It turned rather nasty and
the German Chancellor became

really emotional
because she was isolated.

I remember, you know, leaving that
meeting,

a very difficult meeting,
and he walked out with her

and was trying to reassure and
console her, put his arm around her,

to comfort her.

I think she understood and believed
that he understood how difficult

this was for her.

Obama realised he had to
drop his plan.

We had a break and we were talking
together on the balcony

and I remember him saying,
"You know, this would be kind of
interesting

"if it wasn't so scary."

Running out of options, the leaders
move to impose controls

on the Eurozone's profligate
members.

Italy was the biggest of the
economies with a bad track record,

but that's not how its colourful
Prime Minister saw it.

Berlusconi appeared almost in
a situation of denial.

He was saying that Italy is
a very rich country,

that Italy can manage and it is true
that Italy has a very strong

economy but it was also true,
at that time,

the markets were extremely sceptical
about the capability of Italy

to honour its commitments, namely
because of the extremely high

level of public debt.

Berlusconi was having none of it.

But when his own Parliament voted
for the austerity measures

he was resisting, Berlusconi was
forced to resign.

Frau Merkel, we have achieved

a victory again. Oh, ja.

People are calling it dictatorial,

where the two of us humiliated

the leader of a little independent
nation...

But I, as you would know, think that
a dictatorship

is quite necessary, sometimes.

That is the French tradition.

And soon there will be a bright new
tomorrow. Oh, ja.

It will be wunderbar.

First Papandreou, then Berlusconi
had been deposed.

Each was replaced by an EU-backed
technocrat.

By the following summer, the EU
managed to agree tough

controls on state budgets and
the Eurozone banking system.

We affirm our strong commitment to
do what is necessary to ensure

that the financial stability
of the euro area.

But the markets were unconvinced
and interest rates

were still rising.

We had the Olympic Games on and
with the Olympic Games comes

lots of business leaders,
so we thought, "Well,

"let's put on a show for them. Let's
have a big investor conference."

The new Governor of the European
Central Bank,

Mario Draghi, was invited to speak
at the conference.

While I was trying to prepare for
this conversation,

I asked myself, "What sort of
message did I want to give to you?"

He didn't tell us he was going to
say anything particularly special.

Within our mandate,
within our mandate,

the ECB is ready to do whatever it
takes to preserve the euro.

And, believe me, it will be enough.

Little did we know, this was going
to be the moment

where Mario Draghi essentially
saved the euro.

It is almost word by word

a statement made by euro area
summits some weeks before.

The fact is that the markets paid
much more attention to the word

of the ECB than to the word of
the heads of certain governments.

Now with the might of Europe's
Central Bank finally

behind it, the euro was
out of danger.

The financial crisis was over.

But the solution came at a political
cost.

In the two years that followed,
voters throughout Europe

vented their fury.

Many blamed the dictatorial way
the EU had dealt with the crisis.

In the European elections of 2014,
populist movements on both the right

and the left made spectacular gains.

In Greece, where the crisis began
five years earlier, the radical

left wing Syriza movement
won the election

and Alexis Tsipras became
Prime Minister of the EU's

first populist government.

Tsipras named a Marxist professor
of economics

as his finance minister.

Two weeks later,

Yanis Varoufakis was in Brussels
for his first Eurogroup,

the meeting of the finance ministers
of the countries that use the euro.

I'm confident we're going to have
a very constructive meeting.

Thank you.

The bailout would expire in 17 days
and Greece needed more money.

But its new government was
determined to tear up the terms

and scrap austerity.

He came into the Eurogroup with the
great air of self-confidence,

and you have to understand,
these ministers of finance

are pretty, you know,
down-to-earth, kind of, guys.

So he explained everything in very
melodramatic language

from the beginning of history, right
up to the end of this programme.

What I said was, "We were elected to
challenge a programme that failed

"and put our people in debtor's
prison and destroyed the prospects

"of a whole generation.

"And we promised our electorate that
we would renegotiate

"this failed programme."

All they wanted to do was to
bamboozle me into signing,

or accepting, a communique which
committed me,

as the finance minister,
to effectively no change.

To continue with the previous
programme that I was elected

to challenge and to replace.

It was a very awkward situation,
we were around this round table,

19 ministers, and they were all
there and he made the call

to Prime Minister Tsipras,
in the room, which lasted

for more than an hour.

And the ministers had to wait.

I was on the phone with Tsipras,
he was the Prime Minister.

This was a crucial decision
that no finance minister

has the right to make on his own.

At one point I remember
Wolfgang Schauble saying,

"OK, that's enough, I'm off."

And he left.

I walked over to Varoufakis,
who was still on the phone,

and said, "You may as well put down
the phone

"because now ministers are gone.

"There's nothing I can do,
there is no deal."

In the outside world, this would
really cause havoc.

And I realised that if this guy
doesn't have a mandate

from his Prime Minister,
perhaps I shouldn't be talking

to Varoufakis, perhaps I should be
talking to the Prime Minister.

Luck had it that the Prime Minister
was in Brussels,

so I got in touch with him.

We were at the hotel,

waiting for the summit to start,

and we had a surprise visit by
Jeroen Dijsselbloem.

He had a whole wing, with his staff,
and in his room

he and I sat down and talked for
quite a long time.

He was very reasonable,
he understood the limits

and the possibilities, and the
no-goes in Europe.

And understood very well that we had
to continue to work together.

The bailout was extended for another
four months

so they could try to thrash out
a new deal.

Five days before the deadline,
the EU negotiators

thought they were almost there.

A lot of ground had been covered,
but there were some

remaining points, stuff that you may
not think

is very important, very big, but it
is in the Greek situation.

It's about the VAT on tourism on
some of the Greek islands.

They asked Tsipras to agree that VAT
on hotels should go to 24%.

When, in Turkey, just opposite,
a stone's throw away from Samos,

from Kos, from Rhodes, it's only 7%.

Tsipras had a...

..had been with us all the time
and had been negotiating the text.

Said, "I think this could fly,
but let me check with my people."

And he got up...

..and he was never seen again.

The Greek Prime Minister flew back
to Athens,

leaving his European colleagues
in the dark.

Late that night, he arranged
a conference call

with Angela Merkel,
and Sarkozy's successor,

Francois Hollande.

They asked him, "What is your stance
going to be?"

He said, "I'm going to ask
the people to reject it."

The announcement took the EU leaders
by surprise.

The new president of the European
Council warned Tsipras

that using a referendum to try and
extract better terms could backfire.

I told him, "You know, Alexis,
we are, all of us,

"we are discussing for hours how to
help you.

"How to help Greece.

"And, at the same time, you are
discussing with your people how to
cheat on us, you know?

"It's unacceptable.

"Please, be aware,
that other prime ministers,

"they can also organise
their own referenda.

"With, just, you know,
one question...

"..would you like to pay
the Greek bill?

"And can you imagine, Alexis,
saying... Please, guess what would

"be the result of this referendum?"

And, sorry for this quotation,
but I remember well this moment,
and I said,

"You know, you will find yourself,
with your referendum,

"in deep shit."

Sorry, but it was... Maybe this is
the best illustration

of how emotional the situation was.

The deadline expired,
the European Central Bank

stopped financing Greece.

Greeks rush to take their money out
of the banks.

The state capped cash withdrawals
at 60 euros a day.

Many welfare payments stopped.

In the referendum, the majority
stood by their Prime Minister.

More than 60% of Greeks voted
"Oxi", no to the deal

that the EU was offering.

I had arrived at
the Prime Minister's residence,

after being outside on the streets,
celebrating with people.

When I walked into Tsipras's office,
he was sitting in the chair

and I have never seen him before
so sunk into a chair.

It was as if he had become
liquefied.

Feeling absolutely distraught.

And he said to me, "We messed up."

I said to him,
"No, we didn't mess up.

"This is a magnificent victory,
now we have to honour that." No!

In fact, Tsipras had just spoken to
his most powerful ally in the EU.

The Greek Prime Minister decided
he had no choice but to return

to the negotiating table in
Brussels.

I thought, "No-one, Prime Minister,
can turn against the 62%.

"On the same night."

I was wrong, he did.

I knew that the last morsel of hope
had gone

and, therefore, my next step was
resignation.

The Eurozone leaders called an
emergency summit to settle

the Greek question once and for all.

But before they got there,
the German finance minister

circulated a paper.

He proposed that, unless Greece
accepted the EU's terms,

it should leave the euro
for five years.

In the letter of Schauble, he
suggested this temporary Brexit,

but it was clear for all of us,
for sure for Tsipras,

that this is pure illusion.
Pure fiction.

This temporary exit.

If you leave, you leave for good.

Greece stood alone. The euro was now
far more stable,

only the Greek economy was under
attack from the markets.

To remain in the euro, Tsipras would
have to agree

to the tough terms of the latest
EU bailout.

That meant Greece's fate would be
decided by the very leaders

Tsipras had turned his back on.

We had a full round of debate,
long introductions by,

of course, Tsipras, others who
reacted, some very harshly,

lashing out to the Greek government,

calling them liars,
to their own people.

The President of the European
Council locked Merkel,

Hollande and Tsipras in his office
to nail down the measures

Greece must take.

The sticking point was a huge sale
of Greek state assets.

It had even been suggested they sell
the Parthenon.

About four o'clock we thought that
we'd reached a compromise

and we went back to the plenary
room. I was really proud,

you know, that now I can say,
"OK, we did it!"

The other leaders thought Tsipras
was ready to sign,

then he took the floor.

Merkel said, "No way, we need that
money to reduce your debt.

"You need to repay us."

I come back to our office of
the Italian delegation,

and I am so tired.

I take my shoes off,
I close the doors,

with the key, and I sleep
on the sofa.

I received a very strong knock-knock
on the door.

I open the door, Francois Hollande.

He entered in our delegation.
"Matteo, it is time to find

"a compromise because Angela risks,

"clearly, to accept the exit
of Greece."

The first hour of the morning
I had a very strong

discussion with Angela.

I bluffed her.

"Now, it's enough."

And she told me, very strongly,
"I'm not stupid!"

My reaction was, "This decision is
the most stupid thing for Europe."

President Tusk called
the key players back in.

I close the doors and then I said,

"You know, guys, there is no way you
are leaving the room

"before we reached an agreement."

After four more hours of
negotiations, Merkel gave way.

She agreed that the Greek government
could invest a quarter

of the privatisation fund
in its economy.

Greece would remain in the single
currency,

with another huge loan of
86 billion euros.

But the terms were worse than
those on the table

before the referendum.

I wanted to quote Shakespeare, it
was something in between tragedy

and comedy of Shakespeare, you know?

All's well that ends well.

But, then, someone from my staff
gave me a piece of paper

with just one word.

After 17 hours of negotiations,
we have finally reached it.

Someone can say that we have
an a-GREEK-ment.

After that, I immediately
went to bed!

Two months later, the Greek people
endorsed Tsipras's U-turn

by re-electing him.

Like Tsipras, they looked over
the brink and decided

they were better off inside the euro
than out in the cold.

The European Union had survived
its biggest crisis.

Worse was to come.

In the next episode, how the arrival
of hundreds

of thousands of migrants
on Europe's shores

tore its leaders apart.

Do not come to Europe.

It is all for nothing.

I was still encouraging her not to
close the border.