O Mês Que Não Terminou (2019) - full transcript

The documentary analyzes the Brazil's process from June/2013 till Bolsonaro's election, investigating the Lulism crisis, Operation Car-Wash, Dilma Rousseff's impeachment and the rise of new right-wings parties.

For many, those millions
of people taking the streets

looked like a bolt of lightning
on a clear blue sky.

They held posters
as they opposed police repression

and flooded the symbolic
landmarks of their cities,

including the National Congress.

After all, the country was in a
period of economic growth,

with low unemployment rates
and inflation over control,

plus high popularity
of the current president.

Five years later,
it's easy to understand

the reasons for the riots
and their legitimacy.

June can't be thought
about as simply the past.

We should be considering
the general lessons

we can take from those events.

The emergence of civil society
as an active political agent,

capable of destabilizing states,

establishing social
and institutional causes,

enforcing its
own view on reality,

and clearing the path
for more, or less, democracy.

June marked the birth of
an engagement-based social culture,

but social participation
goes both ways.

It isn't less engaged once it stops
representing a given

political or ideological

NBL isn't any
less June than MPL.

School Without Party isn't any less
June than the students

who occupied Brazil's
public schools.

The rallies of the conservative
right aren't any less June

than the feminist spring.

In its intense sense
as strikes by civil society

against the political system,

June was seen as revolutionary.

In its more extensive sense
as a month that never ended,

June served a
conservative function.



During the years of "Lula-ism",

one would watch,
with renewed perplexity,

the alliances between
the Workers' Party

with notoriously corrupt
or regressive players

of the national government.

From Jos? Sarney
to Renan Calheiros,

from Severino Cavalcante
to Eduardo Cunha,

through Paulo Maluf,

The conciliation of the
irreconcilable illustrated

a perplexing logic.

That strategy, perceived by
the Workers' Party as being

the only feasible one
within those conditions,

consisted of misdirecting conservative
groups instead of fighting them.

Philosopher Marcos Nobre
named it PMDB-ism,

that conservative and physiological
force that took the parliament

and served as a balancing act since
the beginning of the redemocratization.

That globalization

-of the neoliberalism in the 1990s

demanded that all countries
went towards the center.

That "center" being
not challenging certain

economic policies that
were imposed to all countries.

From there things were established
like the center of a scale.

As if saying, "by circling it,
you can only go this far."

If you lean too Right or Left,
you're out of our circle.

You can't have power.
That's the idea.

Both Fernando Henrique Cardoso
and Lula could only,

at most, give the country a certain
sense of meaning

without challenging
that PMDB-ism.

The Lula administration carried out
important changes

through the sacrifice of the
maintenance, and deepening,

of that train of thought.

Those would be one of the
contradictions that would lead

to the end of the
Lula-led peace in June, 2013.

Reasons for the
protests were plenty.

The many years of economic growth
were starting to fade in the background.

That period of "economic miracle"
based on the increase of minimal wages,

family grants, payroll loans,
and public investments

started to show
signs of fatigue.

That is when they started.
Debates on which direction

economy should take in order to keep
that growth cycle going.

Although the external political
environment did help,

-we didn't face too many obstacles.

There was an increase
in oil and iron ore prices

that made things easier
both for public finances

and for the country's
external situation.

So the domestic market managed
to grow that way, and it worked.

But many were worried
that that wouldn't last forever,

that to do so it would be
necessary to develop various sectors.

Technology, for example.
Things we could export.

Taking that as a starting point,
a certain idea got traction:

the idea that, in order to solve
our industrial problems,

we would need to develop
various policies

that would reduce costs
to the industrial sectors

and, at the same time,
give it the means to compete

with foreign companies
that were flooding our market.

Chinese companies and the like.

And also give us greater
weight in foreign markets.

And so a change
in direction was imposed,

one led not only
by the government.

That new economic agenda was
endorsed by employers' organizations

that would later,
following that failure,

not only claim innocence,
but also put the blame

on the government,
aiming to bring it down.

What were those policies? Instead of
continuing to expand public investments,

they started carrying out
a FIESP agenda.

I call it that since it's
almost entirely defined

by proposals mentioned
in a 2011 seminar

that had the participation of FIESP
and other employers' organizations,

plus trade unions.

They listed things such as

tax exemptions,
and tax reductions in general,

in order to guarantee higher
profitability for the corporate sector,

high exchange rates in order
to increase the price of imports,

lowering interest rates
in order to ease industry financing,

managing electricity rates in order to
further reduce industrial costs.

Dilma's government
started to adopt such measures,

known by liberal economists
as the "new economic matrix",

and they ultimately
have no effect.

Economist Marcos Lisboa

believes that the change in direction
for economic policies is even older.

It begins in 2008, with an excessive
and misguided intervention

on the economy by the State.

Economic policies
went through an inflection,

-especially since 2008.

A result of the world
facing hardships combined

with Brazil thinking it was rich
and that would now become huge.

That's when they started
putting forth excessive projects

that ended in failure
5 to 9 years later.

Most of the disasters that fell
upon Brazil over the last decade

had their start back then.

The reinforcement of
Petrobr?s's monopoly,

projects such as Brazil Seven,

the widespread distribution
of subsidized credit,

rulings over national content.
It's hard to imagine

an agenda that has failed harder
than the one started back then.

But one must observe June
within the global context

of accumulated outrage
against the money-based tendencies

of liberal democracies,
moved by a privatization of life

that kept on crunching
the space of the common.

Political systems and financial
elites took the reins of democracy,

ignoring the interests of the
remaining 99% of the population.

Taking that global
perspective into account,

June was, partially, a consequence
of the great capitalist crisis of 2008.

Or rather, a consequence of the apathy
of governments in regards to it.

As observed by philosopher
Rodrigo Nunes,

that which was meant to be
the end of unregulated capitalism

became, on the contrary,
an opportunity to implement

austerity-based measures.

Banks were rescued,
and their debts, socialized.

That exposed how much
policies representative

of both the Right
and the Left

were seized by corporate
and financial interests.

That triumphant neoliberalism
from the 1990s and the 2000s

promised a true paradise, and when
a crisis came about instead of it,

well, that's an impasse.

The way democracy was exercised,
the way society was represented,

it came crashing down.

The crisis plunged the populations
of many countries into debt,

and reversed the flow of
material prosperity

experienced over these
last few decades,

from Latin America
to the old Soviet bloc.

Uproars such as those
from June in Brazil,

Occupy Wall Street in New York City,
and the indignados in Madrid

marked the end of the
so-called "moderation era,"

a mixture of neoliberalism
and democracy that was in vogue

in western countries
since the 1990s.

Those democratic uproars
from 2011 to 2013

have one thing in common.

They were saying that
democracy as it was now

didn't represent
the rioters anymore.

Of course, that is tied not only
to the decline of the world order

that was in place since before 1989,
but also to the Internet.

It changed the relations between
people and their society,

politics, and life.

The power of the people
to build a new world!

In Brazil, those protests opposed
an armored institutional system

that asphyxiated
political presence,

reducing its power
to the bare minimum.

That distant kind
of citizenship resulted

in the abhorrent quality
of public services.

Social inclusion doesn't necessarily
come about through income distribution.

Improving public services
is also a way to fight inequality.

Those big protests

-show a discomfort

towards the limitations
of what was known in 2006

as the redemocratization
social contract.

That social contract was
the desires of the people of Brazil

expressed through
the constitution of 1988.

Those desires were renewed
in every election since then.

The desire to establish,
in Brazil, a variant

of the standard continental European
social welfare state.

So we established various
pension systems,

we put the Family Grant
into place,

among various other projects,
such as unemployment insurance.

We made it so that the Brazilian State
would create revenue

and that revenue would reach
the people who needed it

through various programs that are
linked to the risks

commonly seen
in market economies.

But we couldn't properly
equip our metropolitan areas.

Our public transportation is lacking,
our cities are decayed,

our sewerage services are poor.

There was an increase in income.
We had the rise of the new middle class.

People renovated their homes,
renewed their appliances,

installed flat screen TVs...
No civilization-wide gain, but still.

Then people leave their nice houses
and see that everything is wrong.

Everything is a mess.

The original catalyst, the increase
in public transport fares, confirms it.

It wasn't just a matter
of 20 centavos.

The upcoming World Cup
and the Olympics in Rio

aggravated that feeling
of a citizenship scorned.

The insane costs of stadiums
were incoherent

with the precariousness
of public services.

In addition, many were built
without bidding,

leaving a stench
of corruption in the air.

And authoritarianism still
bared its fangs

through the compulsory
removal of the poor.

A united people
will never be defeated!

That torpid democracy
then suffered a huge shock.

People took to the streets.

The activists were, for the
most part, young people.

Temporary workers and students

claiming to be autonomous,
who were part of anarchic,

communist, socialist,
feminist, and LGBT groups.

Plus sectors of the black movement,
left party youth organizations,

the Homeless Movement,

and educators' organizations.

Everything was threatened.

Academia was threatened,

-institutionality and bureaucracy,

the machine for grinding down
party leaderships was threatened,

the financial economic
system was threatened,

and the media was threatened as well,
since anything was possible there.

The first big middle class crisis
was seen in the entertainment industry,

especially the post-internet
music industry.

The second one was
the media crisis,

where people could
tell their stories

firsthand and dispute
those absolute truths.

The media is stealthy,

everyone can tell their
own version of the story.

The idea of a bias mosaic,
a mass of media

as opposed to mass media.

It wasn't a theory being proposed,
but rather a buildup that,

eventually, as part of that
wave, blew up.

Instead of the country
of carnaval and soccer,

we became the country
of politics.

They used to say every
Brazilian was a coach.

Now, they're all activists.

The beginning of the end
of the Lula wave unleashed

the transition
from culture to politics

in the Brazilian
people's self image.

In so many words,
"the giant had woken up."

When I think back to 2013, one of the
first things that come to mind

-is me going to one of the schools

I work on,
at the Brazilian Central.

It was Brazil's match
in the Confederations Cup.

Everybody was in the bar,
but instead of talking about the match,

they were talking about
the protests, the bus wages,

about Cabral,
about what happened.

Then, suddenly, the entire city
was talking politics.

Involved with politics,
giving their opinions on it,

arranging to go
on rallies together.

They started
questioning everything.

This awakening had its
genesis in the protests

led by the Free Pass Movement,

a social leftist movement
demanding the repeal

of the decision to increase
bus wages in S?o Paulo,

and the implementation
of free public transportation.

If we analyze it from the start
of the campaign, we can observe

that the MPL made it to every
cover of every newspaper in S?o Paulo.

-They were very daring,

using techniques
of social mobilization

in ways that were far beyond
what was usually done,

blocking important streets.

It tried and achieved to block roads
that others movements didn't dare to

due to being too important.
The black block happened,

that is, destruction of property
happening in large scale,

from the very first

So MPL's protests
were very daring,

and press coverage
followed them.




The press, at first, presented
itself against the protests,

and asked for greater police
repression in editorials.

S?o Paulo's military police,
following that request,

felt authorized to use even more
violence on the protesters.

At the same time as that was going on,
a different phenomenon took place.

Datafolha took to the streets before
manifests and before police reactions

to gather data.

And that's when they found out
that the MBL protests

were supported by 55%
of the people of S?o Paulo.

It was clear that the press
had summoned the police

to use violence against a movement
that was way more legitimate

than the established powers.

Come to the streets
against the wage!

There was a shift in the way
mass media tackled the protests,

and that growing trend
of people supporting the protests

and siding with radical rallies

made things blow up.
It was building up,

but things just escalated fast between
the 13th and the following protest,

on the 17th,
if I'm not mistaken.

On that day, the rallies
were already massive

and went completely out of control
of the MPL or any other group

that tried to guide or organize
such rallies in other parts of Brazil.

Its scope became broader,
as people taking part in it

weren't just Left-leaning
youngsters anymore,

but all young people,
from both sides.

That massive amount of people,
neither right nor left-leaning,

"regular" people
in relation to politics,

felt summoned by
and identified with

that act of rebellion.


From that point on,
June became complex and confusing.

In the streets, anti-party cries
clashed with anti-fascism cries.

Everybody sticking together
against the wages, not parties!

Red flags, balaclava helmets,
colorful banners.

A united people,
we are without party!

The agendas multiplied
as the protesters diverged.


The movement
was no longer leftist.

Go away, Workers' Party!
We don't need you!

Some see in June's protests,

despite the diversity
of ideologies and players,

a unity in civil society
against the political system.

However, we have yet
to explain why that unity,

not long after,
resulted in a split and,

later, sharp polarization.

Why did that common agenda pro health,
education, and transportation

led to such a radical split
between the left, that defends

the universality of such
public services,

and the liberal right,
that claims for minimal state?

Probably because,
as observed by Wilson Gomes,

in June, there was a delicate
combination of elements

that only converged in
an abstract, generic level,

and that tended to diverge,

politically, economically,
and attitude-wise.

And so it was.

The indignation against the system
would soon be channeled

into an anti-corruption sentiment
that became the political trench

that split the country in two.


The June protests did achieve
some immediate results.

Approximately 70% of Brazilians
who life in big cities

saw a reduction in bus wages.

Some removal proceedings
faced heavy resistance

and were aborted.

In Rio de Janeiro, the
bulldozing of Maracan? Village,

the Indian Museum,
was canceled.

The democratizing legacy of June,
however, went far beyond that,

and manifested itself
in the rise of new,

egalitarian social movements.

The window between 2013 and 2014
had the biggest number of strikes

since the establishment
of the new republic.

The so-called "rolezinhos"
was a political movement

by young black people
from lower-income areas

who took to public areas,
those usually reserved

to the middle class and up.

In Rio de Janeiro, the Street Cleaner
Group went on a successful strike

supported by most
of the populace.

-That is related to the exacerbation

June brought upon.

Those undervalued groups

have always existed,
but haven't always had

room to manifest.

As soon as the fight
went to the streets,

it became imperative
for people to be on the streets

to manifest themselves against

that government that intended

to keep the less fortunate
as less fortunate.

Mr. President, sir,
Mr. representatives,

and to all other present,
good afternoon.

My name is Ana J?lia,
a second year student

at the Senador Manoel Alencar de
Guimar?es State High School.

I am 16 years old
and I'm here to talk to you

about the occupations.

My first question to you is,

who does the school
belong to?

In 2015, second year students
mobilized against

the closure of public
schools in S?o Paulo.

The next year, their movement expanded
to towns throughout the country.

The students protested
against PEC 241,

amendment that would freeze
investments in education for 20 years.

They also protested against
the School Without Party project,

seen as a political maneuver denouncing
the politicization of education.

Among the egalitarian movements
that blew up starting with 2013,

the actions of sidelined groups,
also known as identitarians,

was the most successful
in terms of organization

and the impact of their actions,
though there is criticism to be had

over some of its
ideas and methods.

I have some distaste
for that word, "identitarian".

-Fights that politicize

gender, sexuality, ethnicity,

religion, or territory
aren't "identitary", to me.

I see them as fights
for fulfilling lives,

for ways of living that try
to draw attention

to more traditional
and well-established struggles,

especially those related
to economy, class struggles.

We can't discuss
healthcare, schools,

public security, and transportation
without mentioning struggles

over our own bodies.
Who are the bodies that will have

access to those
rightful services?

I think that's what's changed
the most since 2013.

The way those struggles
have gained a brand new reach.

Intersectionality plays a big part in
that, a notion that was

already elaborated way back
between black feminists,

but that I'm only seeing becoming part
of public debate in Brazil now.

The black movement came from over
a decade of fundamental achievements,

such as the quota system
in public universities.

Since June 2013, their agenda
became based less on legal topics

and more on a struggle
for recognition,

identifying the naturalization
and the scope of racial prejudice

in the daily social relations
of our country.

I will not be interrupted!
I do not stand for the interruption

by congressmen here.

I will not stand for men who
come here and can't hear

the stances of an elected woman.

The feminist movement imposed
its agenda as the main player

in pro-equality
fights in Brazil.

Its impact is felt,
and will change gender relations.

LGBT movements also made progress
in their struggles for recognition

by public policies
and representation.

In 2018, 45 trans people

ran for elective posts.

Nine times more
than in previous elections.

It was also observed the rise
of new social movements,

both right and left-leaning,
seeking direct access

to institutional politics
aiming to change the system.

We need to occupy
institutional spaces.

Not to reinforce institutionalism,
but to challenge it,

and create more opportunities
to get into the institution.

We need to be here
because most resources

that affect our lives
go through institutional,

and institutions are led by people
who don't care for most of country.

The most advanced intelligence
can be found autonomously,

you can find them
around the land, in the rallies.

People doing their best
to find solutions to their problems.

That should guide
institutional occupations.

But the "giant" would prove to be
more complex than once thought.

From 2015 on,

the new Brazilian political culture
was formed by Operation Car Wash,

by the anti-Workers' Party sentiment,
by Dilma Rousseff's impeachment,

by Lula's arrest, and by the sharing
of news through digital means.

Amidst those events,

the space for the Right was set,

a space that was disjointed since
the end of military dictatorship.

The Right made
better use of the tools

that the collective Bluetooth
generation offered them.

They told their story better.
And Operation Car Wash organized them,

served as their basis.



The new Right resurfaced
to talk about corruption.

The theme had already been
visited in June 2013,

but the anti-corruption sentiment
would only take roots in Brazil

starting with
Operation Car Wash.

That was the main fuel
for anti-Workers' Party sentiment

that would lead
to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment.

It's still early to say whether
Operation Car Wash have changed

the culture
of corruption in Brazil,

but its legacy for 2018's
elections was undeniable.

It made corruption into the main
topic considered by voters.

I don't believe Operation Car Wash
to be partisan at all,

but I do think it's political,
and that we can only understand

many of its ramifications
on a political sense.

The Operation knows it has to answer
to public opinion and the press,

that it needs their support
to carry on its institutional mission.

My issue with
Operation Car Wash?

-Denouncing withdrawals? No.

I mean, it should
be investigated, sure.

But it made so that delations
became evidence.

Denunciation should be
a means to obtain evidence.

There is an exacerbation

in what I like to call,
"the toga republic".

They decided to
rewrite the political trial.

A mix of Savonarola
with Torquemada.

"We are the pure ones,
the rest of the world is rotten,

"all politicians are the same."
Operation Car Wash is antipolitical.

It's equanimus in that sense,
the most negative sense there is.

It "squeegeed" all politicians,

turned delations
into convictions,

which is unacceptable.

It's unacceptable
in a liberal society,

but not in a left wing dictatorship.

And in a right
wing dictatorship.

But not in a liberal society.

A part of June's energy
was leeched off by Operation Car Wash.

As if Operation Car Wash was
representative of a part of June

that was fighting against
the political system.

If we see it that way,
it boils down to,

"may justice be carried out,
may the world perish."

But at a certain point,

that didn't happen.
That was observed when

Judge S?rgio Moro leaked
audio files of conversations

between the president,
in the exercise of her mandate,

and a former president.

That was when Moro stopped

chasing that
end-justifies-the-means justice,

and became a political player.

Lula's sentence for the
apartment in Guaruj? case

was scandalous.

So, the prosecution
claimed in the report

that the apartment was
the result of three contracts

by consortia
integrated by Grupo OAS.

Did they show any evidence? No.

At the time of carrying out the
sentence, did S?rgio Moro

even touch the contracts,
since they are in the report?

Rights are shaped.
If they aren't, they're nothing.

It's content,
but, above all, it's shaped.

If this is the accusation,
then the sentence

should be supported
by the accusation.

S?rgio Moro's sentence
has no relation to the accusation.

When Lula's lawyers raised his
statement embargo, Moro's answer was,

"I never said the apartment was resulted
of those contracts with Petrobr?s."

But if it, indeed, wasn't...

He wasn't even
the investigating judge.

The only information he was privy
to were those related to Petrobr?s.

He wasn't even a judge.

The anti-Workers' Party sentiment
that infected much of the populace

is a complex phenomenon.

It houses, among other elements,
the revolt against the true corruption

in the Lula and Dilma

the political economical mistakes
caused in that period,

the electoral fraud of 2015,

that would require
heavy fiscal adjustments

whose need was omitted
in 2014's political campaigns,

and the lack of self-criticism by
the Party in regards to all of that.

But the anti-Workers' Party sentiment
is also based on interests

of sectors of society
bothered by the Party's

redistributive policies.

With its support to the appeals
of belittled groups

such as women, people of color,
and the LGBT community,

and from an anticommunist paranoia
nourished in the middle

of a social democratic rule.

The anti-Workers' Party sentiment
became one of the dominant feelings

in Brazil's politics.

A feeling of hatred
that gave social support

to the controversial
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.


By God, by my family,
by the families of good men,

I vote "yes"! Out with Dilma, out with
Lula, out with the Workers' Party!

With the help of God, for my family,
for the Brazilian people,

for the evangelists
in our country...

In memory of my father,
Roberto Jefferson,

for the truth, for democracy...

For S?rgio Moro, for the
evangelists, for my Brazil,

for my family, "yes"!

For the military of '64,
today and always.

For the memory of Colonel
Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra,

the one Dilma fears the most,

I vote "yes"!

All who vote "yes",
put your hands up!

Seeing as how
that corrupt Congress,

-how most of those who voted

for their "mothers",
for their dear "wives", their "kids",

for "God" etc.
Few voted "for the sake of Brazil".

It was always for their families.
Fishy from the get-go.

Only private interests counted.
They voted for the impeachment

of a honest president,

and seeing as how most of them
were accused of corruption,

that feeling of anomie,

or, as some of my Argentinian friends
have said, "psychopathizing Brazil."

It generates a feeling
of public and civic insecurity,

and also of,
"oh, so we can do that?"

"Anything goes, now?"

And we are in times
of "anything goes."

The fall of Dilma had its start
in the 2013 protests,

as they weakened the former president
and the Workers' Party as a whole.

Still, Dilma managed
to beat A?cio Neves

in a difficult election
in the following year.

In order to do so, she masked
Brazil's economic situation

and, soon after winning, had to
apply an unpopular fiscal adjustment.

Unpopular even within
her own party.

The opposition made use of the
opportunity and, aiming to push Dilma

off the cliff, didn't hesitate
to sabotage the country

through the use of
"bomb agendas,"

that ended up exploding
the government's tax conditions

that had been deteriorating
over the last few years.

Worn out by the corruption
accusations in Operation Car Wash,

losing support of society itself after
proposing a fierce fiscal adjustment,

having lost the support
of business sectors

as the economy
went down the drain,

and, finally, having to face the
wrath of the Chairman of the Board,

Eduardo Cunha,
for the Workers' Party refusal

to help him dismiss a lawsuit
over his Ethics Committee,

Dilma soon found
herself cornered.

Our flag will never be red!

The coordination of the mainstream
media with the New Right rallies

generated the social
support needed

for the Parliament
to decide to take her down.

It is hereby authorized
the prosecution

of President Dilma Rousseff
for crimes committed...

Ever since the slowing down
of economy of 2011,

which, of course, came about
due to errors in internal policies

but also due to an unfavorable
external situation...

The oil prices' spike came
to an end, the commodities boom.

We started to see
the state budget drying up.

That created the opportunity
for a kind of discourse

trying to pin the blame regarding
the government's central role

on policies of income redistribution,
public service provision,

public investments,
and infrastructure,

on the collapse
that would come later.

It's not surprising
that tax liabilities

and other methods used
to mask the fiscal deficit

became the core

of the impeachment process.

The accusations that the impeachment
process was based on referred

to possible crimes against the LRF,
the Fiscal Responsibility Law.

In addition to the so-called
"fiscal pedalings,"

the second accusation that served
as basis for the impeachment

was that of Dilma signing six decrees
of supplementary credit facility

with a cost incompatible
with that of the fiscal target.

The first matter is the relevance
of such an accusation.

Did President Dilma commit
a crime against the LRF?

Gentlemen, budgets

are important laws
that should be respected,

but they are authorizations
of spendings.

Article 4 says

that it is perfectly possible
for such decrees to be issued

as long there is a compatibility

with the fiscal target.
Not a limit.

There is a difference between
compatibility and limit.

A limit is something
I can't go beyond.

The investigations have proved
that all decrees combined

didn't spend a single nickel!

The 2014 pedalings

were nothing
but fraud. Lies. Awful.

It worked like this.

BNDS wrote off on a loan. They
thought the grant was still not enough,

so in 2000-something,
they issued a grant over the grant.

But BNDS didn't agree to that.

Then the Treasury took on
the grant over the grant,

that's the Investment
Maintenance Program.

But then the government said,

"I created this grant,

"clearly it's accounted for
in BNDS, since it loans much less

"than it's supposed to, so we have
to include it in its assessment.

"But the Treasury will only

"account for that grant
20 months later."

It's insane. There was
this public body

that already accounted
credit for a grant

that didn't belong to him,

and there was this other public body,
the one responsible for the grant,

wouldn't account for that money.

It's clear fraud.

-Dilma did countable, financial,

large scale fraud in Brazil,

masking the dire situation
of public accounts,

the various illegal acts that were
chronically carried out

as a form of financing
by the State,

that had growing expenses

and that wouldn't do
anything to fix that.

So, it was a serious violation.

All of the other governments
did the same. Don't say they didn't.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso
issued decrees just like this one.

So did Lula.

The so-called grant delay
happened in all administrations.

And so they keep making up
reasons to justify it.

False reasons.

"Oh, but they should
have realized it!"

Should they?

Why didn't the National
Congress report on this?

Were all members of the parliament,
congressmen, and senators asleep?

A splendid sleep.

The impeachment
has two elements.

There's the legal element, so to say.
Responsibility law was broken.

And a political one.
Impeachments aren't judged

by a court of judges,
or ministers from the Supreme Court.

It's the Congress,
because there is that element

of the political moment
and political settlement.

But for the impeachment to happen,
there must be a crime committed.

A law must be violated.

And what the Dilma administration
did was nothing like that.

If you look at other states,
yes, maybe you will find governors

being as dismissive
as Dilma was.

But the comparisons made
between Dilma's pedalings

with those of Lula or FHC
made no sense.

It's the same difference there is between
embezzling money from your company

and taking
the company's pen home.

Where's the president's deceit?

Everyone knows she acted
knowing of all that was exposed here.

Falls upon the deceit of the defendant.
People unsure of her actions?

Falls upon the defendant.

Despite having proof,
she will be dissolved.

Back in the Middle Ages, if suspected,
the person was convicted.

Later on, in the 19th Century,
no. They were acquitted.

Then there's
the political aspect.

The legal reason could be used
if one wanted to,

and they did want to.

Even if we were to admit that
the creative accounting practiced

defied tax liability law,

and that, technically,
the the lawsuit was legal,

the political nature of
the impeachment is clear.

Its main motivation, at least
in the political system's eyes,

was to "stop the bleeding"
caused by Operation Car Wash,

paraphrasing the historical
recording of the conversation

between Romero Juc?
and S?rgio Machado.

We have to fix this shit,

we have to change the government
in order to stop the bleeding.

The easiest solution would be
putting Michel there.

It's an agreement,
put Michel there,

a national agreement.

I believe the word "coup"

is too strong a word
for what happened.

I used the term "parlamentada".

I call it the
"parlamentadas" from 2016.

It's a reference to the period
of Latin-American history

with the "quarteladas".

Since there are no more "quarteladas",
now they're "parlamentadas".

The "parlamentada",
is, first and foremost,

a movement of self-defense by the
political system against justice.

It's like they're saying,
"we need

"to seize power
in order to control this,

"or else everyone will be
arrested. That can't happen."

In that sense,
the impeachment represents

a serious breaking of an
unwritten rule of democracy

that political scientists Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt

call "self-control."

That is the stance of not
using against one's opponents

all available
constitutional resources

for the sake of keeping the
political game as a whole functional.

In opposition to that,
the impeachment represented

what law professor Mark Tushnet
titles, "constitutional hardball."

Forcing an interpretation
of the Constitution

beneficial to the interests
of a certain group.

This story, like all stories,
has two sides.

There is another version of the rivalry
between the Right and the Left,

the Workers' Party and the Socialist
Party of the New Republic of Brazil.

In this version of the story,
the sequence of events

that led to Dilma's
impeachment is bilateral.

Who started the hardball
was the other political group.

They used that hardball to the max
during the electoral campaign,

through various measures.
First, by defrauding public accounts

to reelect Dilma.

Second, lying thoroughly.

That's an issue with democracy,

size matters. Lying just a little bit
isn't the same as lying a lot.

And once it was clear she was
going for embezzlement...

There couldn't be any dialogue.

That Workers' Party subgroup
lost the main group's trust.

The reciprocity of that lack
of self-control isn't recent.

It's similar to that of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso's administration.

In truth,
the first one was PSDB's.

The amendment for the
election of FHC.

Later on, all throughout
his administration,

the Workers' Party would
go against all of the projects

proposed to help the country.
The Workers' Party voted for

"bomb agendas" its entire life.

How can a party that spent
its life voting for "bomb agendas"

complain about A?cio Neves
voting against retirement factor,

which did sadden
me tremendously?

The discourse is productive,
and necessary.

Be that as it may, the impeachment
had various consequences for Brazil.

Economically speaking,
it had some positive effects.

But the fact it was led
by Eduardo Cunha,

a notoriously corrupt politician,
who would later be sentenced

to over 24 years in prison,

plus developments such as the fact
that an elected president was replaced

by one accused of corruption,

and that, despite that,
managed to stay in power,

plus the fact A?cio Neves,
one of the men behind the impeachment

who was exposed through
a compromising recording

and stayed in the
Senate regardless...

All of that hurt the credibility
of an already precarious democracy.


The impeachment,
the "parlamentada", or the coup,

brought upon an structurally
underground player

in Brazilian politics.

Michel Temer.

The living symbol
of back room deals,

a figure that lurks in the shadows,
that the public soon associated

with that of a vampire.

It's funny the way people's
imagination deemed him a vampire,

-or a butler. They say a lot about his

place in politics. He's always
been there, in the shadows,

but those shadows,
the real, organic politics,

and negotiations
behind the curtains,

with its corruption,
that shadow rose to power.

Out with Temer!

As observed by philosopher
Rodrigo Nunes,

Temer might have been the first
president in history

to flaunt his lack of
legitimacy as a virtue.

According to him, not having been
elected by popular vote

meant he was entitled to carry out
welfare and labor reforms

that were rejected
by a majority of the population.

That was the agenda
of the Brazilian business community

that led that movement.

Increasing the power
of capital over labor.

Decreasing as much as possible
the cost of the capital's labor.

That was the point,
economic and politics-wise.

It was a delivery to the government,
and he delivered it.

Brazil managed to put that in power
without any extra arguments,

no project, no dreams,
no relation to history.

It's the relinquishing of the beauty
of having a country

with any level of desire

for the sake of having
a concrete objective.

And nothing more.

Temer was the president with the
most repudiation in 28 years.

Flaunting, also, the supposed honor
of being the first active president

accused of a common crime,
all while surrounded by politicians

who could have all
been behind bars,

were it not for
their special jurisdiction.

He made through threats
of cassation and impeachment

thanks to ministers of the
Superior Electoral Court

and the buyout of the Congress
with 15 billion reais

taken from the already
battered public purse.

We observed then a combination
of macroeconomic stability

with an unpopular agenda
that Temer rushed to carry out.

June 2013, that great
pro-deposing movement,

created a void in which
the new Right started operating.

They were already incubated
since the Lula administration,

slowly gathering through
social media

in their infancy.

-The mensal?o made people that

weren't very keen on the
Workers' Party and Lula to begin with

quite dissatisfied.

Any of them who voted for Lula were now
dead set on voting for his opponent.

But it was a very
populist administration,

so that's another factor.
Yes, corruption is important,

put so is the government's popularity.
That's where June comes in.

So a window of opportunity
was created for all of those people

who were piling up those
feelings of dissatisfaction

with the Workers' Party,
with Lula, with Dilma.

Plus investigations on Operation
Car Wash kept advancing.

It was the culmination of those
factors that led those people to feel

able to express themselves,
even in the streets.

We will rid our
country of corruption

Out with Dilma,
out with Lula,

out with the Workers' Party.

Out with Dilma,
out with Lula,

out with the Workers' Party.

The New Right emerged in
the reflux of June's protests

and grew stronger with
anticorruption movements

that mainly affected
the Workers' Party.

But its rise was also a reaction
to the economic crisis.

That crisis was, in part, caused by
the policies of social spending

prevalent in the FHC
and Lula administrations.

Compromised by the poor decisions
regarding economic management,

especially in the Dilma administration,
social spendings increased

the public debt, which eventually
became unsustainable.

When we look at the FHC
and Lula administrations

and we observe in the social agenda
so much continuity,

clearly there is a consensus in society
that is larger than any party.

The consensus that makes way for that
social contract of redemocratization.

Essentially, we imagine an election
process in which every person is a vote.

In general, the rich
want financial growth,

the poor wants income redistribution,
and in this kind of voting environment,

the people in the middle, who is poorer
than the rich and richer than the poor,

they decide. In a society with
such immense inequality as Brazil's,

the income of the "people
in the middle" is very low.

So the average voters,
those who decide elections,

are relatively poor, and vote for the
increase of tax burden and income

redistribution. It's what I call the
social contract for redemocratization.

The one who produced that,
for the most part,

was our own democracy.
It wasn't the politicians.

They had simply answered
to society's demands.

Society demanded
high tax burden,

demanded more public spendings,
demanded a balance

that led to high interest rates
and low growth rates.

There is a reaction to that,
and that is the New Right.

Just as there are many branches
of the Left, ranging

from liberal socialism to the
confiscation of private property,

the Right is also vast.
In it, conservatives,

militarists, and various
shades of liberals coexist.

I don't get the idea of "conservative
in the economy, liberal in behavior."

Liberalism is accepting
what's different.

Maybe the greatest mind
of 19th century liberalism

was John Stuart Mill.

He fought for the inclusion of women,
compared the living conditions of women

in the 19th century to slavery,

fought for the freedom of black
citizens, for the end of slavery.

To be a liberal is to accept
those who think different than you.

What kind of liberal would
shut down museums?

You're either a liberal,
or you shut down museums.

The foundation of liberalism is the
maintenance of individual freedoms.

It has a political side
and an economic side.

In politics, John Stuart Mill's
principle must rule above all.

"A person is only amenable to society
in terms of what concerns others."

In other words,
no authority, be it the State

or members of a social majority,

has the right to impose
behaviors on people

unless such behaviors
violate the freedom of others.

In such a political scenario,
the Brazilian new liberals

aren't consensual,
and are constantly confused

with conservatives.

I'd say the New Right,
in a sense,

go against what
Nancy Fraser calls

the "Hegemony of Progressive

They oppose what's
"politically correct",

oppose the idea
of the State being active

in culling homophobia,

or sexism, or transphobia.

In that sense, the ultra-liberals
see Olavo de Carvalho-influenced

conservatives eye-to-eye.

They both agree that those
are private matters,

that should be solved within
one's family, within civil society,

that the government
shouldn't be involved.

That is quite different from
what used to be advocated before

by the Right itself.
Either that Old Right

was only concerned
with the economy,

they were technocratic
and didn't care about morals,

or there was a concern
about such things,

but it was exclusive
to religious groups

and limited to those groups.

Usually Christians, evangelists.

But not the New Right.
It expands the scope.

That level of confusion
with conservatism can be found

in the stances taken by the founder of
Brazil's most explicit and well-defined

liberal party, the New Party.

Jo?o Amoedo claims to be both in favor
of the citizens' right to bear arms,

but against the decriminalization
of drugs and abortions.

the new liberal discourse

appears even more extreme
than the liberalism as it was seen

in parties and economic policies
of Brazilian governments


I'd say they are
way more radical.

In terms of radically
cutting down on laws,

being responsible for more
privatizations than ever before,

in speeds greater
than ever before.

They've even thought about privatizing
goods that no one would even think

of privatizing before.

An opportune binomial to consider
the virtues and limits

of the liberal economic
perspective is as follows.

Poverty and inequality.

Jo?o Amoedo has repeatedly
stated that inequality

isn't the problem
that needs to be tackled.

He says,

"we want to fight poverty,
not necessarily inequality.

"To fight poverty, we need to
increase and create capital,

"not redistribute it."

In those words may be
the main manifestation

of the difference between
the Left and the Right.

There is a debate going on
between the Left and the Right

as Norberto Bobbio defined.

The Left wants more equality,
and greater care for vulnerable groups.

In exchange for that care, they'd
accept a country that grows less,

a poorer country, but one
with greater equality.

The Right, on the other hand,
is more accepting of inequality,

more accepting of caring less
for less fortunate groups,

in exchange for a country that,
on average, would be richer.

That is a social choice.

There's no economy weighting
in on this. It's a choice.

Some prefer to live in a richer country,
one with a higher average income,

though less equal.

Others prefer more equal,
though poorer, countries.

Some would rather
live in Cuba. It's a poor country,

but one in which everyone
is sort of similar.

Some would rather live in the U.S.,
a country with immense inequality,

but on in which, in general,
even the poorest

are richer than the
Cuban middle class.

Some prefer something
in the middle. A Nordic country.

Or France,

even with its subtle decay.
Not as rich as the U.S.,

but with a quality of life
that offers different benefits.

Less working hours,
longer vacation periods.

That is a political choice
by the society.

In general,

those who believe to be liberal
worry more about poverty,

about the lack of access
to basic services,

something that much
many go through.

They worry about children who
have no access to quality education.

50% of the country has
no access to indoor plumbing.

Some go through terribly hard times.
We have so many unemployed,

we have people who rely
on cash transfers due to having

no opportunities.
That is poverty,

and that's what must be tackled.

Another matter is:

What is the gap between the
richest and the poorest in society?

That's inequality.
If we could only transfer

some of the income
of the richest to the poorest,

that would help the poorest
to be less poor,

and would reduce
the elite's wealth. Great.

But there are ways to fight poverty
that might not reduce inequality,

but that are also important. Because
poverty is an urgent issue to solve.

And there are ways to reduce poverty
that might increase inequality,

and in Brazil's current situation,
that might be positive as well,

since you're improving the quality
of life of those in the bottom.

In economy, we can see
proof that when the market works,

it works wonderfully.

Life expectancy in 1800
was 40 years old,

and now, it's over 80.

An average citizen in a
developed European country

at the start of the 19th century

made 400 to 600 dollars a year.

One and a half dollar per day.

Now, they make
40 to 60 thousand.

Their income multiplied by 100.
Of course,

we recognize the advances of market
economy, but we also see its flaws.

How can you guarantee
equal opportunities?

How can we turn that
wealth growth into equality

and greater care
for the more vulnerable?

The virtues of the free
market are irrefutable.

Over these last few centuries,
our wealth and life expectancy

multiplied in most
sectors of humanity.

But the limits of the free
market are just as evident.

One doesn't necessarily
need to fight inequality

in order to improve the lives
of the less fortunate.

But it might be impossible,
from the perspective of economy,

to grow sustainably
without reducing the privileges

of the higher classes,

eliminating certain benefits
of certain sectors with the State,

and advocating tax reforms
that taxes more heavily

those with higher incomes.

Besides, inequality,
on its own, is harmful.

Inequality is anti-democratic,
as wealth equals political power,

and makes way for social unrest,
which leads to violence.


The history of informed conservatism
dates back to the 18th century.

In that "moderate" version,
conservatism is a position

more reliant on skepticism,

that works as a counterpoint
to utopical political ideas,

that believe to be able to radically
change people and society,

often to disastrous results.

But the emerging conservatism
in Brazil is, for the most part,

from different origins.

It's based on religion
and dogma.

Its stances are reactionary,

and it manifests itself heavily
in what is known as culture wars.

Gender ideology is mocked
in moral debates.

The persistent belief in the existence
of a sort of pro-LGBT elitism

serves as an alibi
that masks their fear

when faced with the full
realization of modern society.

The idea is that

we are in a "moral chaos"

in which there are no more
values to be upheld.

We can't differentiate
right from wrong anymore,

but we will be able to if men are
men, and women are women.

It's a common sight
among contemporary

conservative ethics writers

that initial diagnosis.

"We are all lost.
We no longer know

"what criteria to use.
We must return to..."

Then they might say,
"to Aristotle," or "to Kant..."

The end of that sentence
doesn't matter.

But we must "return" to
some point in history

in order to recover
criteria from it

that would allow us to,
once again,

tell right from wrong,
and do so universally.

Doing so to get us out
of the chaos

that post-modernists
got us into.

That definition tends to end
on that very clich?d note.

Blessed be Jesus Christ!

Blessed be
the Christian culture!

The key to understanding
the retail fights between

the Queer Museum,
lecture by Judith Butler

and transvestite Jesus Christ,

isn't in surface-level

The true arena for this
conflict is a bit deeper.

It takes place in the
emotional psyche of people,

and boils down to a conflict
between the modern and the pre-modern,

the open world
and the closed world.

As noted by trans
intellectual Helena Vieira,

this conservatism is a refusal
to accept the death of old traditions.

I like to see conservatism
as a kind of melancholy.

It's a feeling of those who don't want
to advance, those who can't

understand that
the world has changed.

And since they can't understand
that, they feel lost and wish

for the regression of the world back
to a time when things "made sense,"

according to that
person's beliefs.

We live in ambiguous times,

in which the old world of traditions
feels threatened as it gazes upon

a new, expanding, world.

In that intermediate point,
to quote Gramsci,

a variety of morbid symptoms
manifest themselves.

Every step society takes
towards full acceptance

of all lifestyles,

all identities, sexualities,
and genders,

a reactionary movement
takes shape to try to restore

the normative values
of tradition.

The white, male,
straight supremacy.

The world of tradition
is one in which principles

are assured
by a solid foundation.

The God of monotheisms,
whose rules are made

into commandments
that man must follow.

That world of tradition
loses in freedom

what it gains
in psychological comfort.

In it, all are born knowing
what is right and what is wrong,

and what they should do
in all aspects of their lives.

The modern world
challenges that belief.

The modern times
questions all dogma,

and does so by undermining
its primordial basis,

the monotheist God.

Modern times are those
described by Jordano Bruno,

Coppernicus and Galileo.

Through science,
explaining the world with proof.

Through exploring
and its cultural decentralizations.

Through Kantian reasoning,
through Nietzsche's superman,

through the industrial revolution
and technological development.

The ideal of the modern
world is liberty.

In it, all possibilities
are accepted

as long as they don't violate
the freedom of others.

What one gains in freedom,
one loses in psychological comfort.

That's why so many
can't stand modern times.

It anguishes them.
Makes them feel threatened

regarding their
defining truthisms.

How can the freedom of others

be so deeply disturbing?

I'm fond of a very
simple explanation

by psychoanalyst
Christian Dunker.

"Because they're afraid."

It sounds so obvious

that it might elicit
a "that's it?" reaction.

But it's a lot.

We have a Right that is radically
opposed to gay marriage,

and to this day,
I don't understand why.

I mean,

the concept of abortion
touches up notions of life and such,

drug abuse is an issue
that affects society as a whole,

children, dos and don'ts,
blurred lines and such.

But why would people care about
what two people do in private?

We are currently seeing a rise

of this reactionary Right,

and the most violent of them,

today represented by
the "bolsonarism".

It's like there was
a "combo" of beliefs.

You have to be anti-LGBT,

anti-abortion, anti-drugs,

and, curiously,
pro-death sentence.

Which I also find to be
a stupid, incoherent circus.

Abortion is a no-no, that kills people,
but I do want to kill people

after they're already grown.

It is impossible
to understand the rise

of the New Conservative
Right in Brazil

without talking about
Olavo de Carvalho.

His active online presence during
these last two decades

was decisive for the propagation
of the reactionary sentiment.

There are excellent things to be found
in Olavo de Carvalho's books,

and there are
absolutely putrid things.

I've recently gotten
a hold of a copy

of "The Collective Imbecile".

There are some fantastic passages
there, but it just so happened

that I opened the book
and randomly found something like,

"Graciliano Ramos was
repulsed by eating

"anything prepared
by his gay cook.

"But I ask: why can't we be
disgusted by gay people?"

In my reality, I can't even understand
the reason for the question.

Why is it even questionable,
whether it's acceptable

to be disgusted by homosexuals?

Is there room for debate
on whether there is an excess

of "gay patrolling" in cultural
production? I think that's acceptable.

If feminists exaggerate,
if LGBT defenders exaggerate,

those are debates
that can be made.

But when you make that
into a divide

to classify people

and to qualify beliefs,

then I'd say
things went south.

They follow a bad train of thought.
You're promoting intolerance.

Brazil's conservatism is more
than a mere moral agenda.

The fear it motivates spreads
through social experience as a whole,

creating a widespread desire
for restoration of order.

Ever since the days of Thomas Hobbes,
we know that the State begins

as fear.

People's longing for a government,
for a central entity

capable of preventing
a war between everyone,

goes to show how fear has
the power to stabilize society.

That is why fear is an element
manipulated by those in power.

The more fear there is,
the more order there is.

As noted by philosopher
Vladimir Safatle,

fear reproduces the conditions
of the human race

that gave birth to the
religious view of the world.

That creation was meant to relieve
insecurities over the violence of nature

through the creation
of authority figures.

The religious view
lives on in modern politics

as a longing for an authority
considered capable of pacifying

the fundamental insecurity
when faced with the disorder of things.

That is a form of politics
from 60 thousand years ago.

It's "horde politics".

During crisis

in the order of reality,
in the level of violence in the world,

it would be possible
to have a regression

to those primordial structures
to political order.


a psychological territoriality,

paranoid projections
of the enemy,

the right to violence,

and the authoritarian, paternal
management of that group.

That's Freud's "horde".

A regression back to the horde.

Jair Bolsonaro symbolizes
that regressive desire

for an authority figure.

The demand for a tyrant
father can be seen

when democracy fails.

People then believe that that
"father" can restore the lost order,

and people take the risk that,
instead of reestablishing law,

he might impose order.

It's an interesting notion.
The idea of "order" in Brazil.

The idea that "order" is
an authoritarian element

divorced from "law".

It's an issue in Brazil.
This idea that order

is a direct right from political actions
from a certain lordship

over society, without the
involvement of the social contract.

That is a typical consequence

of the backwardness
and Brazil's post-colonial nature

that doesn't gel
with the social integration

of liberal capitalism
since the industrial revolution,

or with the contractual
relationship between classes.

Even with the violence
of the capital over society,

some forms of intermediation are
vital for the reproduction of capital.

Our forms of production
and reproduction of capital

are tied to slavery,

the ultimate, most absolute
form of exploiting.

One can expropriate
everything to Brazil.

The order is tied to that.

Maybe a given sector

is more powerful than all
other contracts in the country.

But that is "order".

From time to time,
due to historical fragility,

that kind of crazy
thought gains strength.

The law is universal
and egalitarian.

All are subject to it.

It's the belief in its
efficiency that measures

a democracy's welfare.

Order, on the other hand,
is vertical and authoritarian.

Those who carry it out
are above the law,

and aren't subject to the same
principles as the rest.

In Freudian legend,
in "Totem and Taboo,"

the father had an abusive,
tyrannical power.

He was the strongest, physically.

And so his children realize that,
together, they can bring him down,

so they kill their father.
And, so they wouldn't

fall to a state of anomia, in which
everyone would fight among themselves,

they establish the basic law
that rules over subjectivity:

having access to all women
except for their father's wife,

the law prohibiting incest.

That's the Freudian fable.
He didn't intend for it

to be exactly as he narrated.

Though the father allows
himself to do things he forbid,

such as drinking,
staying up late, unlike his children,

it's okay, because he tells them
they'll eventually get those privileges.

Putting a limit on one's
enjoyment is different.

You can't do whatever you want.
You can't disobey civil laws,

nor can you exploit

your own lust,

things that are with
every person from birth.

When that father starts
reveling in his privileges,

claiming that he is not subject
to laws like the others are,

he plants in his children's
minds that fantasy

of, one day, being
the same as their father.


June had thrown the first stone.

Following that, the displayed corrupted
entrails of the political system

shook the traditional
Left, Central and Right parties.

PMDB, the ultimate symbol
of this failed system,

was the biggest loser
in the 2018 elections.

PSDB sunk deep after
the charges against A?cio Neves,

and Geraldo Alckmin's
usual behavior.

The Workers' Party was
upheld by most voters

as being the greatest
villain overall.

Anti-Workers' Party sentiment
was one of the decisive aspects

of public opinion.

Within a few years, it resulted
in Dilma Rousseff's impeachment,

Lula's arrest, and
Fernando Haddad's defeat.

The rejection of corruption might
have been the elections' main theme.

Operation Car Wash had effectively
taken down once invulnerable figures

and shook the corrupt
power structure.

But it's still too soon to judge
the practical implications of OC

over the culture of the system.

The Congress had its largest renewal
since the redemocratization began.

Many of the spokesmen for traditional
politics were not reelected.

The elected Congress
has a conservative stance.

There was a revolution
in the electoral campaigns.

Not due to the end
of corporate financing,

but because social media replaced
television as the dominant media.

Within this context of distrust
regarding institutions,

including the press,

chat groups produce an
spontaneous effect that disarms people.

That spontaneity, as it arose,
is, for the most part, fake.

Regulating this new media is one of
the main political hurdles of our time.

At the end of the day, Brazil's liberal
democracy was deemed a failure,

and the Center,
its main symbol, collapsed.

The traditional Center, Center-Right
an Center-Left parties

saw themselves becoming unfeasible due
to their involvement with corruption.

The then-ruling Left
was demonized.

The one who enjoyed the spoils
was Jair Bolsonaro,

the Radical Right's candidate.

Translation: Marcelo Gouv?a

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