America's Hidden Stories (2019–…): Season 1, Episode 5 - CIA Cyber Attack - full transcript
It's a Cold War story involving a turncoat KGB agent, doctored computer chips, and a fiery blast in the Siberian wilderness big enough to see from space. Modern historians investigate the ...
(Exploding)
Narrator: In the
depths of the cold war,
a mysterious blast rocks
the siberian wilderness.
Stout: Something on the order
of a small nuclear weapon.
Major: You could actually see it
from space with our satellites.
Narrator: Decades after
the fall of the Soviet union,
investigators are
searching for the truth.
A government insider claims
the United States attacked
a Soviet gas pipeline with the
world's first cyber-weapon.
Reed: We put a trojan horse
in their computers
that ran the pipeline,
and it did not work
out well for them.
Narrator: He says a kgb colonel
may have helped
the American CIA.
Macrackis: He really had the
key to the safe,
I mean, that is the
best source you can get.
Narrator: And that the
attack was secretly ordered
by President Ronald Reagan
to bring the Soviet
union to its knees.
Allen: He said, "so, my
theory of the cold war is"
"we win and they lose."
Narrator: A secret,
closing act in the cold war
may have opened a
new battleground
for the 21st century.
♪
History may be more shocking
than we ever imagined.
Today, technology
forces the past
to give up its secrets.
Newly discovered documents
turn history on its head.
And discoveries in
ancient archives reveal
startling stories we never knew.
June, 1982.
National security official
Thomas Reed is at his desk,
when he says the white
house situation room gets
a shocking report.
A spy satellite has
registered what appears
to be a massive explosion
in the heart of
the Soviet union.
(Phone ringing)
As a senior advisor
to the president,
Reed is immediately alerted.
Reed: I was working
in the white house
and the situation room reported
that there had been a
large explosion in Siberia.
Narrator: Has a
missile been launched?
Has some sort of
accident occurred?
Or has the cold war
just turned hot?
Reed: The defense, research,
and engineering people said
something big went on out there,
but it doesn't make any sense.
Narrator: Seconds tick by.
When suddenly,
(knocking)
A familiar figure
appears in the doorway.
Reed: Gus weiss was a
mysterious character.
He was oddball, but
an awful lot of people
in the intelligence world are.
Narrator: Gus weiss is a
senior white house advisor
on intelligence and technology.
Reed: He said, "you heard
about this explosion?"
"Don't worry about it."
"I got it, okay."
That was it.
30 seconds.
Okay, I won't worry about it.
Narrator: Reed puts
the incident to one side.
As a special assistant
to President Reagan
for national security,
each day brings new drama.
Reed: When you're in
the white house,
I mean, the bulletins
flow in like crazy.
If you go shopping for problems,
you'll never get anything done.
Narrator: But
something doesn't add up.
The giant explosion continues
to echo in reed's memory.
What exactly happened
in the siberian tundra?
Years later, he turns to the man
who'd told him not to
worry that day, Gus weiss.
Reed: It's now 1995, and I
started to write this book.
You know, 15 years after this.
I call up Gus, and
he says, "yeah."
"That's an interesting story."
Narrator: Interesting
story is an understatement.
Gus weiss tells
Reed secret details
of what may be one of the
most remarkable stories
of the cold war.
♪
A tale of a turncoat kgb agent,
of a discovery that the
Soviet union has been stealing
American secrets for decades.
Major: It was a real
bombshell that said,
what are we going to
do about this issue?
Narrator: And of an
alleged CIA retaliation,
to blow up a Russian
gas pipeline,
in the world's first
ever cyber attack.
Reed: A trojan horse is
a piece of software
that will run fine for
a while until some date
or until they get some message,
and then it will do
something different.
So, we put a trojan
horse in their computers
that ran the pipeline,
and it did not work
out well for them.
Narrator: Investigating
the full story
of the mysterious siberian
explosion has become
ever more urgent for
today's historians.
Rid: We see major cyber
operations, almost every day,
happening today.
This is potentially one of
the first major cyber-attacks.
Narrator: For decades,
the tale of the cyber pipeline
attack has been explored,
investigated, and questioned.
Yet even today, the details
of the alleged attack
remain hard to track down.
Stout: Intelligence history,
particularly for something
that is as comparatively
recent as this story,
is very difficult and very murky
and very hard to really get
to the bottom of things.
Narrator: The mystery
begins 9,000 miles away
from Siberia, with the election
of president Ronald
Reagan in 1980.
Reagan: I, Ronald Reagan,
do solemnly swear.
Narrator: And a new
era in us foreign policy.
(Audience applauds)
Reagan: Our country is
in danger.
Stout: Ronald Reagan came into
office with the bold vision
that he made no secret
of amongst his advisors
that he wanted to see an
end to the Soviet union.
Narrator: Reagan
is especially opposed
to the policy of detente.
During the 1970s,
the United States
and the Soviet union had
cooperated on economic issues,
and signed nuclear arms
control agreements.
(Audience applauds)
Reed: Ronald Reagan thought
detente was absolute folly.
Reagan: When action is required
to preserve our national
security, we will act.
Narrator: Reagan has a vision
of a world free from communism,
and of American victory
in the cold war.
Allen: He said, "so, my
theory of the cold war is"
"we win and they lose."
"What do you think
about that, dick?"
And I said to him,
"governor, do you mean that?"
And he said, "well, of course
I mean it, I just said it."
Narrator: Reagan's
suspicions of the Soviet union
and of detente are dramatically
confirmed in July 1981
at an international
economic summit in Canada.
President mitterrand
of France is there.
He asks Reagan for
a private meeting.
Richard Allen was
at reagan's side.
Allen: Mitterrand made the
most extraordinary gesture
and offer to Reagan, describing
a very successful operation
that French intelligence
had underway.
Narrator: The details of
the intelligence operation
are stunning.
The French have
made secret contact
with a kgb colonel in Moscow.
His name is Vladimir vetrov.
He says he's an analyst
in a shadowy kgb office
known only as directorate t.
Kalugin: Directorate t was the
main office of the Russian,
both scientific and
technological intelligence.
Macrakis: Directorate t,
where vetrov worked,
was probably the most important
directorate in the kgb.
Narrator: Vetrov
tells the French
that detente is a giant lie.
Directorate t is controlling
hundreds of kgb agents
who are using detente
to acquire the west's
technological secrets.
Macrakis: Acquiring is just a
polite word for stealing.
So they called them
acquisition lines.
Basically, stealing science
and technology from the west.
Narrator: The Soviet
spies are burrowing deep
into western factories
and research laboratories.
Major: We found out
through this source,
one of the things
they were doing is
they were taking scientists
and making them intelligence
officers to do collection.
Narrator: The Russians
are using American research
and development to build
their own war industry.
Leebaert: It vastly compressed
the research and
development time
in their own weaponry.
They would be able to produce
warships in a shorter time
from American plans than
we would produce ourselves.
It was across the board,
satellite technology,
warships, missile technology.
Stout: So vetrov starts to
hand off this material.
Suddenly it becomes clear
to French intelligence
and then also
American intelligence
just the tremendous extent
of the kgb's science and
technology espionage efforts
against the west.
It must have been truly
a dramatic realization.
Macrakis: They could round up...
Narrator: Historians
kristie macrakis
and Mark stout are
fascinated by vetrov's story
of kgb theft and how it
may have been connected
to the siberian explosion.
During the 1970s, detente
allowed Soviet scientists
to visit western factories,
to encourage
economic cooperation
and reduce cold war tensions.
Stout: There's always been this
ethos, at least in the west,
that you know, knowledge
wants to be free
and that there is sort of
a brotherhood or sisterhood
of scientists that transcends
international boundaries.
Macrakis: What they would do is
they would send a delegation
to America, they would
get visa approval
to go to one company,
at the last minute
they would switch
and go to a more sensitive
company like boeing.
Stout: So they would go
to some place
that maybe wasn't quite
as sanitized and prepared
from a security point of view
to receive a Soviet delegation.
Macrakis: Exactly, yeah.
So they would show up at boeing.
Well, this was a real case.
They actually went to boeing
in Seattle, Washington.
But they went to such lengths
in their whole program
to acquire our
science and technology
that they had some
really bizarre methods
they used as well.
They just didn't get blueprints,
they also collected
samples, big samples,
but they also collected
very small samples.
And so they were viewing
the material in the factory
and they put sticky tape on
the bottom of their shoes
to pick up the metal
filings from the floor.
Well, if you give me your shoe,
I'll explain how it worked.
So what I'm going to do is
I'm gonna put some sticky tape
on the bottom of your shoes.
And we want some samples
of metal filings.
Narrator: Silently, the
tape collects the dirt and dust
from the factory floor.
Macrakis: It's a pretty
clever method.
So let's see your shoe
and the metal filings.
Oh, it's black now.
Stout: Nice and
black from the filings.
Macrakis: Beautiful.
Stout: It's kind of remarkable
that the Soviets only need
a tiny sample like this,
but I guess that's all
that a chemist really needs
to figure out precisely what
metals went into this alloy
that's perfect for building
the body of an airplane.
Narrator: Not
all the Soviet spies
were visiting delegations.
Some were sleeper agents,
living in the west
under deep cover.
Stout: They take on entirely
new identities,
sometimes even new ethnicities,
often raise families
and have entire careers
in their target country
completely unconnected to Moscow
or whoever sent them.
Narrator: What
vetrov has revealed
to French intelligence
and the CIA is deception
on a gigantic scale.
Leebaert: It was a scale
of industrial theft
that had not been
seen since the 1940s.
Narrator: For Ronald Reagan,
it was what he feared the most.
Macrakis: What frightened
Reagan was
that they were stealing all
this defense technology.
So our own technology
would be turned against us
because they either
stole it or bought it.
Narrator: But as he walked away
from president mitterrand
at the economic summit,
Reagan senses an opportunity
to strike back, secretly.
When French president mitterand
tells President Reagan
in July 1981 that the
kgb has been stealing
western technology, it
confirms reagan's distrust
of the Soviet union.
Richard Allen was with
him when he got the news.
Allen: When we were
walking back inside,
he simply shook his head
and said "that's marvelous."
"That's extraordinary
and marvelous."
Narrator: Allen knew
Reagan would retaliate.
The question was exactly how
and which administration
officials would plan the attack.
Allen: It was my task then to
begin to set up the machinery
to make it happen
but it had to be very, very
closely held as you can imagine.
Narrator: Reagan fears
that stolen technology
will help the Soviet
union complete
a giant engineering project,
the trans-siberian pipeline.
Leebaert: The siberian
pipeline was
the largest construction effort
that the Soviet
union ever undertook.
Earle: I can see it crosses, are
those the ural mountains?
Stout: Ural mountains.
Ranich: Yep.
Narrator: To understand why
a pipeline 9,000 miles away,
in Siberia, so worried
the United States,
historian Mark stout and
energy expert Rebecca ranich
are working with graphic
artist, Edmund earle.
Ranich: This urengoy field
was discovered in 1966.
Narrator: By 1981,
the pipeline has
become a chess piece
in the new cold war
between the United States
and the Soviet union.
Ranich: And at the time,
it was the largest single
natural gas field discovered.
Narrator: It's a potential
fortune for the Soviets,
if they can transport it out.
Earle: We've got
rivers that it crosses,
so it's going through vast
stretches of land and geology.
Narrator: The
communists are prepared
to do whatever it takes to
bring the gas to market.
Earle: If I pull out
from the pipeline,
I see that it is really not
going across the Soviet union.
It's headed straight for Europe.
Why would they do that?
Stout: Europe is where
the money is, right?
You have to remember that
the Soviet union basically,
aside from weapons,
doesn't make anything
that anybody wants to buy.
Nobody wants to have
a Soviet television
or a Soviet washing machine,
or drive a Soviet sports car.
But what they do have is
lots of natural resources,
and gas and oil are
really high on that list.
Earle: So the Soviet union
is trying
to make itself a necessary
part of European economy?
Stout: Yes, exactly.
That's one of the things that
the Reagan administration
is particularly worried about,
some sort of military crisis
or diplomatic
showdown or something,
that Moscow could
say to the west,
you guys back down or we're
gonna turn off the gas
in Frankfurt and Paris,
and everybody freezes to death
in the middle of the winter.
That's the big Reagan
administration concern.
Narrator: Reagan's
concern increases
when he learns from the French
how much western technology
the kgb have been stealing.
The French have given their
kgb mole Vladimir vetrov
a code name, farewell.
Reagan turns the information
about vetrov over
to his own CIA.
Reed: Reagan gets the file
delivered directly
to bill Casey at the CIA.
Casey looks at this, and
what's in the file is
the fact that the Soviets have
penetrated American industry
and are stealing technology
all across the board.
They had a shopping list, and
here's what we're going for,
and here's who's doing it.
Narrator: The CIA want
to use that shopping list
to disrupt key Soviet projects.
But can the information
from the Soviet mole
Vladimir vetrov be trusted?
Some of the details of
his story seem incredible.
Macrakis: He had been a
patriotic soldier
for the Soviet
union going abroad.
He probably had a privileged
life as a kgb agent.
He seemed to be happily
married and had a child.
Narrator: It seems
too good to be true.
Vetrov doesn't want money.
And the French report that
he's passing them state secrets
in broad daylight,
in a Moscow park.
Macrakis: Maybe he was an
ideological traitor.
I mean, they exist but
you have to be skeptical.
Narrator: Is vetrov
attempting to
entrap his handlers?
Major: In every
case you ever operate,
the question is, is this valid?
Narrator: Retired FBI
counterintelligence agent,
David major, and former
kgb general Oleg kalugin
have a hunch,
that vetrov's odd behavior may
have been a perfect disguise.
Stout: So it was a public
park in Moscow,
maybe not so different
from this one,
in which vetrov made
many of his handoffs
to his French case officers.
Major: You know, trade craft
is an interesting thing.
One observes what is
already in the mind,
so if you don't know
what you're looking at,
you don't necessarily see it,
it already has to
be in your mind.
And so when you look is
this a good or bad spot,
it's a spot and if
someone is watching us
and they don't know who we are
or don't know what we're
looking for, then you can do it.
So it depends on every situation
but you can operate
in the open sometimes.
Nobody has ever been
caught by using,
just by trade craft,
it's never happened.
Hiding in plain sight
is a very effective way
to run intelligence operations.
If you're too spooky,
people are gonna notice that
and say what are they doing?
So you wanna look
natural all the time.
You wanna look natural.
You say that all the time.
Did you use parks?
Kalugin: Oh, well, I used
everything in my life.
In a park, yeah, sure.
Yeah, in a park.
In some suburban area.
Major: Better a
park then a dark alley.
Why be in a dark alley?
You look guilty.
Stout: There's no good
reason for that.
Sort of hiding in plain sight,
which is so utterly contrary
to the normal
espionage tradecraft
that I think it's
kind of brilliant.
I wonder if the size of Moscow,
I mean it's an enormous
highly urbanized city,
might have played
a role in this?
That they might have felt it
would have seemed unnatural
or strange to travel
more out to the suburbs
for the kind of place that
maybe you would prefer.
Kalugin: Well, find a safe
place, the right place,
don't stay there too long.
Stout: So the kind of place you
might meet might depend
on what city you're in
and where you're
conducting your operations.
Kalugin: Absolutely right, yeah.
Major: You always said
this to me,
you always wanted to look at
your source and see his soul,
look into his eyes.
Kalugin: Absolutely, look into
his eyes and read his soul.
Exactement.
I mean, this is part of
the intelligence world,
you cannot rely just
on someone's statements
or even papers,
you have to look
at the guy's eyes
and maybe read something
which maybe crucial...
Stout: Well, help me out here,
I always worked back
at headquarters.
Why is that?
Why is it so important to
read the soul of your source?
Kalugin: Well, because he
may be a planted agent
of a hostile service,
FBI or wherever, kgb.
Stout: So you're judging his
credibility and his motives.
Kalugin: Right, credibility.
Major: It can be legitimate, it
can turn and work against you.
It's never absolute,
it's never static,
you always have to do what
you say, has he changed...
Kalugin: It's a
risky business, eh?
Major: It's a risky business.
So...
Stout: And he may be
good initially,
and that may change in the
course of running the case.
Major: Absolutely.
Nothing absolute here but
it is a people business,
and the more you
understand people,
and you do talk to
them personally,
you get to understand
that person.
That's why this man is so good
because he's a people person.
♪
Narrator: Vetrov had once
been stationed in Paris,
a top posting for a kgb officer.
Stout: He'd spent about five
years in the 60s in France
and loved it.
Narrator: But he's recently
been recalled to Moscow
and has grown bitter.
Stout: His marriage is
in trouble
and he's drinking too much.
And he's basically just
having this horrible crisis
where his life is going south
and he's resentful of the kgb,
that they have shunted
him off to the side.
Kalugin: He was not satisfied
with his career.
I mean, he expected
promotions, he was ambitious.
And it was all in vain,
all his passions and
desires never materialized
so he decided to go on his own.
Narrator: In exchange for
a steady supply of alcohol,
and the opportunity to
exact revenge on the kgb,
vetrov is passing over the
most extraordinary secrets.
Kalugin: He passed information
which was very damaging
to the Soviet system.
Narrator: Vetrov's
information comes directly
from the safe in his office.
Those documents list where
Soviet spies are located
and how much they are stealing.
Macrakis: So he really had
the key to the safe,
I mean that is the best
source you can get.
Narrator: Convinced
he may be one
of the most important spies
the west has ever had,
the CIA gets vetrov
a minox spy camera.
Major: We came up with an
elaborate plan where we,
the American intelligence,
would find dead drops
for him in Moscow.
Narrator: These dead
drops are locations
where vetrov can leave
the undeveloped film
for later collection.
Major: And then that
would go to Frankfurt
where it would be developed,
and then shared with
us and the French.
Stout: He hands over something
like 4,000 pages of material,
which in this digital age may
not sound like a whole lot.
But in the era where we
are literally talking
about individual
pieces of paper,
this is an enormous haul.
Narrator: Detente
has been a smokescreen.
A decade of deceit is laid
out in black and white,
along with a wish
list of future theft.
Stout: Exactly which kinds
of technologies,
which pieces of equipment,
which weapons they're
trying to steal,
and exactly the names and
identities of the kgb officers
in specific countries who
were charged with doing that.
Narrator: Now the
challenge for the CIA.
How to respond?
Macrakis: You have to be
really careful.
They couldn't round up
all the agents right away
because then the kgb would know
that someone was ratting on
them, and that they had a mole.
Narrator: CIA boss
William Casey knows
he has been handed a once
in a lifetime opportunity.
Reed: Casey was an erratic
guy, but he was a genius
and he had the idea, no,
we're not gonna arrest them
because what we got is not
only what they're doing,
but we have their shopping list.
We know what the Soviets
are shopping for.
Narrator: Casey
shares vetrov's documents
with a brilliant economist
on the national security
council, Gus weiss.
Macrakis: Gus weiss had been
working with the CIA
on technology transfers
since the 1970s.
And he was also interested
in economic warfare.
He was probably a pretty
hardliner, a cold warrior.
One of my sources, a CIA
source, introduced me.
He wore a wig, and
kind of geeky glasses,
and people called
him Dr. Strangelove.
He didn't mind that actually.
He took it in stride.
But he was a bit odd.
Narrator: For years Gus
weiss has been a canary
in the coal mine,
warning that the Soviets
are using detente
to steal technology.
Again and again, he's ignored.
Leebaert: Gus weiss went to
Langley CIA headquarters,
went to the FBI,
and really came up with
their lack of interest.
Well, why would the
Russians behave like this?
Narrator: Now in 1981,
weiss finally has evidence.
He's been right all along.
Stout: He's impressed in a
negative way,
I guess you could say,
with the extent and
the sophistication
and the success to date
of the Soviet effort.
But he also realizes that
there's an opportunity here
with this blueprint in
hand to utterly eviscerate
the Soviet technology
collection effort.
Narrator: Weiss and
Casey show the evidence
of Soviet treachery to
some of the us corporations
whose secrets are being stolen.
Reed: They really went berserk.
They learned the Soviets
had their fingers in there,
and the head of Texas
instruments,
the head of lockheed,
all these people said, boy,
we'll help you big time.
Narrator: Casey and weiss
suggest allowing the flow
of stolen technology
to continue.
But they start including
a few adjusted products.
Reed: I like the word adjust
because it was not
a massive assault
on what they were doing.
If you did major changes,
they'd notice it.
So, you gotta have
the chips be standard,
government-issued Texas
instruments chips,
except in one little corner
you put a trojan horse.
Stout: Lull the Soviets into
thinking they are continuing
to be successful while we
in fact feed them junk.
Narrator: Weiss and
Casey take the plan
to President Reagan,
who loves it.
Reed: It was sheer genius to
pollute the technology
they were stealing
that it would then pollute
their own whole system.
Narrator: But Gus weiss
has something even
bigger planned.
Allen: The second ultimate
long-term vision of Gus weiss
would set the stage
for something
very dramatic to happen.
Narrator: Weiss doesn't
just want the kgb to look bad,
he wants to make an example.
Produce a spectacular
attention-getting failure
and bring the Russian
bear to its knees.
A secret kgb program
to steal us technology
has been unmasked.
Now economist Gus weiss and CIA
boss bill Casey are plotting
how to turn that program
against the Soviets.
According to Thomas Reed,
they have set their sights
on an explosive target,
a gas pipeline in the
siberian wilderness.
Reed: The Soviets were
going broke,
and they saw the shipment of
gas from Siberia through Russia
to the German market would
produce hard currency.
It was clear they had
to have that pipeline.
Narrator:
Construction of the giant
trans-siberian pipeline
had begun in 1978,
during the years of detente.
Western corporations
jumped at the opportunity
to sell the Soviets
turbines and computers.
Ranich: This particular
project has a lot
of western European content.
The pipe comes from Germany.
The compressor stations
come from Italy.
The pipe was
expected to generate
about 6 billion dollars
per year in revenue.
Narrator: But by
1981, detente is over.
The Soviet union has
invaded Afghanistan
and crushed a workers'
rebellion in Poland.
Reagan: It's time for the united
states to chart a new course.
For too many years,
we've stood still
while the Soviets increase
their military strength
and expanded their
influence from Afghanistan
to Ethiopia and beyond.
Narrator: In the United States,
Ronald Reagan bans
us corporations,
such as general electric,
from selling equipment
for the pipeline.
Reagan: I imposed an embargo on
selected oil and gas equipment
which relies heavily
on high technology.
Leebaert: Reagan determined that
the pipeline would be cut off.
This is a result of
that conscious strategy
of undermining the Soviet union.
Narrator: The Soviets
attempt an end run.
They approach a Canadian company
to acquire the software needed
to control the pipeline.
Reed: They had the
Canadian firm steal it,
and they took it to
program their computers
that ran the pipeline.
Narrator: But according to Reed,
the software has been doctored,
to fail at a later date.
Reed: We knew what they
were doing,
so we, first of all,
adjusted the software
to put a trojan horse in there.
A trojan horse is
a piece of software
that will run fine for
awhile until some date
or until they get some message,
and then it will do
something different.
Major: The idea was let's
affect the pumps,
so that it won't work properly,
and see if you can
get them to explode.
(Explodes)
Ranich: So compressor
stations are built
along the entirety of
that 3,000 mile pipeline.
Earle: Here are 42
compressor stations.
Narrator: Energy expert
Rebecca ranich is working
with graphic artist Edmund
earle and historian Mark stout
to figure out how
exactly the pipeline
might have been targeted.
Ranich: Along the corridor
of the pipe,
the compression is
obviously going to be needed
where you're changing
elevations, right?
Or where you're going
through a river crossing,
and you want to make sure
that there is enough boost
for the gas to continue to
flow smoothly and evenly.
Narrator: The 3,000 mile
pipeline needed hundreds
of pumps and
compressor stations.
Earle: So I guess
there is a chance
that someone could
hack into this system
and remotely change the pressure
of one of those stations?
Ranich: You could potentially
send some sort of a signal
that might indicate that
there was a problem.
Narrator: A false computer
signal might, in turn,
have triggered human error.
Earle: You fake a low
pressure so that they go
and manually turn it up too far.
Ranich: Hypothetically, right.
Narrator: Disrupting
pipeline pressure
can have deadly consequences.
In 2010, a gas pipeline exploded
in San Bruno, California,
killing eight and
destroying a neighborhood.
Systems control expert Joe weiss
has studied that explosion.
Today, he's working
with engineers David xu
and Glen stevick of Berkeley
engineering and research,
a firm specializing
in pipeline safety.
Xu: This pipe is an exact scale
model of the San Bruno pipe.
Weiss: So this isn't just a toy.
Narrator: Gas pipelines
need to be checked
for corrosion, or bad welds.
Xu: This thing is solid.
(Pipe clangs)
It weighs about 300 pounds
just for this tiny
little segment,
so this thing will
not blow normally.
Narrator: Berkeley's
engineers use
high pressure water
to test pipeline safety.
This section has a
small internal flaw,
to replicate a bad weld,
which was blamed for
the San Bruno explosion.
Stevik: I'll tell you
what's going on.
It's about 100.
Xu: 100.
Stevik: Keep going.
200.
Three, four.
Five.
(Pipe bangs)
Whoa!
Narrator: A failed pipeline
can then ignite a
deadly explosion.
In a test environment, the
fire has to be started by hand.
Stevik: So imagining a cloud
of natural gas that forms
and then ignites and takes
out an entire neighborhood,
like San Bruno.
Narrator: San
Bruno was an accident.
But today there is growing fear
that an even more lethal
disaster could be triggered
by an enemy.
Industrial infrastructure
in the United States
and around the world is being
targeted by cyber weapons.
Lee: We are seeing very
aggressive threat actors,
or foreign states and
foreign actors compromising
and targeting these systems.
It's getting extremely
aggressive, actually.
Narrator: And that
makes figuring out
exactly what happened in
Siberia during the cold war
more important than ever.
(Alarm blaring)
The story of a CIA attack
on a Soviet pipeline
was first reported by
Reagan official Thomas Reed
in his 2004 book
about the cold war.
Reed: In 82, I was working
in the white house
national security staff.
And we got all sorts
of bulletins
from the situation room.
There had been a large
explosion in Siberia.
Gus weiss who I knew
casually, he was on the staff,
but not my personal
staff, and he said,
"you heard about this explosion?"
"Don't worry about
it, I got it."
Okay, that was that.
30 seconds.
Narrator: More
than a decade later,
Reed turned to the man
who had told him not to
worry that day, Gus weiss.
Weiss claimed that the
explosion in Siberia
had been a CIA cyber attack on
the trans-siberian pipeline.
Reed: He had so many
interesting things to say
and once the cold war was
over, he could tell you.
Gus weiss told me that's
what was going on,
so I believed him.
Lee: We have a set up
over here actually
that I wanted kind of to
show you, especially...
Narrator: As the threat of
such attacks has increased,
studying their early history
has attracted a new generation
of historians,
such as Thomas rid.
Rid: When this story came
out in Thomas reed's book,
I later decided
to investigate it.
Narrator: He's visiting dragos,
a computer security
firm outside Baltimore.
Lee: We try to look at
industrial attacks,
it's good to learn what it
takes to actually do the attack
so that we can also learn
from a defensive perspective
on how we should build
our systems better.
Narrator: Dragos
has built a scale model
of how computers
control a gas pipeline
to study how they
can be attacked
and just how sophisticated
that attack needs to be.
Lee: To go back to the 1980s,
that's a very enticing thing.
What happened then?
What can we learn from that?
If we look over here,
we can actually see a human
machine interface interacting
with equipment.
Like opening up a
valve to be able
to let the water flow
through the pipelines,
turning on a pump,
turning on the heater,
but, behind the scenes,
it's actually all this
kind of equipment.
So this would be the
control equipment
that we're generally
referring to.
Rid: So that small thing
would be a computer?
Lee: It is.
It absolutely is
a type of computer
but it's not your
traditional windows computer
that you're checking
Facebook on,
it is your purpose-built
control systems
with inputs and outputs to
that physical equipment.
And generally it's
purpose tailored
for the exact physical systems
that they're interacting with.
Which makes it really
difficult for an adversary.
So, let me show you what
the target would be.
Rid: This is our pipeline here?
Lee: This is our pipeline,
so in this case, when we're
clicking on those buttons
and it's running those logic,
really what's happening is down
in these control
environment here
where the pressure is increasing
as the water increases.
In our office, it's
going to be water
because we both enjoy living,
but this is gonna be
gas in the real world.
Narrator: Lee says that
the threat of computer attacks
on industrial equipment
is growing more dangerous.
Lee: I don't like the math.
Just in the past couple of
years, we've seen a sharp uptick
in the number of intrusions
into these environments.
Narrator: In 2016, dragos
security was called in
by the Ukrainian government,
after their electrical
grid was attacked
in the middle of winter.
Lee: In 2015, when
the power went out
across those three regions,
the scale of that
attack really was
around 150,000 customers.
Rid: So we're looking at an
attack in late December,
it's cold in the
winter in Ukraine,
and you're saying
that 150,000 houses
or apartments are
suddenly without energy?
Lee: Each apartment building
though would be one customer.
So, it's not like
150,000 people.
It'd be a couple
hundred thousand people.
Narrator: At
first, the operators
of the Ukrainian grid have
no idea what is happening.
The computers have
a life of their own.
Rid: When they're sitting
in front of their interface
and they see the mouse moving?
Lee: Absolutely.
So they're sitting there
and their mouse starts moving
on its own and they thought
that it was probably just
the it security people,
so their own support
staff at that company.
And they recorded it,
making a joke about it
on a cell phone camera
until the circuit
breakers started opening
and they realized they
were under attack.
Narrator: Lee found the
attacker's fingerprints,
a program or malware
called crash override.
Lee: So, this is the actual
code of what was done
on the Ukrainian
site in 2016 in Kiev.
This is crash override.
That's that
malicious capability.
Rid: This is what
attacked the power plant.
Lee: Absolutely.
So when the human
adversary broke in
and put their software on the
system, this was the software.
Narrator: The software
had been downloaded
when one of the Ukrainian
operators had clicked
on a bogus email.
Once the suspected Russian
attackers had broken
into the network,
they spent months learning
how to control the system.
Lee: I mean, they cased the
joint before they got there.
They've had to.
And so when they're actually
in, we can see the commands
that they'd be sending
to the circuit breakers.
Rid: So, what did it actually
do, this kind of attack?
Lee: Well, when these
commands were sent,
it would open up the
circuit breakers.
When you open up
the circuit breaker,
it no longer allows
electricity to roll through it,
so it de-energizes
the substations.
Causing a blackout.
Rid: Killing the power.
Lee: Causing a blackout.
Narrator: What happened
in the Ukraine sounds similar
to what the CIA may have
done a generation earlier
to the siberian pipeline.
But Lee knows far fewer
details about that attack.
Lee: The story of the
siberian pipeline explosion
is very minimal in
terms of actual details,
so the author puts forth
just a bare minimum claim
with hardly any
technical details at all,
and puts the burden of
proof really on the reader
to try to pretend what
could have happened.
Narrator: Lee says the
idea of a trojan horse
is easy to understand but
very difficult to implement.
Lee: The analogy is more
akin to a bunch of guys
getting in a wooden
horse having no idea
where they're going,
having no idea the
equipment they're supposed
to take with them for the battle
they're about to get into,
and then popping out
in an unknown location
against an unknown adversary
in an unknown part of the world.
They would be very unprepared.
Narrator: Historian Thomas
rid has dug through CIA files
and searched Soviet sources.
But the evidence
for a CIA attack
on the pipeline has
remained elusive.
Lee: Is there anything
from their own reporting
or their own people
referencing these cases?
Rid: So, there are no
reports in the Russian
or at the time, the
Soviet press coverage
of pipeline explosions in
that timeframe, in 1982.
One Russian general
published a book in 1990,
only eight years after
the alleged incident,
talking about computer
sabotage cases.
But this one example,
the pipeline explosion
is not among them.
The cyber security
discussion is full of myths,
it's full of cases
that may have happened
or may not have happened.
And it's really important
for me as a scholar,
as a historian, as
a thorough academic
who works on cyber
security, to raise the bar.
Lee: And so this was
some huge explosion,
surely there would be some
news reporting about it
or even eye-witnesses,
I would imagine.
Rid: Well, you know, we have
examples of massive explosions
in the cold war that for
a long time was secret.
We know for example
the Soviet union
used a nuclear weapon once
to put out a fire in
Siberia, amazingly.
And that only came
out many years later.
Narrator: The history
of the cold war
still holds secrets.
And for some, those
secrets turn deadly.
(Gun fires)
A Reagan era official claims
that an American
cyber attack in 1981
destroyed a Soviet pipeline
with an explosion big enough
to be seen from space.
Energy expert Rebecca ranich
has studied the history
of the siberian gas pipeline.
She says poor records make
fact finding difficult.
Ranich: The first recorded
accident is in 1983
but it's at a compressor
station in the gas field.
The source of the
accident, unknown.
Again, we don't have really
deep excellent records
available to us.
Stout: There were a lot
of smaller pipelines
all over much of
the Soviet union.
Is the fundamental story
that there was an explosion
somewhere plausible?
Narrator: Rebecca says
that a smaller pipeline
carrying gas to the west
had existed since 1978.
That may have been
where a blast occurred.
Ranich: I think you could have
a pipeline explosion,
a natural gas pipeline
explosion, absolutely.
Narrator: But she
says the main section
of the siberian pipeline
wasn't operational until 1984.
And she's found no
satellite photographs
of the alleged blast.
Ranich: My challenge back
to the theory is
if this pipe was only
beginning construction
sometime in 1982, how could
it have had a blast on it
that summer seen from space?
Stout: Potentially we could
imagine this explosion happened
in 83, but again,
it's one of the things
where the devil
is in the details.
Ranich: It is, and
we just don't know.
Narrator: The few
details that have emerged
about the pipeline story
tantalize historians
such as Mark stout.
Stout: It's a particular kind
of software from Canada,
as opposed to sort of
generically it's from somewhere,
suggests to me that there
is a basis of truth here.
I don't have any reason to doubt
that something
like that happened.
Whether that software
made it into that pipeline
and caused an explosion,
different question.
Narrator: The CIA is
virtually silent on the subject.
Instead of an explanation
of the siberian
pipeline explosion,
a short essay on their website
by Gus weiss tells the story
of the kgb mole Vladimir vetrov.
Vetrov was given the
code name farewell.
He had revealed to the west
that the Soviet union
had been using detente
to steal western technology.
The essay details how
the west had struck back,
selling the Soviets
flawed turbines
and feeding their military
faulty computer chips.
That there is no mention
of a cyber attack
on the siberian pipeline
may not be surprising.
Stout: Things in the
intelligence world
don't get written down.
Also, I think that the CIA
would probably rather
not have people dwelling
on the notion that we might
be enabling the acquisition
by foreign governments
of sensitive technology
and using that as an opportunity
to put things like
trojan horses in it
because I imagine that
that might be a tool
that they still have
in their tool kit
that they just don't want
people thinking about too much.
I certainly would never want
to say this didn't happen.
I'm just not
convinced that it did,
is the way I would put it.
Narrator: Mark stout
is sharing his research
with historians kristie
macrakis and Derek leebaert.
Stout: There is not a lot of
primary source evidence
out there,
which it basically boils down
to the recollection
of one person.
Macrakis: I do know episodes
where technology was exported
to the east bloc
and it was doctored
and it failed upon arrival.
And I have specific cases
and I have the files
and I have evidence and
those are things I want
as a historian.
I only know the pipeline
story from secondary sources,
so I don't know what's
true, what's not true.
Leebaert: I worked closely with
Gus weiss for a number of years.
Macrakis: Oh, oh, oh, I
didn't know that.
Leebaert: And one of his
favorite expressions was
"just because
there's no evidence"
"doesn't mean it's not true."
Narrator: Even the former
Reagan official Thomas Reed,
whose book claimed
the siberian explosion
was a CIA cyber attack,
wants more evidence.
Reed: Good journalism
requires second sources,
and Gus weiss told me
that's what was going on,
so I believed him.
After the fact, when
I published the book,
Soviet kgb historians said,
"yes, there was a big explosion."
"No, that wasn't the pipeline."
I never had the ability
to check a second source.
Narrator: But perhaps the
bigger story is the success
of the secret war that
President Reagan had launched
on the Soviet union.
Stout: At the end of the day,
whether there was an explosion
in a particular place
on a particular day,
ultimately doesn't really
matter a whole lot.
Narrator: With foot soldiers
such as CIA director
bill Casey and Gus weiss,
the Reagan administration
had confronted communism
around the world,
and struck at the heart
of the Soviet economy.
Leebaert: Here for perhaps the
first time since world war ii,
it was a grand strategy to
pull down the Soviet union.
Stout: The beauty of weiss'
plan is that even if
or when, really, the Soviets
eventually figure out
that we'd been giving
them bad stuff,
that doesn't solve
the Soviet problem
because the Soviets
will have to go back
and either test or just get
rid of every single thing
in their entire economic system
and in their entire military
system that came from the west
because otherwise they won't
ever be able to trust it.
Narrator: The
Soviets learned some
of what the west was doing
because we told them.
Kristie macrakis found
evidence in the files
of the east German
secret police,
a message on an
American-supplied computer chip.
Macrakis: They would engrave
little messages on the chips.
So one of the chips said,
"when are you going to
stop stealing?" In it.
So when the east
Germans got this,
they opened their package
and the chip said,
"when are you going to
stop stealing?" In Russian.
Narrator: Derek leebaert
sounds a cautionary note.
Leebaert: We didn't
realize how close
to the edge the
Soviet union was.
They interpreted the us approach
as characteristic
of an aggressor.
Narrator: As Reagan had
increased American pressure,
the Soviet finger on
the nuclear trigger
had squeezed ever tighter.
Leebaert: According to those
on the scene
within government in 1983,
it got extremely dangerous.
Narrator: The kgb spies
stealing western technology
were finally arrested.
Major: We kicked 100
intelligence officers out
of the United States
and they were the best
officers they had,
the ones who had
the best languages,
the ones that had
the best sources.
Narrator: It was
a Soviet statesman,
mikhail gorbachev, who helped
write the final chapter
of the cold war.
Translator: Today
I can report to you
that the Soviet union
has taken a decision
to reduce its armed forces.
Leebaert: He had the good
sense not to lash out
when he realized that
the oxygen coming
into the Soviet union
had been turned off.
The cash had been turned off,
technology had been cut off.
What he deserves to be
remembered for is for giving in.
Narrator: In 1989, the
Soviet union finally collapsed.
The Reagan cold warriors
got their victory.
But Vladimir vetrov,
who'd exposed the kgb
technology thieves,
didn't live to see the
results of his handiwork.
Macrakis: I mean, the whole
thing with this vetrov story is,
I mean, it could be straight
out of a Hollywood movie.
Narrator: In Moscow, as
he was spying for the west,
vetrov had an affair with
a fellow kgb officer.
Major: Well, he was
photographing documents
in his office
for the French when
she caught him.
She should have turned
him in, but she didn't.
She basically says, "it's time
for you to leave your wife"
"and marry me, or
I'll turn you in."
Stout: On February 22nd, 1982,
he is parked in a parking lot
with his mistress
drinking champagne.
He becomes enraged
and pulls a knife
out of the glove compartment
and starts stabbing her.
Major: He doesn't want
to be blackmailed.
At that time, this
other kgb officer,
who had had an affair
with the same woman,
who had followed them to the
park, opens the car door.
And vetrov comes out of the
thing, and they have a fight,
and he kills that kgb officer.
Narrator: Vladimir
vetrov is arrested.
Then, while in jail,
the man who had been one of
the kgb's worst ever traitors
is himself betrayed.
The kgb had a source
inside French intelligence
who revealed vetrov's treachery.
Kalugin: He was pulled out of
jail and executed as a traitor.
(Gun fires)
Narrator: Vetrov was
executed on January 23, 1985.
16 years later, Gus weiss
also had an unnatural death.
He had battled the Soviets from
the shadows his entire life.
But in 2003, he
fell from a window
in the Watergate building,
in an apparent suicide.
The police report nothing
suspicious about weiss' death.
For some, doubts remain.
Macrakis: It's not clear
whether it was suicide
or if he was pushed.
He is an important
figure in all this.
Narrator: And while
doubts also remain
about whether the CIA
caused an explosion
in Siberia in 1981, it is
clear that a new weapon,
doctored computer chips,
were first used to
fight the Soviet union.
It was the opening battle
in a secret cyber war
still being fought today,
just beyond our line of sight.
Narrator: In the
depths of the cold war,
a mysterious blast rocks
the siberian wilderness.
Stout: Something on the order
of a small nuclear weapon.
Major: You could actually see it
from space with our satellites.
Narrator: Decades after
the fall of the Soviet union,
investigators are
searching for the truth.
A government insider claims
the United States attacked
a Soviet gas pipeline with the
world's first cyber-weapon.
Reed: We put a trojan horse
in their computers
that ran the pipeline,
and it did not work
out well for them.
Narrator: He says a kgb colonel
may have helped
the American CIA.
Macrackis: He really had the
key to the safe,
I mean, that is the
best source you can get.
Narrator: And that the
attack was secretly ordered
by President Ronald Reagan
to bring the Soviet
union to its knees.
Allen: He said, "so, my
theory of the cold war is"
"we win and they lose."
Narrator: A secret,
closing act in the cold war
may have opened a
new battleground
for the 21st century.
♪
History may be more shocking
than we ever imagined.
Today, technology
forces the past
to give up its secrets.
Newly discovered documents
turn history on its head.
And discoveries in
ancient archives reveal
startling stories we never knew.
June, 1982.
National security official
Thomas Reed is at his desk,
when he says the white
house situation room gets
a shocking report.
A spy satellite has
registered what appears
to be a massive explosion
in the heart of
the Soviet union.
(Phone ringing)
As a senior advisor
to the president,
Reed is immediately alerted.
Reed: I was working
in the white house
and the situation room reported
that there had been a
large explosion in Siberia.
Narrator: Has a
missile been launched?
Has some sort of
accident occurred?
Or has the cold war
just turned hot?
Reed: The defense, research,
and engineering people said
something big went on out there,
but it doesn't make any sense.
Narrator: Seconds tick by.
When suddenly,
(knocking)
A familiar figure
appears in the doorway.
Reed: Gus weiss was a
mysterious character.
He was oddball, but
an awful lot of people
in the intelligence world are.
Narrator: Gus weiss is a
senior white house advisor
on intelligence and technology.
Reed: He said, "you heard
about this explosion?"
"Don't worry about it."
"I got it, okay."
That was it.
30 seconds.
Okay, I won't worry about it.
Narrator: Reed puts
the incident to one side.
As a special assistant
to President Reagan
for national security,
each day brings new drama.
Reed: When you're in
the white house,
I mean, the bulletins
flow in like crazy.
If you go shopping for problems,
you'll never get anything done.
Narrator: But
something doesn't add up.
The giant explosion continues
to echo in reed's memory.
What exactly happened
in the siberian tundra?
Years later, he turns to the man
who'd told him not to
worry that day, Gus weiss.
Reed: It's now 1995, and I
started to write this book.
You know, 15 years after this.
I call up Gus, and
he says, "yeah."
"That's an interesting story."
Narrator: Interesting
story is an understatement.
Gus weiss tells
Reed secret details
of what may be one of the
most remarkable stories
of the cold war.
♪
A tale of a turncoat kgb agent,
of a discovery that the
Soviet union has been stealing
American secrets for decades.
Major: It was a real
bombshell that said,
what are we going to
do about this issue?
Narrator: And of an
alleged CIA retaliation,
to blow up a Russian
gas pipeline,
in the world's first
ever cyber attack.
Reed: A trojan horse is
a piece of software
that will run fine for
a while until some date
or until they get some message,
and then it will do
something different.
So, we put a trojan
horse in their computers
that ran the pipeline,
and it did not work
out well for them.
Narrator: Investigating
the full story
of the mysterious siberian
explosion has become
ever more urgent for
today's historians.
Rid: We see major cyber
operations, almost every day,
happening today.
This is potentially one of
the first major cyber-attacks.
Narrator: For decades,
the tale of the cyber pipeline
attack has been explored,
investigated, and questioned.
Yet even today, the details
of the alleged attack
remain hard to track down.
Stout: Intelligence history,
particularly for something
that is as comparatively
recent as this story,
is very difficult and very murky
and very hard to really get
to the bottom of things.
Narrator: The mystery
begins 9,000 miles away
from Siberia, with the election
of president Ronald
Reagan in 1980.
Reagan: I, Ronald Reagan,
do solemnly swear.
Narrator: And a new
era in us foreign policy.
(Audience applauds)
Reagan: Our country is
in danger.
Stout: Ronald Reagan came into
office with the bold vision
that he made no secret
of amongst his advisors
that he wanted to see an
end to the Soviet union.
Narrator: Reagan
is especially opposed
to the policy of detente.
During the 1970s,
the United States
and the Soviet union had
cooperated on economic issues,
and signed nuclear arms
control agreements.
(Audience applauds)
Reed: Ronald Reagan thought
detente was absolute folly.
Reagan: When action is required
to preserve our national
security, we will act.
Narrator: Reagan has a vision
of a world free from communism,
and of American victory
in the cold war.
Allen: He said, "so, my
theory of the cold war is"
"we win and they lose."
"What do you think
about that, dick?"
And I said to him,
"governor, do you mean that?"
And he said, "well, of course
I mean it, I just said it."
Narrator: Reagan's
suspicions of the Soviet union
and of detente are dramatically
confirmed in July 1981
at an international
economic summit in Canada.
President mitterrand
of France is there.
He asks Reagan for
a private meeting.
Richard Allen was
at reagan's side.
Allen: Mitterrand made the
most extraordinary gesture
and offer to Reagan, describing
a very successful operation
that French intelligence
had underway.
Narrator: The details of
the intelligence operation
are stunning.
The French have
made secret contact
with a kgb colonel in Moscow.
His name is Vladimir vetrov.
He says he's an analyst
in a shadowy kgb office
known only as directorate t.
Kalugin: Directorate t was the
main office of the Russian,
both scientific and
technological intelligence.
Macrakis: Directorate t,
where vetrov worked,
was probably the most important
directorate in the kgb.
Narrator: Vetrov
tells the French
that detente is a giant lie.
Directorate t is controlling
hundreds of kgb agents
who are using detente
to acquire the west's
technological secrets.
Macrakis: Acquiring is just a
polite word for stealing.
So they called them
acquisition lines.
Basically, stealing science
and technology from the west.
Narrator: The Soviet
spies are burrowing deep
into western factories
and research laboratories.
Major: We found out
through this source,
one of the things
they were doing is
they were taking scientists
and making them intelligence
officers to do collection.
Narrator: The Russians
are using American research
and development to build
their own war industry.
Leebaert: It vastly compressed
the research and
development time
in their own weaponry.
They would be able to produce
warships in a shorter time
from American plans than
we would produce ourselves.
It was across the board,
satellite technology,
warships, missile technology.
Stout: So vetrov starts to
hand off this material.
Suddenly it becomes clear
to French intelligence
and then also
American intelligence
just the tremendous extent
of the kgb's science and
technology espionage efforts
against the west.
It must have been truly
a dramatic realization.
Macrakis: They could round up...
Narrator: Historians
kristie macrakis
and Mark stout are
fascinated by vetrov's story
of kgb theft and how it
may have been connected
to the siberian explosion.
During the 1970s, detente
allowed Soviet scientists
to visit western factories,
to encourage
economic cooperation
and reduce cold war tensions.
Stout: There's always been this
ethos, at least in the west,
that you know, knowledge
wants to be free
and that there is sort of
a brotherhood or sisterhood
of scientists that transcends
international boundaries.
Macrakis: What they would do is
they would send a delegation
to America, they would
get visa approval
to go to one company,
at the last minute
they would switch
and go to a more sensitive
company like boeing.
Stout: So they would go
to some place
that maybe wasn't quite
as sanitized and prepared
from a security point of view
to receive a Soviet delegation.
Macrakis: Exactly, yeah.
So they would show up at boeing.
Well, this was a real case.
They actually went to boeing
in Seattle, Washington.
But they went to such lengths
in their whole program
to acquire our
science and technology
that they had some
really bizarre methods
they used as well.
They just didn't get blueprints,
they also collected
samples, big samples,
but they also collected
very small samples.
And so they were viewing
the material in the factory
and they put sticky tape on
the bottom of their shoes
to pick up the metal
filings from the floor.
Well, if you give me your shoe,
I'll explain how it worked.
So what I'm going to do is
I'm gonna put some sticky tape
on the bottom of your shoes.
And we want some samples
of metal filings.
Narrator: Silently, the
tape collects the dirt and dust
from the factory floor.
Macrakis: It's a pretty
clever method.
So let's see your shoe
and the metal filings.
Oh, it's black now.
Stout: Nice and
black from the filings.
Macrakis: Beautiful.
Stout: It's kind of remarkable
that the Soviets only need
a tiny sample like this,
but I guess that's all
that a chemist really needs
to figure out precisely what
metals went into this alloy
that's perfect for building
the body of an airplane.
Narrator: Not
all the Soviet spies
were visiting delegations.
Some were sleeper agents,
living in the west
under deep cover.
Stout: They take on entirely
new identities,
sometimes even new ethnicities,
often raise families
and have entire careers
in their target country
completely unconnected to Moscow
or whoever sent them.
Narrator: What
vetrov has revealed
to French intelligence
and the CIA is deception
on a gigantic scale.
Leebaert: It was a scale
of industrial theft
that had not been
seen since the 1940s.
Narrator: For Ronald Reagan,
it was what he feared the most.
Macrakis: What frightened
Reagan was
that they were stealing all
this defense technology.
So our own technology
would be turned against us
because they either
stole it or bought it.
Narrator: But as he walked away
from president mitterrand
at the economic summit,
Reagan senses an opportunity
to strike back, secretly.
When French president mitterand
tells President Reagan
in July 1981 that the
kgb has been stealing
western technology, it
confirms reagan's distrust
of the Soviet union.
Richard Allen was with
him when he got the news.
Allen: When we were
walking back inside,
he simply shook his head
and said "that's marvelous."
"That's extraordinary
and marvelous."
Narrator: Allen knew
Reagan would retaliate.
The question was exactly how
and which administration
officials would plan the attack.
Allen: It was my task then to
begin to set up the machinery
to make it happen
but it had to be very, very
closely held as you can imagine.
Narrator: Reagan fears
that stolen technology
will help the Soviet
union complete
a giant engineering project,
the trans-siberian pipeline.
Leebaert: The siberian
pipeline was
the largest construction effort
that the Soviet
union ever undertook.
Earle: I can see it crosses, are
those the ural mountains?
Stout: Ural mountains.
Ranich: Yep.
Narrator: To understand why
a pipeline 9,000 miles away,
in Siberia, so worried
the United States,
historian Mark stout and
energy expert Rebecca ranich
are working with graphic
artist, Edmund earle.
Ranich: This urengoy field
was discovered in 1966.
Narrator: By 1981,
the pipeline has
become a chess piece
in the new cold war
between the United States
and the Soviet union.
Ranich: And at the time,
it was the largest single
natural gas field discovered.
Narrator: It's a potential
fortune for the Soviets,
if they can transport it out.
Earle: We've got
rivers that it crosses,
so it's going through vast
stretches of land and geology.
Narrator: The
communists are prepared
to do whatever it takes to
bring the gas to market.
Earle: If I pull out
from the pipeline,
I see that it is really not
going across the Soviet union.
It's headed straight for Europe.
Why would they do that?
Stout: Europe is where
the money is, right?
You have to remember that
the Soviet union basically,
aside from weapons,
doesn't make anything
that anybody wants to buy.
Nobody wants to have
a Soviet television
or a Soviet washing machine,
or drive a Soviet sports car.
But what they do have is
lots of natural resources,
and gas and oil are
really high on that list.
Earle: So the Soviet union
is trying
to make itself a necessary
part of European economy?
Stout: Yes, exactly.
That's one of the things that
the Reagan administration
is particularly worried about,
some sort of military crisis
or diplomatic
showdown or something,
that Moscow could
say to the west,
you guys back down or we're
gonna turn off the gas
in Frankfurt and Paris,
and everybody freezes to death
in the middle of the winter.
That's the big Reagan
administration concern.
Narrator: Reagan's
concern increases
when he learns from the French
how much western technology
the kgb have been stealing.
The French have given their
kgb mole Vladimir vetrov
a code name, farewell.
Reagan turns the information
about vetrov over
to his own CIA.
Reed: Reagan gets the file
delivered directly
to bill Casey at the CIA.
Casey looks at this, and
what's in the file is
the fact that the Soviets have
penetrated American industry
and are stealing technology
all across the board.
They had a shopping list, and
here's what we're going for,
and here's who's doing it.
Narrator: The CIA want
to use that shopping list
to disrupt key Soviet projects.
But can the information
from the Soviet mole
Vladimir vetrov be trusted?
Some of the details of
his story seem incredible.
Macrakis: He had been a
patriotic soldier
for the Soviet
union going abroad.
He probably had a privileged
life as a kgb agent.
He seemed to be happily
married and had a child.
Narrator: It seems
too good to be true.
Vetrov doesn't want money.
And the French report that
he's passing them state secrets
in broad daylight,
in a Moscow park.
Macrakis: Maybe he was an
ideological traitor.
I mean, they exist but
you have to be skeptical.
Narrator: Is vetrov
attempting to
entrap his handlers?
Major: In every
case you ever operate,
the question is, is this valid?
Narrator: Retired FBI
counterintelligence agent,
David major, and former
kgb general Oleg kalugin
have a hunch,
that vetrov's odd behavior may
have been a perfect disguise.
Stout: So it was a public
park in Moscow,
maybe not so different
from this one,
in which vetrov made
many of his handoffs
to his French case officers.
Major: You know, trade craft
is an interesting thing.
One observes what is
already in the mind,
so if you don't know
what you're looking at,
you don't necessarily see it,
it already has to
be in your mind.
And so when you look is
this a good or bad spot,
it's a spot and if
someone is watching us
and they don't know who we are
or don't know what we're
looking for, then you can do it.
So it depends on every situation
but you can operate
in the open sometimes.
Nobody has ever been
caught by using,
just by trade craft,
it's never happened.
Hiding in plain sight
is a very effective way
to run intelligence operations.
If you're too spooky,
people are gonna notice that
and say what are they doing?
So you wanna look
natural all the time.
You wanna look natural.
You say that all the time.
Did you use parks?
Kalugin: Oh, well, I used
everything in my life.
In a park, yeah, sure.
Yeah, in a park.
In some suburban area.
Major: Better a
park then a dark alley.
Why be in a dark alley?
You look guilty.
Stout: There's no good
reason for that.
Sort of hiding in plain sight,
which is so utterly contrary
to the normal
espionage tradecraft
that I think it's
kind of brilliant.
I wonder if the size of Moscow,
I mean it's an enormous
highly urbanized city,
might have played
a role in this?
That they might have felt it
would have seemed unnatural
or strange to travel
more out to the suburbs
for the kind of place that
maybe you would prefer.
Kalugin: Well, find a safe
place, the right place,
don't stay there too long.
Stout: So the kind of place you
might meet might depend
on what city you're in
and where you're
conducting your operations.
Kalugin: Absolutely right, yeah.
Major: You always said
this to me,
you always wanted to look at
your source and see his soul,
look into his eyes.
Kalugin: Absolutely, look into
his eyes and read his soul.
Exactement.
I mean, this is part of
the intelligence world,
you cannot rely just
on someone's statements
or even papers,
you have to look
at the guy's eyes
and maybe read something
which maybe crucial...
Stout: Well, help me out here,
I always worked back
at headquarters.
Why is that?
Why is it so important to
read the soul of your source?
Kalugin: Well, because he
may be a planted agent
of a hostile service,
FBI or wherever, kgb.
Stout: So you're judging his
credibility and his motives.
Kalugin: Right, credibility.
Major: It can be legitimate, it
can turn and work against you.
It's never absolute,
it's never static,
you always have to do what
you say, has he changed...
Kalugin: It's a
risky business, eh?
Major: It's a risky business.
So...
Stout: And he may be
good initially,
and that may change in the
course of running the case.
Major: Absolutely.
Nothing absolute here but
it is a people business,
and the more you
understand people,
and you do talk to
them personally,
you get to understand
that person.
That's why this man is so good
because he's a people person.
♪
Narrator: Vetrov had once
been stationed in Paris,
a top posting for a kgb officer.
Stout: He'd spent about five
years in the 60s in France
and loved it.
Narrator: But he's recently
been recalled to Moscow
and has grown bitter.
Stout: His marriage is
in trouble
and he's drinking too much.
And he's basically just
having this horrible crisis
where his life is going south
and he's resentful of the kgb,
that they have shunted
him off to the side.
Kalugin: He was not satisfied
with his career.
I mean, he expected
promotions, he was ambitious.
And it was all in vain,
all his passions and
desires never materialized
so he decided to go on his own.
Narrator: In exchange for
a steady supply of alcohol,
and the opportunity to
exact revenge on the kgb,
vetrov is passing over the
most extraordinary secrets.
Kalugin: He passed information
which was very damaging
to the Soviet system.
Narrator: Vetrov's
information comes directly
from the safe in his office.
Those documents list where
Soviet spies are located
and how much they are stealing.
Macrakis: So he really had
the key to the safe,
I mean that is the best
source you can get.
Narrator: Convinced
he may be one
of the most important spies
the west has ever had,
the CIA gets vetrov
a minox spy camera.
Major: We came up with an
elaborate plan where we,
the American intelligence,
would find dead drops
for him in Moscow.
Narrator: These dead
drops are locations
where vetrov can leave
the undeveloped film
for later collection.
Major: And then that
would go to Frankfurt
where it would be developed,
and then shared with
us and the French.
Stout: He hands over something
like 4,000 pages of material,
which in this digital age may
not sound like a whole lot.
But in the era where we
are literally talking
about individual
pieces of paper,
this is an enormous haul.
Narrator: Detente
has been a smokescreen.
A decade of deceit is laid
out in black and white,
along with a wish
list of future theft.
Stout: Exactly which kinds
of technologies,
which pieces of equipment,
which weapons they're
trying to steal,
and exactly the names and
identities of the kgb officers
in specific countries who
were charged with doing that.
Narrator: Now the
challenge for the CIA.
How to respond?
Macrakis: You have to be
really careful.
They couldn't round up
all the agents right away
because then the kgb would know
that someone was ratting on
them, and that they had a mole.
Narrator: CIA boss
William Casey knows
he has been handed a once
in a lifetime opportunity.
Reed: Casey was an erratic
guy, but he was a genius
and he had the idea, no,
we're not gonna arrest them
because what we got is not
only what they're doing,
but we have their shopping list.
We know what the Soviets
are shopping for.
Narrator: Casey
shares vetrov's documents
with a brilliant economist
on the national security
council, Gus weiss.
Macrakis: Gus weiss had been
working with the CIA
on technology transfers
since the 1970s.
And he was also interested
in economic warfare.
He was probably a pretty
hardliner, a cold warrior.
One of my sources, a CIA
source, introduced me.
He wore a wig, and
kind of geeky glasses,
and people called
him Dr. Strangelove.
He didn't mind that actually.
He took it in stride.
But he was a bit odd.
Narrator: For years Gus
weiss has been a canary
in the coal mine,
warning that the Soviets
are using detente
to steal technology.
Again and again, he's ignored.
Leebaert: Gus weiss went to
Langley CIA headquarters,
went to the FBI,
and really came up with
their lack of interest.
Well, why would the
Russians behave like this?
Narrator: Now in 1981,
weiss finally has evidence.
He's been right all along.
Stout: He's impressed in a
negative way,
I guess you could say,
with the extent and
the sophistication
and the success to date
of the Soviet effort.
But he also realizes that
there's an opportunity here
with this blueprint in
hand to utterly eviscerate
the Soviet technology
collection effort.
Narrator: Weiss and
Casey show the evidence
of Soviet treachery to
some of the us corporations
whose secrets are being stolen.
Reed: They really went berserk.
They learned the Soviets
had their fingers in there,
and the head of Texas
instruments,
the head of lockheed,
all these people said, boy,
we'll help you big time.
Narrator: Casey and weiss
suggest allowing the flow
of stolen technology
to continue.
But they start including
a few adjusted products.
Reed: I like the word adjust
because it was not
a massive assault
on what they were doing.
If you did major changes,
they'd notice it.
So, you gotta have
the chips be standard,
government-issued Texas
instruments chips,
except in one little corner
you put a trojan horse.
Stout: Lull the Soviets into
thinking they are continuing
to be successful while we
in fact feed them junk.
Narrator: Weiss and
Casey take the plan
to President Reagan,
who loves it.
Reed: It was sheer genius to
pollute the technology
they were stealing
that it would then pollute
their own whole system.
Narrator: But Gus weiss
has something even
bigger planned.
Allen: The second ultimate
long-term vision of Gus weiss
would set the stage
for something
very dramatic to happen.
Narrator: Weiss doesn't
just want the kgb to look bad,
he wants to make an example.
Produce a spectacular
attention-getting failure
and bring the Russian
bear to its knees.
A secret kgb program
to steal us technology
has been unmasked.
Now economist Gus weiss and CIA
boss bill Casey are plotting
how to turn that program
against the Soviets.
According to Thomas Reed,
they have set their sights
on an explosive target,
a gas pipeline in the
siberian wilderness.
Reed: The Soviets were
going broke,
and they saw the shipment of
gas from Siberia through Russia
to the German market would
produce hard currency.
It was clear they had
to have that pipeline.
Narrator:
Construction of the giant
trans-siberian pipeline
had begun in 1978,
during the years of detente.
Western corporations
jumped at the opportunity
to sell the Soviets
turbines and computers.
Ranich: This particular
project has a lot
of western European content.
The pipe comes from Germany.
The compressor stations
come from Italy.
The pipe was
expected to generate
about 6 billion dollars
per year in revenue.
Narrator: But by
1981, detente is over.
The Soviet union has
invaded Afghanistan
and crushed a workers'
rebellion in Poland.
Reagan: It's time for the united
states to chart a new course.
For too many years,
we've stood still
while the Soviets increase
their military strength
and expanded their
influence from Afghanistan
to Ethiopia and beyond.
Narrator: In the United States,
Ronald Reagan bans
us corporations,
such as general electric,
from selling equipment
for the pipeline.
Reagan: I imposed an embargo on
selected oil and gas equipment
which relies heavily
on high technology.
Leebaert: Reagan determined that
the pipeline would be cut off.
This is a result of
that conscious strategy
of undermining the Soviet union.
Narrator: The Soviets
attempt an end run.
They approach a Canadian company
to acquire the software needed
to control the pipeline.
Reed: They had the
Canadian firm steal it,
and they took it to
program their computers
that ran the pipeline.
Narrator: But according to Reed,
the software has been doctored,
to fail at a later date.
Reed: We knew what they
were doing,
so we, first of all,
adjusted the software
to put a trojan horse in there.
A trojan horse is
a piece of software
that will run fine for
awhile until some date
or until they get some message,
and then it will do
something different.
Major: The idea was let's
affect the pumps,
so that it won't work properly,
and see if you can
get them to explode.
(Explodes)
Ranich: So compressor
stations are built
along the entirety of
that 3,000 mile pipeline.
Earle: Here are 42
compressor stations.
Narrator: Energy expert
Rebecca ranich is working
with graphic artist Edmund
earle and historian Mark stout
to figure out how
exactly the pipeline
might have been targeted.
Ranich: Along the corridor
of the pipe,
the compression is
obviously going to be needed
where you're changing
elevations, right?
Or where you're going
through a river crossing,
and you want to make sure
that there is enough boost
for the gas to continue to
flow smoothly and evenly.
Narrator: The 3,000 mile
pipeline needed hundreds
of pumps and
compressor stations.
Earle: So I guess
there is a chance
that someone could
hack into this system
and remotely change the pressure
of one of those stations?
Ranich: You could potentially
send some sort of a signal
that might indicate that
there was a problem.
Narrator: A false computer
signal might, in turn,
have triggered human error.
Earle: You fake a low
pressure so that they go
and manually turn it up too far.
Ranich: Hypothetically, right.
Narrator: Disrupting
pipeline pressure
can have deadly consequences.
In 2010, a gas pipeline exploded
in San Bruno, California,
killing eight and
destroying a neighborhood.
Systems control expert Joe weiss
has studied that explosion.
Today, he's working
with engineers David xu
and Glen stevick of Berkeley
engineering and research,
a firm specializing
in pipeline safety.
Xu: This pipe is an exact scale
model of the San Bruno pipe.
Weiss: So this isn't just a toy.
Narrator: Gas pipelines
need to be checked
for corrosion, or bad welds.
Xu: This thing is solid.
(Pipe clangs)
It weighs about 300 pounds
just for this tiny
little segment,
so this thing will
not blow normally.
Narrator: Berkeley's
engineers use
high pressure water
to test pipeline safety.
This section has a
small internal flaw,
to replicate a bad weld,
which was blamed for
the San Bruno explosion.
Stevik: I'll tell you
what's going on.
It's about 100.
Xu: 100.
Stevik: Keep going.
200.
Three, four.
Five.
(Pipe bangs)
Whoa!
Narrator: A failed pipeline
can then ignite a
deadly explosion.
In a test environment, the
fire has to be started by hand.
Stevik: So imagining a cloud
of natural gas that forms
and then ignites and takes
out an entire neighborhood,
like San Bruno.
Narrator: San
Bruno was an accident.
But today there is growing fear
that an even more lethal
disaster could be triggered
by an enemy.
Industrial infrastructure
in the United States
and around the world is being
targeted by cyber weapons.
Lee: We are seeing very
aggressive threat actors,
or foreign states and
foreign actors compromising
and targeting these systems.
It's getting extremely
aggressive, actually.
Narrator: And that
makes figuring out
exactly what happened in
Siberia during the cold war
more important than ever.
(Alarm blaring)
The story of a CIA attack
on a Soviet pipeline
was first reported by
Reagan official Thomas Reed
in his 2004 book
about the cold war.
Reed: In 82, I was working
in the white house
national security staff.
And we got all sorts
of bulletins
from the situation room.
There had been a large
explosion in Siberia.
Gus weiss who I knew
casually, he was on the staff,
but not my personal
staff, and he said,
"you heard about this explosion?"
"Don't worry about
it, I got it."
Okay, that was that.
30 seconds.
Narrator: More
than a decade later,
Reed turned to the man
who had told him not to
worry that day, Gus weiss.
Weiss claimed that the
explosion in Siberia
had been a CIA cyber attack on
the trans-siberian pipeline.
Reed: He had so many
interesting things to say
and once the cold war was
over, he could tell you.
Gus weiss told me that's
what was going on,
so I believed him.
Lee: We have a set up
over here actually
that I wanted kind of to
show you, especially...
Narrator: As the threat of
such attacks has increased,
studying their early history
has attracted a new generation
of historians,
such as Thomas rid.
Rid: When this story came
out in Thomas reed's book,
I later decided
to investigate it.
Narrator: He's visiting dragos,
a computer security
firm outside Baltimore.
Lee: We try to look at
industrial attacks,
it's good to learn what it
takes to actually do the attack
so that we can also learn
from a defensive perspective
on how we should build
our systems better.
Narrator: Dragos
has built a scale model
of how computers
control a gas pipeline
to study how they
can be attacked
and just how sophisticated
that attack needs to be.
Lee: To go back to the 1980s,
that's a very enticing thing.
What happened then?
What can we learn from that?
If we look over here,
we can actually see a human
machine interface interacting
with equipment.
Like opening up a
valve to be able
to let the water flow
through the pipelines,
turning on a pump,
turning on the heater,
but, behind the scenes,
it's actually all this
kind of equipment.
So this would be the
control equipment
that we're generally
referring to.
Rid: So that small thing
would be a computer?
Lee: It is.
It absolutely is
a type of computer
but it's not your
traditional windows computer
that you're checking
Facebook on,
it is your purpose-built
control systems
with inputs and outputs to
that physical equipment.
And generally it's
purpose tailored
for the exact physical systems
that they're interacting with.
Which makes it really
difficult for an adversary.
So, let me show you what
the target would be.
Rid: This is our pipeline here?
Lee: This is our pipeline,
so in this case, when we're
clicking on those buttons
and it's running those logic,
really what's happening is down
in these control
environment here
where the pressure is increasing
as the water increases.
In our office, it's
going to be water
because we both enjoy living,
but this is gonna be
gas in the real world.
Narrator: Lee says that
the threat of computer attacks
on industrial equipment
is growing more dangerous.
Lee: I don't like the math.
Just in the past couple of
years, we've seen a sharp uptick
in the number of intrusions
into these environments.
Narrator: In 2016, dragos
security was called in
by the Ukrainian government,
after their electrical
grid was attacked
in the middle of winter.
Lee: In 2015, when
the power went out
across those three regions,
the scale of that
attack really was
around 150,000 customers.
Rid: So we're looking at an
attack in late December,
it's cold in the
winter in Ukraine,
and you're saying
that 150,000 houses
or apartments are
suddenly without energy?
Lee: Each apartment building
though would be one customer.
So, it's not like
150,000 people.
It'd be a couple
hundred thousand people.
Narrator: At
first, the operators
of the Ukrainian grid have
no idea what is happening.
The computers have
a life of their own.
Rid: When they're sitting
in front of their interface
and they see the mouse moving?
Lee: Absolutely.
So they're sitting there
and their mouse starts moving
on its own and they thought
that it was probably just
the it security people,
so their own support
staff at that company.
And they recorded it,
making a joke about it
on a cell phone camera
until the circuit
breakers started opening
and they realized they
were under attack.
Narrator: Lee found the
attacker's fingerprints,
a program or malware
called crash override.
Lee: So, this is the actual
code of what was done
on the Ukrainian
site in 2016 in Kiev.
This is crash override.
That's that
malicious capability.
Rid: This is what
attacked the power plant.
Lee: Absolutely.
So when the human
adversary broke in
and put their software on the
system, this was the software.
Narrator: The software
had been downloaded
when one of the Ukrainian
operators had clicked
on a bogus email.
Once the suspected Russian
attackers had broken
into the network,
they spent months learning
how to control the system.
Lee: I mean, they cased the
joint before they got there.
They've had to.
And so when they're actually
in, we can see the commands
that they'd be sending
to the circuit breakers.
Rid: So, what did it actually
do, this kind of attack?
Lee: Well, when these
commands were sent,
it would open up the
circuit breakers.
When you open up
the circuit breaker,
it no longer allows
electricity to roll through it,
so it de-energizes
the substations.
Causing a blackout.
Rid: Killing the power.
Lee: Causing a blackout.
Narrator: What happened
in the Ukraine sounds similar
to what the CIA may have
done a generation earlier
to the siberian pipeline.
But Lee knows far fewer
details about that attack.
Lee: The story of the
siberian pipeline explosion
is very minimal in
terms of actual details,
so the author puts forth
just a bare minimum claim
with hardly any
technical details at all,
and puts the burden of
proof really on the reader
to try to pretend what
could have happened.
Narrator: Lee says the
idea of a trojan horse
is easy to understand but
very difficult to implement.
Lee: The analogy is more
akin to a bunch of guys
getting in a wooden
horse having no idea
where they're going,
having no idea the
equipment they're supposed
to take with them for the battle
they're about to get into,
and then popping out
in an unknown location
against an unknown adversary
in an unknown part of the world.
They would be very unprepared.
Narrator: Historian Thomas
rid has dug through CIA files
and searched Soviet sources.
But the evidence
for a CIA attack
on the pipeline has
remained elusive.
Lee: Is there anything
from their own reporting
or their own people
referencing these cases?
Rid: So, there are no
reports in the Russian
or at the time, the
Soviet press coverage
of pipeline explosions in
that timeframe, in 1982.
One Russian general
published a book in 1990,
only eight years after
the alleged incident,
talking about computer
sabotage cases.
But this one example,
the pipeline explosion
is not among them.
The cyber security
discussion is full of myths,
it's full of cases
that may have happened
or may not have happened.
And it's really important
for me as a scholar,
as a historian, as
a thorough academic
who works on cyber
security, to raise the bar.
Lee: And so this was
some huge explosion,
surely there would be some
news reporting about it
or even eye-witnesses,
I would imagine.
Rid: Well, you know, we have
examples of massive explosions
in the cold war that for
a long time was secret.
We know for example
the Soviet union
used a nuclear weapon once
to put out a fire in
Siberia, amazingly.
And that only came
out many years later.
Narrator: The history
of the cold war
still holds secrets.
And for some, those
secrets turn deadly.
(Gun fires)
A Reagan era official claims
that an American
cyber attack in 1981
destroyed a Soviet pipeline
with an explosion big enough
to be seen from space.
Energy expert Rebecca ranich
has studied the history
of the siberian gas pipeline.
She says poor records make
fact finding difficult.
Ranich: The first recorded
accident is in 1983
but it's at a compressor
station in the gas field.
The source of the
accident, unknown.
Again, we don't have really
deep excellent records
available to us.
Stout: There were a lot
of smaller pipelines
all over much of
the Soviet union.
Is the fundamental story
that there was an explosion
somewhere plausible?
Narrator: Rebecca says
that a smaller pipeline
carrying gas to the west
had existed since 1978.
That may have been
where a blast occurred.
Ranich: I think you could have
a pipeline explosion,
a natural gas pipeline
explosion, absolutely.
Narrator: But she
says the main section
of the siberian pipeline
wasn't operational until 1984.
And she's found no
satellite photographs
of the alleged blast.
Ranich: My challenge back
to the theory is
if this pipe was only
beginning construction
sometime in 1982, how could
it have had a blast on it
that summer seen from space?
Stout: Potentially we could
imagine this explosion happened
in 83, but again,
it's one of the things
where the devil
is in the details.
Ranich: It is, and
we just don't know.
Narrator: The few
details that have emerged
about the pipeline story
tantalize historians
such as Mark stout.
Stout: It's a particular kind
of software from Canada,
as opposed to sort of
generically it's from somewhere,
suggests to me that there
is a basis of truth here.
I don't have any reason to doubt
that something
like that happened.
Whether that software
made it into that pipeline
and caused an explosion,
different question.
Narrator: The CIA is
virtually silent on the subject.
Instead of an explanation
of the siberian
pipeline explosion,
a short essay on their website
by Gus weiss tells the story
of the kgb mole Vladimir vetrov.
Vetrov was given the
code name farewell.
He had revealed to the west
that the Soviet union
had been using detente
to steal western technology.
The essay details how
the west had struck back,
selling the Soviets
flawed turbines
and feeding their military
faulty computer chips.
That there is no mention
of a cyber attack
on the siberian pipeline
may not be surprising.
Stout: Things in the
intelligence world
don't get written down.
Also, I think that the CIA
would probably rather
not have people dwelling
on the notion that we might
be enabling the acquisition
by foreign governments
of sensitive technology
and using that as an opportunity
to put things like
trojan horses in it
because I imagine that
that might be a tool
that they still have
in their tool kit
that they just don't want
people thinking about too much.
I certainly would never want
to say this didn't happen.
I'm just not
convinced that it did,
is the way I would put it.
Narrator: Mark stout
is sharing his research
with historians kristie
macrakis and Derek leebaert.
Stout: There is not a lot of
primary source evidence
out there,
which it basically boils down
to the recollection
of one person.
Macrakis: I do know episodes
where technology was exported
to the east bloc
and it was doctored
and it failed upon arrival.
And I have specific cases
and I have the files
and I have evidence and
those are things I want
as a historian.
I only know the pipeline
story from secondary sources,
so I don't know what's
true, what's not true.
Leebaert: I worked closely with
Gus weiss for a number of years.
Macrakis: Oh, oh, oh, I
didn't know that.
Leebaert: And one of his
favorite expressions was
"just because
there's no evidence"
"doesn't mean it's not true."
Narrator: Even the former
Reagan official Thomas Reed,
whose book claimed
the siberian explosion
was a CIA cyber attack,
wants more evidence.
Reed: Good journalism
requires second sources,
and Gus weiss told me
that's what was going on,
so I believed him.
After the fact, when
I published the book,
Soviet kgb historians said,
"yes, there was a big explosion."
"No, that wasn't the pipeline."
I never had the ability
to check a second source.
Narrator: But perhaps the
bigger story is the success
of the secret war that
President Reagan had launched
on the Soviet union.
Stout: At the end of the day,
whether there was an explosion
in a particular place
on a particular day,
ultimately doesn't really
matter a whole lot.
Narrator: With foot soldiers
such as CIA director
bill Casey and Gus weiss,
the Reagan administration
had confronted communism
around the world,
and struck at the heart
of the Soviet economy.
Leebaert: Here for perhaps the
first time since world war ii,
it was a grand strategy to
pull down the Soviet union.
Stout: The beauty of weiss'
plan is that even if
or when, really, the Soviets
eventually figure out
that we'd been giving
them bad stuff,
that doesn't solve
the Soviet problem
because the Soviets
will have to go back
and either test or just get
rid of every single thing
in their entire economic system
and in their entire military
system that came from the west
because otherwise they won't
ever be able to trust it.
Narrator: The
Soviets learned some
of what the west was doing
because we told them.
Kristie macrakis found
evidence in the files
of the east German
secret police,
a message on an
American-supplied computer chip.
Macrakis: They would engrave
little messages on the chips.
So one of the chips said,
"when are you going to
stop stealing?" In it.
So when the east
Germans got this,
they opened their package
and the chip said,
"when are you going to
stop stealing?" In Russian.
Narrator: Derek leebaert
sounds a cautionary note.
Leebaert: We didn't
realize how close
to the edge the
Soviet union was.
They interpreted the us approach
as characteristic
of an aggressor.
Narrator: As Reagan had
increased American pressure,
the Soviet finger on
the nuclear trigger
had squeezed ever tighter.
Leebaert: According to those
on the scene
within government in 1983,
it got extremely dangerous.
Narrator: The kgb spies
stealing western technology
were finally arrested.
Major: We kicked 100
intelligence officers out
of the United States
and they were the best
officers they had,
the ones who had
the best languages,
the ones that had
the best sources.
Narrator: It was
a Soviet statesman,
mikhail gorbachev, who helped
write the final chapter
of the cold war.
Translator: Today
I can report to you
that the Soviet union
has taken a decision
to reduce its armed forces.
Leebaert: He had the good
sense not to lash out
when he realized that
the oxygen coming
into the Soviet union
had been turned off.
The cash had been turned off,
technology had been cut off.
What he deserves to be
remembered for is for giving in.
Narrator: In 1989, the
Soviet union finally collapsed.
The Reagan cold warriors
got their victory.
But Vladimir vetrov,
who'd exposed the kgb
technology thieves,
didn't live to see the
results of his handiwork.
Macrakis: I mean, the whole
thing with this vetrov story is,
I mean, it could be straight
out of a Hollywood movie.
Narrator: In Moscow, as
he was spying for the west,
vetrov had an affair with
a fellow kgb officer.
Major: Well, he was
photographing documents
in his office
for the French when
she caught him.
She should have turned
him in, but she didn't.
She basically says, "it's time
for you to leave your wife"
"and marry me, or
I'll turn you in."
Stout: On February 22nd, 1982,
he is parked in a parking lot
with his mistress
drinking champagne.
He becomes enraged
and pulls a knife
out of the glove compartment
and starts stabbing her.
Major: He doesn't want
to be blackmailed.
At that time, this
other kgb officer,
who had had an affair
with the same woman,
who had followed them to the
park, opens the car door.
And vetrov comes out of the
thing, and they have a fight,
and he kills that kgb officer.
Narrator: Vladimir
vetrov is arrested.
Then, while in jail,
the man who had been one of
the kgb's worst ever traitors
is himself betrayed.
The kgb had a source
inside French intelligence
who revealed vetrov's treachery.
Kalugin: He was pulled out of
jail and executed as a traitor.
(Gun fires)
Narrator: Vetrov was
executed on January 23, 1985.
16 years later, Gus weiss
also had an unnatural death.
He had battled the Soviets from
the shadows his entire life.
But in 2003, he
fell from a window
in the Watergate building,
in an apparent suicide.
The police report nothing
suspicious about weiss' death.
For some, doubts remain.
Macrakis: It's not clear
whether it was suicide
or if he was pushed.
He is an important
figure in all this.
Narrator: And while
doubts also remain
about whether the CIA
caused an explosion
in Siberia in 1981, it is
clear that a new weapon,
doctored computer chips,
were first used to
fight the Soviet union.
It was the opening battle
in a secret cyber war
still being fought today,
just beyond our line of sight.