Air Emergency (2003–…): Season 16, Episode 3 - Disaster at Tenerife - full transcript
On 27 March 1977, the deadliest-ever aviation accident occurs at Los Rodeos Airport (now known as Tenerife-North Airport) in the Canary Islands. KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 ...
[Explosion]
PASSENGERS: [Screaming]
NARRATOR: Two jumbo jets.
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people.
NARRATOR: The deadliest
air crash of all time.
JOHN: This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I
could actually lose my license.
NARRATOR: Blame
soon falls on one pilot.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
DENNIS: Why would he
ignore those instructions?
NARRATOR: But as investigators
sift through all the evidence...
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
NARRATOR: The
disaster in Tenerife
grows more and more mysterious.
INVESTIGATOR: Why didn't they
get off where they were told?
DENNIS: These are the top guys.
These are the best in the
business. How could this happen?
Flight attendant:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
WE ARE STARTING OUR APPROACH.
Pilot: WE LOST BOTH ENGINES!
Flight attendant:
PUT THE MASK OVER YOUR NOSE.
EMERGENCY DESCENT.
Pilot: MAYDAY, MAYDAY.
Flight attendant:
BRACE FOR IMPACT!
Controller: I THINK I LOST ONE.
Man: INVESTIGATION STARTING
INTO THIS TRAGEDY...
Man: HE'S GONNA CRASH!
*
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Sunjet 2-8-2,
proceed directly to
runway, backtrack and hold.
NARRATOR: Los Rodeos Airport on
the Spanish island of Tenerife
is busier than it's ever been.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: BA-783,
hold short of the runway
and stand by for taxi clearance.
NARRATOR: The
controllers are swamped.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Scandinavian 1-4-2-0,
you are
cleared for takeoff.
Sterling 7-3-9-2,
you are next in line.
Sierra Alpha Tango Alpha
69, right turn, heading 0-4-0.
Goodbye.
NARRATOR:
A few hours ago, dozens
of flights were diverted here
after a terrorist bombing
shut down a larger airport
in nearby Las Palmas.
JIM: It's a
single-runway airport
with a single parallel taxiway,
and because of the
terrorist event in the region,
they had much more traffic
than I'm certain that
they would normally see.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sterling
7-3-9-2, taxi to the runway
and exit at taxiway Charlie 3.
JIM: They were
dealing with aircraft
that had been delayed
for a good part of the day,
and now there was
a sense of urgency
to get them out and
safely on their way.
NARRATOR: With so many
planes parked on the taxiways,
the controllers
instruct departing flights
to taxi along the
airport's only runway
to get into
position for takeoff.
One of the planes
waiting to get to Las Palmas
is Pan Am flight 1736.
CPT. GRUBBS: We
must be getting close.
FO. BRAGG: I sure hope
so. I'm ready for the beach.
NARRATOR: Thirty-nine-year-old
Robert Bragg
is the first officer.
ROBERT: After we
got to Las Palmas,
we were supposed
to have a day there
and then fly the airplane
to Paris and have a day off
and then back to New York.
So it was supposed
to be a very good trip.
NARRATOR: His
captain is Victor Grubbs.
Flight engineer George Warns
completes the
highly experienced crew.
JOHN: Pan American World
Airways was not only a pioneer,
but they were the one we
all looked up to tremendously.
Those of us who wanted to
be pilots and who later were
always had that fantasy
that we might some day fly
for Pan American.
So they were the creme de la
creme for so many, many decades.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew is
ready to get back in the air,
but they can't
taxi to the runway.
A KLM 747 has stopped in
front of them to refuel.
ROBERT: We were about 12 feet
short of getting around them,
and we were all
on the same radio.
I asked him how long would it
be for him to finish fueling.
He said about 45 minutes.
JOHN: You're trying
to get your passengers
where they want to go
and now KLM wants more fuel
and it's just one of those
things. It gets frustrating.
These irritations are small,
but at the end of a long day
they begin to add up.
PASSENGER: Not even a sandwich?
NARRATOR: It's been a long
day for the 378 passengers
on board the Pan Am airplane.
The flight started in
Los Angeles before stopping
in New York and
now in Tenerife.
ROBERT: They had been on
the airplane 12, 13 hours.
So they were getting tired.
NARRATOR: The
passengers have no idea
how long the delay will last.
ROBERT: KLM was our big concern.
And we found out his
fueling would be finished.
FO. MEURS:
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
We've finished refueling.
Requesting
clearance for start up.
NARRATOR: The KLM aircraft
is finally ready to roll.
Both 747s should be
back in the air soon.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
requesting start clearance.
ROBERT: I said okay, Pan
Am is ready to start also.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
you are cleared to start.
*
CPT. GRUBBS: Okay.
Pre-start checklist please.
FO. BRAGG: Ladies and gentlemen,
the flight deck once again.
I'm happy to say we've been
finally cleared to get moving.
We should have you in the air
in about 15 minutes from now.
NARRATOR: The Canary Islands lie
off the west coast of Africa.
Tenerife is one of seven
in the Spanish archipelago.
The mountainous island
is famous for
constantly changing weather.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I
can't see anything out there.
JIM: A fog bank rolled in,
and visibility went
down to almost zero.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
clear taxi into the runway
following the 747 from KLM.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
JIM: To expedite the departures
of both KLM and Pan Am,
they taxied both on the
runway at the same time
to put them in a position
where they would be ready
for a departure.
ROBERT: He said follow KLM
down the runway, backtrack,
make an exit to get
around back of KLM.
So that's what we were doing.
NARRATOR: Once they get in the
air, the flight to Las Palmas
should only take
about 25 minutes.
*
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
how many taxiways did you pass?
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
NARRATOR: The KLM 747 will
be the next plane to take off.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway make a 180
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
(In Spanish) Ya despues
de estos dos ya terminamos.
NARRATOR: First Officer Bragg
is unfamiliar with the airport.
He checks a runway diagram
to help find their turning.
FO. BRAGG: Okay,
that's this one right here.
CPT. GRUBBS: It goes ahead. It's
going to put us on the taxiway.
NARRATOR: As they taxi,
they listen to the
tower controller tell
the KLM crew ahead of them
what to do after departure.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the
Papa Beacon. Flight level 9-0.
Right turn at...we
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
I will call you.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew
will be turning off the runway
in just a few more yards.
But now something's wrong.
First Officer Bragg can
see a plane through the fog.
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
ROBERT: And I
looked up and there he was
coming down the runway.
It was very
obvious that he was moving
because his landing
lights were shaking.
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
ROBERT: He saw KLM too.
FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off!
*
NARRATOR: Captain
Grubbs tries to steer clear
of the oncoming KLM.
But it's bearing down on them
at nearly 200 miles an hour.
ROBERT: He had
lifted off the runway.
I could see his
rotating beacon underneath.
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
Get off. Get off. Get off!
ROBERT: And then I ducked
and said a real quick prayer.
"God, I hope he misses us."
PASSENGERS: [Screaming]
[Explosion]
*
NARRATOR: The unimaginable
collision between two jumbo jets
has turned a runway in
Tenerife into a disaster zone.
ROBERT: I opened my eyes.
The first thing I noticed,
all the windows were gone,
and it looked like
somebody had taken a big knife
and just cut the whole
top of the airplane off.
FO. BRAGG: Get out! Get out!
ROBERT: That's when I
decided it was time to leave.
NARRATOR: It's a 45-foot
drop onto solid concrete.
ROBERT: And I just
jumped right over the side.
I didn't even think about it.
When I hit I rolled on
the ground and looked around
and discovered I wasn't hurt.
WOMAN: [Coughing]
NARRATOR:
Some passengers in the shattered
cabin of the Pan Am jet
have also survived.
FEMALE PASSENGER: Get out!
NARRATOR: They're
desperate to get off the plane.
ROBERT: The airplane
was totally burning.
There were flames
probably 200 feet high.
NARRATOR: An
opening in the fuselage
offers the
possibility of escape,
but there are no
emergency slides.
The long drop to the
runway could be fatal.
With the plane engulfed in
flames, it's the only way out.
PASSENGER: We're
going to have to jump.
ROBERT: I thought the
airplane was going to blow up.
And I yelled out at them to
start jumping. And they did.
NARRATOR: Only 61 people
from the Pan Am flight survive.
The cockpit crew is
alive, but 335 others are dead.
On the KLM flight,
there are no survivors.
Two hundred and
forty-eight passengers and crew
have been killed.
All told, the
disaster claims 583 lives.
It's the deadliest
aviation accident of all time.
*
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people,
with only a few
getting out on Pan Am.
This was something that we
really had not contemplated
when we started
building bigger airplanes.
Nobody ever thought,
what if we lost two of them
in a collision on the ground?
This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
*
NARRATOR: The next morning,
investigators from Spain,
the Netherlands and the
United States are on the scene.
DENNIS: We didn't have
a whole lot of experience
with 747s
crashing at that point.
So from an accident
investigation standpoint
it was going to be as
big a deal as you can get.
INVESTIGATOR: Pan Am
clearing the runway.
KLM on its takeoff
roll. Someone messed up.
NARRATOR: They face a huge task,
trying to untangle
the chain of events
that led to this
catastrophic runway collision.
The search for the black
boxes begins immediately.
The recorders could
hold important details
about what was
happening in both cockpits.
DENNIS: The voice recorders
in this case were vital.
You had two airworthy aircraft
coming together on the runway.
So the events leading up
to that, you know, were key.
INVESTIGATOR: It was busy.
Controllers had to get
almost 50 planes off the ground
in just a few hours.
NARRATOR: Investigators
know that Los Rodeos Airport
has no ground radar to
help controllers track planes.
JIM: At a busy location,
it's unusual for a controller
to have to work
without ground radar.
It increases the stress
a little bit in the tower.
NARRATOR: There's no
question that the small airport
was dealing with
more traffic than usual.
Was it too much for
controllers to handle?
Did they make a fatal mistake?
A visit to the tower
is the obvious next step.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
We've never been that busy.
And the planes were
parked here and here.
They had to use the runway
to taxi into
position one at a time.
JIM: They were actually having
to park aircraft on the taxiway,
the only taxiway that they had,
and therefore kind of deviate
from their standard
operating procedures.
And anytime you do
that, unfortunately, risk,
things get a little bit riskier.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
So I instructed KLM to taxi
to the foot of the
runway, make a 180,
and wait for takeoff clearance.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway, make a 180
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And a couple of minutes later,
he reported that he
was in position here.
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
JOHN: When KLM had turned
around at the end of the runway
and was in position for takeoff,
we call that "line up and wait."
So they are waiting
for takeoff clearance,
which will equal a clear runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And then I had Pan Am move up
the runway right behind the KLM.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Papa Alpha
1-7-3-6 report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
It's true we were busier
than we've ever been
before, but we were managing.
We were getting the job done.
NARRATOR: It's
becoming clear to investigators
that the cause of the
Tenerife tragedy goes beyond
a busy airport.
Controllers had a lot to do,
but they were not overwhelmed.
There must have been
other factors at play.
[Distant explosion]
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Que paso?
JOHN: In accident investigation,
we learned a long time
ago that there is never ever
just one cause,
and there are a multiplicity
of moving parts on this.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: I couldn't
actually see what happened.
A thick fog had rolled in.
Visibility was
almost zero by then.
DENNIS: This particular airport
had a unique characteristic
in that it was high
enough so that you would get
actually clouds
rolling in across the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
how many taxiways did you pass?
JIM: The controllers
looking out the window
could not see any
aircraft that were taxiing,
either on the
taxiways or on the runways,
and instead had to rely solely
on transmissions from the pilots
to report whether or not
they were clear of the runway.
NARRATOR:
Investigators know that
if the controller couldn't see
the airplanes through the fog,
his instructions to the pilots
would have to be crystal clear.
They gather recordings
from air traffic control.
Perhaps the tapes can
paint a better picture
of what really happened.
DENNIS: That was the key
to the whole investigation.
Where were the
aircraft on the runways,
and what was being said along
their path down the runway?
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off! Get off!
[Explosion]
NARRATOR: History's deadliest
air crash is leading newscasts
around the world.
The pressure for
answers is not about to let up.
DENNIS: We knew we had a
tremendous task on our hands
to solve this accident.
*
INVESTIGATOR: All right,
let's start with KLM clearing
the end of the runway. 5-0-2.
NARRATOR: Investigators want to
know if the Tenerife controller
said anything to the
KLM or Pan Am pilots
that could have
led to the collision.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
KLM 4-8-0-5, how many
taxiways did you pass?
NARRATOR:
They listen to the recordings
from inside the tower.
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
INVESTIGATOR: Okay, so they just
passed Charlie 4 right here.
*
NARRATOR:
KLM Captain Jacob Van Zanten and
his first officer, Klaas Meurs,
taxi up the runway in thick fog.
JOHN: By the time that the main
island airport at Las Palmas
reopened and everybody
was getting ready to go,
it was down to about 700
to 900 yards' visibility,
and that's just
right at minimums.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
At the end of the runway,
make a 180 and report
ready for ATC clearance.
INVESTIGATOR: Okay.
KLM was told to proceed
to the end of the runway,
turn around and wait.
What was the Pan
Am flight told to do?
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
leave the runway
3-1 to your left.
INVESTIGATOR: Whoa. What
did they just ask him to do?
FO. BRAGG: I'm
sorry. Say again please.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Leave the runway,
the third one to your left.
FO. BRAGG: Okay.
Taxi down the runway
and leave the runway at the
first intersection on the left.
Is that correct?
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Negative. The
third one. The third one.
JOHN: Whenever we
look at the question of
whether or not the air traffic
controllers in the tower,
the two gentlemen in the tower
were giving clear instructions,
you've gotta remember we have
kind of a linguistic problem
here because these were two
Spaniards who speak Spanish
as their native
language attempting
to speak in aviation
English to an American crew
and to a KLM Dutch crew.
INVESTIGATOR: He's
on an active runway,
and he doesn't know if he's
being told to get off here,
here, or maybe here.
JIM: There seemed
to be some confusion
as to which exit they
were supposed to take,
and I have a feeling
part of that had to do
with the accents involved.
FO. BRAGG: Maybe
I'll ask him again.
Would you confirm that you want
Clipper 1-7-3-6 to turn left
at the third intersection?
NARRATOR: It
takes an extra effort,
but the controller eventually
makes himself understood.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The
third one, sir. One, two, three.
The third one, third!
NARRATOR: The
controller's accent
may have been another
complicating factor for pilots
in an unfamiliar
airport on a very busy day.
But for investigators, it's not
enough to explain the crash.
They need to keep digging.
INVESTIGATOR: One, two, three.
This is where they
were told to get off,
and they clearly understood.
But they moved past C-3.
Why didn't they get
off where they were told?
NARRATOR: The Pan Am plane
taxied past the third exit.
Why did it stay on the runway?
For more insight, investigators
examine the geometry
of the turn the Pan Am
pilots were asked to make.
That leads to a
surprising discovery.
INVESTIGATOR: So you
have a 148-degree turn here,
followed by another one here.
NARRATOR: Leaving the runway
at the third intersection
would have required
two very sharp turns,
both tighter than 90 degrees.
INVESTIGATOR: That's
practically impossible.
JOHN: A 747 is a beast.
This is a big, big airplane.
You just can't
turn it on a dime.
So a crew is going
to always be reluctant,
an experienced crew
especially like Pan Am's,
to take a turn if it
doesn't look logical to them.
And this one did not
look logical to them.
INVESTIGATOR: All right. So
the collision happened here.
So he obviously passed
C-3 and was headed for C-4.
NARRATOR: Instead of
leaving the runway at an exit
that required two
very difficult turns,
the Pan Am crew
headed for the fourth exit.
It was further along the runway
but provided a much easier turn.
ROBERT: If you see
C-4, it's the only taxiway
going off the runway
at a 45-degree angle.
The other, C-3, would have
not done what we needed to do.
JIM: I can see how that
would definitely have induced
the Pan Am crew to
think that Charlie-4
was the exit that they
were supposed to turn at.
NARRATOR: In the
fog, the KLM crew
would not have been
able to see that Pan Am 1736
was taxiing past the
C3 exit as they waited
for takeoff instructions
from the controller.
FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for
takeoff. Awaiting ATC clearance.
JIM: The first clearance
they were asking for was
an air traffic
control route clearance,
which tells pilots how to get
from the airport that
they were at, Tenerife,
to their destination airport.
NARRATOR: The air traffic
recording suggests the KLM crew
knew the correct procedures
and was following them.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
INVESTIGATOR: It sounds fine.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to Papa Beacon.
Flight level nine-zero. Right
turn out. We are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Standby for takeoff.
I will call you.
JIM: It's kind of a verification
between the controller and
the pilot that they are doing
what they should be doing.
INVESTIGATOR: He's telling the
tower he's in takeoff position,
but he's been told to
wait for takeoff clearance.
So why does he
start his takeoff roll?
NARRATOR:
Investigators are mystified.
Nothing on the tower
recording can explain
why the KLM crew
started down the runway
before they were
cleared to do so.
DENNIS: The big
question then was, you know,
once you get over the
horrific nature of it
and say, how could this happen?
[Explosion and screams]
NARRATOR: At the crash site,
there's new hope of
finding some answers.
Investigators have
recovered the black boxes.
DENNIS: The voice recorders
were key to the investigation.
That gave us an insight
into what was going on
in the respective cockpits.
NARRATOR: They can only hope
the new evidence will be enough
to finally solve the mystery
of the worst air disaster
the world has ever seen.
INVESTIGATOR:
We've located the CVR.
*
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the Tenerife disaster
shifts to the
Washington headquarters
of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
Investigator Dennis Grossi
has painstakingly matched up
the cockpit voice recordings
with the known movements
of both planes.
DENNIS: Okay. Let's
listen to the Pan Am.
DENNIS: In this case,
fractions of a second mattered.
So it was important that we
had those recorders synced up
so you could hear it and you
could have precise measurements
of when things were said.
FO. BRAGG: Yeah.
That's that 45 there.
That's this one right here.
The next one is almost a 45.
Goes ahead. It's going
to put us on the taxiway.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am cockpit
tape confirms that the crew
was having a hard time figuring
out where to leave the runway.
DENNIS: They're passing
C-3 and no one sees them.
NARRATOR: Did the KLM
crew think the Pan Am plane
was already off the runway?
DENNIS: Keep it going.
NARRATOR: What the tape reveals
next suggests the answer is no.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: Both crews are
using the same radio frequency.
KLM should have heard
First Officer Bragg
report his location.
ROBERT: That's why I said,
"We're still on the runway,
and we will report
clear of the runway."
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
DENNIS: Crystal
clear for all to hear.
He's still on the runway.
Yet KLM continues to take off.
NARRATOR: Captain Van Zanten
is a highly experienced pilot
with more than
11,000 hours in the air.
What led him to believe
the runway ahead was clear
and that he had
permission to take off?
DENNIS: It just seems so alien
for the crew to
make that mistake.
I mean, these are the top guys.
These are the
best in the business.
DENNIS: He lands
just after 13:30.
NARRATOR: Investigators
turn to the KLM voice recording
for answers.
Perhaps something
said in that cockpit
can explain the
incomprehensible decision
to start down the runway.
FE. SCHREUDER: We
landed here at 1:38.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Yes, I know that,
but we have to start from 7:00.
That's when we checked in.
DENNIS:
You're trying to recreate
the cockpit environment,
why certain decisions were
made, why things were said.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: The time
limit is 10 hours of flying
with an amplitude of 13 hours.
That's with one stopover.
NARRATOR: The recording
reveals that the captain
is worried about work hours.
If the crew
exceeds their duty time,
they'll be forced
to cancel the flight.
JOHN: And that means probably
thirty, $40,000 of hotel rooms
for the outbound passengers
who they're not going to be
able to carry back that night.
It is a bit of a
logistical nightmare,
especially in an
outstation in a foreign place.
NARRATOR: Dutch
regulators have also recently
tightened the rules governing
flight crew duty time.
A Dutch pilot can now
have his license revoked
if he exceeds the
legal number of hours.
The crew left Amsterdam
at nine in the morning.
They still have to get
their passengers to Las Palmas,
pick up another
load of passengers,
and get back to Amsterdam
before the clock runs out.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I could
actually lose my license.
FE. SCHREUDER: We
certainly wouldn't want that.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Well, if we're waiting,
we might as well refuel.
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
Now requesting
refueling at the apron.
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
concern over duty time explains
why he decided to
refuel while in Tenerife.
DENNIS: He was going to
do everything in his power
to make sure that he
could complete the flight
within his legal
duty time limits.
NARRATOR: But then,
a short time later,
the airport in
Las Palmas reopens.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
To all aircraft, Las
Palmas has reopened.
You may ask for start up and
clearances at your discretion.
NARRATOR: And Van
Zanten's plan backfires.
Refueling takes much
longer than expected,
and now he can't
move until it's done.
JOHN: When Las
Palmas reopened, here he is
sucking on a fuel hose
instead of starting
the engines and moving.
FO. BRAGG: This
is Clipper 1-7-3-6
requesting startup clearance.
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
decision has a huge impact
on the Pan Am flight as well.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: The KLM beside you
has requested a refuel,
and it doesn't look like
you're going to get by him.
JOHN: The Pan American 747
didn't have enough
wing tip clearance.
FO. BRAGG: You
gotta be kidding me.
Roger Tenerife, Clipper 1-7-3-6.
JOHN: The other
captains were unhappy with him
because he was the
cork in the bottle.
NARRATOR: The refueling
delay means the KLM crew
now has only two hours
until they're grounded.
DENNIS: A half hour to
taxi. A half hour to get there.
An hour to swap passengers and
get back in the air. It's tight.
And guess what? The
weather's getting worse.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
you are clear to
taxi to the runway.
NARRATOR: The question
facing investigators now is,
did the rush to get off the
ground in worsening weather
cause the KLM
crew to jump the gun?
DENNIS: So he taxis to the end
of the runway and does this 180.
We know this
from the tower tapes.
Can we hear it
from that point please?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Starting. Landing lights on.
Checklist complete.
NARRATOR: Investigators
hear more evidence
that the captain of KLM flight
4805 may have been in a rush.
DENNIS: Is he throttling up?
FO. MEURS: Wait a minute.
We do not have ATC clearance.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: No, I
know that. Go ahead and ask.
DENNIS: It's obvious that
time was an important factor
in the KLM
Captain's decision-making.
He wasn't going
to waste any time
once he got to the
end of the runway.
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
DENNIS: So he
requests ATC clearance.
We're about a
minute from the collision.
JOHN: When the first officer
asked for the clearance,
he was asking for the air
traffic control clearance,
completely
separate from the clearance
to actually roll this
500, 600,000-pound monster
down the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
NARRATOR: What
investigators hear next
answers many of the questions
plaguing this investigation.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Clear to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go! Check thrust.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0, right turn out.
We are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
Play that again, please.
NARRATOR: The controller
is providing instructions
for what to do after takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
NARRATOR: But the captain reacts
as if he's actually
been cleared for departure.
JIM: They get a clearance
from air traffic control
that contains the word takeoff,
and that confirms for
them that everything is
the way it should be, when
in fact everything was not.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
NARRATOR: Before
his first officer
has finished reading
back the instructions,
Captain Van Zanten
is already on the roll.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
We are now at takeoff.
NARRATOR: Investigators now know
what the Dutch first
officer meant by "at takeoff."
DENNIS: He's reporting
that he's actually taking off,
not that he's ready to take off.
JIM: Unfortunately, in this case
it meant they were taking
off from the KLM perspective.
And from the air
traffic control perspective,
they were hearing, "We
are at takeoff position."
NARRATOR: But for investigators
there's something
about the radio exchange
that still doesn't make sense.
DENNIS: According to
the tower transcripts,
the controller
advised him to stay put.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
I will call you.
NARRATOR:
Why didn't the KLM crew
follow that clear instruction
to stand by?
DENNIS: Give me Pan Am at 17:06.
That's when Pan Am
reports on the same frequency
that they're
still on the runway.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
DENNIS: Hold it there.
Why would he ignore them?
NARRATOR: The cockpit recordings
continue to
baffle investigators,
until they hear another critical
moment on the KLM tape.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
DENNIS: That's what he heard?
NARRATOR: It's a
stunning discovery.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
We're now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
NARRATOR: The two
warnings to stay put
were never heard
in the KLM cockpit.
The tower and the Pan Am flight
both made their critical
calls at the exact same moment.
FO. BRAGG (Overlap): And we're
still taxiing down the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(overlap): Okay. Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: The
simultaneous transmissions
produced a four second
squeal in the KLM cockpit.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: The crew
heard only one word: okay.
JIM:
Unfortunately, this happened
during that pause after
the controller says okay.
For KLM, they had no opportunity
to hear the controller
saying standby for takeoff,
nor were they able to hear,
because they were
speaking at the same time,
the Pan Am crew reporting that
they were still on the runway.
DENNIS: So what's next?
NARRATOR: There's
one final transmission
recorded in the KLM cockpit.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
NARRATOR: It should
have alerted the crew
that another plane
was still on the runway.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
NARRATOR:
Only the flight engineer
seems to have understood it.
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
NARRATOR: The
pilots ignore his concern
and miss their last
chance to avoid a disaster
that will claim 583 lives.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
*
[Warning alert sound]
DENNIS: Van Zanten
should not have moved
without explicit clearance.
ROBERT:
You learn that in probably
the first or second lesson
in aviation: Do not take
off unless you get a clearance.
NARRATOR: Investigators
dig into the career
of Captain Van Zanten.
They're looking for
anything that might explain
why an experienced pilot would
violate such a fundamental rule.
INVESTIGATOR: This
guy was a superstar.
NARRATOR: They
learn that Van Zanten
was one of KLM's top pilots.
He was the face of the airline,
the director of flight safety,
and head of the
flight training department.
JOHN: How could a human being
with so much intelligence,
so much capability and
experience and position,
and the director of safety
-- how could he fail like this?
[Explosion]
*
NARRATOR: Investigators
suspect that, in an odd twist,
the captain's elevated status
may have played a role
in the Tenerife disaster.
ROBERT: Back in those
times, everyone had an awe
of the captain, if you
will. His word was god.
His word was unquestioned.
DENNIS: If he has
that kind of authority,
it's less likely
for someone his junior,
in this case the flight
engineer and the first officer,
to challenge anything he does.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
NARRATOR: The
conversation in the KLM cockpit
leading up to the accident
seems to support that notion.
But Van Zanten's
esteemed status doesn't explain
the most
troubling question of all.
Why did he believe it was safe
to take off in the first place?
DENNIS: Logically, you
should make extra clear that,
hey, we're taking
off. Is the runway clear?
NARRATOR: Investigators search
desperately for an answer and
come across a stunning detail
in the captain's flight log.
It could be the
final piece of the puzzle.
INVESTIGATOR: This was his
first flight in three months.
NARRATOR: Records show
that Van Zanten's cockpit hours
had dropped
dramatically in recent years.
He was spending most of
his time in a simulator
training other pilots.
JOHN: The
simulation is interesting
because, when you spend a
lot of time as an instructor
in a simulator, it's
an artificial environment
that we try to make
as real as possible.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay. Checklist
complete. Let's go. Thrust.
NARRATOR: Flight simulators
do a remarkably good job
at recreating the
experience of a real flight.
But there is one very
important element missing.
There is no air traffic
controller in a simulator.
DENNIS: His
focus was on training,
and there was this
difference in the way
you treat air traffic
control communications
in a training environment
versus the real world.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay, let's
go. Thrust. V-1. Here we go.
Takeoff thrust. Rotate.
Okay let's go. Takeoff thrust.
Thrust. Let's go.
INVESTIGATOR: All that
time he spent in a simulator
works against him.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
JOHN: Jacob Van
Zanten's attempt to take off
without a clearance
resulted from his
time in the simulator
and that he kind
of reset himself.
He was his own clearance
authority in the simulator.
INVESTIGATOR: And then
two separate radio calls
that should have told him
the Pan Am was off the runway
cancel each other out.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
FO. BRAGG: [Static
squeal] Clipper 1736.
The world's
deadliest airline accident
is now all but inevitable.
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
*
JOHN: Basically we had a captain
who wanted to get off the
ground as rapidly as possible.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
*
JOHN: The weather
was not cooperating,
and he was about
out of crew duty time,
and in a situation
like that, the human mind,
our carbon-based brains tend to
jump a few cogs, so to speak.
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
Get off! Get off! Get off!
[Explosion]
JOHN: He had a gun cocked
and loaded by various factors
and he was the one
that pulled the trigger.
But you have to take
them all in connection.
[Explosion]
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the collision at Tenerife
results in dozens
of recommendations.
Few aviation accidents
have triggered a greater number
of significant changes.
JOHN: That's what began
to be the seed of training
for what we later called
crew resource management
where we said to the
captain, we're onto you, bub.
You're a human being.
You can make mistakes, even
when you have no intention to,
and even when you're
completely qualified.
NARRATOR: KLM and other airlines
transform their
training methods for captains,
helping them become more
responsive to their crew-mates.
DENNIS: Even the most senior
and the most highly trained
individuals can make mistakes
and we need to
rely on the resources
of all the crew members
to compensate for that.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
NARRATOR: The accident
also changes the very language
used by
controllers around the world.
JIM: Controllers
don't use the word takeoff
unless they
actually mean and intend
for the aircraft to be
doing just that, taking off.
Instead, they will substitute
the word "after departure turn
right heading zero-four-zero"
or something to that effect.
JOHN: Those 583
people did not die in vain.
We have learned those lessons.
They changed the whole
face of aviation safety.
*
PASSENGERS: [Screaming]
NARRATOR: Two jumbo jets.
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people.
NARRATOR: The deadliest
air crash of all time.
JOHN: This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I
could actually lose my license.
NARRATOR: Blame
soon falls on one pilot.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
DENNIS: Why would he
ignore those instructions?
NARRATOR: But as investigators
sift through all the evidence...
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
NARRATOR: The
disaster in Tenerife
grows more and more mysterious.
INVESTIGATOR: Why didn't they
get off where they were told?
DENNIS: These are the top guys.
These are the best in the
business. How could this happen?
Flight attendant:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
WE ARE STARTING OUR APPROACH.
Pilot: WE LOST BOTH ENGINES!
Flight attendant:
PUT THE MASK OVER YOUR NOSE.
EMERGENCY DESCENT.
Pilot: MAYDAY, MAYDAY.
Flight attendant:
BRACE FOR IMPACT!
Controller: I THINK I LOST ONE.
Man: INVESTIGATION STARTING
INTO THIS TRAGEDY...
Man: HE'S GONNA CRASH!
*
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Sunjet 2-8-2,
proceed directly to
runway, backtrack and hold.
NARRATOR: Los Rodeos Airport on
the Spanish island of Tenerife
is busier than it's ever been.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: BA-783,
hold short of the runway
and stand by for taxi clearance.
NARRATOR: The
controllers are swamped.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Scandinavian 1-4-2-0,
you are
cleared for takeoff.
Sterling 7-3-9-2,
you are next in line.
Sierra Alpha Tango Alpha
69, right turn, heading 0-4-0.
Goodbye.
NARRATOR:
A few hours ago, dozens
of flights were diverted here
after a terrorist bombing
shut down a larger airport
in nearby Las Palmas.
JIM: It's a
single-runway airport
with a single parallel taxiway,
and because of the
terrorist event in the region,
they had much more traffic
than I'm certain that
they would normally see.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sterling
7-3-9-2, taxi to the runway
and exit at taxiway Charlie 3.
JIM: They were
dealing with aircraft
that had been delayed
for a good part of the day,
and now there was
a sense of urgency
to get them out and
safely on their way.
NARRATOR: With so many
planes parked on the taxiways,
the controllers
instruct departing flights
to taxi along the
airport's only runway
to get into
position for takeoff.
One of the planes
waiting to get to Las Palmas
is Pan Am flight 1736.
CPT. GRUBBS: We
must be getting close.
FO. BRAGG: I sure hope
so. I'm ready for the beach.
NARRATOR: Thirty-nine-year-old
Robert Bragg
is the first officer.
ROBERT: After we
got to Las Palmas,
we were supposed
to have a day there
and then fly the airplane
to Paris and have a day off
and then back to New York.
So it was supposed
to be a very good trip.
NARRATOR: His
captain is Victor Grubbs.
Flight engineer George Warns
completes the
highly experienced crew.
JOHN: Pan American World
Airways was not only a pioneer,
but they were the one we
all looked up to tremendously.
Those of us who wanted to
be pilots and who later were
always had that fantasy
that we might some day fly
for Pan American.
So they were the creme de la
creme for so many, many decades.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew is
ready to get back in the air,
but they can't
taxi to the runway.
A KLM 747 has stopped in
front of them to refuel.
ROBERT: We were about 12 feet
short of getting around them,
and we were all
on the same radio.
I asked him how long would it
be for him to finish fueling.
He said about 45 minutes.
JOHN: You're trying
to get your passengers
where they want to go
and now KLM wants more fuel
and it's just one of those
things. It gets frustrating.
These irritations are small,
but at the end of a long day
they begin to add up.
PASSENGER: Not even a sandwich?
NARRATOR: It's been a long
day for the 378 passengers
on board the Pan Am airplane.
The flight started in
Los Angeles before stopping
in New York and
now in Tenerife.
ROBERT: They had been on
the airplane 12, 13 hours.
So they were getting tired.
NARRATOR: The
passengers have no idea
how long the delay will last.
ROBERT: KLM was our big concern.
And we found out his
fueling would be finished.
FO. MEURS:
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
We've finished refueling.
Requesting
clearance for start up.
NARRATOR: The KLM aircraft
is finally ready to roll.
Both 747s should be
back in the air soon.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
requesting start clearance.
ROBERT: I said okay, Pan
Am is ready to start also.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
you are cleared to start.
*
CPT. GRUBBS: Okay.
Pre-start checklist please.
FO. BRAGG: Ladies and gentlemen,
the flight deck once again.
I'm happy to say we've been
finally cleared to get moving.
We should have you in the air
in about 15 minutes from now.
NARRATOR: The Canary Islands lie
off the west coast of Africa.
Tenerife is one of seven
in the Spanish archipelago.
The mountainous island
is famous for
constantly changing weather.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I
can't see anything out there.
JIM: A fog bank rolled in,
and visibility went
down to almost zero.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
clear taxi into the runway
following the 747 from KLM.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
JIM: To expedite the departures
of both KLM and Pan Am,
they taxied both on the
runway at the same time
to put them in a position
where they would be ready
for a departure.
ROBERT: He said follow KLM
down the runway, backtrack,
make an exit to get
around back of KLM.
So that's what we were doing.
NARRATOR: Once they get in the
air, the flight to Las Palmas
should only take
about 25 minutes.
*
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
how many taxiways did you pass?
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
NARRATOR: The KLM 747 will
be the next plane to take off.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway make a 180
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
(In Spanish) Ya despues
de estos dos ya terminamos.
NARRATOR: First Officer Bragg
is unfamiliar with the airport.
He checks a runway diagram
to help find their turning.
FO. BRAGG: Okay,
that's this one right here.
CPT. GRUBBS: It goes ahead. It's
going to put us on the taxiway.
NARRATOR: As they taxi,
they listen to the
tower controller tell
the KLM crew ahead of them
what to do after departure.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the
Papa Beacon. Flight level 9-0.
Right turn at...we
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
I will call you.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew
will be turning off the runway
in just a few more yards.
But now something's wrong.
First Officer Bragg can
see a plane through the fog.
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
ROBERT: And I
looked up and there he was
coming down the runway.
It was very
obvious that he was moving
because his landing
lights were shaking.
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
ROBERT: He saw KLM too.
FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off!
*
NARRATOR: Captain
Grubbs tries to steer clear
of the oncoming KLM.
But it's bearing down on them
at nearly 200 miles an hour.
ROBERT: He had
lifted off the runway.
I could see his
rotating beacon underneath.
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
Get off. Get off. Get off!
ROBERT: And then I ducked
and said a real quick prayer.
"God, I hope he misses us."
PASSENGERS: [Screaming]
[Explosion]
*
NARRATOR: The unimaginable
collision between two jumbo jets
has turned a runway in
Tenerife into a disaster zone.
ROBERT: I opened my eyes.
The first thing I noticed,
all the windows were gone,
and it looked like
somebody had taken a big knife
and just cut the whole
top of the airplane off.
FO. BRAGG: Get out! Get out!
ROBERT: That's when I
decided it was time to leave.
NARRATOR: It's a 45-foot
drop onto solid concrete.
ROBERT: And I just
jumped right over the side.
I didn't even think about it.
When I hit I rolled on
the ground and looked around
and discovered I wasn't hurt.
WOMAN: [Coughing]
NARRATOR:
Some passengers in the shattered
cabin of the Pan Am jet
have also survived.
FEMALE PASSENGER: Get out!
NARRATOR: They're
desperate to get off the plane.
ROBERT: The airplane
was totally burning.
There were flames
probably 200 feet high.
NARRATOR: An
opening in the fuselage
offers the
possibility of escape,
but there are no
emergency slides.
The long drop to the
runway could be fatal.
With the plane engulfed in
flames, it's the only way out.
PASSENGER: We're
going to have to jump.
ROBERT: I thought the
airplane was going to blow up.
And I yelled out at them to
start jumping. And they did.
NARRATOR: Only 61 people
from the Pan Am flight survive.
The cockpit crew is
alive, but 335 others are dead.
On the KLM flight,
there are no survivors.
Two hundred and
forty-eight passengers and crew
have been killed.
All told, the
disaster claims 583 lives.
It's the deadliest
aviation accident of all time.
*
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people,
with only a few
getting out on Pan Am.
This was something that we
really had not contemplated
when we started
building bigger airplanes.
Nobody ever thought,
what if we lost two of them
in a collision on the ground?
This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
*
NARRATOR: The next morning,
investigators from Spain,
the Netherlands and the
United States are on the scene.
DENNIS: We didn't have
a whole lot of experience
with 747s
crashing at that point.
So from an accident
investigation standpoint
it was going to be as
big a deal as you can get.
INVESTIGATOR: Pan Am
clearing the runway.
KLM on its takeoff
roll. Someone messed up.
NARRATOR: They face a huge task,
trying to untangle
the chain of events
that led to this
catastrophic runway collision.
The search for the black
boxes begins immediately.
The recorders could
hold important details
about what was
happening in both cockpits.
DENNIS: The voice recorders
in this case were vital.
You had two airworthy aircraft
coming together on the runway.
So the events leading up
to that, you know, were key.
INVESTIGATOR: It was busy.
Controllers had to get
almost 50 planes off the ground
in just a few hours.
NARRATOR: Investigators
know that Los Rodeos Airport
has no ground radar to
help controllers track planes.
JIM: At a busy location,
it's unusual for a controller
to have to work
without ground radar.
It increases the stress
a little bit in the tower.
NARRATOR: There's no
question that the small airport
was dealing with
more traffic than usual.
Was it too much for
controllers to handle?
Did they make a fatal mistake?
A visit to the tower
is the obvious next step.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
We've never been that busy.
And the planes were
parked here and here.
They had to use the runway
to taxi into
position one at a time.
JIM: They were actually having
to park aircraft on the taxiway,
the only taxiway that they had,
and therefore kind of deviate
from their standard
operating procedures.
And anytime you do
that, unfortunately, risk,
things get a little bit riskier.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
So I instructed KLM to taxi
to the foot of the
runway, make a 180,
and wait for takeoff clearance.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway, make a 180
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And a couple of minutes later,
he reported that he
was in position here.
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
JOHN: When KLM had turned
around at the end of the runway
and was in position for takeoff,
we call that "line up and wait."
So they are waiting
for takeoff clearance,
which will equal a clear runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And then I had Pan Am move up
the runway right behind the KLM.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Papa Alpha
1-7-3-6 report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
It's true we were busier
than we've ever been
before, but we were managing.
We were getting the job done.
NARRATOR: It's
becoming clear to investigators
that the cause of the
Tenerife tragedy goes beyond
a busy airport.
Controllers had a lot to do,
but they were not overwhelmed.
There must have been
other factors at play.
[Distant explosion]
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Que paso?
JOHN: In accident investigation,
we learned a long time
ago that there is never ever
just one cause,
and there are a multiplicity
of moving parts on this.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: I couldn't
actually see what happened.
A thick fog had rolled in.
Visibility was
almost zero by then.
DENNIS: This particular airport
had a unique characteristic
in that it was high
enough so that you would get
actually clouds
rolling in across the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
how many taxiways did you pass?
JIM: The controllers
looking out the window
could not see any
aircraft that were taxiing,
either on the
taxiways or on the runways,
and instead had to rely solely
on transmissions from the pilots
to report whether or not
they were clear of the runway.
NARRATOR:
Investigators know that
if the controller couldn't see
the airplanes through the fog,
his instructions to the pilots
would have to be crystal clear.
They gather recordings
from air traffic control.
Perhaps the tapes can
paint a better picture
of what really happened.
DENNIS: That was the key
to the whole investigation.
Where were the
aircraft on the runways,
and what was being said along
their path down the runway?
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off! Get off!
[Explosion]
NARRATOR: History's deadliest
air crash is leading newscasts
around the world.
The pressure for
answers is not about to let up.
DENNIS: We knew we had a
tremendous task on our hands
to solve this accident.
*
INVESTIGATOR: All right,
let's start with KLM clearing
the end of the runway. 5-0-2.
NARRATOR: Investigators want to
know if the Tenerife controller
said anything to the
KLM or Pan Am pilots
that could have
led to the collision.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
KLM 4-8-0-5, how many
taxiways did you pass?
NARRATOR:
They listen to the recordings
from inside the tower.
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
INVESTIGATOR: Okay, so they just
passed Charlie 4 right here.
*
NARRATOR:
KLM Captain Jacob Van Zanten and
his first officer, Klaas Meurs,
taxi up the runway in thick fog.
JOHN: By the time that the main
island airport at Las Palmas
reopened and everybody
was getting ready to go,
it was down to about 700
to 900 yards' visibility,
and that's just
right at minimums.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
At the end of the runway,
make a 180 and report
ready for ATC clearance.
INVESTIGATOR: Okay.
KLM was told to proceed
to the end of the runway,
turn around and wait.
What was the Pan
Am flight told to do?
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
leave the runway
3-1 to your left.
INVESTIGATOR: Whoa. What
did they just ask him to do?
FO. BRAGG: I'm
sorry. Say again please.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Leave the runway,
the third one to your left.
FO. BRAGG: Okay.
Taxi down the runway
and leave the runway at the
first intersection on the left.
Is that correct?
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Negative. The
third one. The third one.
JOHN: Whenever we
look at the question of
whether or not the air traffic
controllers in the tower,
the two gentlemen in the tower
were giving clear instructions,
you've gotta remember we have
kind of a linguistic problem
here because these were two
Spaniards who speak Spanish
as their native
language attempting
to speak in aviation
English to an American crew
and to a KLM Dutch crew.
INVESTIGATOR: He's
on an active runway,
and he doesn't know if he's
being told to get off here,
here, or maybe here.
JIM: There seemed
to be some confusion
as to which exit they
were supposed to take,
and I have a feeling
part of that had to do
with the accents involved.
FO. BRAGG: Maybe
I'll ask him again.
Would you confirm that you want
Clipper 1-7-3-6 to turn left
at the third intersection?
NARRATOR: It
takes an extra effort,
but the controller eventually
makes himself understood.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The
third one, sir. One, two, three.
The third one, third!
NARRATOR: The
controller's accent
may have been another
complicating factor for pilots
in an unfamiliar
airport on a very busy day.
But for investigators, it's not
enough to explain the crash.
They need to keep digging.
INVESTIGATOR: One, two, three.
This is where they
were told to get off,
and they clearly understood.
But they moved past C-3.
Why didn't they get
off where they were told?
NARRATOR: The Pan Am plane
taxied past the third exit.
Why did it stay on the runway?
For more insight, investigators
examine the geometry
of the turn the Pan Am
pilots were asked to make.
That leads to a
surprising discovery.
INVESTIGATOR: So you
have a 148-degree turn here,
followed by another one here.
NARRATOR: Leaving the runway
at the third intersection
would have required
two very sharp turns,
both tighter than 90 degrees.
INVESTIGATOR: That's
practically impossible.
JOHN: A 747 is a beast.
This is a big, big airplane.
You just can't
turn it on a dime.
So a crew is going
to always be reluctant,
an experienced crew
especially like Pan Am's,
to take a turn if it
doesn't look logical to them.
And this one did not
look logical to them.
INVESTIGATOR: All right. So
the collision happened here.
So he obviously passed
C-3 and was headed for C-4.
NARRATOR: Instead of
leaving the runway at an exit
that required two
very difficult turns,
the Pan Am crew
headed for the fourth exit.
It was further along the runway
but provided a much easier turn.
ROBERT: If you see
C-4, it's the only taxiway
going off the runway
at a 45-degree angle.
The other, C-3, would have
not done what we needed to do.
JIM: I can see how that
would definitely have induced
the Pan Am crew to
think that Charlie-4
was the exit that they
were supposed to turn at.
NARRATOR: In the
fog, the KLM crew
would not have been
able to see that Pan Am 1736
was taxiing past the
C3 exit as they waited
for takeoff instructions
from the controller.
FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for
takeoff. Awaiting ATC clearance.
JIM: The first clearance
they were asking for was
an air traffic
control route clearance,
which tells pilots how to get
from the airport that
they were at, Tenerife,
to their destination airport.
NARRATOR: The air traffic
recording suggests the KLM crew
knew the correct procedures
and was following them.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
INVESTIGATOR: It sounds fine.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to Papa Beacon.
Flight level nine-zero. Right
turn out. We are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Standby for takeoff.
I will call you.
JIM: It's kind of a verification
between the controller and
the pilot that they are doing
what they should be doing.
INVESTIGATOR: He's telling the
tower he's in takeoff position,
but he's been told to
wait for takeoff clearance.
So why does he
start his takeoff roll?
NARRATOR:
Investigators are mystified.
Nothing on the tower
recording can explain
why the KLM crew
started down the runway
before they were
cleared to do so.
DENNIS: The big
question then was, you know,
once you get over the
horrific nature of it
and say, how could this happen?
[Explosion and screams]
NARRATOR: At the crash site,
there's new hope of
finding some answers.
Investigators have
recovered the black boxes.
DENNIS: The voice recorders
were key to the investigation.
That gave us an insight
into what was going on
in the respective cockpits.
NARRATOR: They can only hope
the new evidence will be enough
to finally solve the mystery
of the worst air disaster
the world has ever seen.
INVESTIGATOR:
We've located the CVR.
*
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the Tenerife disaster
shifts to the
Washington headquarters
of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
Investigator Dennis Grossi
has painstakingly matched up
the cockpit voice recordings
with the known movements
of both planes.
DENNIS: Okay. Let's
listen to the Pan Am.
DENNIS: In this case,
fractions of a second mattered.
So it was important that we
had those recorders synced up
so you could hear it and you
could have precise measurements
of when things were said.
FO. BRAGG: Yeah.
That's that 45 there.
That's this one right here.
The next one is almost a 45.
Goes ahead. It's going
to put us on the taxiway.
NARRATOR: The Pan Am cockpit
tape confirms that the crew
was having a hard time figuring
out where to leave the runway.
DENNIS: They're passing
C-3 and no one sees them.
NARRATOR: Did the KLM
crew think the Pan Am plane
was already off the runway?
DENNIS: Keep it going.
NARRATOR: What the tape reveals
next suggests the answer is no.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: Both crews are
using the same radio frequency.
KLM should have heard
First Officer Bragg
report his location.
ROBERT: That's why I said,
"We're still on the runway,
and we will report
clear of the runway."
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
DENNIS: Crystal
clear for all to hear.
He's still on the runway.
Yet KLM continues to take off.
NARRATOR: Captain Van Zanten
is a highly experienced pilot
with more than
11,000 hours in the air.
What led him to believe
the runway ahead was clear
and that he had
permission to take off?
DENNIS: It just seems so alien
for the crew to
make that mistake.
I mean, these are the top guys.
These are the
best in the business.
DENNIS: He lands
just after 13:30.
NARRATOR: Investigators
turn to the KLM voice recording
for answers.
Perhaps something
said in that cockpit
can explain the
incomprehensible decision
to start down the runway.
FE. SCHREUDER: We
landed here at 1:38.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Yes, I know that,
but we have to start from 7:00.
That's when we checked in.
DENNIS:
You're trying to recreate
the cockpit environment,
why certain decisions were
made, why things were said.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: The time
limit is 10 hours of flying
with an amplitude of 13 hours.
That's with one stopover.
NARRATOR: The recording
reveals that the captain
is worried about work hours.
If the crew
exceeds their duty time,
they'll be forced
to cancel the flight.
JOHN: And that means probably
thirty, $40,000 of hotel rooms
for the outbound passengers
who they're not going to be
able to carry back that night.
It is a bit of a
logistical nightmare,
especially in an
outstation in a foreign place.
NARRATOR: Dutch
regulators have also recently
tightened the rules governing
flight crew duty time.
A Dutch pilot can now
have his license revoked
if he exceeds the
legal number of hours.
The crew left Amsterdam
at nine in the morning.
They still have to get
their passengers to Las Palmas,
pick up another
load of passengers,
and get back to Amsterdam
before the clock runs out.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I could
actually lose my license.
FE. SCHREUDER: We
certainly wouldn't want that.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Well, if we're waiting,
we might as well refuel.
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
Now requesting
refueling at the apron.
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
concern over duty time explains
why he decided to
refuel while in Tenerife.
DENNIS: He was going to
do everything in his power
to make sure that he
could complete the flight
within his legal
duty time limits.
NARRATOR: But then,
a short time later,
the airport in
Las Palmas reopens.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
To all aircraft, Las
Palmas has reopened.
You may ask for start up and
clearances at your discretion.
NARRATOR: And Van
Zanten's plan backfires.
Refueling takes much
longer than expected,
and now he can't
move until it's done.
JOHN: When Las
Palmas reopened, here he is
sucking on a fuel hose
instead of starting
the engines and moving.
FO. BRAGG: This
is Clipper 1-7-3-6
requesting startup clearance.
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
decision has a huge impact
on the Pan Am flight as well.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: The KLM beside you
has requested a refuel,
and it doesn't look like
you're going to get by him.
JOHN: The Pan American 747
didn't have enough
wing tip clearance.
FO. BRAGG: You
gotta be kidding me.
Roger Tenerife, Clipper 1-7-3-6.
JOHN: The other
captains were unhappy with him
because he was the
cork in the bottle.
NARRATOR: The refueling
delay means the KLM crew
now has only two hours
until they're grounded.
DENNIS: A half hour to
taxi. A half hour to get there.
An hour to swap passengers and
get back in the air. It's tight.
And guess what? The
weather's getting worse.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
you are clear to
taxi to the runway.
NARRATOR: The question
facing investigators now is,
did the rush to get off the
ground in worsening weather
cause the KLM
crew to jump the gun?
DENNIS: So he taxis to the end
of the runway and does this 180.
We know this
from the tower tapes.
Can we hear it
from that point please?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Starting. Landing lights on.
Checklist complete.
NARRATOR: Investigators
hear more evidence
that the captain of KLM flight
4805 may have been in a rush.
DENNIS: Is he throttling up?
FO. MEURS: Wait a minute.
We do not have ATC clearance.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: No, I
know that. Go ahead and ask.
DENNIS: It's obvious that
time was an important factor
in the KLM
Captain's decision-making.
He wasn't going
to waste any time
once he got to the
end of the runway.
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
DENNIS: So he
requests ATC clearance.
We're about a
minute from the collision.
JOHN: When the first officer
asked for the clearance,
he was asking for the air
traffic control clearance,
completely
separate from the clearance
to actually roll this
500, 600,000-pound monster
down the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
NARRATOR: What
investigators hear next
answers many of the questions
plaguing this investigation.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Clear to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go! Check thrust.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0, right turn out.
We are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
Play that again, please.
NARRATOR: The controller
is providing instructions
for what to do after takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
NARRATOR: But the captain reacts
as if he's actually
been cleared for departure.
JIM: They get a clearance
from air traffic control
that contains the word takeoff,
and that confirms for
them that everything is
the way it should be, when
in fact everything was not.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
NARRATOR: Before
his first officer
has finished reading
back the instructions,
Captain Van Zanten
is already on the roll.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
We are now at takeoff.
NARRATOR: Investigators now know
what the Dutch first
officer meant by "at takeoff."
DENNIS: He's reporting
that he's actually taking off,
not that he's ready to take off.
JIM: Unfortunately, in this case
it meant they were taking
off from the KLM perspective.
And from the air
traffic control perspective,
they were hearing, "We
are at takeoff position."
NARRATOR: But for investigators
there's something
about the radio exchange
that still doesn't make sense.
DENNIS: According to
the tower transcripts,
the controller
advised him to stay put.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
I will call you.
NARRATOR:
Why didn't the KLM crew
follow that clear instruction
to stand by?
DENNIS: Give me Pan Am at 17:06.
That's when Pan Am
reports on the same frequency
that they're
still on the runway.
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
DENNIS: Hold it there.
Why would he ignore them?
NARRATOR: The cockpit recordings
continue to
baffle investigators,
until they hear another critical
moment on the KLM tape.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
DENNIS: That's what he heard?
NARRATOR: It's a
stunning discovery.
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
We're now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
NARRATOR: The two
warnings to stay put
were never heard
in the KLM cockpit.
The tower and the Pan Am flight
both made their critical
calls at the exact same moment.
FO. BRAGG (Overlap): And we're
still taxiing down the runway.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(overlap): Okay. Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: The
simultaneous transmissions
produced a four second
squeal in the KLM cockpit.
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
NARRATOR: The crew
heard only one word: okay.
JIM:
Unfortunately, this happened
during that pause after
the controller says okay.
For KLM, they had no opportunity
to hear the controller
saying standby for takeoff,
nor were they able to hear,
because they were
speaking at the same time,
the Pan Am crew reporting that
they were still on the runway.
DENNIS: So what's next?
NARRATOR: There's
one final transmission
recorded in the KLM cockpit.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
report runway clear.
NARRATOR: It should
have alerted the crew
that another plane
was still on the runway.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
NARRATOR:
Only the flight engineer
seems to have understood it.
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
NARRATOR: The
pilots ignore his concern
and miss their last
chance to avoid a disaster
that will claim 583 lives.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
*
[Warning alert sound]
DENNIS: Van Zanten
should not have moved
without explicit clearance.
ROBERT:
You learn that in probably
the first or second lesson
in aviation: Do not take
off unless you get a clearance.
NARRATOR: Investigators
dig into the career
of Captain Van Zanten.
They're looking for
anything that might explain
why an experienced pilot would
violate such a fundamental rule.
INVESTIGATOR: This
guy was a superstar.
NARRATOR: They
learn that Van Zanten
was one of KLM's top pilots.
He was the face of the airline,
the director of flight safety,
and head of the
flight training department.
JOHN: How could a human being
with so much intelligence,
so much capability and
experience and position,
and the director of safety
-- how could he fail like this?
[Explosion]
*
NARRATOR: Investigators
suspect that, in an odd twist,
the captain's elevated status
may have played a role
in the Tenerife disaster.
ROBERT: Back in those
times, everyone had an awe
of the captain, if you
will. His word was god.
His word was unquestioned.
DENNIS: If he has
that kind of authority,
it's less likely
for someone his junior,
in this case the flight
engineer and the first officer,
to challenge anything he does.
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
NARRATOR: The
conversation in the KLM cockpit
leading up to the accident
seems to support that notion.
But Van Zanten's
esteemed status doesn't explain
the most
troubling question of all.
Why did he believe it was safe
to take off in the first place?
DENNIS: Logically, you
should make extra clear that,
hey, we're taking
off. Is the runway clear?
NARRATOR: Investigators search
desperately for an answer and
come across a stunning detail
in the captain's flight log.
It could be the
final piece of the puzzle.
INVESTIGATOR: This was his
first flight in three months.
NARRATOR: Records show
that Van Zanten's cockpit hours
had dropped
dramatically in recent years.
He was spending most of
his time in a simulator
training other pilots.
JOHN: The
simulation is interesting
because, when you spend a
lot of time as an instructor
in a simulator, it's
an artificial environment
that we try to make
as real as possible.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay. Checklist
complete. Let's go. Thrust.
NARRATOR: Flight simulators
do a remarkably good job
at recreating the
experience of a real flight.
But there is one very
important element missing.
There is no air traffic
controller in a simulator.
DENNIS: His
focus was on training,
and there was this
difference in the way
you treat air traffic
control communications
in a training environment
versus the real world.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay, let's
go. Thrust. V-1. Here we go.
Takeoff thrust. Rotate.
Okay let's go. Takeoff thrust.
Thrust. Let's go.
INVESTIGATOR: All that
time he spent in a simulator
works against him.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
JOHN: Jacob Van
Zanten's attempt to take off
without a clearance
resulted from his
time in the simulator
and that he kind
of reset himself.
He was his own clearance
authority in the simulator.
INVESTIGATOR: And then
two separate radio calls
that should have told him
the Pan Am was off the runway
cancel each other out.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. [Static squeal]
FO. BRAGG: [Static
squeal] Clipper 1736.
The world's
deadliest airline accident
is now all but inevitable.
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
*
JOHN: Basically we had a captain
who wanted to get off the
ground as rapidly as possible.
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
*
JOHN: The weather
was not cooperating,
and he was about
out of crew duty time,
and in a situation
like that, the human mind,
our carbon-based brains tend to
jump a few cogs, so to speak.
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
Get off! Get off! Get off!
[Explosion]
JOHN: He had a gun cocked
and loaded by various factors
and he was the one
that pulled the trigger.
But you have to take
them all in connection.
[Explosion]
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the collision at Tenerife
results in dozens
of recommendations.
Few aviation accidents
have triggered a greater number
of significant changes.
JOHN: That's what began
to be the seed of training
for what we later called
crew resource management
where we said to the
captain, we're onto you, bub.
You're a human being.
You can make mistakes, even
when you have no intention to,
and even when you're
completely qualified.
NARRATOR: KLM and other airlines
transform their
training methods for captains,
helping them become more
responsive to their crew-mates.
DENNIS: Even the most senior
and the most highly trained
individuals can make mistakes
and we need to
rely on the resources
of all the crew members
to compensate for that.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
NARRATOR: The accident
also changes the very language
used by
controllers around the world.
JIM: Controllers
don't use the word takeoff
unless they
actually mean and intend
for the aircraft to be
doing just that, taking off.
Instead, they will substitute
the word "after departure turn
right heading zero-four-zero"
or something to that effect.
JOHN: Those 583
people did not die in vain.
We have learned those lessons.
They changed the whole
face of aviation safety.
*