Challenger: The Final Flight (2020): Season 1, Episode 4 - Nothing Ends Here - full transcript

[woman] There it goes.
I see it in between the trees.

[man] There it goes. It's comin'
way over top the trees, isn't it?

- [woman] Uh-huh.
- [man] That's brighter than usual.

[woman] Yeah, it is.

- [man] Well, that's it. Oh, yeah!
- [woman] Yeah!

- Right over those trees!
- [man 2] Oh, yeah, there it is.

[man] I don't remember it being
that bright and big.

[woman] I don't either.

[man] What was that part?
That must've been one of the boosters.

[woman] Oh, look! There's two.
It's going off into two...

[man] Hey, is that trouble, or not?



[man 2] What?

[man]
They're not having trouble, are they?

[man 2] I don't know!
I ain't never seen anything like that.

[man] That didn't look right.
That's trouble of some kind, George.

[George] I don't know.

[man] They got troubles!

[theme music playing]

[overlapping murmurs and chatter]

[operator] Again, I repeat, we have
a report that the vehicle has exploded.

[people sobbing and crying]

[Lisa Bristol] Listening to the announcer,

that's when we knew something
really horrible had happened.

That there's no going back.

That…



That it probably wasn't survivable.

[June Scobee Rodgers]
Christa's husband, Steve McAuliffe,

his eyes met mine.

I didn't have an answer.

My son, who was
a pilot engineer himself…

We didn't have answers.

And I turned and kept looking.

And I thought,
"This is not gonna be good."

But, I said,
"They're okay, they're trained to land.

They're trained for emergencies.
They'll go land over here. It'll be okay."

[Marcia Jarvis]
I remember Rich Scobee said,

"If there's any way my dad can
get everybody out of it, he will."

He had total confidence
in Dick to do that.

[Barbara Morgan] I remember coming down
and just running as quickly as I could

'cause I wanted to reach the crew quarters
to help out the families.

I was just saying, "Dick, Mike,

El, Ron, Judy, Greg, Christa."

That's... that's what
was going through my mind.

Fido, can we get any reports
from recovery forces?

[operator] Stand by.

We'd had no idea if the orbiter was
intact, we had no idea where it was,

or what it might…
What kind of condition it might be in.

I never even tried to make a call
to the Challenger crew.

We had no way of helping.

[operator] We are now looking
at all the contingency operations

and awaiting word from any recovery forces
in the downrange field.

[William Harwood]
Staring out at that contrail,

I just felt tears start welling up.

And I remember having to really
grip my legs hard

and say, "Leave this.
Think about this later."

And I, you know, kinda shook my head
and started typing again.

[woman] When the Challenger exploded,
none of us knew.

We weren't savvy in what
it was supposed to look like.

A teacher started yelling,
"Stop! It exploded!"

And then it was just, like, a hush.

[Leslie Serna] We all just sat there
in awe about what had taken place.

Dad put his hand in his face

and sobbed, sobbed, and sobbed.

[Russell] I noticed in front of the room,
that the senior engineer got up and left.

And I left a little bit after him.
And I went down to his... his, uh…

I went down to his office,
and he was in tears.

And I was in tears.

And it seemed that there was no question
in either one of our minds that, uh…

that what we had feared had come to pass.

And we just felt terrible about it.

[reporter] There's Larry Speakes
in the White House Briefing Room.

The President is concerned.
He is saddened.

He is, uh, very anxious to have
more information on it.

At the moment, as I say,

we're learning most of our information
from what the public is getting.

[crowd clamoring]

[John Zarrella] In unison,
everybody takes off

and runs towards the press dome,

which is where
the NASA public affairs folks are.

By the time I get there, I mean,
it's an absolute chaotic…

event going on and nobody knowing
what to do or what to say.

And NASA public affairs was, like…

Nobody planned for anything like this.

[June] They took us on a bus
to the crew quarters.

And, sitting in that bus,
we stopped at a stop light.

Around me, everywhere on the streets,
people were parked,

out of their cars on major thoroughfares.

Some people were
at the steering wheels, weeping.

[voice trembling] Some people were out
banging on the hood of their cars.

I knew... I knew something really,
really bad had happened.

[Tom Brokaw] There are rescue ships
and other vehicles now, other helicopters,

other vessels are attempting
to find out what they can.

The silence is deafening.

There is no word from NASA,
no word from the rescue vehicles,

no word whatsoever
on what may have happened.

[indistinct clamoring]

[Harwood] First thing everybody wanted
to know was what caused the accident.

So it was a mad rush to try to get experts
to tell you what could've gone wrong,

what are some of the likely candidates.

[Tom Brokaw] In slow-motion now.

To my eye, at least, it appears that
the entire external tank just came apart.

[man] Well, if I had to hazard a guess,
I'd say something with the main engine,

since that would be the high probability,
but that could be totally wrong,

and it'll take a lot of numbers crunching
and data analysis to really sort it out.

It was what, uh, engineers call
a catastrophic failure.

Several things had to go wrong at once,

and from the looks of those tapes,
that was certainly the case.

The shuttle had a telemetry stream
that was really unbelievable.

I mean, they had enormous amounts of data

all the way up to the moment
they lost the orbiter.

So we were waiting for NASA to tell
because they must know

what happened,
or have a pretty darn good idea.

[operator] J.C., all operators,
contingency procedures in effect.

[Frederick Gregory]
They locked the doors to keep people out.

And then,
for the next four or five hours,

we sat there and tried to go back
through everything we'd seen,

just trying to figure out
if there had been

anything that we could have seen
and prevented.

[Covey] We had to collect
all the documentation

of everything that we had done, said,

or thought, or knew before
we could leave the control center.

[operator 2]
Okay, everybody, stay off the telephones,

make sure you maintain all your data,
start pulling it together.

[Allan McDonald] The first comment came by
was that "anybody that's at a console

must not change the screen.
It must be left where it's at."

And that all of this data is
going to be treated as secret-level.

No one can leave the room.
Not even to go to the bathroom.

No one can use a telephone.

And they made it very clear

that no one should be talking
to the press.

[June] We pulled up to crew quarters.
We all stepped into the lobby,

and there was the announcers for NASA.
NASA reporting.

And, you know, it's obvious… They were
saying it was an obvious disaster.

Obvious total loss
of the orbiter, the crew.

"Obvious."

Um…

[sniffles] And…

that was confirming.

I knew… they were all gone.

Not all the crew members' families
really understood

that their crew member
is not coming back,

even though that was pretty obvious.
But not all of them understood that.

I had seen Ron come through
difficult times before

and I, for some reason, um…

Yeah, I thought
he was gonna make it somehow.

[June] The NASA official, George Abbey,

came out and looked at all of us,

including parents, and children,
all brought together in the same room…

and he said, "No one could've survived.
No one could have survived."

I had heard that and I remember just…

[voice breaking] …like, hyperventilating,
'cause, up to that point, I thought,

"Well, surely they're..." I mean,
here's me, like, optimi...

"Surely, they're floating somewhere.

Like, surely somebody figured out
how to get them out of there."

[crying] This wasn't how
it was supposed to be.

This wasn't the end of the story.

Well, the doctor said, "Can I give you
something for your nerves?"

And I told her, "I am not nervous.

If you give me something for heartbreak,
I will take it.

I will take it.

But I'm not nervous."

I went into Dick's room by myself,
so that they couldn't see me.

And I reached over to his closet,
where his clothes were hanging,

and hugged his clothes,
all hanging in that closet.

And picked up his briefcase and opened it.

I saw his astronomy maps

and I saw a Valentine card,

"To my wife."

January the 28th, he was already prepared
to come home and give me a Valentine.

[shuddered breathing]

[reporter] Mr. Vice President, can you
tell us further details about the shuttle?

- Were you briefed on this?
- No. No more than anyone else knows.

- A terrible tragedy.
- [reporter] How would you react to this?

[Bush] Great concern for the families.
I really don't have any detail on it.

Vice President Bush flew down
to the Cape to meet with family members

that same day, along with Jake Garn, who
had flown on the space shuttle earlier.

[Marcia] Jake Garn was a senator from Utah
who bumped Greg from his first flight.

So that was hard for me to see
Senator Garn there.

At that time, I think…
I believe I walked out of the room.

[Jesse Moore] I regret
that I have to report,

that based on very preliminary searches
of the ocean where the Challenger

impacted this morning…

these searches have not revealed
any evidence

that the crew of Challenger survived.

The American space shuttle Challenger
exploded 60 seconds into its flight.

…obliterated the shuttle Challenger...

[speaking French]

[speaking Russian]

[speaking Japanese]

[speaking Spanish]

[speaking German]

[man] My heart sort of stopped beating,
you know, just feel for the families,

you know, 'cause that school teacher,
you know, was involved in it and,

you know, it's just a really,
you know, terrible thing to happen.

Seven really brilliant and beautiful
people got killed.

I was shocked.

Reminded me a lot of
President Kennedy's death in '63.

I don't know where the analogy comes,
but it was a national tragedy.

[man 2]
Many schools had broadcast the launch,

and it was horrible for the kids.

[Peter Billingsly]
We felt connected to it.

Like, "That's us! That's a teacher!"
We were invested.

And for many,
it was the first dealing of death.

It was somewhat of a loss of innocence.

[softly] Just…
She was just really special.

It's hard.

Well, I was really amazed to see it

'cause I never thought an explosion
would really ever happen.

I felt as if, um,

my whole body blew up
inside when I saw that.

And I can, just,
never be as shocked as I am now.

[Brokaw] The real question that
remains to be answered, of course, is,

was there some kind of incompetence
on the part of those people

who are charged
with the Space Shuttle Program?

The American public will
be demanding some difficult answers

to some difficult questions,
and of course we'll all have to examine

what it is that we want
from this era of high technology.

[Ronald Reagan] Ladies and gentlemen,
I'd planned to speak to you tonight

to report on the State of the Union.

But the events of earlier today
have led me to change those plans.

Today is a day for mourning
and remembering.

Nancy and I are pained

to the core over the tragedy
of the shuttle Challenger.

We know we share this pain
with all of the people of our country.

This is truly a national loss.

The crew of the space shuttle Challenger

honored us with the manner
in which they lived their lives.

We will never forget them,
nor the last time we saw them,

this morning, as they prepared
for their journey and waved goodbye,

and slipped the surly bonds of Earth
to touch the face of God.

Thank you.

We set up a review board to talk
about what could've caused it.

And nobody seemed to know.

And finally some photography
became available.

NASA's STS-51L investigation board
today released photographic data

of the STS-51L system during its ascent.

They observed what appears
to be an unexpected change,

seen as an unusual plume in the lower
part of the right SRB area of the system.

The cause is still unknown,

and neither the board nor NASA
will speculate as to the cause or effects

of this observation until all data
has been carefully studied and evaluated.

[reporter] By "unusual plume,"
do you mean to say "flame"?

No… The, uh... the board said
"an unusual plume," and the, uh…

and that's what the,
you know, statement says.

NASA was so tight-lipped
about it that the briefer that they put up

wasn't allowed to call it "flame."

It was an "anomalous plume."

And I remember watching that video,

in which there is a very clear
jet of flame.

You could see it start small
and get bigger.

It was clearly a burn-through
in the booster.

[reporter 2] Can you elaborate at all

on what was unusual
or abnormal about this plume?

Its location or when it showed up,
or what is the unusual aspect?

The statement of the board
is it's an "unusual plume."

And that's, you know, all that I have.

NASA was issuing a lot
of extraordinarily general answers

to highly specific questions.

And usually when that happens,
it means one of two things:

either the people you're asking
the question to don't know,

or the people you're asking
the question to do know,

and they're trying to keep you away
from the specifics.

[reporter 3]
Would it be logical for us to assume

the focus of the investigation,
at this point, is trying to determine

what caused that plume
and what effect it had on the explosion?

Yes and no.

The board is looking at that area,

but they're also looking
at a lot of other areas.

[David Sanger] It seemed to us that
there could well be deflection under way.

NASA was zeroing in on there being
a problem with the solid boosters.

But we were told
we couldn't offer something up

that they didn't want to release.

We were circling the wagons.

Management was a little frightened,
and didn't want to deal with it.

And, of course, when you blow up
a three billion dollar orbiter

and kill seven people on live television,

it's not gonna wait two or three months
for an investigation. It's just not.

That's just human nature.
Everybody wanted to know what happened.

- [program music playing]
- [announcer] From CBS News Washington,

Face the Nation with White House
Correspondent Lesley Stahl.

We spoke with the acting head of NASA,
Dr. William Graham, this morning

about that flame that appeared
in the right booster rocket

15 seconds before the shuttle exploded.

Can you just give us
a succinct explanation of

how it was possible
that no one picked up this plume?

[Graham] These very heavy steel casings
that constitute the, uh, structure

of these solid rocket boosters
are considered primary structure

and not susceptible to failure.

Of course, we designed them that way.

It wasn't just a chance
that they're not susceptible,

or we thought them not susceptible,

but they were designed
with great care and great thought

and everything we could do
to keep them from having any...

[coughs] Excuse me, any failure modes.

[Richard Cook]
I saw William Graham on Face the Nation

saying that the solid rocket boosters
were primary hardware

not susceptible to failure.

The same day, the photograph was
published in the press

of a flame coming out the side
of the solid rocket booster.

I was also told by one of the engineers,
whose memo I had gotten,

not to show that to Graham.

And it seemed to me
that people from NASA were keeping

the knowledge of O-ring erosion
from the head of the agency.

[Reagan] I am today announcing
the formation of a presidential commission

on the space shuttle
Challenger's accident.

William P. Rogers, former Secretary
of State and former Attorney General,

will serve as chairman of the commission.

[Sanger] Bill Rogers,
an interesting choice

because he was a political figure,
not somebody with any technical knowledge

of the space program.

He was such an establishment figure,

and we later learned
that Reagan had said to him,

"Whatever you do, don't embarrass NASA.

They're national heroes.
We're going to need them.

They're going to have to launch again."

Ladies and gentlemen, I now would
like to call this first meeting to order.

[Keel] I was the Executive Director
of the Shuttle Commission.

I had several positions
in government prior to that,

including Assistant Secretary to
Air Force for Research and Development.

In addition, there were people

like Dr. Sally Ride,
first American woman in space,

Neil Armstrong, first man
to walk on the moon, of course,

and Dr. Richard Feynman,
who was a Nobel Laureate.

[Sanger] Feynman was
a fascinating addition to the commission.

Here was a scientist who was
known not only as a brilliant lecturer,

but as a man who had been involved
in the creation of the atomic bomb.

He was deeply anti-authority.

If the people in the Swedish Academy
decide that X, Y, or Z

wins the Nobel Prize, then so be it.

I won't have anything to do with
the Nobel Prize. It's a pain in the…

[chuckling quietly]

I'm not sure that they understood
any of that when they appointed him.

And it turned out that he had
one great ally on the commission,

and that was General Don Kutyna.

[Kutyna] Feynman and I kinda got close.

The first day of the commission,
for the VIPs,

everybody had a limo to pick them up.

And he said, "Kutyna, where's your limo?"

And I says,
"I'm just a two-star, I ride the subway."

And he says, "Kutyna, you're all right,"
and patted me on the back.

And from that day on,
he and I rode the subway to meetings

instead of having a limo come pick us up.

I don't think Rogers necessarily wanted
a military guy on the commission.

State and military did not get along.

I think he put up with me during
the commission, and after that,

we did not call each other
or send Christmas cards.

[Rogers] That is our purpose this morning

to be brought up to date on the events
that occurred since the accident.

We will call on NASA officials.

[Sanger] At the beginning, Rogers was
extremely defensive of NASA.

And he gave a lot
of leeway to NASA officials.

I had not planned to focus
on any particular area.

And that's why
I'm not prepared to do that.

[Rogers] Yeah. We can come back to that.

We appreciate that we didn't give you
much notice of the meeting, so proceed.

We'll be able to get that information.

I saw NASA officials making statements
that were simply not true.

[Judson] We have seen
some erosion of those seals.

The primary seal. We've never seen
any erosion of the secondary seal.

And when I saw this, I said,
"What am I gonna do?"

[Phillip Boffey] I was handed a message
by the newsroom clerk,

and it said some guy wants to talk
about the Challenger accident,

and he wants to speak to our NASA writer.

I think he called himself
something-or-other Lee. Maybe Richard Lee.

I get out the NASA phone book that we had
in the bureau, and I can't find any Lee.

So I call this guy back and I said,

"You know, Mr. Lee, I can't find you
in the NASA phone book."

Well, he says, "Well, okay, I'll fess up.
My name's Richard Cook."

I said, "I have some documents
about the NASA explosion."

Then he said, "Well, can you come
down here tomorrow and see me?"

I was feeling very nervous

because I knew how far outside
official channels I was going.

[Boffey] He said,
in that first conversation,

"I don't want my name identified.
NASA could fire me."

I told him I wanted to see everything
he had before I made a judgment.

[Cook] He looked at the documents
and said, "This looks like good stuff."

He said, "The publisher wants this
to be the lead story for Sunday."

But we've got to use your name
on that memo.

And I kinda gulped.

It's one thing to have
an anonymous document leak,

but if you can't attach it to somebody,

it's just another…

anonymous guy who may or may not
know what the hell he's talking about.

And I said, "Okay."

[Boffey] It was a major scoop.

[reporter] Three years ago,

NASA safety analysts
documented problems with the seals

on the solid rocket boosters
on the shuttle flights.

[Sanger] The story suggested,
for the first time,

that there had been a past problem
with the solid rocket boosters.

[Keel] This was explosion information.

Secretary Rogers was not happy with that.

He wanted to make sure,
in no uncertain terms,

that we're not happy with learning
things, uh, second-hand, if you will.

So he and I concurred that
the next meeting should be closed-door.

And it was basically a "let's come
to terms here with NASA officials."

[reporter] The presidential commission
investigating the Challenger tragedy

now moves its hearings
into private session.

[McDonald] We met at the old executive
office building next to the White House.

Larry Mulloy made it very clear that
he's gonna make the whole presentation.

Larry started talking.

Sally Ride says, "Well,
before you start, here, you know,

I answered a few of my phone calls,

and one of them was from a reporter
here in Washington,

said that they heard some rumor
that one of the contractors

may have recommended not even launching.

Is that really true?"

[Russell] Larry Mulloy was not gonna
mention that there was any big deal,

that they had an O-ring issue.
They talked about it. They resolved it.

And that was all that
he wanted to say about that.

Sally Ride said,
"Well, do you have any documentation

from the contractor saying
he was worried about cold temperatures?"

Larry says, "I don't recall any."

I thought,
"Well, that's a flat-ass-out lie."

[Keel] And at that point,
Allan McDonald from Thiokol,

on the back bench against the wall,
stood up and raised his hand.

He was trembling,
and his voice was quivering.

And he said, "Mr. Chairman,
we recommended not to launch

because of concern about the temperature."

And so that was a startling revelation.

We already had scheduled
an open session for the very next day.

Chairman Rogers said, "Let's not talk
about the weather at this next hearing.

Let's give NASA a chance
to explain themselves."

[footsteps approaching]

[Kutyna] After the commission meeting,

we were in the basement
of the State Department.

Sally Ride was walking next to me.

And, without saying a word to me,
gave me a piece of paper.

It had two columns.

One column was outside air temperature.

The other was the resiliency of an O-ring.

And, of course, the paper showed
that the ability to bounce back

as it got colder got less and less.

And NASA was withholding it.

The thing was, how can I introduce
this into the commission

without getting Sally in trouble?

Feynman came to my house for dinner.

I had an Opel GT in the garage
that I was very proud of.

So I came out of the kitchen door,
walked him around the Opel GT,

and the engine was open.

It just hit me.

"Professor, I have O-rings in this engine,

and they leak when it is cold."

On the counter I had an O-ring.

He picked it up and he looked at it.
And he didn't say a word.

Richard Feynman called me
right around midnight.

And he said,
"David, I have to do something

during the commission hearing tomorrow."

He said, "I can't tell you what it is,

but I need to get a little bit
of basic equipment for it.

Where do I get a pliers?"
And I said, "Well, Dr. Feynman,

it's midnight here in Washington.

There's sort of nothing open,
except maybe a 24-hour drug store."

He said,
"Well, take me to the drug store."

[Rogers] I'd like to call
the commission to order, please.

This morning we will start the meeting
with officials from NASA,

particularly dealing with the matter
of seals on the booster rockets.

[man] I'd like to introduce
Mr. Larry Mulloy,

who is the project manager
at the Marshall Space Flight Center.

[Keel] Larry Mulloy came up to talk about
the joints for the solid rocket motor.

So let me go to chart, uh, five, please.

[Kutyna] Richard Feynman
was a little bit of a showman.

To get the microphone
to become a hot mic,

you press the little red button.

The button would light up,

and then your mic was hot,
and you could talk.

And so he started
reaching out for the mic.

And I grabbed his hand,
and I said, "Not now."

He looked and he says, "When?"

And I says, "I'll tell you when."

And it was a proper break,
then I said, "Now."

[Richard Feynman] Well, I took this stuff
that I got out of your seal,

and I put it in ice water.

And I discovered that, when you put
some pressure on it for a while

and then undo it, it maintains…
It doesn't stretch back.

It stays the same dimension.

In other words, for a few seconds,
at least, and more seconds than that,

there's no resilience
in this particular material

when it's at a temperature of 32 degrees.

I believe that has some significance
for our problem.

[Sanger] If anybody other than
a Nobel Laureate in physics

had conducted this experiment,

they would've been laughed off the stage
and, you know, told,

"Sorry, we do real science here."

And because it was Richard Feynman,

all the NASA people could do
was sit there and fume.

And that's all Rogers could do, too.

[Kutyna] That night,
on national television,

every television channel had him doing
the O-ring experiment on there.

[reporter] Commission member
and physicist Richard Feynman

wanted to know what happened…

[reporter 2] He even dunked
a piece of one ring into ice water

to show that it becomes brittle.

[Boffey] That was all you saw or heard
for about 24 to 48 hours.

Sure affected public perceptions
and understanding of what had happened.

[Sanger] Feynman and Kutyna basically
forced everyone to focus attention

on the cold weather conditions.

[reporter] It was 38 degrees
in Cape Canaveral at the moment of launch.

[reporter 2] The rings become brittle
in cold weather. It was 38 degrees…

[Sanger] As bureaucratic jujitsu goes,
it was pretty brilliant on Kutyna's part.

[phone ringing]

[McDonald] At about 11:00 at night,
I got a telephone call.

And it was a fellow
from the New York Times.

He said, uh, "We have an issue
we're releasing in the morning

about a discussion you had
with the presidential commission

indicating concerns about launching
in the cold temperatures,

and we wanted to verify
if the information we have is correct."

He came to the conclusion
that we had the story already,

and we were going to publish it
one way or the other.

[reporter] There was an extraordinary
meeting at Cape Canaveral

the night before the Challenger launched.

Mulloy argued that the O-ring seals
would withstand the cold temperatures,

despite Thiokol's objections.

[Sanger] We established
there had been a very specific warning

from the engineers,
who knew the solid rocket booster best,

not to launch in those cold conditions.

It became impossible for Chairman Rogers
to observe the instructions

from President Reagan to make NASA
come out of this not looking bad.

The engineering people would not recommend
a launch below 53 degrees Fahrenheit.

I found this conclusion without basis,
and I challenged its logic.

They construed what you said to mean that
you wanted them to change their minds.

So they were under a lot of pressure
to give you the answer you wanted.

[Sanger] Why were they in such a rush?

If it was too cold today,
you wait for the temperature to warm up.

The answer was,
they were trying to stay on a schedule.

Mulloy was operating
within the constraints of a system

that required far more launches
than they could successfully make.

Larry Mulloy was less a bad actor…

It's a guy who acted badly
because his hand was forced

by the constraints of the system.

[McDonald] Larry Mulloy
was told by his boss, Dr. Lucas.

He made it very clear that NASA
needed to launch shuttles

and launch them on schedule.

[Rogers]
Were you familiar with the concerns

that had been expressed
in the previous years, I guess?

[Lucas] I have been aware
of the problem with the seals.

My assessment was that
it was a reasonable risk to take.

Thirty years have not changed
the way I think about it at all.

Going into space is something
that great countries do.

They want to advance technology.
They want to learn.

It's also risky.

You have to take some chances.

[Rogers] Beginning in April 1985,

did you then begin to think
it was a problem with flight safety?

I did not think it was a problem
sufficient to, uh, ground the fleet.

The waiver says, "Actual loss:
loss of mission, vehicle, and crew."

I don't see how you could say
that didn't involve flight safety.

[Sanger] We began to get a sense
of how much they knew.

The thought rose
in the back of our minds

that this wasn't really
an accident at all,

that this was more like manslaughter.

[June] To learn that there were managers
who allowed this spacecraft to take off,

knowing full well the risk,
I was tremendously angry.

Unable to forgive people
who made such a bad decision.

[Cheryl McNair] They knew
something was not right.

They didn't consider human life,

and the safety and the effects
that it could have on a family.

There was a root of anger and bitterness
and sadness that was growing in me

because how could they let this happen?

[Sanger] The culture at NASA in that
period in time was, "we can do anything."

[reporter] NASA projected the image
of a well-managed agency,

accomplishing miracles in space
and keeping to its budget.

[Harwood] NASA was always
the good guys, the "right stuff."

[Billingsly] We were wired to believe.
We were filled with hope.

[Sanger] By the time the shuttle
was flying, NASA was basically saying,

"This is so safe,
we can put school teachers on it."

Then you realize
they're really rolling the dice.

[Lucas] There's no way
you can account for those seven lives,

except to say that
that's the way development happened.

My forebears came across
the Appalachian Mountains in a wagon

with horses. Some of them didn't make it.

It's regrettable,
but costs sometimes are very difficult.

And those lives were... were it.

[reporter] Search teams have now recovered

hundreds of pounds of debris
from the Challenger.

[Rhea Seddon] After the 51-L accident,
I didn't know quite what to believe.

I didn't know who to blame,
and so we all looked for what we could do.

I had the task of helping
to identify things

that came out of the Atlantic Ocean.

Scuba divers went down.

It was in fairly shallow water.

The crew members are there,
inside this intact compartment.

And that just tore me to pieces.

[reporter] Yesterday divers confirmed

that they have located
the Challenger's cabin and its crew.

Family members were notified Friday

when the wreckage was found
by sonar in 100 feet of water.

[June] It was several weeks later,

they had retrieved
the remains of the astronauts.

[inhales sharply]

And I... I... I just started… crying.

I was so devastated, I totally broke down.

[Lisa] "I've had a long day preparing
for the memorial service.

Today is the final ceremony to attend."

[somber instrumental music playing]

[jets whooshing]

[Russell] After the testimonies,

it was clear that it was going to be
a tough time for the company.

We had, uh, accepted the, uh...

The risk to fly and, therefore,
we're responsible for that acceptance.

[Kilminster] I received a call
from my boss at that time

to tell me that I was going to be removed.

I was disappointed to hear that,
but I wasn't… totally surprised.

[reporter] The company receptionist
made the announcement

that 200 employees were being laid off.

Fourteen hundred others
put on a part-time status,

a four-day week,
pending resumption of operation.

The last rocket motor sections
from the production line

are being stored away.

People from the town were filled
with tension and sadness,

and everyone was talking about it.

The town was disappointed
that we had failed the space program.

There was graffiti on the bridge
that you take going into town.

My dad's eyes got filled with tears.

Big, white spray paint:

"Thiokol Murderers."

He spent 24/7 for nearly 30 years
feeling like he was to blame.

[Russell] One night,
I went to Joe Kilminster's house.

He broke down into tears.

He was under the weight
of that decision that was made.

There were seven wonderful,
wonderful, capable, dedicated people

that lost their lives.

And I was part
of a decision-making process

that said it was okay to launch.

That has…

always been on my mind.

The presidential commission
returned its verdict today

on the Challenger space shuttle disaster.

It found responsible a rubber seal
on a booster rocket that was faulty,

and an attitude of NASA
that was equally faulty.

It was a fatally flawed decision process.

But the human failure
was centered on Marshall.

And if I had to fix the responsibility,
I'd fix it in on Lucas.

Marshall's director, William Lucas,
has just announced his early retirement.

I did what I thought was right
in the light of the information I had,

and if I were going over it

with the same information
I had at the time,

I'd make the same decision.

'Cause I thought it was right.

I didn't do anything that
I thought was wrong then,

and I didn't do anything that
I think was wrong in retrospect.

[reporter] The man who is most
heavily criticized in the report,

Lawrence Mulloy,
has been moved into another job,

and has indicated that he may leave NASA.

I feel I was to blame.

But I felt no guilt.

[June] Forgiving him was difficult.

You go through anger.

You go through resolution. You go through,
"They're in a better place."

You can think away anything.

But it was…

hard to forgive.

There were still those times that I had
to stop and physically say to myself,

"I forgive those people.

We need to forgive those people.
We need to move on."

[Marcia] After the accident,
on the 28th of January,

I have always woken up at sunrise.

I think Greg would be very upset
if I just spent my life being negative.

A sunrise is a new beginning…

and if we can make those new beginnings
beautiful in our lives,

then I think that's important.

[Reagan] In America, we learn from
our setbacks as well as our successes.

And although
the lessons of failure are hard,

they are often the most important
on the road to progress.

We've learned in these past few
months that we're frail and fallible.

But we have also learned that
we have the courage to face our faults

and the strength to correct our errors.

This has been a difficult passage
for America, but we will go on,

just as the crew of the space shuttle
Challenger would have wanted us to.

We'll simply do what has to be done
to make our space program safe

and reliable and a renewed source
of pride to our nation.

We've suffered a tragedy and a setback.

But we'll forge ahead,
wiser this time and undaunted.

As undaunted as the spirit
of the Challenger and her seven heroes.

[Crippen] Dick Truly was given the job
of Associate Administrator.

Dick called me up and said,
"Would you come up to Washington?"

No doubt it was a tough job
because we had more people telling us

why we couldn't go fly
than why we ever could.

[McDonald] I got called in
by our new general manager, and he said,

"We've been working with NASA on how
we're going to recover from this problem.

So we're gonna do this in a task force.

And we're gonna have the lead
of the task force.

NASA is gonna be working for us.

We want you to be the head of that.
Would you take that job?"

[reporter] Allan McDonald,
one of the engineers

who opposed the Challenger launch,

is now in charge
of designing a new, safer booster.

I mean, we ended up redesigning
everything in that to some degree.

[reporter 2] A full test firing
of a solid rocket booster

was conducted by Morton Thiokol,

the maker of the SRB
that failed on Challenger.

Morton Thiokol says initial data indicates
the rocket's O-rings performed flawlessly.

It was a two-year process to do,
but the redesign was marvelous.

[crowd cheering and applauding]

[reporter] Hundreds of NASA workers
cheered as Discovery was pulled along.

It was like a ticker-tape parade
for a long-lost hero.

[reporter 2] NASA officials insist that
this time they will not waive the rules,

as they did many times in the past.

[Brokaw] Thirty-two months ago,
this was the site, of course,

of a tragedy that none of us will forget.

The loss of the shuttle Challenger
and seven astronauts.

Now, for the first time
since that awful day,

NASA is ready to launch another shuttle:
the shuttle Discovery.

[Aldrich] We got to fly again
after Challenger, and here's Discovery…

[chuckling] …ready to go.

Return to flight was so important
to prove that we could go forward.

[Billingsly] The last image
of a launch, for me, was…

a live explosion.

I think it was important
to see something successful.

[applause and whistling]

[reporter] The launch team leaving
the suiting room now,

and coming down
from their third-floor crew quarters area.

[Covey] It was an honor
to be asked to be on that crew.

I was committed to make sure
that the Challenger crew

had not been lost in vain.

[Harwood] Even though I had
total confidence in the redesign,

I truly believed they'd fixed the problem…
I don't think

you could ever be relaxed, watching
a shuttle launch after Challenger.

[Brokaw] Here we go.

Remember the Challenger.
Godspeed, Discovery.

[mission control] …e leven, ten…

We're a go for main engine start.
Seven, six…

My daughter and I were hugging each other,
just so scared it was going to explode.

[mission control] …zero, and liftoff!

Liftoff. Americans return to space,
as Discovery clears the tower.

[operator 2] Roger roll, Discovery.

[June] I stood up as close
as I could be to the TV to say,

"Godspeed. Godspeed."

[mission control]
Discovery, go and throttle up.

[operator 2] Roger, go.

[operator 3] Discovery given a go
at throttle-up. Three engines at 104%.

Velocity 3,200 feet per second,
altitude 10.8 nautical miles,

standing by for solid rocket booster
separation.

[man] There they go.

That looks normal.

Looks great.

[Gregory]
I think all of us were holding our breath.

And so we were all very excited
and thinking, "We're back on track again."

[all cheering]

I was thrilled. We had done it.

[Aldrich]
I felt like we all had done our job.

And that we could go on.

And we did.

[closing theme music playing]