Taxi to the Dark Side (2007) - full transcript
Using the torture and death in 2002 of an innocent Afghan taxi driver as the touchstone, this film examines changes after 9/11 in U.S. policy toward suspects in the war on terror. Soldiers, their attorneys, one released detainee, U.S. Attorney John Yoo, news footage and photos tell a story of abuse at Bagram Air Base, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay. From Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Gonzalez came unwritten orders to use any means necessary. The CIA and soldiers with little training used sleep deprivation, sexual assault, stress positions, waterboarding, dogs and other terror tactics to seek information from detainees. Many speakers lament the loss of American ideals in pursuit of security.
On December 1st,
Dilawar, a young
Afghan taxi driver
took three
passengers for a ride.
He never returned home.
- When the sun
started to go down,
the sand started blowing,
so it was
a like a big dust bowl
and I'm thinking,
boy is it gonna be like
this every night?
- I remember walking in
there for the
first time and the smell,
the smell's
the first thing that hit you.
I'm a man from DC, if
you've ever been
to the National Zoo
when you walk
into the elephant house there,
that's the best way
to describe it.
There's a few of us
that lived in
the prison and I was
one of them.
They built it up to be a
big scary place
to the prisoners.
After then
invasion of Afghanistan,
US forces occupied Bagram,
an old Soviet air base
as a place to collect
and interrogate
thousands of detainees, captured
throughout Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
These were
suspected Taliban.
They were being caught by
Special Forces
throughout the countryside,
brought to Bagram
and be held,
interrogated to determine
if they were a high
value prisoner.
These were
not nice people at all.
They were very evil people who
definitely had
violent intentions.
On December 5,
2002,
Dilawar, the taxi driver,
was brought
to Bagram, he was
designated a PUC,
person under control,
number 421.
- He was something to
do with a trigger man
for a rocket attack and
that's about all I know.
Five days after
his arrival, he was dead.
- I would say this was around
'bout 05:00 in the morning
and as I walked by, Dilawar,
I think
that's his name, Dilawar,
I walked by
Dilawar's cell and I
noticed he was
just kinda hanging
there with his head down
but he was being too
still to be just
hanging there and sleeping.
- Sergeant Curtis
opened up the door
and we went in and he
was unresponsive
and we started CPR.
I was downstairs in
general population
then I heard a call
come in asking
for Cammack to come
upstairs, he was a medic
and we carried him
downstairs on the stretcher
and Cammack was still
on top of him
while we were carrying him down,
still trying to get
him back going
all the way down the stairs,
got him
to the front door and
they kept working on him
and kept working on him
until the doctor
got there and
pronounced him dead.
I don't know whether there
was an injury that was
aggravated by something
or whether he was just
sick coming in.
- They're very frail
people and I was surprised
that it had taken
that long for one
of em to die in our custody.
- It was a sense of,
definitely a sense of concern
because he was the second one.
Just a week
before Dilawar's death,
another detainee at
Bagram had died.
- You know, you wonder,
is it something
we did or did somebody
kill him or something
but I just didn't know.
According
to the medical examiner,
the first detainee to die,
Habibullah,
had a pre-existing
pulmonary condition
but it was the
beatings he sustained
in Bagram that led to
the cause of his death
a blood clot that
traveled to his lungs.
- When the second one
died a week later
that's when it was like oh crap,
something was gonna happen now,
yes, two prisoners
dying within a week
of each other, that's bad.
A
preliminary investigation
into Dilawar's death
revealed deep bruises
all over his body, but
did not conclude
that his treatment at
Bagram was to blame.
- The next day, they
said just draw out
how he was shackled up
here and I made
that little crude drawing.
The ceiling of these
isolation rooms
was just a simple metal
grate and it was
thick enough you could
put handcuffs
through the wires of
that and you just
kind of chain em up like that,
out to the sides like this.
Forced
standing for long periods
had inflamed tissue
damage from blows
to Dilawar's legs, but
the initial Bagram
press release failed to mention
overhead shackling or beatings.
It declared that both detainees
had died of natural causes.
- My opinion is that
the military
wanted to get this
over and get this
done quickly, before
it really got noticed.
Soon after
Dilawar's death,
the officer in charge
of interrogation
at Bagram, Captain Carolyn Wood
was awarded the Bronze
Star for Valor.
Following the Iraq invasion,
Wood
and her intelligence
unit were given
a new assignment, Abu Ghraib.
- The only thing I can
really remember
about Abu Ghraib was the heat,
it was like
a 148 degrees or so there
and it was all concrete.
You know, Abu Ghraib
also had that infamous
torture chambers and stuff
left from Saddam's era.
I remember walking
through those and seeing
fingernail marks on the
walls and blood stains
and guillotines and
stuff like that
it was a pretty surreal feeling.
We went to Abu Ghraib, I
believe in July,
July August of 2003 to
start that prison.
- You put people in a
crazy situation
and people do crazy things
and Abu was getting
mortared every night.
These 120mm mortars
killing prisoners.
The first time that happened,
they should
have evacuated those
prisoners to somewhere else.
Because the prisoners
weren't safe.
- People were being
told to rough up Iraqis
that wouldn't cooperate,
we were also told
they're nothing but dogs,
then all of a sudden
you start looking at
these people
as less than human and you start
doing things to em you
would never dream of
and that's where it got scary.
- It was only the night shift,
there's always a few bad apples.
- It's been a body blow
for all of us.
- This is clearly an
isolated incident.
- The conduct of a
very very small
number of our leaders
and soldiers.
In the
wake of media attention
surrounding Abu Ghraib,
the military
began a series of
investigations.
- The people who
engaged in abuses
will be brought to justice,
the world
will see how a free
system, a democratic system
functions and operates
transparently with no cover ups.
- The Secretary and
others have said
well, you know, we've conducted
12 investigations, each
and all of which
were geared to looking downward,
Down toward Lynndie
England and Graner
and not looking up.
The
soldiers in the photos
are Military Police, or MPS,
whose job
it was to guard and
protect the prisoners.
In their statements,
the MPs claimed
that Military Intelligence or MI
ordered them to weaken,
humiliate
and break the prisoners
for interrogation purposes.
- Obviously what they were doing
in those pictures was
not sanctioned
by the interrogation
rules of engagement
and they weren't interrogators,
so yes, I did think that
they were bad apples.
However, I also think
that they were
taking cues from Intel.
- Just reading reports
that was happening
in Afghanistan, I
mean humiliation
trying to break people
came from somewhere.
MPs didn't think of it,
MPs were not
ever trained in such things.
We should have never
been breaking anybody.
- I can tell you we set
the same policy
at Abu we set at Bagram,
same exact rules.
Same thing was going on.
They wonder why it happened.
In her
sworn testimony
about Abu Ghraib,
Captain Wood said
she felt pressured to
produce intelligence
so she brought
unauthorized techniques
dogs, nudity, sleep depravation
and stress positions
to Abu Ghraib from Afghanistan.
Wood maintained that
the Bagram model
had tacit approval
from superiors
but US Central Command had never
responded to her requests
for authorization
so the mystery remained,
was Abu Ghraib
the work of a few bad
apples or evidence
of a new worldwide system on
detention and interrogation?
- I'm pretty sure that
interrogators
were telling the guards,
strip this guy naked
chain him up to the
bed in an uncomfortable
position do whatever
you can and then
they just decided to
take it one step further
and have some fun with,
and take pictures.
- You've always got people
in the military
who are just this side
of the Marquis de Sade
and one of the reasons
you want rules
and this code of conduct
to help you lead
mud Marines and mud grunts,
Infantry
is so that you can
use those tools
to restrict this tendency
in your soldiers.
When you have your friends dying
on your left and right,
you can sometimes go
beyond the pail, so a
Lieutenant, a Captain
down where the rubber
meets the road
needs these tools and he needs
to be able to punish
people who cross the line.
When the Secretary
walked through
my door into my office
about the time
the photos of Abu Ghraib
were getting ready
to come out and we had
rumor they were
coming out, he said to me
I need to know
what happened and why,
and so then
I began to build both
an open source
and an inside the government,
classified
and unclassified document
file and I began
to see legal arguments as to why
the President could
pretty much do anything
he wanted to in the
name of security
and the Secretary of
Defense and others
beneath him were
actually looking for
the twin pressures that
they put on people
that is to say the
pressure to produce
intelligence and the fact that
they were saying the
gloves are off
created the
environment in the field
that we later saw reflected in
the photographs from Abu Ghraib
and in my few, far more
serious fashion
than the photographs we saw,
98 deaths
of people in detention,
which I understand now
from my Army colleagues
is up to some
25 of which have been
declared officially
by the Army as homicides.
People say well
these photographs
from Abu Ghraib, they
weren't real torture
I look back at those
people and I say
murder's torture, murder's
the ultimate torture.
In the case of Dilawar,
he was subjected to
certainly cruel and
unusual punishment
and ultimately, he was subjected
to torture because he died.
It's not our
intent for people
to die, especially when
we're seeking
to get information from them.
Did the
treatment they received
in those rooms cause the
death of these two men?
First,
we're not chaining
people to the ceiling, I
think you asked
me that question before.
First, we're not chaining
people to the ceiling,
that's what he says.
Carlotta
Gall is a New York Times
journalist based in Kabul.
Unsatisfied with the
military's explanation
of the two deaths at Bagram,
she set out to investigate.
- It took a long time to
find the family
because the military
didn't tell us
who they were and we
started calling around
Governors, they're very
simple farming family
they don't speak English,
but they
showed me a paper that
was given to them
with the body and that's
when I opened it up
and read it and it
was in English
and it was a death
certificate from
the American Military and
it was signed by
a US Major who was
the pathologist
and there were four boxes
and she'd ticked
the box for homicide.
I said my god they've
killed him and we then
had to tell the
family do you know
what's written here
and they said no
it's in English we
don't understand
and I think maybe the Red Cross
who helped return the
body had explained
but they hadn't taken
it in and then
the pathologist had said
it was this blunt
force trauma to the legs.
In other words, did they receive
any trauma, any blunt
injury trauma as we call it?
Presently I
have no indiction of that
but we will be looking
as this investigation
continues to go down
its due course.
- Presently have no
indication of that
you know, there's been a
death certificate
signed by his people and he says
presently I have no
indication of any
blunt force trauma
and it's written
on the death certificate,
which I've seen.
- The story probably
would have gone away
had it not been for my
colleague, Carlotta Gall
who tracked down
Dilawar's family
and found the knife in
the back clue
that told everyone that
this incident
had been something other
than the military portrayed.
Tim
Golden picked up
the trail of the
story and obtained
a confidential file of
the Army investigation
including hundreds of
pages of testimony
from the soldiers involved.
Part of what
made this story
compelling to me was
that you had
these young soldiers
with very little training
or preparation, thrown
into this situation
in the aftermath of 9/11
just as the rules
were changing and
they weren't told
what the new rules
were and you had
this young Afghan
man who came in
to this system at the wrong time
and in the wrong way
and this is what
happened to him.
- I saw his picture in
the New York Times article
before that picture, I
couldn't have
picked his face out, you know,
my memory
of him was chained up
with the hood on,
no sleeping.
Following
questions raised
by the New York Times and
under scrutiny
from the Abu Ghraib scandal,
the Army
finally stepped up the
Dilawar investigation
and began charging
soldiers with maltreatment
maiming and homicide.
- When you're working
with the organization
like the military,
they're gonna hold
somebody accountable,
you can sweep
some things under the
rug, but this was a death
it was two deaths and okay fine,
they're gonna charge people.
- It seemed like the
military now,
after they got a black eye
from Abu Ghraib
wanted to get a public
opinion that they were
policing their
soldiers and so they
said we had this
incident that happened
a couple of years ago,
we can still
prosecute some of them.
- I had nothing to do
with the military
for two years and
all of a sudden
I'm getting a call saying that
I'm being court-martialed,
I mean
that was a huge surprise for me.
- From the defense perspective,
I immediately said this
is a political show trial.
Willie Brand is a good soldier
good soldiers tend to
obey orders,
good soldiers tend to be people
who do what they're
trained to do.
- The interrogators
on the ground
for the most part didn't know
what the rules were,
they'd never been
interrogators before.
- My interrogation
training consisted
of basically they taught
us some approaches
how to get people to
talk and then
here, go, go watch these
guys interrogate
which were the people
that we were replacing
for about five, six hours before
I did my first interrogation.
- Damien was picked for this job
because he's big, he's
loud and he's scary
that was his qualification.
- Soldiers are dying, get
the information.
That's all you're told,
get the information.
- Soldiers said that
when prisoners
like Dilawar came in to
Bagram they were
immediately assaulted.
They blasted music at em, often
they had dogs barking
at em and they
would use some of the
most menacing
interrogators to create
this sense of threat
one of those was
Damien Corsetti.
- With the screening
you're trying to instill
what's call shock of
capture, when the person
first comes in, that's
when they're most
apt to give you
information because
they're just like holy crap,
you know
what's going on.
- It's not just that
the disorientation
procedure, it's actually
a terrorizing procedure,
it's designed
to terrify you into
spilling the beans
as it were, being spat at,
being sworn at
having the dogs barking around,
cameras flashing in your face.
- Keep in mind, in their culture
that dog's more shocking to them
than it is to us,
kinda like a woman
telling em what to do, you know,
it's a cultural thing,
so you get
more bang for your
buck over there
with the dog.
- And then to be re-shackled
completely naked, and to
do what they call
the body search, the
cavity search
and then to be questioned
naked, shivering.
- After they're read their rules
and everything, they're
taken to their cell
to where they're gonna be put in
sleep depravation for 24
hours, that's standard
for everybody, then
from their MI direct us
that they can go to
general population
or they have to stay
in isolation
or if they are gonna
stay in isolation
if they're gonna be
allowed to sleep
and if they can, then when.
To
weaken the defenses
of detainees,
interrogators ordered
military police to find
ways of keeping
the prisoners awake.
- You know, you're in that
room not saying anything,
oh well you know
maybe he knows a little bit more
let's let him lose a
little bit more sleep.
Which is the idea of
keeping him like this
so he won't sleep, you'll
stand, cause as soon
as you start to let your body go
all that pressure on your wrists
and your arms, you're gonna
feel that with those cuffs on.
- The only time the MPs
would ever help us
do anything would be
to keep them
on a sleep schedule, you
know, they're guaranteed
so much sleep, is that
sleep consistent?
Is it uninterrupted?
You know, there's
fifteen minutes here
fifteen minutes there,
who knows.
That's how it was
proposed to us.
- There'd be a board
when you walk
in the room on this wall,
you might see
an arrow going up to the ceiling
and it would be
maybe a one by it
so that'd be an hour
up, he's gotta stand up
for one hour, and then
you may see a two
with an arrow pointing down,
that means
he can sit down for two hours.
The prisoners
were kept in these big pens
downstairs and their
numbers would be
scribbled on the door
of the airlock
which was the little passageway
that they were taken out of when
they were brought up to the
isolation cells upstairs.
- Detainees were
actually chained
with their hands
above their heads
in these airlocks,
his number 421
was something that I
could see often
because his back was towards me
in the airlock and the numbers
were written on the backs
of the detainees
in black marker and
we all had that
as well as on the front.
What was your number?
- My number in Bagram was
180 but later it became 558.
- Thank you, it's great
to be with ya
it's good to be here in
Bagram of course.
I'm sure,
any high ranking officer
who toured would see
the shackles.
Because you're gonna
tour to look.
You know, they're
curious just like
everybody else is.
There are
always officers coming
and going through the facility.
We kinda joked about it as being
the greatest show on Earth,
everyone
wanted to come and look at
the terrorists.
- Mr Rumsfeld's office
called our office
frequently, very high commanders
would wanna be kept up to date
on a daily basis on
certain prisoners there.
The Brass knew, they
saw em shackled
they saw em hooded and
they said right on
y'all are doing a great job.
When the
Red Cross toured Bagram
the sleep deprivation
chart was erased
and the prisoners
were unshackled.
- Traditional military procedure
did not allow you to
shackle somebody
to a fixed object, certainly not
chaining their arms overhead.
Initially they were
handcuffing people
into the airlock of the
cells for punishment
and that was to be
strictly limited
15 minutes, half an hour,
but it quickly evolved
and when you walked in
there, they just had
a pair of long
handcuffs dangling
from the wire mesh
ceiling of the cell
ready for whoever came in.
The Army
coroner who examined Dilawar
discovered massive tissue
damage in his legs.
She later testified that
his legs had been pulpified.
But what could have caused
that kind of damage?
This is not
a hotel, this is a not
a place for them to get
fat, and lazy and happy.
In a video
tape that surfaced
as part of the homicide
investigation,
Colonel David Hayden, a
top Army lawyer
for US forces in
Afghanistan described
a Policy of shackling
and striking detainees.
- There was an approved
technique for the MPs
when somebody was a
difficult prisoner
that you could hit em on
the legs, it was
supposedly not considered
not a lethal blow.
- I didn't actually hear
a higher up say
go and kick em in the leg,
if they do this
or do that, the higher ups said,
if, you know, in order
to get control of em
that's an option what
you can use.
- It's just your knee
going into the side
of their thigh, bout midway up
supposed to be a pressure
point right there
and it controls em really easy.
- Over two ays,
everybody's hitting you
in the legs, it can cause
some severe problems.
- Throughout the
investigation and even
in the trials, a lot
of the guards
and interrogators
described Dilawar
as a very combative detainee,
as a tough character
and that's just never
been reconciled
with all the other evidence that
there was about this
guy who weighed
122 pounds when he died.
The men who had been passengers
in Dilawar's taxi told us later
that he had just been
absolutely terrified
at Bagram, that they heard him
through the walls of the
isolation cells
screaming for his
mother and father.
He'd been in a very
uncomfortable position
muttering things
sometimes praying,
sometimes asking for help
or seemingly asking for help,
because I couldn't
understand his language.
A number
of witnesses
remember the night
before Dilawar died.
Just that
one night, he got kicked
in the leg maybe like 10 times.
- Some of the soldiers
said they started
using the knee
strikes essentially
to shut em up because
he was yelling
and screaming.
- The damage that was done
was done from multiple
strikes and a lot
of that could have been avoided
had you known the
person before you
had fought with them and
used that exact technique.
When they
eventually came to take him
to an isolation cell, I believe
his body had become almost limp.
One of the reasons why
they began punching him
was that they felt he was
putting it on.
He was in the airlock,
standing there
with a hood over his head,
he had
his hands tied above his
head and he was moaning.
- He just started to fight,
right there
in the airlock and
the airlock has
a front gate and a back
gate but both
the sides are concertina wire,
neither
of us officers wanted to get in
to the concertina wire,
so we pulled him out
of the airlock and put
him on the floor
and put him into restraints.
What
kind of force
did you have to use in
order to subdue him?
- Physical force, he was struck.
- There's like four
MPs on this guy
and one of the MPs just
kept giving him
kidney shots, the other
two, they'd slammed
him to the ground and
then the fourth one
jumped on his back, he got
a big gash on his nose.
- There was no
reason to hit him,
let's remember he's shackled.
- Even when the control
was an issue,
it became well I'm just
gonna do this
to get mine in, and
that's probably
why they got in trouble,
because you really
couldn't justify kicking the guy
that much if he was
just chained up.
Dilawar
was taken to
an isolation cell, where
the knee strikes continued.
In her statement at
trial, the Army coroner
said his lower limbs looked like
they had been run over by a bus.
Had he lived, it would have been
necessary to amputate his legs.
- Then it kinda raised
the question of
this is what we did to him,
it's not
just this is what I did to him
or this is what
Cammack did to him
or Morden or anybody,
it just this is
what we've done.
It's almost
hard to fathom now,
you had soldiers like
Willie Brand
who seems like this very gentle
kind of soft spoken guy,
but who testified
that he struck Dilawar
so many times
in the leg that his
knee got tired
and he had to switch to
the other one.
- Sometimes I feel that
I should have gone with
my own morality more then
what was common.
One MP
testified that
the strikes became an amusement,
inflicted on Dilawar
just to hear
him scream Allah.
- Some would say well hey
you should have stopped this,
you should
have stopped that, when
you saw he was
injured or saw he was
being kicked on his knees,
why didn't you do something?
That'd be a good question,
my answer
would be well, it was
us against them
I was over there, I
didn't wanna appear
to be going against my
fellow soldiers.
Which is that wrong, you
could sit here
and say that was dead wrong,
go over there and say that.
No one
ever investigated
who set the rules at Bagram.
Investigators never
asked Captain Wood
what senior officers
had given orders
to treat detainees in
ways that were
forbidden according to
the Army Field Manual.
MP Captain Beiring was the only
officer prosecuted in the case.
His dereliction of duty
charge was dismissed
when the judge
determined that no one
had made clear what
Captain Beiring's duty was.
In spite of repeated
requests for proper training
rules of engagement
for his soldiers
his superiors gave him neither.
- We were all worried
about not having
that written guidelines,
by they kept
reassuring us that
it was coming.
- We knew exactly why we
weren't getting
clear guidance, just in
case something
like this happened.
- If I had to do it
again, I'd probably say no
I just, I'd be like I'm
not doing anything
until I see
something in writing.
And
do you think,
looking back, do you
think you were misled?
- I think we all were.
A week after
September 11th
Vice President Dick
Cheney appeared
on Meet the Press to
describe how
interrogation policies
were about to change.
- I have to work the
dark side, if you will
spend time in the shadows,
in the
intelligence world,
a lot of what
needs to be done here will
have to be done
quietly without any discussion,
using sources and methods that
are available to our
intelligence agencies
if we're gonna be
successful, that's the world
these folks operate in
and so it's gonna
be vital for us to use
any means at our disposal,
basically, to achieve
our objective.
- It's very clear that it starts
in the office of Vice
President Cheney
he had a very strong view
that we were not
as aggressive in
dealing with people
in interrogations as
we could or should be.
Taking the gloves off,
being rough with detainees.
If Dick Cheney was
the primary architect
of a new policy,
John Yoo was the
chief draftsman.
He wrote guiding
opinions which argued
for a flexibly approach to
treating suspected terrorists.
- United States used to
treat terrorism
as a criminal justice problem.
The September 11th
attacks showed that
the struggle with
Al-Qaeda had moved
into warfare, I think
when a sworn enemy
for political purposes can kill
three thousand Americans,
cause billions
of dollars of damage and
try to eliminate
the leaders of the
American Government
that sounds like war
to most people,
it doesn't sound like crime.
President
Bush declared
a war on terror, but he
raised questions
about whether
suspected terrorists
should be protected by
the laws of war.
The Geneva Conventions.
Atrocities that shocked
the conscience
of the world gave rise
to the modern
Geneva Conventions,
international treaties
meant to provide
fundamental protections
for every human being
captured in war time.
In effect for over 50
years, Geneva offered
legal protections and
prohibited interrogators
from using torture, murder,
or even
humiliating and
degrading treatment.
After 9/11, John Yoo
worked closely
with Dick Cheney's office
and Alberto Gonzales
the Counsel to the President.
They wrote a series of
memos arguing
that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply
to suspected terrorists
and they gave
legal cover for the CIA
and Special Forces
to embark on a secret program
of previously forbidden
interrogation techniques.
- More than 3000
suspected terrorists
have been arrested in
many countries
many others have met a
different fate
let's put it this way,
they're no longer
a problem to the United States
and our friends and allies.
The problem
for the President,
Gonzalez warned, was that some
of the new
interrogation techniques
were banned under US
and international law.
- One of the points
that he makes
is that we don't want
the Geneva Conventions
to apply because if they do,
these things
can be war crimes.
- What's well known is
the principle of command
responsibility.
This was established
in the Nuremberg trials
after World War II and
it established
the principle of
international criminal law
that individuals who
order illegal treatment
will be held accountable
for the illegal
treatment even if they're
not immediately
applying the kind of
abusive treatment.
To be
certain that Americans
interrogating
prisoners would not
be accused of torture,
John Yoo co-authored
a memo that would clarify
the meaning of the term.
- The only prohibited
acts would be
extreme acts which
are equivalent
to serious physical injury,
such as organ failure
impairment of bodily
functions or even death.
That's an illegal memo, that's
the so-called torture memo.
- That was an arguable
interpretation
of the law, I'm sure we
had discussions about it
and ultimately it was accepted,
because it represent,
that was the ultimate
decision and position of
the Office of Legal Counsel.
- The Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum
was unbounded, meaning
nowhere did it state
that the application of
cruel and inhuman
and degrading treatment
was prohibited
and at one point, I
asked John Yoo
can the President
authorize torture
and his response was yes.
- I think the lawyers
job is to tell
people what laws do
or do not apply
so that they know what
space they have
to make the policy decision.
If the
President deems that
he's got to torture somebody,
including
by crushing the testicles
of the person's child,
there is no law that
can stop that?
That's what you wrote
in the August 2002 memo.
I think it depends
on why the President
thinks he needs to do that.
Military
lawyers were outraged
by the implications of
John Yoo's memo.
- My first
involvement in this came
when I was visited by a
group of senior
JAG officers, more than
a year before
the first story about the
Abu Ghraib broke
who were very troubled
about what was going on
and the focus of their concern
was failing in the
responsibilities
that the military
leadership had,
to soldiers in the field,
that was the
responsibility to provide fair,
clear guidance to them as to how
to behave in these
difficult circumstances
and what they saw was
an intentional
decision taken at the
height of the Pentagon
to put out a fog of
ambiguity coupled with
great pressure to bring results
to be prepared to be
violent with the detainees
but you know, this
violence with the detainees
is a criminal act.
- They may be Al-Qaeda,
they may be Taliban
they may be the worst
people in the world
and I'm sure that
some of them are
but there are
certain basic rules
and international agreements
that the United states
has agreed to, that
we will observe
you go ahead and please respond,
you wanted to.
- Very quickly, let me clarify
the President's policy,
"as a matter of policy
"the United States Armed Forces
"shall continue to
treat detainees humanely
"and to the extent
appropriate and consistent
"with military
necessity in a manner
"consistent with the
principles of Geneva."
- That is a legalistic
statement and one
that is written with loopholes
and it's clear to me,
the interrogators
did not understand that
quote "humane treatment"
might be in the eye of
the beholder.
In the field
in Afghanistan,
there was a great
deal of confusion
about exactly what
the rules were.
- They told us when
dealing with the PUCs
as they called them, the
persons under US custody
they don't fall under
Geneva Conventions,
basically, the only thing
that we weren't allowed
to do is beat em up.
Person
under control,
person under custody,
something like that,
you know, they call
them anything
to dehumanize em, so
that you don't
look at them as people.
- I don't remember
hearing anything
about Geneva Convention,
'course I'm familiar
with it, but they
didn't go over that
in any kind of detail.
- I didn't know what
the Field Manual
for interrogation, I didn't know
the proper nomenclature
for it, I'd seen it,
there was a copy of
it lying around
I'm sure somewhere,
and if I had chosen to,
I could have picked it
up and read it
but I was working 16 hour days
to sit down and read
a field manual
was not top of my
priorities over there.
- It is a mean, nasty,
dangerous, dirty
business out there and we
have to operate
in that arena, I'm
convinced we can do it
we can do it
successfully but we need
to make certain that we have not
tied the hands, if you will,
of our
intelligence
communities in terms of
accomplishing their mission.
- These terrorists
play by a whole
set of different rules,
it's gonna force us
in your words, to get
mean, dirty and nasty
in order to take em on?
- Right.
Guided by
a legal opinion
from John Yoo, the Bush
Administration
began shipping some
high-value detainees
to the US Naval Base,
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- Initially I thought good,
safe place.
Put them there, barbed
wire all over.
Then it became apparent
that the reason
we were doing it was
because we were
going to argue that
there's no law.
A Cuban law didn't apply,
US law didn't apply
well that was a big step
down the slippery slope.
- I think what the policy makers
were trying to do was
to try to find a place
that was physically as close to
the unIted States so it
could be well protected
but still would benefit
from the rule
that the United states military,
is one who has ultimate
say and control
over enemy prisoners who are
held outside the country.
- One by one, the
terrorists are learning
the meaning of American justice.
In December 2001,
a man named
Mohammed al-Qahtani was swept up
in Afghanistan and sent
to Guantanamo.
After eight months in detention
the Army discovered that he may
have trained to be the
20th hijacker.
Suddenly, Qahtani
became the most
important detainee
in Guantanamo.
- Here we had a man
who was supposed
to have been on that
plane that was flown
into the
Pennsylvania countryside
so I think there was a
sense of urgency
to find out what this
guy knew in order
to be able to prevent any
future attacks.
- He successfully
resisted standard
interrogation
techniques at Guantanamo
for eight months and he
is the genesis
for the request by the
joint task force
at Guantanamo for
more techniques
that might be able to get
past his resistance training.
In September 2002,
John Yoo and Alberto
Gonzalez traveled
to Guantanamo, soon
after their visit,
and just before Dilawar's
arrival at Bagram,
Donald Rumsfeld
personally approved
a new menu of
psychological interrogation
techniques for use on
Mohammed al-Qahtani.
Exactly how the techniques
would be applied
was often left to
the imagination
of the interrogators.
- His interrogations are
well-documented
in a log and from
November 2002 in to
early January 2003, he was
subjected to this regime.
It involved very severe
sleep deprivation.
He was only permitted to sleep
four hours a day from seven
o'clock in the morning
till 11 o'clock in the morning,
and that lasted for 50
days with one exception.
He was held in severe isolation
and sensory deprivation.
There are a number of instances
in the log where you'll
see the phrase
invasion of space by a female,
and that was actually
an interrogation
tactic designed to
break his faith.
- An interrogator
approached detainee
from behind, rubbed his back,
whispered
in his ear and ran
fingers through his hair
that was authorized under
the futility technique.
He was
subjected to what I would call
sexual assault by female
interrogators.
- He was forced to wear
women's lingerie
multiple allegations of
homosexuality
and that his comrades
were aware of that
he was forced to dance
with a male interrogator
subject to strip searches
for control measures
not for security, and
he was forced
to perform dog tricks.
All this to lower his
personal sense of worth.
They tried to
categorize it as individual
interrogators pushing
the envelope
or starting to get
quote creative.
♪ God bless America
♪ Land that I love
The combination
of his lack of food intake
and forcible hydration
led him at one point
to actually, his
heart slowed down
to 35 beats per minute
and he was rushed
to the hospital to be revived.
- Mohammed al-Qahtani
in many ways
that single interrogation,
protected interrogation
contains within it, if you will,
the entire genealogy, the
entire history
of CIA torture over the
last 50 years.
The CIA launched a mind
control project,
a veritable Manhattan
Project of the mind
in the 1950s, in house,
the CIA worked on
exotic techniques, hypnosis,
and then
they worked on sodium penothal
then they worked on
electro shock
and ultimately, they
discovered LSD.
All of that drug stuff,
in house, went nowhere
except to lawsuits, but
what did work
was the CIA outsourced
all of the dull
behavioral research to
the most brilliant
behavioral scientists at the top
universities in the
United States and Canada.
At McGill,
experiments
by famed psychologist Donald O.
Hebb
caught the eye of CIA
researchers.
- Doctor Hebb found
that he could
induce a state akin to a
acute psychosis
in 48 hours, all he
did was he had
student volunteers sit in
a very pleasant
air-conditioned cubicle
with goggles,
gloves and ear muffs, actually,
you know
what they looked just like?
The Guantanamo detainees,
if you see
those outfits that the
Guantanamo detainees
have where they have the gloves,
and the googles and
the earmuffs?
Not everything's all
about security,
no, no, no, that's
sensory breakdown.
Within a day, there
would be hallucinations
within two days, breakdown.
- I began to think
while we were doing
our experiments, it's
possible that something
that involves physical
discomfort or even pain
might be more
tolerable than simply
the deprivation conditions
that we studied.
The CIA was
fascinated by this,
they jumped on it immediately.
- I had no idea what a
potentially vicious
weapon this could be.
- They identified two
key techniques.
They identified sensory
disorientation
and they identified
self-inflicted pain,
standing for days at a
time while fluid
flowed to the legs and
they put them together
in the Kubark
Counterintelligence
Interrogation manual
and they propagated
around the world
and through the US
intelligence community.
Think about what al-Qahtani
was subjected to, okay?
First of all, he's in dark,
he's in light
he's in cold, he's in
heat, what they're doing
is they're attacking
his universal
sensory receptors, they're
also scrambling
his time, so that's phase one.
In Guantanamo under the
regime of General Miller
he turned Guantanamo
into a veritable
behavioral scientific laboratory
and Donald Rumsfeld gave orders
for techniques beyond
the field manual
and they percolated and
they percolated
in ambiguous way that
allowed people to
do what they thought
needed to be done.
And they explored our
male sensitivity
to gender and sexual
identity, so that's the thing
about being homosexual,
the underwear
on the head, all that
sort of stuff.
- People were saying
Arabs really
are very sensitive to
sexual humiliation
well, who the hell
isn't sensitive
to sexual humiliation,
nobody wants
to be stripped down
naked and forced
to masturbate with a hood
over your head.
It's ridiculous.
- Then they created
behavioral science
consultation teams
where they had
military
psychologists integrated
into the ongoing interrogation
to discover individual
fears and phobias
and all of that was
visited on al-Qahtani.
You are
aware of communications
between General Miller
and Secretary Rumsfeld
specifically about this
one prisoner?
- To our knowledge, there
was considerable
manner of communication
up and down the chain.
- As you know from
General Schmidt's report
he concluded that
these techniques
individually did not
constitute torture
but he said that the
sum of these techniques.
- The cumulative effects
of simultaneous
applications of
numerous authorized
techniques had abusive
and degrading
impact on the detainee.
- And he recommended that
General Miller be disciplined.
But he said it did not
constitute torture.
- We made a distinction between
what torture and
inhuman treatment
would be given the
general guidelines
and then what might be
abusive and degrading
something might be
degrading but not
necessarily torture
and it may not
be inhumane, it may
be humiliating
but it may not be torture,
no torture
no physical pain, injury,
there was a safe
secure environment
the entire time.
- And that, of course,
is the genius
of the CIA's
psychological paradigm.
Psychological torture
is all a matter
of definitions and then
it's a very slippery indeed.
- That sounds remarkably similar
to what occurred at Abu Ghraib,
people being led
around in chains
people being forced to
wear lingerie,
perhaps a coincidence,
perhaps not.
- If you look at those
Abu Ghraib photographs
again, it's always the
same techniques.
First of all, there's the
sexual activity
with the women's garments
and the masturbation
and all the rest, that's
the cultural sensitivity.
They're short shackled,
they're long-shackled
they're shackled upside down.
These are stress positions.
The most famous of all
Abu Ghraib photographs
of course of that hooded
Iraqi standing
on a box arms outstretched,
he's told
that if he steps off the box,
if he moves,
he'll be electrocuted,
that's the point
of the fake electrical
wires, so it's the absolute
immobility for
protract appearance
and then with arms extended,
as we'd say
to viewers, don't
they this at home
but do try it, just stand
for 10 minutes
with your arms stretched out,
not moving.
Carolyn Wood
was an example
of the way new techniques
spread and mutated
like a virus, long before
Wood took charge
of interrogation at Abu Ghraib,
her unit
was involved with harsh
techniques at Bagram
including stress
positions, forced standing,
and sleep deprivation.
- One of the memorandums
shows that in early
December 2002, the interrogators
at Bagram just looked
on the internet
they're in touch with the guys
at Guantanamo and they leaned
that these guys at
Guantanamo had gotten
new techniques from the
Secretary of Defense
and they just
started using them,
even though the
techniques had clearly
been approved exclusively
for use at Guantanamo.
- When General Miller
himself traveled
from Guantanamo to Iraq
in August 2003,
he brought with him a
CD and a manual
on the advanced
techniques they developed
at Guantanamo and he gave them
to General Sanchez's command.
So there are these
multiple paths that you
can trace whereby these
interrogation techniques
go through this global migration
through Afghanistan to
Iraq from Guantanamo
directly to Iraq and that
result is Abu Ghraib.
Well before
the abuses at Abu Ghraib
became public,
Government officials
had been quietly
raising concerns
about harsh techniques
in use at Guantanamo.
- There were emails back
to the Department
of Justice from FBI
personnel down
at Guantanamo, saying
you won't believe
what's going on down here,
we've gotta
disassociate ourselves
as FBI people
from what is going on
here in Guantanamo.
This email says, "The
DOD has their marching
"orders from the
Secretary of Defense."
Marching orders from the
Secretary of Defense.
"To engage in practices
which the FBI
"finds to be deeply
offensive and dangerous."
But the emails are what is
called redacted
which means that
there's big holes
in these emails, now
some of the emails
are totally redacted,
so we don't know
what they say at all,
that's an example
a lot of the documents
that we got here.
You know, you can't see
anything on these documents.
One after another of
where there's nothing.
- In early December 2002,
I had heard
that there was detainee
abuse going on.
I called the Army
General Counsel and asked
him whether he had
any information,
I said I'm receiving
reports that some detainees
are being abused in Guantanamo,
do you know anything about this?
And his response back
was I know a lot
about it, come on down
to my office.
They pushed a stack of documents
across the desk, top
document was a memorandum
from the General
Counsel to Department
of Defense to Secretary Rumsfeld
and it was that cover
memo that requested
the authorization for
the application
of certain
interrogation techniques
and the top memo gave
Secretary Rumsfeld's
approval for the application of
some of those techniques.
It's the memo with
Secretary Rumsfeld's
handwritten notations
on the bottom
that he stands 8-10 hours a day,
how come these
detainees are only
required to stand up to
four hours a day.
I was astounded, but my
first reaction was
that this was a mistake,
somebody just
didn't read the documents
carefully enough.
- I think people in
the Pentagon thought of
Alberto Mora as a
loyal Republican
political appointee,
he would never
have been considered a
rabble rouser
or a liberal, he
said he expected
that he would raise these issues
and people in
positions of authority
would say oh, thanks for
letting us know
and that would be the end of it.
- I wanted to ask you
about a memo
that was written by
Alberto Mora.
Do you recall in this
memo that you wrote
a little notation at
the bottom about
standing more than four hours.
- I do.
- Because you stand at your
desk.
- I do.
- This attorney argued
that that could be
interpreted as some by a
wink and a nod
that it would be okay
to go beyond the
techniques that were
prescribed in the memo.
- No, no no, it did,
there's no wink and a nod
about anything, there
was one provision
in there that they would
have people stand
for several hours and
it was a semi-humorous
remark that a person in
his seventies
stands all day long, I
just mused that
and maybe it shouldn't
have gone out
but it did and I wrote
it, and life goes on.
- But his point was
that you should
have gotten much
better advice from
your legal staff.
- I heard your question
the first time.
- What was of concern to me
was the techniques
either individual
or in combination could rise
to the level or torture.
Okay, you're permitting
certain interrogation
techniques but
certainly there must be
some limit which is set
upon the severity
of the techniques, light
deprivation could mean
placing the detainee
in a dark room
for 15 minutes or it
could mean a month
or two months or three
months until he goes blind.
Detainee specific
phobia techniques.
The snakes, the bats,
the rats, lock somebody
up in a coffin,
you're limited only
by your imagination, any
one of these techniques
individually could yield
the results of torture
certainly in combination,
you could
reach that fairly quickly.
- See, if you put a
person into this procedure
and keep em there for
more than the six
or eight days that I
would think might be
the maximum tolerability,
then the price
is pretty high.
- The price is someone's
sanity.
- Presumably it could be.
- The medical literature
had a phenomenon
known as force drift
that made it
almost inevitable that
the interrogators
would continue applying
greater and greater
increments of force to
achieve their desired results.
- For example, take
Secretary Rumsfeld's memo
then to say that well look,
he said
that dogs have to be
mizzled, well that's a man
who doesn't understand
the military on the ground
because when that E-6
is sitting there
with that muzzled dog
and there's absolutely
no impact on that person
being interrogated
he's gonna take that muzzle off.
That's reality, that's
human nature.
Alberto
Mora threatened
to go on record with
his concerns
unless the techniques
were rescinded.
- When after the fact
it turns out
that there's concern
about it that
concerns me then I'm
happy to rescind it
and take another
fresh look at it
and talk to more people about it
and see what ought to be done.
- To his credit,
Secretary Rumsfeld
did rescind the
interrogation techniques
and then for over a
year and a half
I heard no reports
from any quarter
about detainee abuse anywhere.
When Abu Ghraib hit, my
first thought was
have I been circumvented,
have their been
authorizations for the
abuse of prisoners
that I had not learned about?
Had the orders
really been rescinded?
According to interrogators,
the use
of shackling, dogs,
stress positions
and sensory assault
continued to be widespread.
Tony Lagouranis was
an interrogator
who arrived in Iraq
after the military
became aware of the
abuses at Abu Ghraib.
- Among the
interrogation guidelines
they gave us it said
that dogs are authorized
to be used on detainees,
you know,
stress positions,
sleep deprivation,
all of those things
that I did that
I would consider
harsh techniques
were violating the
Geneva Conventions
I was told to do, we were
told to do that
to these people by
our superiors.
- The spine of the United
States Armed Forces
is the chain of command,
what starts
at the top of the
chain of command
drops like a rock down
the chain of command
and that's why
Lynndie England knew
what Donald Rumsfeld
was thinking
without actually talking
to Donald Rumsfeld.
In the wake
of Abu Ghraib,
journalists began to look harder
at previous cases of
abuse to try
to understand what
had caused them
and who was responsible.
- People like Tim Golden
at the New York Times
got a hold of it and
started looking
at the case of Dilawar
in particular,
the taxi driver, it
became at least
plausible to me that this man
wasn't even guilty of anything
other than being there
when the sweep occurred
and here was a guy who
was murdered in detention.
Pay tribute
to those whose lives
were taken and those
who daily give
unselfishly of themselves.
Four years ago, our
nation came under attack.
9/11 was very
much in the air and I think
the officers tried to
keep it in the air
they tried to remind these kids
that these people are
our enemies.
But it's hard to see
how these young soldiers
could have been
expected to figure out
who the real enemies
were among a bunch
of militia men and
farmers in a society
that was completely
foreign to them.
- If I remember correctly,
his story
had something to do with
the rocket attack
on a military base and
he was supposed
to be the driver of
the getaway car.
He had taken
his new car, which he
was obviously excited
about and driven
to Khost, the
provincial capital where
he went to look for
taxi passengers
and he in fact found
these three men
in Khost at the market
place who were headed
back to Yakubi.
- Yakubi, Yakubi!
- You have to imagine
that Dilawar
was driving home from
this provincial capital
which was about as far
as his world stretched
he is stopped at Fire
Base Salerno
by a group of Afghan militia men
and the men apparently found an
electric stabilizer in the trunk
of the car, at least
they claimed to.
Camp Salerno had been rocketed
from some distance
earlier in the day
and the Afghan militia
men immediately
arrested the four
guys on suspicion
of having had some
involvement in that attack.
He's taken to Bagram,
this great distance away.
You get a bunch of
guys who are back
at this detention site
and they're told
we have evidence that
they have been
involved in a rocket
attack on American forces
so I think that kinda
tripped a wire in them.
- You're in this atmosphere,
you're with
nothing but military
people and you feel
sort of morally
isolated and you lose
your moral bearings and
you're frustrated
because you're not
getting intelligence
from a prisoner that you
believe is guilty
and has intelligence to give you
and so of course you wanna start
pushing the limits and
you wanna see
how far you can go.
- A lot of the pressure
came from the fact that
we had a few high
value detainees
that gave a lot of good
information and
when we started to lose
those detainees
due to going to Guantanamo Bay,
that they expected this
to come from everybody.
- We would interrogate
some of these guys
just to interrogate em
and it was ridiculous
I meant you'd get some
of these guys in
and you're like this is
the wrong man
this is not who we're
supposed to have
especially being a
screener, you could tell
from the moment you got em in,
you're like
we're not supposed to have em.
- We had one prisoner
came in, he was mentally
challenged and Sergeant
Loring kept saying
that you know, this is a cover,
this is Al-Qaeda's
cover, it's what they do
and I went in there and
talked to him and
basically they had this
guy in a diaper
he ate his own feces but Loring
kept saying it was an act.
- They'd be like hey,
we want you
go yell at this guy, so I'd grab
my box of Frosted
Flakes that I was
eating for breakfast
that morning
Dilawar, a young
Afghan taxi driver
took three
passengers for a ride.
He never returned home.
- When the sun
started to go down,
the sand started blowing,
so it was
a like a big dust bowl
and I'm thinking,
boy is it gonna be like
this every night?
- I remember walking in
there for the
first time and the smell,
the smell's
the first thing that hit you.
I'm a man from DC, if
you've ever been
to the National Zoo
when you walk
into the elephant house there,
that's the best way
to describe it.
There's a few of us
that lived in
the prison and I was
one of them.
They built it up to be a
big scary place
to the prisoners.
After then
invasion of Afghanistan,
US forces occupied Bagram,
an old Soviet air base
as a place to collect
and interrogate
thousands of detainees, captured
throughout Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
These were
suspected Taliban.
They were being caught by
Special Forces
throughout the countryside,
brought to Bagram
and be held,
interrogated to determine
if they were a high
value prisoner.
These were
not nice people at all.
They were very evil people who
definitely had
violent intentions.
On December 5,
2002,
Dilawar, the taxi driver,
was brought
to Bagram, he was
designated a PUC,
person under control,
number 421.
- He was something to
do with a trigger man
for a rocket attack and
that's about all I know.
Five days after
his arrival, he was dead.
- I would say this was around
'bout 05:00 in the morning
and as I walked by, Dilawar,
I think
that's his name, Dilawar,
I walked by
Dilawar's cell and I
noticed he was
just kinda hanging
there with his head down
but he was being too
still to be just
hanging there and sleeping.
- Sergeant Curtis
opened up the door
and we went in and he
was unresponsive
and we started CPR.
I was downstairs in
general population
then I heard a call
come in asking
for Cammack to come
upstairs, he was a medic
and we carried him
downstairs on the stretcher
and Cammack was still
on top of him
while we were carrying him down,
still trying to get
him back going
all the way down the stairs,
got him
to the front door and
they kept working on him
and kept working on him
until the doctor
got there and
pronounced him dead.
I don't know whether there
was an injury that was
aggravated by something
or whether he was just
sick coming in.
- They're very frail
people and I was surprised
that it had taken
that long for one
of em to die in our custody.
- It was a sense of,
definitely a sense of concern
because he was the second one.
Just a week
before Dilawar's death,
another detainee at
Bagram had died.
- You know, you wonder,
is it something
we did or did somebody
kill him or something
but I just didn't know.
According
to the medical examiner,
the first detainee to die,
Habibullah,
had a pre-existing
pulmonary condition
but it was the
beatings he sustained
in Bagram that led to
the cause of his death
a blood clot that
traveled to his lungs.
- When the second one
died a week later
that's when it was like oh crap,
something was gonna happen now,
yes, two prisoners
dying within a week
of each other, that's bad.
A
preliminary investigation
into Dilawar's death
revealed deep bruises
all over his body, but
did not conclude
that his treatment at
Bagram was to blame.
- The next day, they
said just draw out
how he was shackled up
here and I made
that little crude drawing.
The ceiling of these
isolation rooms
was just a simple metal
grate and it was
thick enough you could
put handcuffs
through the wires of
that and you just
kind of chain em up like that,
out to the sides like this.
Forced
standing for long periods
had inflamed tissue
damage from blows
to Dilawar's legs, but
the initial Bagram
press release failed to mention
overhead shackling or beatings.
It declared that both detainees
had died of natural causes.
- My opinion is that
the military
wanted to get this
over and get this
done quickly, before
it really got noticed.
Soon after
Dilawar's death,
the officer in charge
of interrogation
at Bagram, Captain Carolyn Wood
was awarded the Bronze
Star for Valor.
Following the Iraq invasion,
Wood
and her intelligence
unit were given
a new assignment, Abu Ghraib.
- The only thing I can
really remember
about Abu Ghraib was the heat,
it was like
a 148 degrees or so there
and it was all concrete.
You know, Abu Ghraib
also had that infamous
torture chambers and stuff
left from Saddam's era.
I remember walking
through those and seeing
fingernail marks on the
walls and blood stains
and guillotines and
stuff like that
it was a pretty surreal feeling.
We went to Abu Ghraib, I
believe in July,
July August of 2003 to
start that prison.
- You put people in a
crazy situation
and people do crazy things
and Abu was getting
mortared every night.
These 120mm mortars
killing prisoners.
The first time that happened,
they should
have evacuated those
prisoners to somewhere else.
Because the prisoners
weren't safe.
- People were being
told to rough up Iraqis
that wouldn't cooperate,
we were also told
they're nothing but dogs,
then all of a sudden
you start looking at
these people
as less than human and you start
doing things to em you
would never dream of
and that's where it got scary.
- It was only the night shift,
there's always a few bad apples.
- It's been a body blow
for all of us.
- This is clearly an
isolated incident.
- The conduct of a
very very small
number of our leaders
and soldiers.
In the
wake of media attention
surrounding Abu Ghraib,
the military
began a series of
investigations.
- The people who
engaged in abuses
will be brought to justice,
the world
will see how a free
system, a democratic system
functions and operates
transparently with no cover ups.
- The Secretary and
others have said
well, you know, we've conducted
12 investigations, each
and all of which
were geared to looking downward,
Down toward Lynndie
England and Graner
and not looking up.
The
soldiers in the photos
are Military Police, or MPS,
whose job
it was to guard and
protect the prisoners.
In their statements,
the MPs claimed
that Military Intelligence or MI
ordered them to weaken,
humiliate
and break the prisoners
for interrogation purposes.
- Obviously what they were doing
in those pictures was
not sanctioned
by the interrogation
rules of engagement
and they weren't interrogators,
so yes, I did think that
they were bad apples.
However, I also think
that they were
taking cues from Intel.
- Just reading reports
that was happening
in Afghanistan, I
mean humiliation
trying to break people
came from somewhere.
MPs didn't think of it,
MPs were not
ever trained in such things.
We should have never
been breaking anybody.
- I can tell you we set
the same policy
at Abu we set at Bagram,
same exact rules.
Same thing was going on.
They wonder why it happened.
In her
sworn testimony
about Abu Ghraib,
Captain Wood said
she felt pressured to
produce intelligence
so she brought
unauthorized techniques
dogs, nudity, sleep depravation
and stress positions
to Abu Ghraib from Afghanistan.
Wood maintained that
the Bagram model
had tacit approval
from superiors
but US Central Command had never
responded to her requests
for authorization
so the mystery remained,
was Abu Ghraib
the work of a few bad
apples or evidence
of a new worldwide system on
detention and interrogation?
- I'm pretty sure that
interrogators
were telling the guards,
strip this guy naked
chain him up to the
bed in an uncomfortable
position do whatever
you can and then
they just decided to
take it one step further
and have some fun with,
and take pictures.
- You've always got people
in the military
who are just this side
of the Marquis de Sade
and one of the reasons
you want rules
and this code of conduct
to help you lead
mud Marines and mud grunts,
Infantry
is so that you can
use those tools
to restrict this tendency
in your soldiers.
When you have your friends dying
on your left and right,
you can sometimes go
beyond the pail, so a
Lieutenant, a Captain
down where the rubber
meets the road
needs these tools and he needs
to be able to punish
people who cross the line.
When the Secretary
walked through
my door into my office
about the time
the photos of Abu Ghraib
were getting ready
to come out and we had
rumor they were
coming out, he said to me
I need to know
what happened and why,
and so then
I began to build both
an open source
and an inside the government,
classified
and unclassified document
file and I began
to see legal arguments as to why
the President could
pretty much do anything
he wanted to in the
name of security
and the Secretary of
Defense and others
beneath him were
actually looking for
the twin pressures that
they put on people
that is to say the
pressure to produce
intelligence and the fact that
they were saying the
gloves are off
created the
environment in the field
that we later saw reflected in
the photographs from Abu Ghraib
and in my few, far more
serious fashion
than the photographs we saw,
98 deaths
of people in detention,
which I understand now
from my Army colleagues
is up to some
25 of which have been
declared officially
by the Army as homicides.
People say well
these photographs
from Abu Ghraib, they
weren't real torture
I look back at those
people and I say
murder's torture, murder's
the ultimate torture.
In the case of Dilawar,
he was subjected to
certainly cruel and
unusual punishment
and ultimately, he was subjected
to torture because he died.
It's not our
intent for people
to die, especially when
we're seeking
to get information from them.
Did the
treatment they received
in those rooms cause the
death of these two men?
First,
we're not chaining
people to the ceiling, I
think you asked
me that question before.
First, we're not chaining
people to the ceiling,
that's what he says.
Carlotta
Gall is a New York Times
journalist based in Kabul.
Unsatisfied with the
military's explanation
of the two deaths at Bagram,
she set out to investigate.
- It took a long time to
find the family
because the military
didn't tell us
who they were and we
started calling around
Governors, they're very
simple farming family
they don't speak English,
but they
showed me a paper that
was given to them
with the body and that's
when I opened it up
and read it and it
was in English
and it was a death
certificate from
the American Military and
it was signed by
a US Major who was
the pathologist
and there were four boxes
and she'd ticked
the box for homicide.
I said my god they've
killed him and we then
had to tell the
family do you know
what's written here
and they said no
it's in English we
don't understand
and I think maybe the Red Cross
who helped return the
body had explained
but they hadn't taken
it in and then
the pathologist had said
it was this blunt
force trauma to the legs.
In other words, did they receive
any trauma, any blunt
injury trauma as we call it?
Presently I
have no indiction of that
but we will be looking
as this investigation
continues to go down
its due course.
- Presently have no
indication of that
you know, there's been a
death certificate
signed by his people and he says
presently I have no
indication of any
blunt force trauma
and it's written
on the death certificate,
which I've seen.
- The story probably
would have gone away
had it not been for my
colleague, Carlotta Gall
who tracked down
Dilawar's family
and found the knife in
the back clue
that told everyone that
this incident
had been something other
than the military portrayed.
Tim
Golden picked up
the trail of the
story and obtained
a confidential file of
the Army investigation
including hundreds of
pages of testimony
from the soldiers involved.
Part of what
made this story
compelling to me was
that you had
these young soldiers
with very little training
or preparation, thrown
into this situation
in the aftermath of 9/11
just as the rules
were changing and
they weren't told
what the new rules
were and you had
this young Afghan
man who came in
to this system at the wrong time
and in the wrong way
and this is what
happened to him.
- I saw his picture in
the New York Times article
before that picture, I
couldn't have
picked his face out, you know,
my memory
of him was chained up
with the hood on,
no sleeping.
Following
questions raised
by the New York Times and
under scrutiny
from the Abu Ghraib scandal,
the Army
finally stepped up the
Dilawar investigation
and began charging
soldiers with maltreatment
maiming and homicide.
- When you're working
with the organization
like the military,
they're gonna hold
somebody accountable,
you can sweep
some things under the
rug, but this was a death
it was two deaths and okay fine,
they're gonna charge people.
- It seemed like the
military now,
after they got a black eye
from Abu Ghraib
wanted to get a public
opinion that they were
policing their
soldiers and so they
said we had this
incident that happened
a couple of years ago,
we can still
prosecute some of them.
- I had nothing to do
with the military
for two years and
all of a sudden
I'm getting a call saying that
I'm being court-martialed,
I mean
that was a huge surprise for me.
- From the defense perspective,
I immediately said this
is a political show trial.
Willie Brand is a good soldier
good soldiers tend to
obey orders,
good soldiers tend to be people
who do what they're
trained to do.
- The interrogators
on the ground
for the most part didn't know
what the rules were,
they'd never been
interrogators before.
- My interrogation
training consisted
of basically they taught
us some approaches
how to get people to
talk and then
here, go, go watch these
guys interrogate
which were the people
that we were replacing
for about five, six hours before
I did my first interrogation.
- Damien was picked for this job
because he's big, he's
loud and he's scary
that was his qualification.
- Soldiers are dying, get
the information.
That's all you're told,
get the information.
- Soldiers said that
when prisoners
like Dilawar came in to
Bagram they were
immediately assaulted.
They blasted music at em, often
they had dogs barking
at em and they
would use some of the
most menacing
interrogators to create
this sense of threat
one of those was
Damien Corsetti.
- With the screening
you're trying to instill
what's call shock of
capture, when the person
first comes in, that's
when they're most
apt to give you
information because
they're just like holy crap,
you know
what's going on.
- It's not just that
the disorientation
procedure, it's actually
a terrorizing procedure,
it's designed
to terrify you into
spilling the beans
as it were, being spat at,
being sworn at
having the dogs barking around,
cameras flashing in your face.
- Keep in mind, in their culture
that dog's more shocking to them
than it is to us,
kinda like a woman
telling em what to do, you know,
it's a cultural thing,
so you get
more bang for your
buck over there
with the dog.
- And then to be re-shackled
completely naked, and to
do what they call
the body search, the
cavity search
and then to be questioned
naked, shivering.
- After they're read their rules
and everything, they're
taken to their cell
to where they're gonna be put in
sleep depravation for 24
hours, that's standard
for everybody, then
from their MI direct us
that they can go to
general population
or they have to stay
in isolation
or if they are gonna
stay in isolation
if they're gonna be
allowed to sleep
and if they can, then when.
To
weaken the defenses
of detainees,
interrogators ordered
military police to find
ways of keeping
the prisoners awake.
- You know, you're in that
room not saying anything,
oh well you know
maybe he knows a little bit more
let's let him lose a
little bit more sleep.
Which is the idea of
keeping him like this
so he won't sleep, you'll
stand, cause as soon
as you start to let your body go
all that pressure on your wrists
and your arms, you're gonna
feel that with those cuffs on.
- The only time the MPs
would ever help us
do anything would be
to keep them
on a sleep schedule, you
know, they're guaranteed
so much sleep, is that
sleep consistent?
Is it uninterrupted?
You know, there's
fifteen minutes here
fifteen minutes there,
who knows.
That's how it was
proposed to us.
- There'd be a board
when you walk
in the room on this wall,
you might see
an arrow going up to the ceiling
and it would be
maybe a one by it
so that'd be an hour
up, he's gotta stand up
for one hour, and then
you may see a two
with an arrow pointing down,
that means
he can sit down for two hours.
The prisoners
were kept in these big pens
downstairs and their
numbers would be
scribbled on the door
of the airlock
which was the little passageway
that they were taken out of when
they were brought up to the
isolation cells upstairs.
- Detainees were
actually chained
with their hands
above their heads
in these airlocks,
his number 421
was something that I
could see often
because his back was towards me
in the airlock and the numbers
were written on the backs
of the detainees
in black marker and
we all had that
as well as on the front.
What was your number?
- My number in Bagram was
180 but later it became 558.
- Thank you, it's great
to be with ya
it's good to be here in
Bagram of course.
I'm sure,
any high ranking officer
who toured would see
the shackles.
Because you're gonna
tour to look.
You know, they're
curious just like
everybody else is.
There are
always officers coming
and going through the facility.
We kinda joked about it as being
the greatest show on Earth,
everyone
wanted to come and look at
the terrorists.
- Mr Rumsfeld's office
called our office
frequently, very high commanders
would wanna be kept up to date
on a daily basis on
certain prisoners there.
The Brass knew, they
saw em shackled
they saw em hooded and
they said right on
y'all are doing a great job.
When the
Red Cross toured Bagram
the sleep deprivation
chart was erased
and the prisoners
were unshackled.
- Traditional military procedure
did not allow you to
shackle somebody
to a fixed object, certainly not
chaining their arms overhead.
Initially they were
handcuffing people
into the airlock of the
cells for punishment
and that was to be
strictly limited
15 minutes, half an hour,
but it quickly evolved
and when you walked in
there, they just had
a pair of long
handcuffs dangling
from the wire mesh
ceiling of the cell
ready for whoever came in.
The Army
coroner who examined Dilawar
discovered massive tissue
damage in his legs.
She later testified that
his legs had been pulpified.
But what could have caused
that kind of damage?
This is not
a hotel, this is a not
a place for them to get
fat, and lazy and happy.
In a video
tape that surfaced
as part of the homicide
investigation,
Colonel David Hayden, a
top Army lawyer
for US forces in
Afghanistan described
a Policy of shackling
and striking detainees.
- There was an approved
technique for the MPs
when somebody was a
difficult prisoner
that you could hit em on
the legs, it was
supposedly not considered
not a lethal blow.
- I didn't actually hear
a higher up say
go and kick em in the leg,
if they do this
or do that, the higher ups said,
if, you know, in order
to get control of em
that's an option what
you can use.
- It's just your knee
going into the side
of their thigh, bout midway up
supposed to be a pressure
point right there
and it controls em really easy.
- Over two ays,
everybody's hitting you
in the legs, it can cause
some severe problems.
- Throughout the
investigation and even
in the trials, a lot
of the guards
and interrogators
described Dilawar
as a very combative detainee,
as a tough character
and that's just never
been reconciled
with all the other evidence that
there was about this
guy who weighed
122 pounds when he died.
The men who had been passengers
in Dilawar's taxi told us later
that he had just been
absolutely terrified
at Bagram, that they heard him
through the walls of the
isolation cells
screaming for his
mother and father.
He'd been in a very
uncomfortable position
muttering things
sometimes praying,
sometimes asking for help
or seemingly asking for help,
because I couldn't
understand his language.
A number
of witnesses
remember the night
before Dilawar died.
Just that
one night, he got kicked
in the leg maybe like 10 times.
- Some of the soldiers
said they started
using the knee
strikes essentially
to shut em up because
he was yelling
and screaming.
- The damage that was done
was done from multiple
strikes and a lot
of that could have been avoided
had you known the
person before you
had fought with them and
used that exact technique.
When they
eventually came to take him
to an isolation cell, I believe
his body had become almost limp.
One of the reasons why
they began punching him
was that they felt he was
putting it on.
He was in the airlock,
standing there
with a hood over his head,
he had
his hands tied above his
head and he was moaning.
- He just started to fight,
right there
in the airlock and
the airlock has
a front gate and a back
gate but both
the sides are concertina wire,
neither
of us officers wanted to get in
to the concertina wire,
so we pulled him out
of the airlock and put
him on the floor
and put him into restraints.
What
kind of force
did you have to use in
order to subdue him?
- Physical force, he was struck.
- There's like four
MPs on this guy
and one of the MPs just
kept giving him
kidney shots, the other
two, they'd slammed
him to the ground and
then the fourth one
jumped on his back, he got
a big gash on his nose.
- There was no
reason to hit him,
let's remember he's shackled.
- Even when the control
was an issue,
it became well I'm just
gonna do this
to get mine in, and
that's probably
why they got in trouble,
because you really
couldn't justify kicking the guy
that much if he was
just chained up.
Dilawar
was taken to
an isolation cell, where
the knee strikes continued.
In her statement at
trial, the Army coroner
said his lower limbs looked like
they had been run over by a bus.
Had he lived, it would have been
necessary to amputate his legs.
- Then it kinda raised
the question of
this is what we did to him,
it's not
just this is what I did to him
or this is what
Cammack did to him
or Morden or anybody,
it just this is
what we've done.
It's almost
hard to fathom now,
you had soldiers like
Willie Brand
who seems like this very gentle
kind of soft spoken guy,
but who testified
that he struck Dilawar
so many times
in the leg that his
knee got tired
and he had to switch to
the other one.
- Sometimes I feel that
I should have gone with
my own morality more then
what was common.
One MP
testified that
the strikes became an amusement,
inflicted on Dilawar
just to hear
him scream Allah.
- Some would say well hey
you should have stopped this,
you should
have stopped that, when
you saw he was
injured or saw he was
being kicked on his knees,
why didn't you do something?
That'd be a good question,
my answer
would be well, it was
us against them
I was over there, I
didn't wanna appear
to be going against my
fellow soldiers.
Which is that wrong, you
could sit here
and say that was dead wrong,
go over there and say that.
No one
ever investigated
who set the rules at Bagram.
Investigators never
asked Captain Wood
what senior officers
had given orders
to treat detainees in
ways that were
forbidden according to
the Army Field Manual.
MP Captain Beiring was the only
officer prosecuted in the case.
His dereliction of duty
charge was dismissed
when the judge
determined that no one
had made clear what
Captain Beiring's duty was.
In spite of repeated
requests for proper training
rules of engagement
for his soldiers
his superiors gave him neither.
- We were all worried
about not having
that written guidelines,
by they kept
reassuring us that
it was coming.
- We knew exactly why we
weren't getting
clear guidance, just in
case something
like this happened.
- If I had to do it
again, I'd probably say no
I just, I'd be like I'm
not doing anything
until I see
something in writing.
And
do you think,
looking back, do you
think you were misled?
- I think we all were.
A week after
September 11th
Vice President Dick
Cheney appeared
on Meet the Press to
describe how
interrogation policies
were about to change.
- I have to work the
dark side, if you will
spend time in the shadows,
in the
intelligence world,
a lot of what
needs to be done here will
have to be done
quietly without any discussion,
using sources and methods that
are available to our
intelligence agencies
if we're gonna be
successful, that's the world
these folks operate in
and so it's gonna
be vital for us to use
any means at our disposal,
basically, to achieve
our objective.
- It's very clear that it starts
in the office of Vice
President Cheney
he had a very strong view
that we were not
as aggressive in
dealing with people
in interrogations as
we could or should be.
Taking the gloves off,
being rough with detainees.
If Dick Cheney was
the primary architect
of a new policy,
John Yoo was the
chief draftsman.
He wrote guiding
opinions which argued
for a flexibly approach to
treating suspected terrorists.
- United States used to
treat terrorism
as a criminal justice problem.
The September 11th
attacks showed that
the struggle with
Al-Qaeda had moved
into warfare, I think
when a sworn enemy
for political purposes can kill
three thousand Americans,
cause billions
of dollars of damage and
try to eliminate
the leaders of the
American Government
that sounds like war
to most people,
it doesn't sound like crime.
President
Bush declared
a war on terror, but he
raised questions
about whether
suspected terrorists
should be protected by
the laws of war.
The Geneva Conventions.
Atrocities that shocked
the conscience
of the world gave rise
to the modern
Geneva Conventions,
international treaties
meant to provide
fundamental protections
for every human being
captured in war time.
In effect for over 50
years, Geneva offered
legal protections and
prohibited interrogators
from using torture, murder,
or even
humiliating and
degrading treatment.
After 9/11, John Yoo
worked closely
with Dick Cheney's office
and Alberto Gonzales
the Counsel to the President.
They wrote a series of
memos arguing
that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply
to suspected terrorists
and they gave
legal cover for the CIA
and Special Forces
to embark on a secret program
of previously forbidden
interrogation techniques.
- More than 3000
suspected terrorists
have been arrested in
many countries
many others have met a
different fate
let's put it this way,
they're no longer
a problem to the United States
and our friends and allies.
The problem
for the President,
Gonzalez warned, was that some
of the new
interrogation techniques
were banned under US
and international law.
- One of the points
that he makes
is that we don't want
the Geneva Conventions
to apply because if they do,
these things
can be war crimes.
- What's well known is
the principle of command
responsibility.
This was established
in the Nuremberg trials
after World War II and
it established
the principle of
international criminal law
that individuals who
order illegal treatment
will be held accountable
for the illegal
treatment even if they're
not immediately
applying the kind of
abusive treatment.
To be
certain that Americans
interrogating
prisoners would not
be accused of torture,
John Yoo co-authored
a memo that would clarify
the meaning of the term.
- The only prohibited
acts would be
extreme acts which
are equivalent
to serious physical injury,
such as organ failure
impairment of bodily
functions or even death.
That's an illegal memo, that's
the so-called torture memo.
- That was an arguable
interpretation
of the law, I'm sure we
had discussions about it
and ultimately it was accepted,
because it represent,
that was the ultimate
decision and position of
the Office of Legal Counsel.
- The Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum
was unbounded, meaning
nowhere did it state
that the application of
cruel and inhuman
and degrading treatment
was prohibited
and at one point, I
asked John Yoo
can the President
authorize torture
and his response was yes.
- I think the lawyers
job is to tell
people what laws do
or do not apply
so that they know what
space they have
to make the policy decision.
If the
President deems that
he's got to torture somebody,
including
by crushing the testicles
of the person's child,
there is no law that
can stop that?
That's what you wrote
in the August 2002 memo.
I think it depends
on why the President
thinks he needs to do that.
Military
lawyers were outraged
by the implications of
John Yoo's memo.
- My first
involvement in this came
when I was visited by a
group of senior
JAG officers, more than
a year before
the first story about the
Abu Ghraib broke
who were very troubled
about what was going on
and the focus of their concern
was failing in the
responsibilities
that the military
leadership had,
to soldiers in the field,
that was the
responsibility to provide fair,
clear guidance to them as to how
to behave in these
difficult circumstances
and what they saw was
an intentional
decision taken at the
height of the Pentagon
to put out a fog of
ambiguity coupled with
great pressure to bring results
to be prepared to be
violent with the detainees
but you know, this
violence with the detainees
is a criminal act.
- They may be Al-Qaeda,
they may be Taliban
they may be the worst
people in the world
and I'm sure that
some of them are
but there are
certain basic rules
and international agreements
that the United states
has agreed to, that
we will observe
you go ahead and please respond,
you wanted to.
- Very quickly, let me clarify
the President's policy,
"as a matter of policy
"the United States Armed Forces
"shall continue to
treat detainees humanely
"and to the extent
appropriate and consistent
"with military
necessity in a manner
"consistent with the
principles of Geneva."
- That is a legalistic
statement and one
that is written with loopholes
and it's clear to me,
the interrogators
did not understand that
quote "humane treatment"
might be in the eye of
the beholder.
In the field
in Afghanistan,
there was a great
deal of confusion
about exactly what
the rules were.
- They told us when
dealing with the PUCs
as they called them, the
persons under US custody
they don't fall under
Geneva Conventions,
basically, the only thing
that we weren't allowed
to do is beat em up.
Person
under control,
person under custody,
something like that,
you know, they call
them anything
to dehumanize em, so
that you don't
look at them as people.
- I don't remember
hearing anything
about Geneva Convention,
'course I'm familiar
with it, but they
didn't go over that
in any kind of detail.
- I didn't know what
the Field Manual
for interrogation, I didn't know
the proper nomenclature
for it, I'd seen it,
there was a copy of
it lying around
I'm sure somewhere,
and if I had chosen to,
I could have picked it
up and read it
but I was working 16 hour days
to sit down and read
a field manual
was not top of my
priorities over there.
- It is a mean, nasty,
dangerous, dirty
business out there and we
have to operate
in that arena, I'm
convinced we can do it
we can do it
successfully but we need
to make certain that we have not
tied the hands, if you will,
of our
intelligence
communities in terms of
accomplishing their mission.
- These terrorists
play by a whole
set of different rules,
it's gonna force us
in your words, to get
mean, dirty and nasty
in order to take em on?
- Right.
Guided by
a legal opinion
from John Yoo, the Bush
Administration
began shipping some
high-value detainees
to the US Naval Base,
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- Initially I thought good,
safe place.
Put them there, barbed
wire all over.
Then it became apparent
that the reason
we were doing it was
because we were
going to argue that
there's no law.
A Cuban law didn't apply,
US law didn't apply
well that was a big step
down the slippery slope.
- I think what the policy makers
were trying to do was
to try to find a place
that was physically as close to
the unIted States so it
could be well protected
but still would benefit
from the rule
that the United states military,
is one who has ultimate
say and control
over enemy prisoners who are
held outside the country.
- One by one, the
terrorists are learning
the meaning of American justice.
In December 2001,
a man named
Mohammed al-Qahtani was swept up
in Afghanistan and sent
to Guantanamo.
After eight months in detention
the Army discovered that he may
have trained to be the
20th hijacker.
Suddenly, Qahtani
became the most
important detainee
in Guantanamo.
- Here we had a man
who was supposed
to have been on that
plane that was flown
into the
Pennsylvania countryside
so I think there was a
sense of urgency
to find out what this
guy knew in order
to be able to prevent any
future attacks.
- He successfully
resisted standard
interrogation
techniques at Guantanamo
for eight months and he
is the genesis
for the request by the
joint task force
at Guantanamo for
more techniques
that might be able to get
past his resistance training.
In September 2002,
John Yoo and Alberto
Gonzalez traveled
to Guantanamo, soon
after their visit,
and just before Dilawar's
arrival at Bagram,
Donald Rumsfeld
personally approved
a new menu of
psychological interrogation
techniques for use on
Mohammed al-Qahtani.
Exactly how the techniques
would be applied
was often left to
the imagination
of the interrogators.
- His interrogations are
well-documented
in a log and from
November 2002 in to
early January 2003, he was
subjected to this regime.
It involved very severe
sleep deprivation.
He was only permitted to sleep
four hours a day from seven
o'clock in the morning
till 11 o'clock in the morning,
and that lasted for 50
days with one exception.
He was held in severe isolation
and sensory deprivation.
There are a number of instances
in the log where you'll
see the phrase
invasion of space by a female,
and that was actually
an interrogation
tactic designed to
break his faith.
- An interrogator
approached detainee
from behind, rubbed his back,
whispered
in his ear and ran
fingers through his hair
that was authorized under
the futility technique.
He was
subjected to what I would call
sexual assault by female
interrogators.
- He was forced to wear
women's lingerie
multiple allegations of
homosexuality
and that his comrades
were aware of that
he was forced to dance
with a male interrogator
subject to strip searches
for control measures
not for security, and
he was forced
to perform dog tricks.
All this to lower his
personal sense of worth.
They tried to
categorize it as individual
interrogators pushing
the envelope
or starting to get
quote creative.
♪ God bless America
♪ Land that I love
The combination
of his lack of food intake
and forcible hydration
led him at one point
to actually, his
heart slowed down
to 35 beats per minute
and he was rushed
to the hospital to be revived.
- Mohammed al-Qahtani
in many ways
that single interrogation,
protected interrogation
contains within it, if you will,
the entire genealogy, the
entire history
of CIA torture over the
last 50 years.
The CIA launched a mind
control project,
a veritable Manhattan
Project of the mind
in the 1950s, in house,
the CIA worked on
exotic techniques, hypnosis,
and then
they worked on sodium penothal
then they worked on
electro shock
and ultimately, they
discovered LSD.
All of that drug stuff,
in house, went nowhere
except to lawsuits, but
what did work
was the CIA outsourced
all of the dull
behavioral research to
the most brilliant
behavioral scientists at the top
universities in the
United States and Canada.
At McGill,
experiments
by famed psychologist Donald O.
Hebb
caught the eye of CIA
researchers.
- Doctor Hebb found
that he could
induce a state akin to a
acute psychosis
in 48 hours, all he
did was he had
student volunteers sit in
a very pleasant
air-conditioned cubicle
with goggles,
gloves and ear muffs, actually,
you know
what they looked just like?
The Guantanamo detainees,
if you see
those outfits that the
Guantanamo detainees
have where they have the gloves,
and the googles and
the earmuffs?
Not everything's all
about security,
no, no, no, that's
sensory breakdown.
Within a day, there
would be hallucinations
within two days, breakdown.
- I began to think
while we were doing
our experiments, it's
possible that something
that involves physical
discomfort or even pain
might be more
tolerable than simply
the deprivation conditions
that we studied.
The CIA was
fascinated by this,
they jumped on it immediately.
- I had no idea what a
potentially vicious
weapon this could be.
- They identified two
key techniques.
They identified sensory
disorientation
and they identified
self-inflicted pain,
standing for days at a
time while fluid
flowed to the legs and
they put them together
in the Kubark
Counterintelligence
Interrogation manual
and they propagated
around the world
and through the US
intelligence community.
Think about what al-Qahtani
was subjected to, okay?
First of all, he's in dark,
he's in light
he's in cold, he's in
heat, what they're doing
is they're attacking
his universal
sensory receptors, they're
also scrambling
his time, so that's phase one.
In Guantanamo under the
regime of General Miller
he turned Guantanamo
into a veritable
behavioral scientific laboratory
and Donald Rumsfeld gave orders
for techniques beyond
the field manual
and they percolated and
they percolated
in ambiguous way that
allowed people to
do what they thought
needed to be done.
And they explored our
male sensitivity
to gender and sexual
identity, so that's the thing
about being homosexual,
the underwear
on the head, all that
sort of stuff.
- People were saying
Arabs really
are very sensitive to
sexual humiliation
well, who the hell
isn't sensitive
to sexual humiliation,
nobody wants
to be stripped down
naked and forced
to masturbate with a hood
over your head.
It's ridiculous.
- Then they created
behavioral science
consultation teams
where they had
military
psychologists integrated
into the ongoing interrogation
to discover individual
fears and phobias
and all of that was
visited on al-Qahtani.
You are
aware of communications
between General Miller
and Secretary Rumsfeld
specifically about this
one prisoner?
- To our knowledge, there
was considerable
manner of communication
up and down the chain.
- As you know from
General Schmidt's report
he concluded that
these techniques
individually did not
constitute torture
but he said that the
sum of these techniques.
- The cumulative effects
of simultaneous
applications of
numerous authorized
techniques had abusive
and degrading
impact on the detainee.
- And he recommended that
General Miller be disciplined.
But he said it did not
constitute torture.
- We made a distinction between
what torture and
inhuman treatment
would be given the
general guidelines
and then what might be
abusive and degrading
something might be
degrading but not
necessarily torture
and it may not
be inhumane, it may
be humiliating
but it may not be torture,
no torture
no physical pain, injury,
there was a safe
secure environment
the entire time.
- And that, of course,
is the genius
of the CIA's
psychological paradigm.
Psychological torture
is all a matter
of definitions and then
it's a very slippery indeed.
- That sounds remarkably similar
to what occurred at Abu Ghraib,
people being led
around in chains
people being forced to
wear lingerie,
perhaps a coincidence,
perhaps not.
- If you look at those
Abu Ghraib photographs
again, it's always the
same techniques.
First of all, there's the
sexual activity
with the women's garments
and the masturbation
and all the rest, that's
the cultural sensitivity.
They're short shackled,
they're long-shackled
they're shackled upside down.
These are stress positions.
The most famous of all
Abu Ghraib photographs
of course of that hooded
Iraqi standing
on a box arms outstretched,
he's told
that if he steps off the box,
if he moves,
he'll be electrocuted,
that's the point
of the fake electrical
wires, so it's the absolute
immobility for
protract appearance
and then with arms extended,
as we'd say
to viewers, don't
they this at home
but do try it, just stand
for 10 minutes
with your arms stretched out,
not moving.
Carolyn Wood
was an example
of the way new techniques
spread and mutated
like a virus, long before
Wood took charge
of interrogation at Abu Ghraib,
her unit
was involved with harsh
techniques at Bagram
including stress
positions, forced standing,
and sleep deprivation.
- One of the memorandums
shows that in early
December 2002, the interrogators
at Bagram just looked
on the internet
they're in touch with the guys
at Guantanamo and they leaned
that these guys at
Guantanamo had gotten
new techniques from the
Secretary of Defense
and they just
started using them,
even though the
techniques had clearly
been approved exclusively
for use at Guantanamo.
- When General Miller
himself traveled
from Guantanamo to Iraq
in August 2003,
he brought with him a
CD and a manual
on the advanced
techniques they developed
at Guantanamo and he gave them
to General Sanchez's command.
So there are these
multiple paths that you
can trace whereby these
interrogation techniques
go through this global migration
through Afghanistan to
Iraq from Guantanamo
directly to Iraq and that
result is Abu Ghraib.
Well before
the abuses at Abu Ghraib
became public,
Government officials
had been quietly
raising concerns
about harsh techniques
in use at Guantanamo.
- There were emails back
to the Department
of Justice from FBI
personnel down
at Guantanamo, saying
you won't believe
what's going on down here,
we've gotta
disassociate ourselves
as FBI people
from what is going on
here in Guantanamo.
This email says, "The
DOD has their marching
"orders from the
Secretary of Defense."
Marching orders from the
Secretary of Defense.
"To engage in practices
which the FBI
"finds to be deeply
offensive and dangerous."
But the emails are what is
called redacted
which means that
there's big holes
in these emails, now
some of the emails
are totally redacted,
so we don't know
what they say at all,
that's an example
a lot of the documents
that we got here.
You know, you can't see
anything on these documents.
One after another of
where there's nothing.
- In early December 2002,
I had heard
that there was detainee
abuse going on.
I called the Army
General Counsel and asked
him whether he had
any information,
I said I'm receiving
reports that some detainees
are being abused in Guantanamo,
do you know anything about this?
And his response back
was I know a lot
about it, come on down
to my office.
They pushed a stack of documents
across the desk, top
document was a memorandum
from the General
Counsel to Department
of Defense to Secretary Rumsfeld
and it was that cover
memo that requested
the authorization for
the application
of certain
interrogation techniques
and the top memo gave
Secretary Rumsfeld's
approval for the application of
some of those techniques.
It's the memo with
Secretary Rumsfeld's
handwritten notations
on the bottom
that he stands 8-10 hours a day,
how come these
detainees are only
required to stand up to
four hours a day.
I was astounded, but my
first reaction was
that this was a mistake,
somebody just
didn't read the documents
carefully enough.
- I think people in
the Pentagon thought of
Alberto Mora as a
loyal Republican
political appointee,
he would never
have been considered a
rabble rouser
or a liberal, he
said he expected
that he would raise these issues
and people in
positions of authority
would say oh, thanks for
letting us know
and that would be the end of it.
- I wanted to ask you
about a memo
that was written by
Alberto Mora.
Do you recall in this
memo that you wrote
a little notation at
the bottom about
standing more than four hours.
- I do.
- Because you stand at your
desk.
- I do.
- This attorney argued
that that could be
interpreted as some by a
wink and a nod
that it would be okay
to go beyond the
techniques that were
prescribed in the memo.
- No, no no, it did,
there's no wink and a nod
about anything, there
was one provision
in there that they would
have people stand
for several hours and
it was a semi-humorous
remark that a person in
his seventies
stands all day long, I
just mused that
and maybe it shouldn't
have gone out
but it did and I wrote
it, and life goes on.
- But his point was
that you should
have gotten much
better advice from
your legal staff.
- I heard your question
the first time.
- What was of concern to me
was the techniques
either individual
or in combination could rise
to the level or torture.
Okay, you're permitting
certain interrogation
techniques but
certainly there must be
some limit which is set
upon the severity
of the techniques, light
deprivation could mean
placing the detainee
in a dark room
for 15 minutes or it
could mean a month
or two months or three
months until he goes blind.
Detainee specific
phobia techniques.
The snakes, the bats,
the rats, lock somebody
up in a coffin,
you're limited only
by your imagination, any
one of these techniques
individually could yield
the results of torture
certainly in combination,
you could
reach that fairly quickly.
- See, if you put a
person into this procedure
and keep em there for
more than the six
or eight days that I
would think might be
the maximum tolerability,
then the price
is pretty high.
- The price is someone's
sanity.
- Presumably it could be.
- The medical literature
had a phenomenon
known as force drift
that made it
almost inevitable that
the interrogators
would continue applying
greater and greater
increments of force to
achieve their desired results.
- For example, take
Secretary Rumsfeld's memo
then to say that well look,
he said
that dogs have to be
mizzled, well that's a man
who doesn't understand
the military on the ground
because when that E-6
is sitting there
with that muzzled dog
and there's absolutely
no impact on that person
being interrogated
he's gonna take that muzzle off.
That's reality, that's
human nature.
Alberto
Mora threatened
to go on record with
his concerns
unless the techniques
were rescinded.
- When after the fact
it turns out
that there's concern
about it that
concerns me then I'm
happy to rescind it
and take another
fresh look at it
and talk to more people about it
and see what ought to be done.
- To his credit,
Secretary Rumsfeld
did rescind the
interrogation techniques
and then for over a
year and a half
I heard no reports
from any quarter
about detainee abuse anywhere.
When Abu Ghraib hit, my
first thought was
have I been circumvented,
have their been
authorizations for the
abuse of prisoners
that I had not learned about?
Had the orders
really been rescinded?
According to interrogators,
the use
of shackling, dogs,
stress positions
and sensory assault
continued to be widespread.
Tony Lagouranis was
an interrogator
who arrived in Iraq
after the military
became aware of the
abuses at Abu Ghraib.
- Among the
interrogation guidelines
they gave us it said
that dogs are authorized
to be used on detainees,
you know,
stress positions,
sleep deprivation,
all of those things
that I did that
I would consider
harsh techniques
were violating the
Geneva Conventions
I was told to do, we were
told to do that
to these people by
our superiors.
- The spine of the United
States Armed Forces
is the chain of command,
what starts
at the top of the
chain of command
drops like a rock down
the chain of command
and that's why
Lynndie England knew
what Donald Rumsfeld
was thinking
without actually talking
to Donald Rumsfeld.
In the wake
of Abu Ghraib,
journalists began to look harder
at previous cases of
abuse to try
to understand what
had caused them
and who was responsible.
- People like Tim Golden
at the New York Times
got a hold of it and
started looking
at the case of Dilawar
in particular,
the taxi driver, it
became at least
plausible to me that this man
wasn't even guilty of anything
other than being there
when the sweep occurred
and here was a guy who
was murdered in detention.
Pay tribute
to those whose lives
were taken and those
who daily give
unselfishly of themselves.
Four years ago, our
nation came under attack.
9/11 was very
much in the air and I think
the officers tried to
keep it in the air
they tried to remind these kids
that these people are
our enemies.
But it's hard to see
how these young soldiers
could have been
expected to figure out
who the real enemies
were among a bunch
of militia men and
farmers in a society
that was completely
foreign to them.
- If I remember correctly,
his story
had something to do with
the rocket attack
on a military base and
he was supposed
to be the driver of
the getaway car.
He had taken
his new car, which he
was obviously excited
about and driven
to Khost, the
provincial capital where
he went to look for
taxi passengers
and he in fact found
these three men
in Khost at the market
place who were headed
back to Yakubi.
- Yakubi, Yakubi!
- You have to imagine
that Dilawar
was driving home from
this provincial capital
which was about as far
as his world stretched
he is stopped at Fire
Base Salerno
by a group of Afghan militia men
and the men apparently found an
electric stabilizer in the trunk
of the car, at least
they claimed to.
Camp Salerno had been rocketed
from some distance
earlier in the day
and the Afghan militia
men immediately
arrested the four
guys on suspicion
of having had some
involvement in that attack.
He's taken to Bagram,
this great distance away.
You get a bunch of
guys who are back
at this detention site
and they're told
we have evidence that
they have been
involved in a rocket
attack on American forces
so I think that kinda
tripped a wire in them.
- You're in this atmosphere,
you're with
nothing but military
people and you feel
sort of morally
isolated and you lose
your moral bearings and
you're frustrated
because you're not
getting intelligence
from a prisoner that you
believe is guilty
and has intelligence to give you
and so of course you wanna start
pushing the limits and
you wanna see
how far you can go.
- A lot of the pressure
came from the fact that
we had a few high
value detainees
that gave a lot of good
information and
when we started to lose
those detainees
due to going to Guantanamo Bay,
that they expected this
to come from everybody.
- We would interrogate
some of these guys
just to interrogate em
and it was ridiculous
I meant you'd get some
of these guys in
and you're like this is
the wrong man
this is not who we're
supposed to have
especially being a
screener, you could tell
from the moment you got em in,
you're like
we're not supposed to have em.
- We had one prisoner
came in, he was mentally
challenged and Sergeant
Loring kept saying
that you know, this is a cover,
this is Al-Qaeda's
cover, it's what they do
and I went in there and
talked to him and
basically they had this
guy in a diaper
he ate his own feces but Loring
kept saying it was an act.
- They'd be like hey,
we want you
go yell at this guy, so I'd grab
my box of Frosted
Flakes that I was
eating for breakfast
that morning