JFK: A President Betrayed (2013) - full transcript

male narrator: IN THE EARLY

1960s, MANY AMERICANS FEARED

THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS

PLANNING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR

ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES.

WHAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WAS

THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT

WAS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION FIRST.

ON JULY 20, 1961,



HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS INCLUDING

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF PRESENTED A PLAN

FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE

TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.

THE MEETING WAS TOP SECRET.

NO OFFICIAL RECORD

OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND

...UNTIL 1993.

>> THIS WAS A MEETING THAT WAS

HELD AT A TIME WHEN KENNEDY

WAS RECEIVING VERY BELLIGERENT

ADVICE FROM SOME SENIOR

ADVISORS.



A MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED

FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON

SUMMARIZING THE SEQUENCE OF

DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING

AND THAT MEMORANDUM WAS

DECLASSIFIED IN 1993.

UNTIL WE HAD THE BURRIS

MEMORANDUM, WE DIDN'T HAVE

A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF

WHAT WAS SAID.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BEING

PRESENTED WITH A SCENARIO FOR

LAUNCHING A PRE-EMPTIVE SURPRISE

ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES

ON THE SOVIET UNION.

>> THE SOVIETS WERE LAGGING

BEHIND IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,

AND TOP U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS

SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR FIRST

STRIKE MIGHT BE THE BEST OPTION

BEFORE THEY CAUGHT UP.

>> THE UNITED STATES HAD B-52s

CIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION

IN THE AIR ON A ROTATION BASIS.

EACH ONE OF THE BOMBS THAT

ONE B-52 CARRIED HAD MANY

TIMES THE FIREPOWER

OF ONE HIROSHIMA.

YOU ALSO HAVE TO REMEMBER

THERE WERE FIXED MISSILES,

AND THERE WERE MISSILES

IN SUBMARINES.

>> THE PLAN SUGGESTED A SURPRISE

ATTACK IN LATE 1963.

THE COST WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC.

IN A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

AN ESTIMATED 300 MILLION

PEOPLE WOULD DIE.

FACED WITH THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR

FALLOUT INCLUDING CANCER,

LEUKEMIA, AND BIRTH DEFECTS,

THE SURVIVORS WOULD ENVY

THE DEAD.

>> IT'S VERY HARD TO IMAGINE

THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT

ORGANIZED HUMAN SOCIETY

WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.

THIS IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER

HUMAN LIFE, IN ANY CIVILIZED

FORM, IS GOING TO SURVIVE

AT ALL.

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK

WROTE IN HIS MEMOIR THAT

AS THEY LEFT THE MEETING,

KENNEDY SAID TO HIM IN

DISPARAGING TONES,

"AND WE CALL OURSELVES

THE HUMAN RACE".

KENNEDY HAD AN ENTIRELY

DIFFERENT VIEW

ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FUTURE.

IT'S, I THINK, VERY CLEAR

THAT THIS MEETING INTENSIFIED

FOR HIM THE SENSE OF DANGER

THAT A WAR MIGHT BE UNLEASHED

IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE

MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN

CONTROL OF.

>> EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD

LIVES UNDER A NUCLEAR SORT

OF DAMOCLES, HANGING BY THE

SLENDEREST OF THREADS,

CAPABLE OF BEING CUT AT ANY

MOMENT, BY ACTION,

OR MISCALCULATION,

OR BY MADNESS.

THE WEAPONS OF WAR MUST BE

ABOLISHED, BEFORE THEY

ABOLISH US.

>> IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES

WAS ENGAGED IN A PROTRACTED

COLD WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION,

RED CHINA,

AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC.

THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF

PRESIDENTS HARRY TRUMAN

AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

HAD TRIED TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM

...THEN ROLL IT BACK.

BUT SOVIET PREMIERE

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

REMAINED DEFIANT.

WITH BOTH SIDES

ESCALATING THE PRODUCTION

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE

SUPERPOWERS IN CUBA, BERLIN,

AND VIETNAM THREATENED

TO TURN THE COLD WAR HOT.

IT WAS INTO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES

THAT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

AT THE AGE OF 43,

WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES.

>> THE SCENE ON JANUARY 19, 1961

WAS A REMARKABLE ONE.

THERE WAS THE OLDEST PRESIDENT

IN THE HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES, AGE 70,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

SITTING DOWN WITH THE

YOUNGEST PRESIDENT EVER

TO BE ELECTED, JOHN F. KENNEDY,

THE DAY BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION,

AND SHARING WITH HIM THE MOST

INTIMATE CONVERSATION A

PRESIDENT THOSE DAYS COULD HAVE,

WHICH IS:

WHAT DO YOU DO IF IT COMES

TO MAKING A DECISION ABOUT

NUCLEAR USE?

HE OPENS UP THE SATCHEL

IN WHICH THE COMPUTER-LIKE

DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN

AS A "NUCLEAR FOOTBALL".

GENERAL POWER, THE HEAD OF THE

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,

HAS STARTED ROUND-THE-CLOCK

BOMBER PROTECTION OF THE

UNITED STATES AGAINST

A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK

BY THE SOVIETS.

EISENHOWER SAYS WHAT HE WANTS

KENNEDY TO KNOW ABOUT

KHRUSHCHEV IS,

"HE'S BRUTAL, INCALCULABLE;

HE'S GONNA RUN HOT AND COLD

ON YOU."

IT STRUCK KENNEDY THAT

EISENHOWER WAS REFERRING

TO THE SOVIETS MORE AS ANIMALS

TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN

NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.

>> I REMEMBER, YOU KNOW, BEING

THERE AT INAUGURATION DAY.

OH, BOY, IT WAS COLD.

I REMEMBER HE SAID, "WE MUST

NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR."

>> LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT

OF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER

FEAR TO NEGOTIATE.

>> BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY,

"BUT WE MUST NEVER FEAR

TO NEGOTIATE,"

AND I SAID, "UH OH.

THERE'S SOMETHING NEW.

WE'VE JUST TURNED,

TURNED THE PAGE."

>> KENNEDY, THE FIRST U.S.

PRESIDENT BORN IN THE 20th

CENTURY, INSPIRED A YOUTHFUL

GENERATION EAGER FOR

FRESH LEADERSHIP.

>> THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE

BEGINNING OF THE KENNEDY

ADMINISTRATION THAT A NEW ERA

HAD BEGUN.

JOHN F. KENNEDY CAME

PROMISING A NEW FRONTIER.

IT WAS GOING TO BE A TIME

OF ENDLESS OPPORTUNITY.

AND TO BE PART OF THAT ERA

WAS ONE OF THE GREAT HONORS

OF ONE'S LIFE.

>> I'LL NEVER FORGET THE FIRST

TIME I WALKED INTO THE

WHITE HOUSE TO SEE MY OLD

FRIEND KEN O'DONNELL,

WHO WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

APPOINTMENT SECRETARY.

WE JUST LOOKED AT EACH OTHER

AND BURST OUT LAUGHING.

YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE

US DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?

>> I WAS THE YOUNGEST MEMBER

OF THE KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE.

I HAD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE...

LAST.

EVERYBODY WAS VERY EXCITED.

WE KNEW WE WERE MAKING HISTORY.

WE WERE READY TO GO.

>> I TRAVELED EVERYWHERE

WITH HIM.

HE WAS SUCH AN EXCITING MAN,

BUT ALSO ONE OF GREAT PRINCIPLE.

>> WE WERE CALLED SPECIAL

COUNCIL, AND I WAS ASSISTANT

SPECIAL COUNCIL.

IT WAS JUST PERFECTLY OBVIOUS

THE GUY HAD A FIRST-RATE MIND,

AND HE KNEW HOW TO USE IT.

>> FOR EXAMPLE TAKING

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER,

THE MOST RENOWNED

HISTORIAN IN THE COUNTRY

AND MAKING HIM A SPECIAL

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

IN THE WHITE HOUSE SO THAT

THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERENCE

TO A HISTORIAN WHO COULD PUT

EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE.

>> JFK PULLED DAD ASIDE

AND SAID, "BOBBY TELLS ME THAT

YOU'RE GONNA COME WORK

IN THE WHITE HOUSE."

AND DAD SAID, "WELL, OBVIOUSLY

AS A HISTORIAN IT'S A GREAT

OPPORTUNITY, I'M VERY EXCITED

ABOUT IT, BUT I REALLY DON'T

KNOW WHAT I'LL BE DOING."

AND KENNEDY SAID, "WELL, I DON'T

KNOW WHAT I WILL BE DOING

EITHER, BUT I'M SURE THERE

WILL BE PLENTY OF WORK

FOR BOTH OF US."

>> DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS,

I WAS A CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED

TO JOHN KENNEDY FOR THE

1960 CAMPAIGN.

I WENT WITH HIM INTO THE

WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE I HAD

ALREADY BEEN COVERING

EISENHOWER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

KENNEDY WAS A FORCE

IN THIS TOWN--

WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY

AND VERY ARTICULATE.

>> FROM THE OUTSET OF HIS

PRESIDENCY, KENNEDY KNEW

IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FULLY

ASSESS HIS COLD WAR ADVERSARY,

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

ADVISERS HAD WARNED HIM THAT THE

HOT-TEMPERED SOVIET LEADER

WOULD USE THREATS AND

INTIMIDATION TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.

>>

>> CAREFULLY WEIGHING

KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS AND ACTIONS,

KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE

MEASURE OF THE MAN.

>> PRESIDENT KENNEDY WASN'T EVEN

HOME FROM HIS INAUGURAL DAY

PARTIES WHEN KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED

TO SHOWER HIM WITH CONCILIATION.

FIRST AND FOREMOST,

HE DECIDED TO PUBLISH

THE ENTIRE INAUGURAL SPEECH.

THEN HE WAS READY TO RELEASE

TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN FROM THE

RECONNAISSANCE PLANE THAT HAD

BEEN SHOT DOWN THE PREVIOUS

AUGUST.

HE'D BEEN HOLDING THESE AIRMEN

SO AS NOT TO HELP VICE PRESIDENT

NIXON IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST

KENNEDY.

AND THIS WAS NOW GOING TO BE

HIS INAUGURAL GIFT.

THEREAFTER, HE ALSO MADE KNOWN

THAT 500 ELDERLY SOVIETS

WOULD BE ABLE TO REUNITE WITH

THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S.

KHRUSHCHEV IS

ESSENTIALLY SAYING,

"WE WANT A NEW START.

WE HAVE GREAT HOPES IN

THIS RELATIONSHIP.

WE REALLY ARE GOING TO WORK

VERY EARLY IN YOUR

ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME

BREAKTHROUGHS."

>> NIKITA IST IN DIE

WELTGESCHICHTE MIT SEINEM

SCHUH EINGEGANGEN.

>> MY FATHER WANTED TO

IMPROVE RELATIONS

WITH UNITED STATES.

FIRST OF ALL,

HE WAS A REFORMER BECAUSE

HE REALLY STARTED REFORMATION

OF RUSSIA WHEN HE CAME TO

THE POWER AFTER THE STALIN DAYS.

AND SECONDLY,

MY FATHER WAS IN TWO WARS,

AND HE EVEN COULD NOT WATCH

MOVIE ABOUT THE WAR BECAUSE

IT CAME BACK IN HIS MEMORY

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED,

AND HE COULD NOT SLEEP AFTER

THIS, SO HE WANT TO SHOW

TO THE NEW PRESIDENT

HIS POSITIVE FEELINGS

TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

>> WHILE KHRUSHCHEV'S GOODWILL

GESTURES APPEARED TO SIGNAL

A DESIRE FOR A NEW BEGINNING,

KENNEDY PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS

ON AN INFLAMMATORY SPEECH

THE SOVIET LEADER HAD GIVEN

ONLY A FEW WEEKS EARLIER.

IN IT, KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID

HE INTENDED TO BEAT

THE UNITED STATES WITH

"SMALL WARS OF LIBERATION"

ALL OVER THE WORLD.

>> CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV THREW

DOWN THE GAUNTLET IN THE THIRD

WORLD BY ESSENTIALLY ARGUING

THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN

POLICY NOW INCREASINGLY

WOULD BE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WHERE

THE SUPER POWERS BOTH

ESSENTIALLY TRIED TO GAIN

INFLUENCE.

KENNEDY WAS REALLY QUITE UPSET

ABOUT THIS SPEECH, AND HE GAVE

THE TEXT OF THIS SPEECH TO ALL

OF HIS ADVISORS AND SAID,

"YOU NEED TO READ THIS."

>> KENNEDY ENDS UP CARRYING THIS

SPEECH AROUND IN HIS POCKET,

AND HE PULLS IT OUT WITH EXPERTS

IN HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND

HE READS FROM THE SPEECH

HE'S SO OBSESSED WITH THE

MESSAGE THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS

TRYING TO SEND HIM.

>> IN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN TONE,

KENNEDY USED TOUGH LANGUAGE

TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET THREAT,

AND AT HIS FIRST

STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS,

HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION

TO ACCELERATE U.S. MISSILE

AND SUBMARINE PRODUCTION.

>> EACH DAY, WE DRAW NEARER

THE HOUR OF MAXIMUM DANGER

AS WEAPONS SPREAD AND

HOSTILE FORCES GROW STRONGER.

I FEEL I MUST INFORM THE

CONGRESS THAT OUR ANALYSIS

OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS

MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN EACH

OF THE PRINCIPLE AREAS

OF CRISIS, THE TIDE OF EVENTS

HAS BEEN RUNNING OUT, AND TIME

HAS NOT BEEN OUR FRIEND.

>> THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE

OF THE UNION WAS ALMOST

APOCALYPTIC IN NATURE AND

SUCH A SHIFT FROM CONCILIATION

TO CONFRONTATION.

AND HE IGNORES THE CONCILIATORY

GESTURES AND NEVER REALLY

ADEQUATELY TESTS THEM--

MAYBE THEY WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED

TO NOTHING, BUT WE'LL NEVER

KNOW BECAUSE HE NEVER REALLY

TESTED THEM.

>> KENNEDY'S STRUGGLE

TO UNDERSTAND HOW BEST TO DEAL

WITH THE SOVIETS

WAS ONLY JUST BEGINNING.

>> KENNEDY'S PRESIDENCY WAS VERY

SUBSTANTIALLY ABSORBED BY

THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLD WAR,

WHICH PLAYED ITSELF OUT ON

STAGES ALL OVER THE WORLD:

BERLIN, CUBA, VIETNAM.

AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS

ON THESE MATTERS CONTINUALLY.

>> BERLIN...

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV CALLED IT

"THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE

ON EARTH."

SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR, SOVIET, BRITISH,

FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES

HAD STOOD FACE-TO-FACE IN THE

STREETS OF THE OCCUPIED CITY.

AND THE SITUATION WAS

GROWING TENSER BY THE DAY.

>> ONE THING KENNEDY BROUGHT

WITH HIM INTO THE ADMINISTRATION

WAS AN AWARENESS OF THE

VULNERABILITY OF BERLIN AND

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN

COMMITMENT IN BERLIN.

>> IN 1961,

BERLIN IS AN ISLAND INSIDE

OF EAST GERMANY WITH AN

OPEN BORDER.

>> BERLIN WAS DIVIDED INTO

4 SECTORS,

THE SOVIET SECTOR HOUSING

THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

OF EAST GERMANY.

BUT THE OTHER SECTORS WERE

IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,

AND FRANCE.

AND KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO

END THAT SITUATION.

>> BERLIN WAS ALWAYS A SYMBOL

TO THE SOVIET UNION

OF COMMUNIST FAILURES.

THE SOVIETS WERE BEING

EMBARRASSED BY THE NUMBERS

OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET OUT

FROM COMMUNIST CONTROL.

>> THEY WERE LOSING SOME HUNDRED

THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR--

MORE THAN 10,000 EVERY MONTH.

>> IT'S THE BEST DOCTORS,

IT'S THE BEST FARMERS,

IT'S THE BEST TEACHERS,

SO THE FRONT LINE OF THE

SOVIET EMPIRE IS BEING DRAINED

OF ITS INTELLECTUAL AND

PROFESSIONAL LIFE BLOOD,

THEREFORE THREATENING THE

ENTIRE SOVIET CONSTRUCT.

>> IF KHRUSHCHEV WERE TO USE

MILITARY FORCE IN BERLIN,

KENNEDY AND HIS WESTERN ALLIES

HAD FEW OPTIONS.

>> IF THEY MARCH ON BERLIN,

WE DON'T HAVE THE TROOPS

TO FEND THEM OFF.

WHAT ARE WE GOING TO HAVE TO DO?

WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO USE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AND WHAT DOES THAT DO?

>> KENNEDY WAS LOOKING FOR

A CAPABLE ADVISOR WHO COULD

PROVIDE A COHERENT POLICY

FOR DEALING WITH BERLIN.

>> PRESIDENT KENNEDY BRINGS

DEAN ACHESON BACK INTO SERVICE,

THE LEGENDARY SECRETARY OF STATE

OF HARRY TRUMAN,

A HAWK'S HAWK WHEN IT COMES TO

DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

>> ACHESON WAS A TOUGH OLD HAWK

WHO BELIEVED THAT YOU DIDN'T

NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS,

THAT THEY ONLY UNDERSTOOD POWER.

YOU HAD TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT,

TO GO TO THE BRINK,

TO SHOW THEM THAT YOU HAVE

THE MILITARY CAPACITY

AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.

>> ACHESON PRODUCES A MEMO

THAT'S TOUGH--

ESSENTIALLY SAYS YOU CAN'T GIVE

AN INCH TO THE SOVIET UNION

IN BERLIN BECAUSE THIS IS

ABOUT THE GLOBE.

IF YOU START IN BERLIN,

AND YOU GIVE GROUND IN BERLIN,

ITALY'S NEXT, FRANCE,

THE REST OF GERMANY,

WHO KNOWS WHERE ELSE.

>> OF COURSE,

WITHIN WEEKS

WE HAD THE BAY OF PIGS.

>> IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1961,

A REVOLUTION ON THE CARIBBEAN

ISLAND OF CUBA,

LED BY FIDEL CASTRO,

OUSTED THE COUNTRY'S REPRESSIVE

DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED

ALL FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY.

THE UNITED STATES IMPOSED

AN EMBARGO ON CASTRO'S REGIME,

FREEZING CUBAN ASSETS AND

SEVERING DIPLOMATIC TIES

WITH HAVANA.

THE CUBANS TURNED TO THE

SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT.

>> ON CUBA, WE KNOW FOR A FACT

THAT KENNEDY ACTUALLY VIEWED

FIDEL CASTRO, IN 1960,

AS SOMEBODY WHOSE REVOLUTION

REALLY REPRESENTED THE

ASPIRATIONS, BROADLY SPEAKING,

OF THE VAST MAJORITY

OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT.

AND, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

HAD HANDLED CASTRO RIGHT THAT

HE WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED TO THE

SOVIET UNION, AND OF COURSE

THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE

TO SUPPORT THAT POINT OF VIEW,

BUT VERY EARLY ON HE REALIZED

THAT POLITICALLY HE COULDN'T

TAKE THAT POSITION PUBLICLY.

>> ONLY MONTHS INTO

HIS ADMINISTRATION,

KENNEDY WOULD DISCOVER

THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM

MIGHT LEAD TO HIS UNDOING.

>> AS SOON AS THE KENNEDYS GOT

INTO OFFICE THEY HAD TO WORRY

ABOUT CUBA.

THE CIA HAD COOKED UP A PLAN

TO INVADE CUBA WITH A FORCE

OF EXILES, AND THE CIA

WAS ITCHING TO USE THIS FORCE

AND OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO.

>> HE HAD INHERITED THE WHOLE

THING FROM THE EISENHOWER

ADMINISTRATION.

>> HE HAD BEEN TOLD THIS PLAN

FOR LANDING AT THE BAY OF PIGS

WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO

CONSIDER THE NECESSITY FOR

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

BY THE UNITED STATES,

WE DIDN'T HAVE TO BE DIRECTLY

INVOLVED, THAT WAS THE PREMISE.

BUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY

WAS MISLED.

HIS LEADING ADVISORS,

PARTICULARLY HIS MILITARY

ADVISORS, HAD NOT GIVEN HIM

THE TRUTH--

SAME THING WAS TRUE FOR THE CIA,

BY THE WAY.

>> THE BASIC ISSUE IN CUBA

IS NOT ONE BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.

IT IS BETWEEN THE CUBANS

THEMSELVES.

AND I INTEND TO SEE THAT WE

ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE,

AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT,

THIS ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE

IS SO UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED

BY THE ANTI-CASTRO EXILES

FROM CUBA IN THIS COUNTRY.

>> THE PLANNING HAD BEEN THAT IF

THE INVASION DIDN'T SUCCEED,

THE UNITED STATES WOULD

INTRODUCE ITS OWN FORCES.

>> BUT THE CIA NEVER CLEARLY

COMMUNICATED THIS RATHER

ESSENTIAL FACT TO THE PRESIDENT.

>> PERSUADED BY CIA OFFICIALS

WHO WERE WITHHOLDING VITAL

INFORMATION AND CONCERNED

ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT

OF APPEARING WEAK ON COMMUNISM,

THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE

CIA PLAN FOR AN INVASION

OF ARMED CUBAN EX-PATRIOTS

AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

>> THE CUBAN EXILES LANDED

AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

IT WAS A DISASTER FROM

THE GET-GO.

A THOUSAND OF THEM WERE

BASICALLY DRIVEN INTO THE SEA

OR CAPTURED.

MOST IMPORTANTLY,

THERE WAS NO AIR COVER.

>> MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE

OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY PRESSURED

THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

KENNEDY REFUSED.

>> HIS ARGUMENT AT THE TIME

IS, IF THE U.S. GETS DIRECTLY

INVOLVED, IF AMERICAN

FINGERPRINTS ARE TOO CLEARLY

ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION,

THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL USE THAT

AS AN EXCUSE TO ACT ON BERLIN.

>> KENNEDY WAS WORRIED BECAUSE

HE WAS COMING UP TO A SUMMIT

MEETING, HE HOPED, WITH

KHRUSHCHEV, AND HE DIDN'T

WANT TO DISTRACT FROM THAT

SUMMIT MEETING BY HAVING

TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID

TO CUBA.

>> WHAT THIS BAY OF PIGS QUICKLY

SHOWED WAS THAT THE

DOMINANT FORCES IN THE

ADMINISTRATION WERE PEOPLE

THAT KENNEDY HAD NEVER APPOINTED

THAT HE HAD INHERITED FROM

HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE CIA

AND THE MILITARY,

AND THEY BASICALLY WERE

ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD

PUSH KENNEDY AROUND.

THERE WAS A KIND OF ENTRAPMENT

BUILT INTO THE WHOLE SCENARIO,

AND KENNEDY REALIZED THAT, TOO,

AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO BECOME

A PRESIDENT THAT WAS ENTRAPPED.

>> JOHN F. KENNEDY CLEARLY FELT

THAT HE HAD BEEN MISLEAD,

THAT HIS LEADING ADVISORS

HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH

AND THAT HE HAD TO BE VERY

CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE

ABOUT ACCEPTING ANYTHING

THAT THEY SAID.

>> THE CIA WAS VERY UNHAPPY

BECAUSE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY

ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD

APPROVE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST

CASTRO'S FORCES IF THE BRIGADE

GOT IN TROUBLE ON THE BEACH.

THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A MAJOR

DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES,

NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE WE

HAD BEEN DEFEATED,

BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE

WORLD OUR BALD AGGRESSION

AGAINST CUBA.

AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY

OVER THE GOLIATH OF THE NORTH.

>> KENNEDY TOOK THAT DISASTER

VERY, VERY PERSONALLY

BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS

A PERSONAL FAILURE.

YOU KNOW, YOU DO THE BEST YOU

CAN AND THINGS DON'T WORK OUT

SOMETIMES, WELL, OKAY.

BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE HERE.

AND HE BLAMED HIMSELF,

HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR

NOT ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.

>> NOBODY LIKES TO TAKE A HIT,

ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE SO

PUBLICLY EXPOSED.

BUT YEAH, I THINK HE LEARNED,

AND WHAT HE LEARNED IS...

KNOW WHOSE ADVICE TO RELY ON.

>> KENNEDY RALLIED IN A

NUMBER OF WAYS.

FOR ONE THING, HE TOLD THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS

HIS RESPONSIBILITY.

HE USED A FAMOUS PHRASE,

THAT A "VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND

FATHERS BUT DEFEAT IS AN

ORPHAN."

BUT HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY

FOR IT, AND INTERESTINGLY,

HIS POLL RATINGS SHOT UP

TO ABOUT 90%.

AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN

POLITICIANS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.

>> THE FAILED BAY OF PIGS

OPERATION HAD ENORMOUS INFLUENCE

ON KENNEDY'S IMAGE AS A

FOREIGN POLICY MAKER.

>> THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT THAT

HE WAS SOFT, HE SHOWED THAT

HE WAS SOFT ON COMMUNISM.

HE DID NOT HAVE THE CREDENTIALS,

FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW,

TO BE ABLE TO STAND UP.

>> THERE WAS AMBIVALENCE

ABOUT JFK.

HE WAS A WHIPPERSNAPPER.

HE WAS GREEN.

HE'D BEEN A LT. J.G.

IN WORLD WAR II.

>> HE SAID, "I WAS A LIEUTENANT

JUNIOR GRADE, AND THOSE GUYS

WERE RUNNING THE WAR.

AND I JUST DIDN'T

ASK THE QUESTIONS THAT

I HAD ON MY MIND.

>> JOHN F. KENNEDY EMERGED

FROM THAT CATASTROPHIC FOREIGN

POLICY FAILURE

CHASTENED IN TERMS OF THE

PITFALLS OF THE USE OF FORCE

AND WITH A DEGREE OF WISDOM

ABOUT LISTENING TO THE

ADVICE OF HIS TOP GENERALS,

HIS TOP CIA OFFICIALS,

AND OTHER ADVISORS RATHER

THAN LISTENING TO HIS GUT.

>> AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS,

JACK KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED

TO BREAK THE CIA INTO A

THOUSAND PIECES HE WAS SO MAD

AT THEM,

AND HE ALMOST DID.

HE GOT RID OF ALLEN DULLES,

THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA,

AND RICHARD BISSELL,

THE COVERT OPERATIONS CHIEF.

>> FOLLOWING THE BAY OF PIGS

FIASCO, KENNEDY SENT SIGNALS

THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN

HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING WITH

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE

OF BUREAUCRACY AT THE

STATE DEPARTMENT,

THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REACH

OUT TO THE SOVIET LEADER

THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS.

>> KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED TO

ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH

THE SOVIET UNION

AND TO SEE IF THERE WERE

ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED

AND RECONCILED WITHOUT

CONSTANT MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

>> THE KENNEDYS OPERATED ON MANY

LEVELS, AND THEY LIKED BACK

CHANNELS AS A WAY OF DOING

BUSINESS.

AND THEY FOUND ONE ALMOST

BY ACCIDENT.

>> IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST

UNUSUAL BACK CHANNELS AMONG

MAJOR LEADERS IN HISTORY,

OF HIS BROTHER THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

BOBBY KENNEDY, WHO KNOWS

ALL OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S

MOST INTIMATE THOUGHTS

AND A SOVIET MILITARY SPY,

GEORGI BOLSHAKOV, BASED IN

WASHINGTON, WHO REALLY CAN'T

KNOW ANYTHING VERY INTIMATELY

ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV.

>> ROBERT KENNEDY, WHEN HE MET

WITH BOLSHAKOV, WANTED TO

COMMUNICATE A COUPLE OF THINGS:

ONE, THAT CUBA WAS A MISTAKE,

BUT ALSO THAT HE WANTED

TO HAVE A SUMMIT.

THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MEET

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT

THAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN

MOTION THE SUMMIT MEETING.

>> THE KENNEDYS ARRIVED FROM

PARIS ON SATURDAY THE 3rd OF

JUNE AND WENT DIRECTLY TO THE

RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR

IN HIETZING, WHICH IS A

BEAUTIFUL AREA,

VERY POSH AREA IN VIENNA.

KENNEDY HAD THE SEVERE BACK

PROBLEMS IN VIENNA,

WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE

PUBLIC DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL.

>> HIS DOCTORS RECOMMENDED HIM

TO USE CRUTCHES, BUT KENNEDY,

OF COURSE, DID NOT TAKE CRUTCHES

ON TO VIENNA.

>> IF YOU ASK ME WHAT THE

MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,

I WOULD SAY THAT'S KENNEDY.

>> VICTOR SUKHODREV WAS

WITH KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV

DURING ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS.

>> HE WAS YOUNG, ENERGETIC,

YET HUMAN...

AND COULD BE FRAIL,

AS ALL HUMANS ARE AT SOME POINT.

MY AMERICAN COUNTERPART WAS

ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY

ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

>> I HAD MET KHRUSHCHEV ON A

NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BEFORE,

SO I KNEW HOW HE BEHAVES.

HE WAS A VERY VOLATILE PERSON.

HE COULD, YOU KNOW, BE ENRAGED

THEN CALM DOWN RIGHT AWAY,

AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"

AND THINGS LIKE THAT.

>> DURING THEIR OPENING REMARKS,

KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED INTENTLY

AT THE PRESIDENT AND THEN ASKED,

"MR. PRESIDENT,

HOW OLD ARE YOU?"

AND KENNEDY SAID,

"WELL, I'M FORTY-FOUR."

THERE CAME INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S

EYES A VERY WISTFUL LOOK

AND HE SAID, "YES, FORTY-FOUR.

WELL, YOU KNOW, MY SON

WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,

BUT HE WAS KILLED IN THE WAR."

>> IN THE FIRST MEETING OF HIS

CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV,

KENNEDY GOT OFF ON THE WRONG

FOOT BECAUSE THEY ENGAGED

IN A PRETTY INTENSE

IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE.

PEOPLE LIKE KHRUSHCHEV,

THEY KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY

VERY WELL.

YOU CAN'T REALLY HOLD YOUR

OWN AGAINST THEM

IN SUCH A DISCUSSION.

>> KENNEDY,

HE BEGAN TO FIDGET IN HIS CHAIR;

I LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS

BECAUSE HIS BACK WAS HURTING.

>> AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF

TALKS, AS A FORM OF RELAXATION

THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN

AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

>> THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION

ABOUT MISCALCULATION.

THE PRESIDENT USED THAT

A NUMBER OF TIMES--

THAT TERM "MISCALCULATION."

AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULDN'T

REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT

THAT MEANT.

AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID,

"WELL, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE,

I MADE A MISJUDGMENT IN CUBA."

>> HE SAID "WHAT HAPPENED IN

CUBA, THE BAY OF PIGS."

THE INFERENCE WAS THAT HE HAD

INHERITED THAT PROBLEM FROM THE

PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.

IT WAS NOT REALLY OF HIS DOING.

>> INHERITED OR NOT,

KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT A GAP

EXISTED BETWEEN AMERICAN IDEALS

AND AMERICAN SELF-INTEREST.

WITH LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED,

THE TWO LEADERS RESOLVED

TO RESUME THEIR TALKS

THE FOLLOWING DAY.

>> ON THE 2ND DAY TAKING PLACE

AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY,

ALL THE TALK WAS ABOUT BERLIN.

>> KHRUSHCHEV WENT INTO THIS

TIRADE ABOUT BERLIN.

>> HE KEPT REITERATING THAT

BY THAT VERY WINTER

THE SOVIET UNION WOULD

BLOCK OFF WEST BERLIN,

WHILE EAST BERLIN WOULD BECOME

THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE

GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.

>> KHRUSHCHEV KEPT SAYING THAT

THE DECISION TO CONCLUDE

A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY

WAS IRREVOCABLE;

IT WILL HAPPEN,

NOBODY COULD STOP HIM--

NOBODY IN THE WORLD.

THAT'S HIS WORDS.

>> AND KENNEDY WAS UNPREPARED

FOR THIS AND WAS SHOCKED

AT THE IDEA THAT HIS LEADING

COUNTERPART IN THE COLD WAR

WAS SEEMINGLY SO IRRATIONAL.

>> KHRUSHCHEV AT ONE POINT SAID,

"YOU KNOW, BERLIN IS LIKE

THE SCROTUM IN OUR HANDS,

WHICH WE CAN SQUEEZE AT ANY

TIME WE WANT."

>> HOW THE PRESIDENT TOOK IT:

HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,

"ALEX, IS HE ALWAYS LIKE THAT?"

>> KHRUSHCHEV RESORTED TO

WARNINGS THAT HE ISSUED ABOUT

POTENTIAL WAR.

>> KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED KENNEDY

IN THE EYE AND SAID,

"IF IT'S GOT TO BE WAR,

IT MIGHT AS WELL BE NOW."

>> KENNEDY, WITH HIS HANDS

IN HIS COAT POCKETS

IN A TYPICALLY KENNEDY-ESQUE

GESTURE REMARKED,

"WELL, IT'S GONNA BE

A COLD WINTER."

>> JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS A VERY

CONFIDENT MAN IN SO MANY WAYS,

EVEN COCKY, BUT HE WAS HUMBLED

BY HIS EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

EXPERIENCES.

TO HAVE THE FIASCO

OF THE BAY OF PIGS AND THEN

GET BULLIED BY KHRUSHCHEV

AT VIENNA WAS A PRETTY TOUGH

ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR

FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD.

>> YOU REALLY SEE A PRESIDENT

ON EMOTIONAL EDGE FEELING

THAT HE'S FAILED IN THE MOST

IMPORTANT MOMENT OF HIS

PRESIDENCY AND BELIEVING

THE STAKES ARE NUCLEAR.

>> WHEN THE PRESIDENT RETURNED

FROM VIENNA, HIS BROTHER,

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

FOUND HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE,

AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS

IN TEARS.

AND HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, BOBBY,

YOU AND ARE ADULTS,

WE'VE HAD A GOOD LIFE.

BUT I JUST--

OUR CHILDREN, I JUST CAN'T

STOMACH THE IDEA OF OUR

CHILDREN NOT HAVING A CHANCE.

>> THE SUMMER OF 1961 WAS A TIME

FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGER.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT HIS

ADVISORS TOGETHER.

THERE WERE A SERIES OF

MEETINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO

ABOUT BERLIN.

>> ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE

THE HARDLINERS ON BERLIN,

LED BY DEAN ACHESON.

AND THEN YOU HAVE THE

SOFTLINERS ON BERLIN,

LED BY ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.

BUT ACHESON WAS THE ONLY

ONE WITH A PLAN.

AND IT'S A TOUGH ONE.

>> ACHESON WANTED THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE

A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,

RAISE TAXES, FULLY MOBILIZE THE

MILITARY, INCREASE THE DEFENSE

SPENDING BY FIVE BILLION

DOLLARS, GO EVERYTHING

RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF WAR.

>> WHAT IS KENNEDY DOING

IN THIS THING?

AGAIN, HE'S ASKING QUESTIONS,

CONSTANTLY ASKING QUESTIONS.

AND THE QUESTION HE'S CONSTANTLY

COMING BACK TO IS:

WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO

IF WE DO THIS?

>> THE WORLD IS NOT DECEIVED

BY THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT

TO LABEL BERLIN AS A HOT BED

OF WAR.

THERE IS PEACE IN BERLIN TODAY.

THE SOURCE OF WORLD TROUBLE

AND TENSION IS MOSCOW,

NOT BERLIN.

AND IF WAR BEGINS,

IT WILL HAVE BEGUN IN MOSCOW

AND NOT BERLIN.

>>I THINK KHRUSHCHEV

MISCALCULATED WITH JOHN KENNEDY.

HE WAS A LOT TOUGHER THAN

KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE WAS.

>> KENNEDY CLEARLY WANTED

TO SEND A SIGNAL

TO KHRUSHCHEV.

HE WAS READY TO CONFRONT HIM

MILITARILY IF THAT IS WHAT HE

CHOSE; IF HE WANTED WAR,

THE UNITED STATES

WOULD BE READY.

>> WE MUST MEET OUR OFTEN-STATED

PLEDGE TO THE FREE PEOPLES

OF WEST BERLIN AND MAINTAIN

OUR RIGHTS AND THEIR SAFETY

EVEN IN THE FACE OF FORCE

IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE

CONFIDENCE OF OTHER FREE PEOPLES

IN OUR WORD AND OUR RESOLVE.

>> THE MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE

HOW TOUGH HE WAS BEING WITH

THE SOVIET UNION,

HOW HE WAS STANDING UP TO THEM.

BUT FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

AND FOR KHRUSHCHEV,

BETWEEN THE LINES IS A VERY

CLEAR MESSAGE, WHICH IS:

WHAT I CARE ABOUT IS OUR TROOPS

IN WEST BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS

TO WEST BERLIN.

WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUT

IS EAST BERLIN.

>> IN SHORT, WHILE WE ARE READY

TO DEFEND OUR INTEREST,

WE SHALL ALSO BE READY

TO SEARCH FOR PEACE:

IN QUIET EXPLORATORY TALKS,

IN FORMAL OR INFORMAL

MEETINGS.

WE DO NOT WANT MILITARY

CONSIDERATIONS TO DOMINATE

THE THINKING OF EITHER

EAST OR WEST.

>> ONE CAN UNDERSTAND KENNEDY'S

APPROACH TO BERLIN AT THAT TIME.

HE'S LESS CONCERNED ABOUT

BERLIN AND MORE CONCERNED

ABOUT THE DANGERS

OF NUCLEAR WAR.

HE THINKS THAT IF HE CAN HELP

KHRUSHCHEV SOLVE HIS PROBLEM

OF THE REFUGEE FLOOD FROM

BERLIN THAT HE MIGHT HAVE

A MORE AMICABLE, COOPERATIVE

NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON A

HOST OF OTHER ISSUES.

>> WITHIN DAYS OF

KENNEDY'S SPEECH,

KHRUSHCHEV APPROVED EAST

GERMAN PLANS TO SEAL THE

BORDER IN BERLIN.

ON AUGUST 13, 1961,

COMMUNIST FORCES ERECTED

BARRICADES AND STOOD GUARD ALONG

THE PERIMETER OF WEST BERLIN.

RESIDENTS OF EAST BERLIN SOON

FOUND THEMSELVES TRAPPED

BEHIND A BARRIER THAT WOULD

BECOME THE NOTORIOUS

BERLIN WALL.

>> WE THINK OF THE BERLIN WALL

AS BEING THIS TERRIBLE MOMENT

IN THE COLD WAR--

A SYMBOLIC MOMENT WHEN THE WALL

GOES UP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ACTUALLY, IT WAS A RELIEF

TO KENNEDY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A

CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION

TO HAVE THIS MASS MIGRATION,

PEOPLE JUST FLEEING EAST

TO WEST, THAT BY PUTTING

UP THE WALL IT STOPPED THAT,

AND IN A WAY, IT DIFFUSED

THAT CRISIS AND MADE BERLIN

LESS OF A CRISIS POINT.

SO IN THE LONG RUN, IT HELPED

THE WEST TO HAVE A BERLIN WALL.

>> I THINK THAT THERE'S NO DOUBT

THAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE

FINDING THEIR OWN POLICIES

WERE BEING FRUSTRATED

BY KENNEDY'S POLICIES,

WERE ANGRY, WERE FRUSTRATED.

THEY WERE TALKING AMONG

THEMSELVES, PUTTING HIM DOWN.

>> DEAN ACHESON HAD GROWN SO

FRUSTRATED THAT DURING A

SMALL WORKING GROUP MEETING

ON BERLIN HE SAID,

"GENTLEMAN YOU MIGHT AS WELL

FACE IT: THIS NATION IS

WITHOUT LEADERSHIP."

SOMEONE SERVING THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES,

SOMEONE TRYING TO FRAME

HIS MOST IMPORTANT POLICIES,

TALKING IN FRONT OF A GROUP

OF EXPERTS AND SAYING THIS

ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF

THE UNITED STATES--

AND HE SAID IT IN EVEN HARSHER

TERMS IN A LETTER TO HIS

FORMER BOSS, HARRY TRUMAN

A FEW WEEKS LATER.

>> FOR A LOT OF AMERICANS,

KENNEDY'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

DAYS WERE AMATEUR HOUR,

AND IT WAS UNSETTLING.

THE COUNTRY WAS SCARED IN THE

SUMMER OF 1961 THAT THEIR LEADER

MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT

HE WAS DOING.

>> PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S HOPES

THAT BY ACQUIESCING TO THE

CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN WALL

HE WOULD HAVE A MORE

CONCILIATORY NEGOTIATING PARTNER

IN THE SOVIET LEADER WERE

DASHED DAYS THEREAFTER,

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES

ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.

KENNEDY IS TRYING

TO BE CONCILIATORY.

HE FINALLY HAS TO GIVE UP THAT

COURSE, AND HE HAS TO RESUME,

THOUGH HE WAS VERY RELUCTANT

TO DO SO, HIS OWN TESTING

PROGRAM.

>> KHRUSHCHEV SAID ONE PHRASE,

WHICH I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER.

HE SAID, "WELL, I PITY

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE

ELECTED SUCH A MAN

TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT."

>> KHRUSHCHEV PERCEIVED KENNEDY

AS BEING INDECISIVE AND WEAK

REGARDING BERLIN AND THE

BERLIN CRISIS.

AND BECAUSE OF THAT,

HE WAS WILLING TO ESCALATE

RHETORIC, NUCLEAR TESTING, ETC.

SO, BY ACQUIESCING TO THE

BERLIN WALL, HE'S FACING A

SOVIET LEADER THAT IS BECOMING

EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME

AND PROBLEMATIC.

>> IN THE FALL OF 1961,

KENNEDY WOULD FACE YET ANOTHER

GRAVE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION...

THIS TIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

A COMMUNIST-BACKED INSURGENCY

WAS GAINING MOMENTUM IN

SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING

THE REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM.

U.S. MILITARY AND

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS BELIEVED

THE INSURGENCY COULD BE DEFEATED

AND LOBBIED FOR THE INTRODUCTION

OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS.

BUT THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE

FAILED FRENCH COLONIAL WAR

IN VIETNAM,

JUST A DECADE EARLIER,

HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS.

>> JFK UNDERSTOOD BECAUSE HE HAD

BEEN IN VIETNAM DURING THE

WANING YEARS OF THE FRENCH

COLONIAL PRESENCE THAT

IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY

IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEAT A

VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT, WHETHER IT

WAS COMMUNIST-LED OF NOT,

THAT HAD NATIONALIST

CREDENTIALS, THAT HAD--

THAT REPRESENTED VIETNAMESE

NATIONALISM.

>> THE REASON WHY THE WAR

IN INDOCHINA HAS NOT HAD

THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE

OF THAT AREA AND THE PEOPLE

OF ASIA HAS BEEN THAT THE FRENCH

HAVE MAINTAINED TOO GREAT A

DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE LIVES

OF THE PEOPLE.

AND THEREFORE,

THE COMMUNIST UNDER HOCHI MINH

ARE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE

FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE,

AND THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE

FIGHTING FOR A MAINTENANCE

OF COLONIAL RULE.

I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES

MOVES IN, IN ANY DEGREE,

THAT INDEPENDENCE MUST BE

GRANTED TO THE PEOPLE;

THAT THE PEOPLE MUST SUPPORT

THE STRUGGLE BECAUSE UNLESS,

AS I SAID, THAT SUPPORT

IS FORTHCOMING, ANY INTERVENTION

BY THE UNITED STATES

IS BOUND TO BE FUTILE.

>> JOHN KENNEDY UNDERSTOOD THAT

THE AGE OF COLONIALISM WAS OVER.

>> PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT

GOING TO INTRODUCE COMBAT TROOPS

INTO VIETNAM.

>> THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO JFK'S

FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF TRYING

TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT

OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

CAME IN 1961.

>> THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE

MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE

ESTABLISHMENT WAS THAT WE HAD

TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM,

THAT THAT WAS OUR CLIENT,

OUR ALLY, THAT WE HAD A

MORAL OBLIGATION TO STAND

BY PRESIDENT DIEM,

AND TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM

FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

>> THE MILITARY, THE JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF REALLY HAD

BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT WE

COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM

MILITARILY.

>> THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT COMES

UP IN NOVEMBER OF 1961 WITH

THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT,

WHICH RECOMMENDS THE

INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS.

>> THIS WAS SAYING WE WANT

40,000 TROOPS TO GO

INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

AND DEFEAT THE VIETCONG.

AND THEN WE WANT TO HAVE

125 TO 130,000 TROOPS JUST IN

CASE NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA

INTERVENE, JUST TO HANDLE

THAT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.

JFK TOLD HIS NATIONAL SECURITY

ADVISORS, "WE'RE NOT GOING

TO DO THIS, BASED ON

MY EXPERIENCE AND MY KNOWLEDGE,

MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

OF VIETNAM.

THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, AND

THIS IS NOT AN INTEREST THAT

DESERVES THE UNITED STATES

GOING TO WAR."

SO, IT WAS A VERY DECISIVE

MOMENT WHEN A U.S. PRESIDENT

REALLY RESPONDED TO A VERY

SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR GOING

TO WAR WITH A VERY LOUD "NO".

HOWEVER, AS PART OF THE

POLITICAL POSITIONING THAT

HE FELT THAT HE HAD TO ASSUME,

HE THEN MADE A DEAL THAT HE

WOULD AGREE TO THEIR REQUEST

FOR THOUSANDS OF U.S. ADVISORS.

>> "ADVISORS" IS AN IMPORTANT

WORD; THEY WERE MILITARY

FOR THE MOST PART, A LOT OF THEM

WERE ECONOMIC AID PEOPLE, TOO.

BUT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

INSISTENCE THAT IT NOT BE OUR

WAR THAT LIMITED OUR INVOLVEMENT

IN THAT KIND OF WAY.

WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING

WE COULD TO ADVISE AND TO TRAIN,

BUT KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED THAT

IT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD

BE IN THE FRONT LINES.

>> IN 1962, KENNEDY'S SECOND

YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE,

MORE FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES WOULD

BESET THE YOUNG PRESIDENT...

SUBORDINATES WOULD QUESTION

HIS LEADERSHIP...

AND THE CALCULATIONS OF HIS

ADVERSARIES WOULD BRING

THE WORLD TO THE BRINK

OF NUCLEAR WAR.

>> AT THE BEGINNING OF '62,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

PARTICULARLY LED BY

CURTIS LEMAY,

WHO WAS THE HEAD OF THE

AIR FORCE, WERE VERY SCATHING

ABOUT KENNEDY'S INABILITY

TO DEAL WITH THE CASTRO PROBLEM.

>> VIVA...

EL INTERNACIONALISMO

PROLETARIADO!

>> AND THEY FELT THAT

IN THE END, A INVASION

OF THE ISLAND WOULD BE NECESSARY

AND THEN MADE DETAILED PLANS

FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA

AND, IN FACT, MADE A FORMAL

RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT

THAT AN INVASION SHOULD

BE LAUNCHED.

AT THE SAME TIME,

KHRUSHCHEV HAD VERY REAL

CONCERNS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES

INVADING CUBA.

BOTH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE

CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS

WOULD TRY AGAIN.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS DETERMINED

TO SAVE CUBA ONE WAY

OR THE OTHER.

AND HE CAME UP WITH THIS

IDEA THAT NOBODY ELSE HAD

PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING

NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CUBA.

>> FIDEL CASTRO WANTED THE

SOVIET UNION TO OPENLY

SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA.

THERE WAS NO ILLEGALITY ABOUT

THE SOVIET UNION POSITIONING

INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC

MISSILES IN CUBA.

THE UNITED STATES,

UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

HAD DEPLOYED SIMILAR MISSILES

IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

IT WAS THE POLITICS THAT

WORRIED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE TRIED

TO OPENLY DEPLOY THESE MISSILES

TO CUBA, THE UNITED STATES

WOULD OBJECT.

AND SO KHRUSHCHEV CAME UP WITH

THIS PLAN TO SURREPTITIOUSLY

TRANSPORT THE MISSILE PARTS AND

THE PERSONNEL IN A WAY THAT

WOULD KEEP THEM SECRET UNTIL

THEY WERE READY TO BE ANNOUNCED,

AND AT THAT POINT, KHRUSHCHEV

PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA

AND ANNOUNCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI

AND HAVE THOSE MISSILES THERE AS

A DETERRENT

AGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS.

>> HE WANT TO PREVENT

AMERICAN INVASION.

WE HAVE TO SEND VERY STRONG

SIGNAL THAT WE ARE SERIOUS.

AND THAT MEAN TO HIM WE WILL

SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA THAT

WILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:

BE CAUTIOUS, DON'T DO THIS.

>> AS PLANS GOT UNDERWAY TO

BEGIN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET

TRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT

OF SOVIET MISSILES TO CUBA...

ACROSS THE GLOBE IN

SOUTH VIETNAM, SOME OF

THE NEWLY ARRIVED U.S. ADVISERS

WERE DEFYING ORDERS AND ACTUALLY

ENGAGING IN COMBAT.

>> THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

LEADERSHIP,

THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE,

VERY SUBJECT TO THE THREAT

OF INTERVENTION BY THE

UNITED STATES IN

SOUTH VIETNAM.

THEY WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING

POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT.

AND SO THEY DID, IN FACT,

BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT THE

NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND

OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT,

SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED

SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

>> THAT INFORMATION REACHED

KENNEDY'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

TO INDIA,

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.

>> ONE OF THE REASONS THAT

PRESIDENT KENNEDY CHOSE MY

FATHER TO BE AMBASSADOR

TO INDIA RATHER THAN KEEPING

HIM IN WASHINGTON

WAS THAT THIS PERMITTED

KENNEDY TO CALL ON MY FATHER

AS A FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR.

HE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF

WATCHING THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN

INDOCHINA IN 1954,

SO HE HAD

VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, AND

THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO

KENNEDY'S OWN.

>> SO GALBRAITH SENT A LETTER

TO KENNEDY IN APRIL OF 1962.

WHAT GALBRAITH WAS SUGGESTING

WAS THAT THEY COULD GET THE

INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP

ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF CONTACT

WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

THERE COULD BE SOME TALK

ABOUT A DEAL UNDER WHICH,

IF THEY WOULD LOWER

THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY,

WE WOULD THEN BEGIN TO

WITHDRAW TROOPS, WE COULD TALK

ABOUT SOME CORRESPONDING EFFORTS

OR MOVES TO REDUCE TENSIONS

AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF WAR.

AND JFK DEFINITELY BOUGHT

INTO THAT.

BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS

FILLED UP WITH HOLDOVERS

FROM THE EISENHOWER

ADMINISTRATION:

PEOPLE WHO HAD THESE VERY

RIGHT-WING VIEWS ON

EAST ASIAN POLICY.

AND SO, JFK UNDERSTOOD THAT;

HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE

TO WORK AROUND THE

STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY

AND REALLY, HARRIMAN WAS

THE LOGICAL PERSON FOR HIM

TO TURN TO.

>> AVERELL HARRIMAN WAS A VERY

EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT.

HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE

SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND

WORLD WAR.

HE'D BEEN GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK.

>> HARRIMAN HAD CALLED FOR

AVOIDING SENDING TROOPS

TO VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER OF 1961,

BUT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT

HARRIMAN MIGRATED FROM JFK'S

SIDE OF THE LEDGER TO THE

COALITION OF MILITARY AND STATE

DEPARTMENT PEOPLE WHO WERE

CALLING FOR SENDING TROOPS

TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

AND I DON'T THINK JFK UNDERSTOOD

THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE HAD

REALLY TURNED TO THE OTHER SIDE

ON THAT QUESTION.

JFK ORDERED AVERELL HARRIMAN

TO SEND A CABLE THAT INSTRUCTED

GALBRAITH TO ESTABLISH

A NEGOTIATING CHANNEL WITH

NORTH VIETNAM.

WHAT IS SO INTERESTING ABOUT

THE DOCUMENT IS THAT IMMEDIATELY

HARRIMAN, IN VERY HEAVY

PENCIL, CROSSES OUT THE PART

OF THE DIRECTION FROM THE

PRESIDENT THAT CALLS

FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.

HE ACTUALLY SAT ON THE

NEGOTIATING CABLE AND, IN FACT,

WHEN ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES

TRIED TO WRITE A CABLE THAT

WAS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION,

HE SAID, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING

TO DO THAT."

AND THERE WAS NEVER

A CABLE SENT.

SO, IT WAS AN ASTONISHING CASE

OF A LEADING OFFICIAL

OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

COMPLETELY SUBVERTING

AN EXPLICIT ORDER FROM THE

PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY

OUT A DIPLOMATIC POLICY.

WHAT HARRIMAN DID, I THINK,

WAS A REFLECTION OF A MUCH

BROADER PATTERN IN WHICH ALL

OF THESE ADVISORS WERE

ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAT

JFK WANTED TO DO.

>> THERE WAS A MINDSET THAT SAID

"NO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WEAKNESS"

AND WE'RE IN A WEAK POSITION

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND UNTIL THAT

SITUATION TURNS ITSELF AROUND

AND WE CAN NEGOTIATE FROM

STRENGTH AND THE COMMUNISTS

UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WINNING

AND NOT LOSING, OF COURSE

WE ARE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE.

>> GALBRAITH WOULD LAUGH AT THAT

AND SAY,

"WEAKNESS, THE GREATEST COUNTRY

IN THE WORLD, THE STRONGEST

NATION IN THE WORLD,

CONTENDING WITH VIETNAM,

A COUNTRY OF 50 MILLION PEOPLE,

THAT HAS NO AIR-FORCE,

THAT HAS NO INDUSTRY, AND

THAT IS JUST EMERGING AS A

NATION, THE UNITED STATES

HAS TO BE AFRAID OF THAT

AND NOT SHOW WEAKNESS?"

AND IT'S NOT WEAKNESS,

WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID

IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS

OR TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.

>> THE LACK OF FAITH IN

NEGOTIATIONS HELD BY MANY

U.S. OFFICIALS WENT MUCH

DEEPER THAN DISDAIN FOR

KENNEDY'S TRACK RECORD

IN FOREIGN POLICY.

FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AND WON

THE SECOND WORLD WAR,

ONE OF THE GREATEST ERRORS A

LEADER COULD MAKE WAS TO

TAKE AN ENEMY AT HIS WORD.

IN 1938, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN HAD BELIEVED

HE COULD NEGOTIATE PEACE

WITH ADOLF HITLER.

AS A RESULT, BRITISH WAR

PRODUCTION WAS DELAYED,

AND ENGLAND NEARLY LOST THE WAR.

"APPEASEMENT" WAS CONSIDERED

A DIRTY WORD BY A GENERATION OF

U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WHO KNEW

ALL TOO WELL THE HUMAN

PRICE OF NAÏVE LEADERSHIP.

AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM

TO THE LIMIT.

>> THE MISSILES THAT CAUSED THE

CRISIS WERE LARGE, MEDIUM RANGE

AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

TIPPED BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THESE ARE MISSILES THAT CAN

FLY TO THE UNITED STATES,

HIT TEXAS AND NEW YORK CITY

AND A WIDE RANGE OF U.S.

TARGETS.

>> THE CIA DISCOVERED THE

MISSILES, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY

WAS BRIEFED.

>> THE PRESIDENT ASKED BUNDY,

I'M TOLD, YOU KNOW,

"HOW MANY DAYS DO WE HAVE BEFORE

THIS BECOMES PUBLIC?"

AND BUNDY SAID,

"MAYBE A WEEK."

>> WE WERE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE

OF POLITICAL ELECTION IN OCTOBER

OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN

LOTS OF DIFFERENT WAYS.

HE ASSEMBLED, OF COURSE,

A SPECIAL GROUP THAT THEY CALLED

THE EXCOMM TO HELP HIM DEAL

WITH THIS.

>> ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,

INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE

JOINT CHIEFS, MAXWELL TAYLOR,

WHO WAS A FAVORITE OF KENNEDY'S,

FAVORED A MILITARY HIT ON THOSE

MISSILES FOLLOWED BY

AN INVASION.

>> GENERAL LEMAY'S ATTITUDE WAS,

"I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS,

I'LL BOMB THE HELL OUT OF THEM."

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

AND THEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF

OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

>> ON REFLECTION, AND HE HAD A

FEW DAYS TO REFLECT, HE THOUGHT,

"WELL, A WISER COURSE OF ACTION

WILL BE TO IMPOSE SOME KIND

OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CUBA

TO PREVENT MORE MISSILES FROM

REACHING THE ISLAND."

>> HE DECIDES TO FORGO VIOLENCE,

KNOWING THAT IF HE NEEDS TO

LATER ON, HE CAN INVADE CUBA,

AND ADOPT AN INTERIM STEP

OF QUARANTINE, WHICH BUYS TIME

FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH

THE SOVIET UNION.

>> WHEN CURTIS LEMAY HEARD THAT

KENNEDY WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK

CUBA IMMEDIATELY,

HE WAS FURIOUS AND COMPARED THIS

TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENT

OF HITLER AT MUNICH.

>> AND LEMAY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT

THAT WAS ABOUT BECAUSE

JFK'S FATHER, OF COURSE,

WAS A GREAT SUPPORTER

OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND

BELIEVED IN TRYING TO

DEAL WITH HITLER.

>> CURTIS LEMAY,

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE

SAYS TO THE PRESIDENT,

"YOU'RE IN A BIG FIX,

MR. PRESIDENT," AND KENNEDY

IS TAKEN ABACK AND HE SAID,

"WHAT, WHAT DID YOU SAY?

AND LEMAY SAID,

"YOU'RE IN A BAD FIX!"

>> AND THE PRESIDENT SAID,

"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IT

WITH ME."

>> KENNEDY WENT ON TELEVISION

ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 22,

1962 AND GAVE WHAT IS CERTAINLY

THE MOST CHILLING, FRIGHTENING

OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

TO THE NATION AND THE WORLD

THAT HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN.

>> WHEN HE CAME INTO THE ROOM,

HE WAS DELIBERATE, COOL.

I THOUGHT HE WAS NERVOUS.

BUT ONCE THE RED LIGHT WENT ON,

KENNEDY BRACED IN THAT SEAT,

LOOKED IN THE CAMERAS,

AND HE SAID "GOOD EVENING"

TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT HE HAD TO

DO, BUT HE WAS A DIFFERENT GUY.

>> THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISED,

HAS MAINTAINED THE CLOSEST

SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET

MILITARY BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND

OF CUBA.

WITHIN THE PAST WEEK,

UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE HAS

ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT A

SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE

SITES IS NOW IN PREPARATION

ON THAT IMPRISONED ISLAND.

TO HALT THIS OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP,

A STRICT QUARANTINE ON ALL

OFFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT

UNDER SHIPMENT TO CUBA

IS BEING INITIATED.

ALL SHIPS OF ANY KIND BOUND

FOR CUBA FROM WHATEVER NATION OR

PORT, WERE THEY FOUND TO CONTAIN

CARGOS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,

BE TURNED BACK.

IT SHALL BE THE POLICY OF THIS

NATION TO REGARD ANY NUCLEAR

MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM CUBA

AGAINST ANY NATION IN THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS AN ATTACK

BY THE SOVIET UNION ON

THE UNITED STATES REQUIRING A

FULL RETALIATORY RESPONSE

UPON THE SOVIET UNION.

>> WITH BOMBERS, JET FIGHTERS,

NAVY VESSELS AND OVER A HUNDRED

THOUSAND COMBAT PERSONNEL

ASSEMBLED IN THE GULF,

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS

PUSHED FOR AN INVASION.

>> THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN

VERY SIMILAR IN SCALE TO THE

INVASION OF NORMANDY ON D-DAY

IN 1944.

>> BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW

THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL

NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE.

>> THE SOVIETS SENT TACTICAL

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT

THE CIA NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD

WERE THERE.

>> THE SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR

WEAPONS ON THE BEACH

WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN

INVASION FORCE, AND THAT COULD

HAVE BEEN EASILY THE BEGINNING

OF NUCLEAR WAR.

>> CASTRO SENT A MESSAGE TO

KHRUSHCHEV SAYING THAT

IF THE AMERICANS INVADE CUBA,

"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED

STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

>> THE TWO SUPER POWERS ARE

MARCHING ALMOST INEVITABLY

TOWARDS A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

>> THE U.S. MILITARY WAS NOT

ONLY PRIMED TO ATTACK CUBA,

THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WAS

PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR

STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION

ITSELF.

OVER 150 NUCLEAR MISSILES

AND TWELVE HUNDRED AIRPLANES

CARRYING NEARLY THREE

THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS

WERE ON STANDBY SHOULD

THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE ORDER.

WITH THE WORLD TEETERING

ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION,

BOTH KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY

WERE DETERMINED TO FIND A

WAY OUT THAT WOULD NOT INVOLVE

ARMED CONFLICT.

>> WE KNOW TODAY THAT THE CRISIS

WAS OVERCOME THROUGH A SERIES

OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED

BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

AND JOHN KENNEDY.

>> KHRUSHCHEV'S OFFER TO KENNEDY

IS AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIET

MISSILES IN CUBA FOR U.S.

MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

THIS POSES A VERY DIFFICULT

PROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BECAUSE HE'S ALREADY BEEN

ACCUSED OF WEAKNESS BY THE JOINT

CHIEFS, BY HIS REPUBLICAN

OPPONENTS.

>> HE SECRETLY HAS HIS BROTHER

INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT

ONLY PUBLICLY GUARANTEE THAT

WE WON'T BE INVADING CUBA IN THE

FUTURE, IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW

THEIR MISSILES, BUT SECRETLY

THE UNITED STATES AND JOHN

KENNEDY PLEDGES TO START TO

DISMANTLE U.S. MISSILES

IN TURKEY SO THAT KHRUSHCHEV

CAN WALK AWAY FROM THIS

FEELING THAT HE GOT

SOMETHING HE NEEDED.

>> BOBBY KENNEDY TELLS DOBRYNIN

THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT;

IT'S A MATTER OF HOURS BECAUSE

THE PRESIDENT IS COMING UNDER

PRESSURE FROM HIS SENIOR

MILITARY LEADERS TO DO

SOMETHING.

>> THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS

OFFICIALLY ENDED WITH A

BROADCAST ON SOVIET RADIO

OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

AGREEING TO JOHN KENNEDY'S

PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF A

NON-INVASION PLEDGE OF CUBA,

THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 28, 1962.

>> The Soviet government has

ordered the dismantling of

weapons in Cuba, as well as

their crating and return

to the Soviet Union.

>> KHRUSHCHEV TOOK THE

INITIATIVE TO HAVE IT BROADCAST

OVER MOSCOW RADIO IN ENGLISH,

AND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAT

FINALLY BROKE THE CRISIS.

>> AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE

CRISIS, WHEN THE SOVIETS

ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE

PULLING THEIR MISSILES OUT,

WHICH REALLY WAS A GREAT

VICTORY FOR THE WEST, KENNEDY

WISELY PUT THE WORD OUT,

"DO NOT GLOAT.

DO NOT BRAG ABOUT THIS.

DON'T TREAT THIS AS A VICTORY."

HE WAS VERY CAREFUL.

YOU NEVER RUB YOUR VICTORY

INTO YOUR OPPONENT'S FACE.

AT THE END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

CURTIS LEMAY BELLOWED,

"WE LOST, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE IN

THERE AND CLEARED THEM OUT

WITH MISSILES AND BOMBS."

>> KENNEDY'S GREATNESS IN THE

MISSILE CRISIS WAS HE THOUGHT

IN TERMS OF AVOIDING THE

POINTLESS DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF

PEOPLE, WHETHER THEY WERE

AMERICANS OR RUSSIANS.

SO IN THAT SENSE, HE HAD

A KIND OF UNIVERSAL HUMANISM.

>> THERE'S A WEIRD SCENE AT THE

END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

WHEN JACK AND BOBBY ARE TOGETHER

AND JACK KENNEDY, I GUESS

THINKING ABOUT LINCOLN

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ON THE

NIGHT OF HIS ASSASSINATION,

LINCOLN WENT TO THE THEATER,

AND JACK KENNEDY SAYS TO

BOBBY, "THIS IS THE NIGHT

I SHOULD GO TO THE THEATRE."

AND BOBBY SAYS,

"IF YOU GO, I WILL GO, TOO."

>> I THINK ANY PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS LIFE

IS AT RISK.

AND I THINK JOHN KENNEDY,

WHO HAD HIS OWN VERY PERSONAL

SENSE OF MORTALITY THROUGH

THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER,

THROUGH HIS OWN WOUNDING

IN THE WARS IN THE PACIFIC,

HAD A VERY REAL SENSE

OF THE POSSIBILITIES.

>> FOLLOWING THE CUBAN

MISSILE CRISIS,

KENNEDY HOPED TO FORGE A

NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND RESTART

TALKS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.

INFORMED THAT NORMAN COUSINS,

EDITOR OF THE SATURDAY REVIEW

AND A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

ACTIVIST, WAS HEADED

TO THE SOVIET UNION,

KENNEDY ASKED THAT HE CARRY

A PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO THE SOVIET LEADER.

>> KENNEDY DID WANT MY FATHER

TO TELL KHRUSHCHEV THAT THERE

WAS NO ONE IN THE UNITED STATES

MORE EAGER THAN HE

TO PUT ALL THESE

DIFFERENCES ASIDE.

>> KENNEDY FOUND OUT THAT

COUSINS WAS GOING TO BE IN

THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS WAS AN INSTANCE WHERE JFK

SAW AN INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE

CITIZEN WHO WAS ABLE TO BE A

GOOD BACK CHANNEL ENVOY,

AND JFK WAS INTERESTED IN

RESTARTING THE TEST BAN TREATY

TALKS WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN

BECAUSE THERE WAS A

MISCOMMUNICATION ABOUT HOW

MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS

EACH SIDE WOULD GET EACH YEAR.

>> I REMEMBER MY FATHER TELLING

US THAT KENNEDY SAID HE WAS

VERY SCARED OF THE POWER OF THE

MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES,

AND WHAT HE WAS SCARED OF IS

WHETHER THE MILITARY WOULD

SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND

UNDERMINE HIS EXECUTIVE POWER.

>> ACCOMPANYING THEIR FATHER

TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV IN THE

SOVIET UNION WERE

ANDREA AND CANDICE COUSINS.

>> KHRUSHCHEV AT THAT POINT WAS

STAYING AT THIS LOVELY RETREAT

ON THE EDGE OF THE BLACK SEA;

IT WAS SORT OF THE CAMP DAVID

OF THE SOVIET UNION.

WE CAME INTO THIS BEAUTIFUL

INDOOR/OUTDOOR ROOM WITH A

POOL, AND THERE WERE GLASS

PANELS, AND KHRUSHCHEV

PRESSED A BUTTON AND THE PANELS

FOLDED BACK.

AND THEN TO OUR SURPRISE,

HE SAYS TO MY SISTER ANDREA

AND TO ME,

"WHILE YOUR FATHER AND I

ARE TALKING,

WHY DON'T YOU TAKE A SWIM?"

>> WHILE WE WERE PADDLING AROUND

IN THE SWIMMING POOL,

MY FATHER AND KHRUSHCHEV

WERE OUT TALKING ABOUT

THE FATE OF THE WORLD BASICALLY,

AND I DON'T KNOW,

I DON'T KNOW IF WE REALLY

UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME

HOW SERIOUS, HOW ENORMOUS

THESE QUESTIONS WERE,

AND HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE.

>> WHAT KENNEDY WANTED FOR MY

FATHER TO CONVEY

TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS THAT

IT WAS TIME TO START AFRESH...

AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD GO

FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED

INTENTION OF A TEST BAN TREATY.

>> AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID,

"WE'RE WILLING TO RESTART THESE

TALKS AND GET SOMETHING GOING,

BUT THE BALL'S IN JFK'S

COURT IN TERMS OF DOING IT."

>> EVENTUALLY, THEY CAME AND GOT

US AND BROUGHT US BACK UP

TO KHRUSHCHEV'S STUDY, AND

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK OUT A GREAT

BIG COAT

AND WAS FOOLING AROUND WITH

THE COAT, SORT OF PLAYING

HIDE AND SEEK, COVERING

HIMSELF UP WITH IT AND THROWING

IT OFF AND GROWLING, AND

THEN COVERING HIMSELF UP AGAIN.

IT WAS REALLY DELIGHTFUL

THAT THIS MAN--

HE WAS UNDER SO MUCH PRESSURE,

AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY

TO PLAY AND TO BE SILLY.

>> IT WAS VERY HARD TO SQUARE

THIS PERSONAL VIEW OF HIM

WITH THE WAY HE WAS PICTURED

IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA,

YOU KNOW, POUNDING HIS SHOE

AT THE U.N.--

"WE'LL BURY YOU."

YOU KNOW, IT WAS REALLY

HARD TO SQUARE THOSE TWO THINGS.

>> SO, COUSINS COMES BACK

IN APRIL OF 1963,

VISITS THE WHITE HOUSE ON

APRIL 22 AND REPORTS TO KENNEDY

THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS INTERESTED,

BUT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS ARE

VERY SKEPTICAL AND READY

TO DENOUNCE THE U.S.

COUSINS FOLLOWS UP WITH A LETTER

TO JFK WHERE HE SUGGESTS A

SPEECH OF BREATHTAKING

IMPORTANCE EXPRESSING HIS

FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIETS,

UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY

WENT THROUGH IN THE WAR,

AND HE POINTS OUT THAT THE

SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS

GOING TO MEET IN JUNE OF

THAT YEAR, AND SAYS THAT

WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO IT.

AND, OF COURSE, JFK FORWARDS

THE LETTER ON TO TED SORENSON,

HIS CHIEF SPEECH WRITER,

AND THEY AGREE THAT SINCE JFK IS

GOING TO SPEAK AT AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY ON JUNE 10,

THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH

A SPEECH.

>> I HAVE THEREFORE CHOSEN THIS

TIME AND PLACE TO DISCUSS A

TOPIC ON WHICH IGNORANCE TOO

OFTEN ABOUNDS AND THE TRUTH TOO

RARELY PERCEIVED,

AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT

TOPIC ON EARTH, PEACE.

WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO I MEAN

AND WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO WE

SEEK?

NOT A "PAX AMERICANA,"

ENFORCED ON THE WORLD BY

AMERICAN WEAPONS OF WAR;

NOT THE PEACE OF THE GRAVE,

OR THE SECURITY OF THE SLAVE.

I AM TALKING ABOUT GENUINE

PEACE, THE KIND OF PEACE THAT

MAKES LIFE ON EARTH

WORTH LIVING.

>> CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY SPEECH WAS A BREAK

WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM

AND A BREAK WITH THE

ESTABLISHMENT, WHAT THE

ESTABLISHMENT VIEW OF

THE COLD WAR WAS AND WHETHER

OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND

LIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.

>> EVERY THOUGHTFUL CITIZEN

WHO DESPAIRS OF WAR AND WISHES

TO BRING PEACE SHOULD BEGIN BY

LOOKING INWARD BY EXAMINING HIS

OWN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE,

TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION,

TOWARDS THE COURSE

OF THE COLD WAR,

AND TOWARDS FREEDOM AND PEACE

HERE AT HOME.

FIRST, EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE

TOWARDS PEACE ITSELF.

TOO MANY OF US

THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

TOO MANY THINK IT IS

UNREAL, BUT THAT IS A DANGEROUS,

DEFEATIST BELIEF.

IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE,

THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED,

THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES

WE CANNOT CONTROL.

WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW.

OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE,

THEREFORE THEY CAN BE SOLVED

BY MAN.

>> WHEN KENNEDY DELIVERED HIS

SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,

IT PROVIDED A SIGNAL TO THE

SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THERE COULD

BE A NEW BEGINNING.

>> TO MAKE CLEAR OUR GOOD FAITH

AND SOLEMN CONVICTIONS

ON THIS MATTER,

I NOW DECLARE THAT

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT

PROPOSE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR

TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,

SO LONG AS OTHER STATES

DO NOT DO SO.

WE WILL NOT...

WE WILL NOT BE THE FIRST

TO RESUME.

SUCH A DECLARATION IS NO

SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL, BINDING

TREATY, BUT I HOPE IT WILL

HELP US ACHIEVE ONE.

>> IN SHORT, KENNEDY MADE AN

ADVANCE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,

TOWARDS THE NEED FOR MORE

DISCUSSIONS AND FOR A CLOSER

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO,

AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF

EARS, LET ME ASSURE YOU.

>> MY FATHER'S RESPECT TO THE

KENNEDY GREW THROUGH THESE

YEARS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

MY FATHER REPEATED THAT

"WE ARE VERY DIFFERENT,

WE DEFEND OUR SYSTEMS

ON THE BOTH SIDES,

THEY'RE DIFFERENT,

WE HAVE ONE IN COMMON:

WE WANT TO PREVENT THE WAR.

AND I CAN DEAL WITH THE

PRESIDENT KENNEDY."

>> I THINK THE AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY SPEECH

WAS A MILESTONE IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS--

NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.

WITH A LITTLE DIPLOMACY AND

KENNEDY'S STYLE,

HE BROUGHT KHRUSHCHEV

AROUND, AND WE HAVE A TEST

BAN TREATY TODAY.

>> MANY HAVE ARGUED THAT THE

LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

WAS KENNEDY'S GREATEST

ACCOMPLISHMENT AS PRESIDENT.

HOW THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD RANK

HAD KENNEDY LIVED AND BEEN

PERMITTED TO FULFILL HIS OTHER

FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE.

>> IN OCTOBER OF 1963,

PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE A

DECISION TO BRING THE

THEN-EXISTING U.S. FORCES

IN VIETNAM OUT OVER

A CERTAIN TIMETABLE.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION

MEMORANDUM 263

WAS A DECISION DOCUMENT

THAT BASICALLY

SUMMARIZED KENNEDY'S

APPROVAL TO BRING OUT

THE 17,000 OR SO U.S. FORCES

THAT WERE IN VIETNAM

AT THAT TIME.

THE FIRST 1,000 WOULD BE

WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF

1963, THE REMAINDER WOULD

BE OUT BY THE END OF '65.

AND THAT WAS A FORMAL

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

IT WAS THE POLICY

OF THE UNITED STATES

ON THE DAY HE DIED.

THAT'S, IN FACT, NO LONGER,

I THINK,

HISTORICALLY CONTROVERSIAL.

>> THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATION

OF THE THINKING OF JFK

ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

WAS THAT THE DAY BEFORE HE WAS

SHOT DOWN, HE HAD A CONVERSATION

WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER,

WHO WORKED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA,

MICHAEL FORRESTAL, IN WHICH

HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO

INITIATE A COMPLETE, THOROUGH

REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD

VIETNAM, AND THAT THE REVIEW

HAD TO INCLUDE OR INVOLVE THE

WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

UNITED STATES SHOULD BE THERE

AT ALL.

>> PERHAPS EVEN MORE STARTLING

THAN KENNEDY'S PLAN TO WITHDRAW

PERSONNEL FROM VIETNAM

WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE

FIDEL CASTRO IN A DIALOGUE.

>> JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS

RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE

MOST INFAMOUS ACTS OF AGGRESSION

AGAINST CUBA AND YET,

SECRETLY HE WAS,

AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,

PURSUING AN ACCOMMODATION

WITH FIDEL CASTRO.

KENNEDY'S APPROACH TO CASTRO

WAS BURIED IN SECRET DOCUMENTS

THAT WERE IN A VAULT AT THE

KENNEDY LIBRARY UNTIL I ASKED

FOR THE ENTIRE FILE,

WHICH WAS TITLED,

"CONTACTS WITH CUBAN

LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED

IN THE LATE 1990s."

COULD THE UNITED STATES

ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY

WITH CASTRO?

TOP STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES

WERE SAYING, "THE UNITED STATES

WON'T TALK TO CUBA UNLESS CUBA

THROWS THE SOVIET UNION OUT

AND PROMISES, GUARANTEES

THAT IT WILL STOP SCREWING

AROUND IN THE REST OF LATIN

AMERICA AND PROMOTING REVOLUTION

AGAINST THE U.S. INTERESTS.

AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY TOOK A

VERY DIFFERENT POSITION.

HE TOLD MCGEORGE BUNDY,

HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,

"I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BOX

FIDEL CASTRO INTO A CORNER.

I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD MAKE

PRE-CONDITIONAL DEMANDS

FOR TALKING TO HIM

THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE

TO MEET."

>> MY FATHER, HE REPEATEDLY TOLD

FIDEL CASTRO THAT,

"I TRUST KENNEDY.

I TRUST THAT HE WILL NOT INVADE

YOUR COUNTRY, AND WE HAVE

ANOTHER SIX YEARS BECAUSE

I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL

BE REELECTED."

>> WHILE U.S. EFFORTS TO

DESTABILIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S

GOVERNMENT CONTINUED,

KENNEDY WORKED THROUGH BACK

CHANNELS TO EXPLORE

THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1963,

A BREAKTHROUGH SEEMED NEAR,

AND KENNEDY SENT WORD TO CASTRO

THAT HE WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATING

AN AGREEMENT.

>> HE SENT HIS OWN EMISSARY

TO TALK TO FIDEL CASTRO,

A FRENCH JOURNALIST

NAMED JEAN DANIEL WHO HAD

COME TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER,

MET WITH THE PRESIDENT,

AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT

FOUND OUT THAT HE WAS ON

HIS WAY TO CUBA, HE BASICALLY

SENT A MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO

WITH JEAN DANIEL.

AND JEAN DANIEL WAS GIVING

THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO

ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963.

CASTRO HIMSELF WAS SAYING

THAT KENNEDY MIGHT BECOME

A HISTORIC PRESIDENT,

ONE OF THE FIRST PRESIDENTS

WHO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORLD

WAS A DIVERSE PLACE AND THAT

THE UNITED STATES COULD LIVE

WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES

PEACEFULLY.

AND SO THEY WERE TALKING

ABOUT THIS WHEN, DRAMATICALLY,

AN AIDE CAME IN AND SAID,

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES HAS BEEN SHOT."

CASTRO TURNED TO JEAN DANIEL

AND SAID,

"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION

OF PEACE."

>> MY FATHER WAS VERY NERVOUS

BECAUSE HE DIDN'T KNOW

WHO COULD DO IT.

AND THAT MEAN THAT SOME

HAWKISH AMERICANS

KILLED THE PRESIDENT WHO WANT

TO PRESERVE PEACE AND MAYBE

TOMORROW THEY WILL START

NUCLEAR WAR AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE

KILLING AMERICAN PRESIDENT,

IT IS NOT A SMALL EVENT,

SO HE WAS VERY NERVOUS.

>> ONE OF THE SADNESSES OF MY

GROWING UP WAS THAT WHEN

I WAS A BOY AND KENNEDY CAME TO

OFFICE--I WAS 10 YEARS OLD

WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT--

THERE WAS THIS GREAT BELIEF IN

PUBLIC SERVICE, IN PUBLIC LIFE

AND BY THE TIME I WAS A YOUNG

MAN BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND

WATERGATE, THAT HOPEFULNESS HAD

TURNED TO CYNICISM AND APATHY.

THAT'S A GREAT SADNESS TO ME,

AND WE'VE NEVER QUITE

OVERCOME IT.

>> THOSE WHO WERE LIVING ON THIS

PLANET AT THAT TIME HAD NEVER

EXPERIENCED A PRESIDENT BEING

ASSASSINATED, SO THIS WAS A

SHOCK BEYOND BELIEF.

IT WAS JUST...

STAGGERING, YEAH.

>> I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT

THINGS THAT KENNEDY DID FOR US

AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE

PLANET WAS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO

GO AGAINST A GROUP THAT WAS

POWERFUL AND SPEAK UP IN SPITE

OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALONE.

I THINK THAT THAT'S A--

MAYBE THE HARDEST THING

FOR A PERSON TO DO.

>> KENNEDY SAID FAMOUSLY.

"ONE MAN CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE,

AND EVERYONE SHOULD TRY."

THAT IS PROFOUNDLY TRUE.

AND IT'S NOT JUST TRUE OF

PRESIDENTS AND WITH PRESIDENTS.

IT'S TRUE OF ALL OF US,

WHEREVER WE MAY BE,

WHEREVER WE MAY BE IN LIFE.

>> THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS NOT

ONLY STILL WITH US,

BUT IT'S GREATER THAN EVER.

AND IT IS POSSIBLE

TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST IT.

BUT TAKING A STAND AGAINST IT,

AS WE KNOW FROM KENNEDY,

IS NOT JUST A DIFFICULT THING,

BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.

BUT IT MUST BE DONE ANYWAY.

*

male announcer: IN A 1964 COUP,

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED

FROM POWER BY SOVIET

CONSPIRATORS WHO CLAIMED HIS

RESIGNATION WAS DUE TO

ADVANCED AGE AND POOR HEALTH.

SOURCES IN MOSCOW LATER REVEALED

THAT BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S

DISMISSAL WAS THE HUMILIATION

OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

AND DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS

LEADERSHIP.

FORCED FROM PUBLIC LIFE,

KHRUSHCHEV'S NAME WAS OMITTED

FROM RUSSIAN HISTORY BOOKS,

AND IN 1971, THE FORMER SOVIET

LEADER WAS DENIED

A STATE FUNERAL.

>> ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED

RECORDS, IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING

HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION,

ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.

KENNEDY SENT A MEMO TO SECRETARY

OF STATE DEAN RUSK SEEKING AN

END TO THE U.S. TRAVEL BAN

TO CUBA, CALLING IT

"INCONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL

AMERICAN LIBERTIES."

TODAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A RESOLUTION

CALLING FOR AN END TO THE

ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND

FINANCIAL BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY

THE UNITED STATES ON CUBA

WAS ADOPTED BY A MARGIN OF

188 TO 3.

THIS MARKS THE 21st CONSECUTIVE

YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS

IGNORED U.N. CONDEMNATION OVER

ITS CUBAN POLICIES.

>> PENTAGON PAPERS MADE PUBLIC

TODAY REVEALED NEW DETAILS

SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS

OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS,

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLAN FOR

DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL U.S.

MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH

VIETNAM BY 1965 WAS REVERSED

BY THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER KENNEDY'S

DEATH.

>> TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

HAVE TAKEN PART IN CELEBRATIONS

TO MARK 30 YEARS SINCE THE END

OF THE VIETNAM WAR TODAY.

BY THE TIME THE UNITED STATES

WITHDREW ITS FORCES IN 1975,

THE TRAGIC CONFLICT HAD CLAIMED

THE LIVES OF SOME 60,000

AMERICANS, 1 MILLION VIETNAMESE

SOLDIERS, AND NEARLY HALF A

MILLION VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.